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THE THEODICY PROBLEM IN THE THEOLOGY OP J UK GEN MOLTluvNN
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The thesis is that a theology which takes suffering to be unjustifiable
(of which Moltmann's is the major contemporary example), which can openly
accept this situation, is potentially a very major break-through.
However, it has to be asked if it has a sustainable understanding of the
problem of evil.
Introduction: sets out briefly the traditional understanding of the
theodicy problem, and also the way in which the thesis is developed.
Chapter one looks at the manner in which theodicy can be seen as a
natural and necessary upshot of the fact that Christian belief involves
certain assertions or claims, Words, if they are to be meaningful, are
used in certain ways. Also discussed is an a-theodicist eschatological
verification position. I argue that there has to be a way in which we can
rationally affirm that the world is worthwhile.
Chapter two looks at various theodicies to see how they attempt to make
sense of.the world in its relation to the God who is wholly good, and if
they are saying things which Christians need to say - or which are
incompatible with basic Christian beliefs.
Chapter three looks at Moltmann's understanding of the theodicy question,
leading to the conclusion that there is a major and potentially deeply
problematic departure in interpretation.
Chapter four surveys, and then discusses critically, the view of
suffering in Theology of Hope.
Chapter five reviews Religion. Revolution and the Future, and Hope and
Planning, again in relation to the question of evil.
Chapter six assesses the contribution of The Crucified God to Moltmann's
understanding of suffering.
Chapter seven discusses The Trinity and The Kingdom of God likewise.
Chapter eight is a view of crucial aspects of God in Creation and the
main-stream theodicy problem.
Chapter nine looks at the idea that Moltmann's theologising may be beyond
the reach of conventional theodicy debate criteria. I hold that this is
not so. Attention then switches to D Z Phillips and his claims that
religious language cannot be subjected to classification as right or
wrong: my case being the claim that important aspects of Moltmann's
treatment of evil and God are incoherent. I disagree with Phillips.
There follows the conclusion. Whilst Moltmann brings home the need to
think with the deepest seriousness about the problems of suffering, and
appears to open up a new theological horizon on the problem of evil, he
in the end fails to show how one can legitimately escape the criteria of
the classical problem of justification.
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INTRODUCTION
Theodicy debate traditionally distinguishes two types of evil: physical,
and moral.1 The first category groups together natural afflictions:
disease, of which all kinds have been considered problematic, as much for
instance the cold which lessens alertness, often dangerous, and bringing
physical discomfort, as juvenile Monkey-pox, or the Black Death. Disease
includes all those conditions, infective, inherited, degenerative, which
are fatal, disabling or debilitating. Either chronic, episodic, or
singular. The category of physical evil embraces purposeless pain: that
which might be experienced over and above the levels and duration
necessary for warning, as say in some terminal illness (although this can
of course be defended as causally connected with that which protected in
the previous course of life); 'programmed' cell and systems decay, and
(in the view of many), the consequent universal mortality. It also
includes bodily deformities and disfigurements; accidental injuries; the
physical pain/human anguish and/or animal and environmental dislocation
caused by earthquake, landslide, hurricane, drought, mass extinction,
volcanic eruption, and similar events. The human population
'explosion', with all its potentially destructive consequences, might
perhaps be classed under this heading, as a complex natural 'trap' into
which a species may fall. Then there is that physical suffering with its
origins in evil human action: for Plantinga this is moral evil, but it
can also be considered physical. In Plantinga's qualified definition,
"[moral evil] roughly, is the evil which results from human choice or
volition;... [physical evil] is that which does not" (GAOM pl32). I think
both positions have something to recommend them. It can be argued that
pain of extended duration (as say unrelated to possibilities for
eliminating the cause of that pain, as with a fatal wound), even if
resulting from human action, raises the problem of physical evil,
suffering, as much as it does that of free will directed towards evil -
thus this is simultaneously a question of God's moral status, and whether
he can be held to exist, as much as it one of wrong and injurious action.
For one might argue that it was within God's power to create a world
where there were sentient and insentient beings and where neither kind
relied on a sensitivity to external stimuli which could involve
unjustifiable agony: that a world where such stimuli are possible, and
frequently occur, is a dangerous and cruel world. That God had it at
his disposal to create a world which was otherwise; and so on.
Additionally included in this first category - physical evil - would be
the pain inflicted by predation in 'insentient' animal existence, and
the suffering of 'insentient* creatures in sustaining the success of the
imago dei. For various reasons this could be considered as physical evil
(i.e. involving physical suffering, but out of necessity), or both
physical and moral evil (i.e. involving physical suffering dependent on
moral evil: many human beings have the option not to eat creatures for
instance, although this responsibility is mitigated by cultural pressures
rooted in past necessity). Most importantly, in both instances, moral
evil could arguably be predicated of God, given the crucial belief that
God is wholly good - where this is held to imply that God only permits
the possibility of such evils as are ultimately/overall something it
will be better to have had, than not to have had, through connection with
worthwhile goods, and where we believe that such a justification cannot
be forwarded. Of course, the moment such accrual was perceived, one would
be led to conclude that God, wholly good, does not exist.
The second key category, moral evil, encompasses wrong acts consciously
done; those stemming from culpable or human ignorance; or from sincerely
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held but mistaken beliefs, or the right not being done (additionally,
arising from experience and/or consciousness of both physical and moral
evil, their so afflicting others and self, there is what has been
termed in a special sense, 'suffering', involving an anguish of being
(see G Wallace Philosophy 46, 1971 p349-51).
Together, the constituents of the two classes of evil comprise the basis
for a Christian evaluation of the world as radically disordered, or, from
the atheist's point of view, as not ordered to coincide with what would be
logically expected of the creative work of the Christian God. That is,
the latter group see a world in which suffering (in the generally used
sense of all the creaturely experience of both moral and physical evil),
of many kinds, but crucially, of unjustifiable degree, is present.
Clearly, dis-integrative and destructive experience has been seen as
having profound implications when it is held that a perfectly good and
loving God exists; a creator, omnipotent, omniscient, and free.
The difficulties fe.lt over a long period have crystallised in a range of
arguments dealing with the so-called ' problem of evil'. This is a problem
traditionally stated in terms of a prima facie contradiction, though this
contradiction is generally regarded as not arising immediately from the
juxtaposition of the two propositions, there is a God, omnipotent and
perfectly good, and there is evil, but as requiring a third proposition.
It is this alone which can provide the explicit logical link between
evil, and divine power and goodness, and which could arguably secure a
logical contradiction (Ahern, Mackie, McCloskey, Plantinga). 2 Thus J L
Mackie holds:
It is true that there is no explicit contradiction between the
statements that there is an omnipotent and wholly good god and that
there is evil. But if we add the at least initially plausible
premisses that good is opposed to evil in such a way that a being
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who is wholly good eliminates evil as far as he can, and that there
are no limits to that an omnipotent being can do, then we do have a
contradiction." (MT pi50)
There have of course been various attempts to establish fatal
contradiction, incompatibility, on the basis of such 'additional'
premisses, but whether or not success can be rightly claimed in any
particular case will not be a concern of this study.
Demonstration of the compatibility of such premisses perceived as
implicit in theism (like those above), with evil as it exists; of the
non-problematic nature of the entailments in regard to the permitting or
prevention of evil, is the traditionally understood achievement of the
theodicist. Typically, examination of the problem by those of whom the
latter group is comprised, has led to the conclusion that there is only
prima facie contradiction; evil is compatible with divine goodness, and
is in fact enabling or correlative of otherwise unobtainable, necessary
and justificatory second-order goods (that is, if they have not been
led to the more modest, but still important conclusion that a succesful
theodicy is a possibility not yet disproved, or to reject the possibility
of theodicy).
Thus the problem as debated by atheists and theodicists can be said to be
that of a threatened logical contradiction, between the nature of the
theistic God, what is implicit in it as regards evil, and the existence
of evil(s). This understanding of the issues is present in its settings
by Epicurus, Augustine, and Aquinas, and others. It is interesting to
look at some of the most pointed and concise statements of the problem.
That of Epicurus (341-270BC), is regarded as the earliest:
"God either wishes to take away evils and is unable; or He is able,
and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able; or He is both
willing and able. If He is willing and unable, He is feeble, which is
not in accordance with the character of God; if he is able and
4
unwilling He is malicious which is equally at variance with God; if He
is neither willing nor able, He is both willing and able, which is
alone suitable to God, from what source then are evils? or why does
he not remove them?" (cited by Lactantius, 'On The Anger of God',
chapter 13: WANF, vol. 8)
In the Confessions. Augustine asks:
"Where then does evil come from, if God made all things and, because
he is good, made them good too? It is true that he is the supreme
Good, that he is himself a greater Good than these lesser goods which
he created. But the Creator and all his creation are both good.
Where then does evil come from?" (Confessions, trans. Pine-Coffin,
Penguin, 1961: pl38 - Bk.7, Ch.5)
Aquinas suggested:
"1. It seems that there is no God. For if, of two actually exclusive
things, one were to exist without limit, the other would cease to
exist. But by the word 'God' is implied some limitless good. If God
then existed, nobody would ever encounter evil. But evil is
encountered in the world. God therefore does not exist." (Summa
Theologiae. I, Q2, Art.3, obj. 1.)
Hume, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (PtX p198, BMEP 1980)
states:
"EPICURUS'S old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent
evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing?
then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is
evil?"
Among recent commentators, the problem was presented by J L Mackie on the
lines that:
"God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; yet evil exists. There seems
to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if
any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same
time all three are essential parts of most theological positions."
('Evil and Omnipotence', Mind 1955, 64, p200>
M B Ahern describes classic statements such as these as embodying the
'general' problem: is any evil compatible with the existence of a wholly
good God? (PE p2ff) He would wish to distinguish this problem from that
concerned with the question of the justification of the particular evils
we see around us. Ahern is right, insofar as none of the above posings of
the question refers to anything other than an abstract conflict of divine
goodness and 'evil'. Howver, for most who are involved in the theodicy
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debate, this prima-facie contradiction is the stepping stone to a
different kind of discussion. Statements such as "where then does evil
come from?", or "why does he not remove them [evils]?", are the cue for a
whole range of arguments on justification and proportionality of goods
and evils. As Ahern himself concludes after a discussion of the 'general'
problem: "The notion 'good' does not itself entail that whatever
instantiates it could not logically supppose either moral or non-moral
evil, or that the good could not be proportionate to the evil. If this is
true, there seems to be no way of showing that the conditions [for some
evil being justified] could never be met" (PE p31). Ahern's discussion
of the issue is concise. Could it be true that evil is sometimes
justified by good? In human life and conduct we generally accept that
this can be the case. He offers the following summary of human conditions
of justification, stating first what cannot, arguably, be justified:
"(1) Causing evil, either directly or indirectly, disproportionate to
the good sought.
(2) Directly causing moral evil.
(3) Causing evil, either directly or indirectly, when the good sought
could be achieved by the agent without the evil" (PE p29).
Then there is that which can in 'certain conditions' be argued to be
justified in its relation to good:
"(1) Directly causing non-moral evil.
(2) Not preventing foreseen moral or non-moral evil" (ibid).
And evil can be justified when the following conditions are met,
subjective intention also being taken into account:
"(1) What is done is designed to produce good proportionate to the
evil.
(2) The good cannot be achieved without the evil, in any way
possible for the agent.
In some cases a third condition is required:
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(3) The agent has at least the tacit consent of the person who
suffers the evil" (ibid).
God is of course a case with special terms. For God, all is possible
which is logically possible and compatible with his being wholly good.
Taking Ahern's conditions (1) and (2) above, we would have to say of God
and evil, that the necessarily ". . . proportionate good could not be
achieved without the evil, in any way that is logically possible for a
being of unlimited power" (PE p30). As to the third condition, we could
argue that God as creator has a special relationship to human beings,
analogous to that between parents and children, and if the first two
conditions could conceivably be met, then for the general problem, we
would have shown that it is the case that some evil could be compatible
with the existence of a wholly good God. Interestingly, the way in which
the general problem is met shows (arguably), how transitory any simple
and absolute opposition of good and evil will be once we start to
investigate the the kinds of additional premisses needed to establish the
fallaciousness of the compatibility of God and evil.3 Further, the kinds
of argument Ahern gives here are central to theodicy as it deals with the
specific evils that exist around us. So a probable majority of those
involved with the theodicy debate have ended in taking the abstract
question as the starting point for a more complex discussion concerning
the justifiability of kinds and degrees of evil. For so long as it is
accepted that some evil could be justified, or that it can never be shown
that any evil is incompatible with the existence of a wholly good creator
God, then discussion moves on to look at whether or not specific evils of
which we have experience, or can imagine, can be justified.
Qualifying God's goodness and responsibility beyond certain limits, is
not, I will argue, an acceptable option for theology. For instance, we
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may say God is as good as it is possible to be, or that certain
responsibilities for the world devolve upon us. To say that God is not
wholly good, or that God's ultimate moral responsibilities have to be
qualified because of say, forgetfulness, is contradictory of beliefs at
the core of Christianity. Because of the wish to affirm that God is
wholly good, the pressures which rise from the idea that evil not be
understood to be unintelligible, incompatible with God's perfect
goodness, wisdom, and freedom, lead to an alternative of instrurnentalisra
and justifiability, or a radical dualism. Generally it is held that the
former option, justification, theodicy, is the only one which can yield a
coherent response to the problem of evil: evil perceived as never God's
final wish for creation, and as at the same time permitted by an
omnipotent or potent, omniscient, and wholly good creator of all. This
issue of inter-relationship is at the heart of the debate on the problem
of evil. It is arguable that evil, abstracted from the complex and
valuable world which we seem to have, cut off from the possibility that
it is causally connected with worthwhile goods, is indeed final evidence
that the sovereign wholly good God does not exist. Why permit, create,
such evil, unless one is evil, or incompetent and flawed, or one has
never really been sovereign at all? I think that we can say that the
Christian theodicy enterprise exists because the kind of creator God
talked about is not thought to be one who permits or gives rise to
possibilities for evil and suffering for no reason, but is the supremely
moral being for whom such possibilities must have their justifications,
be causally connected with possibilities for worthwhile goods otherwise
unobtainable.
J L Mackie has argued that if we understand evil such as that it is not
opposed to perfect goodness, then we are side-stepping one set of
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problems, but entering another associated with the relation of this
special use of the term evil to its ordinary usage and meanings <MT
pl5i). This points to a major problem for theodicists, and one which
Moltmann is sensitive to. Can we still revile something, a genocide, or a
painful disease, and hold that it is a possible feature of existence
causally connected to worthwhile goods, without trivialising and
rationalising the obscene and incomprehensible? If the theodicist can
offer a picture of what it means to say that God is wholly good and
creator of the world, but finds that the world is profoundly irrational
and indeed unjustifiably wicked, then they will have to accept that
their God is not a living God, or that their application of concepts such
as goodness to God, is misguided.
John Hick has pointed out that we seem to be faced with a choice between
a problematic monism or dualism. He is concerned that an extreme monism
be avoided for imposing a harmony on reality: a harmony which disguises
the fact that evil is genuinely evil and 'utterly inimical' to the will
of God. He also believes that resorting to a strong dualism would pose
real problems for understanding the lordship and sovereignty of God. For:
"Through his prophets God uncompromisingly attacked greed, cruelty and
injustice... and in Christ He... relieved men's bodily diseases, thereby
treating natural as well as moral evil as hostile to his purpose" (EGL
p22). Yet in Hick's own thought we seem to see here a radical dualism
trying to co-exist, impossibly, with monism. That is, until we realise
that Hick's attempt to overcome the problem of compatibility involves an
integration of the possibilities for evil into a pattern of worthwhile
human life and development. Still, the desire to retain the ability to
indicate that natural and moral evils are 'hostile to God's purpose', is
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a strong one, and central for Moltmann. Tensions exist for the sensitive
theodicist such as Hick, as we shall see in chapter two.
So it can be argued that there is an important issue here in the problem
of evil. The justificatory arguments made by Christians, relating to the
world as it is, are based on the conclusion that initial oppositions
between divine goodness and evil are prima facie only, and that evil can
occur, and is possible in a divine creation, where such possibility is
towards worthwhile good otherwise unobtainable. Clearly though, theodicy
arguments have their critics and opponents. Whilst the so-called general
problem may be resolved in abstract terms, the actual evil and suffering
in the world with which theodicy mainly deals, or responds to, raises
many questions.
I think that are four broad positions with regard to theodicy. These
are: CI] atheist anti-theodicist (that of critics who offer arguments
against theodicists, and for the incompatibility of God and world evil);
C 2] theodicist; and C 3] what I shall call Christian atheodicist, (such
as Ahern). Then there is C41 Moltmann, with whose difficult and
intriguing position I am principally concerned. The first three have, as
we shall see, the common criteria for the coherence of the Christian
idea of God that the evil that occurs be capable of justification. Yet
they are not the only options available when considering how the
relationship of evil to a perfectly good God, and the issue of
justification might be approached.
The situation can be schematized in more detail as follows (the numerals
refer to the ordering above): C13 Some evil cannot be justified by any of
the goods with which its existence may be causally connected: all would
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need to be in fact so justifiable, i.e., first order evil through causal
connection with possibilities for second order goods, if God, wholly good
and omnipotent, creator out of nothing, were to exist; C 23 All evil is
justifiable, and must be, if God, wholly good and omnipotent exists. It
has not yet been shown that such a justifiability of evil is impossible.
[33 All the evil that exists, or will exist, should be justifiable if
God wholly good and omnipotent is to exist, but we cannot as yet say if
this is logically possible/impossible - only eschatological verification
is available. [4/ A] All evil can be justified - i. e, is compatible with
the existence of a God who is perfectly good; who permits or performs
only those things which are in the end better to have been created and
enacted. Those which are worthwhile, or not so evil as to indelibly
compromise the worthwhile. In this schema it is given that God has
foresight, and that evils are causally connected with, and necessary
possibilities of, the set of affairs which makes what is good possible
itself. Up to this point this is clearly a theodicist stance, predicated
on the fundamental nature of the theodicy problem. Crucially, the
question of righteousness implies certain beliefs about God which set up
an at least prima facie contradiction when the suffering of creation is
considered. So, if all evil can be justified, this is as it should be if
God, wholly good and omnipotent, or however powerful he may be exists,
and is righteous.
<4/ B) Yet, and this will by normal standards be a case of self-
contradiction, all evil cannot be justified, and it should not be for
God's sake, given his righteousness and perfection, and for the sake of
those who suffered, and whose innocent suffering can never be compensated
for. I will explain my reason for setting out this strange juxaposition
below.
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First, and quite simply, I will argue this is how Moltmann approaches the
theodicy question. It is certainly what is implicit in his stance. The
question only exists because of certain beliefs about God, and certain
problematic features of his creation. Moltmann, as I will attempt to
show, thinks that some evils are unjustifiable, and should not be
justified, and holds that God is just. This is what gives us our
disconcerting juxtaposition. What does his stance imply? Does it imply
that he supports the atheist anti-theodicist in understanding the logic
of the justificatory criteria, and understanding that there is evil which
cannot be reconciled with God's existence? An evil whose existence is an
eternal injustice, which cannot be absorbed by connection with some
second order good, or by a causal connection with that which makes
possible second order goods? Does he then succesfully abandon or by-pass
the justice model which makes such assessments possible? Are the criteria
of injustice flexible enough to allow one to continue, and to talk about
the God who is just? Or does its shadow hang over an entire theology,
where Moltmann talks of evil that can never be come to terms with? And if
it does, is it not the case that when Moltmann says there is
unjustifiable evil, he is inescapably committed to the (seemingly)
concomitant belief that God is unjust? That is, is it not the case that
one cannot have a significant concept of justice extending to the new
creation, without having committed oneself to a thorough-going conception
of the unjust and the unjustifiable, with all the consequences? What then
is the subject of this thesis? The issue of whether or not Moltmann
holds a radical position such as described above, and how he then
develops his theology in accordance (or not), and in a way which is
coherent, or not (i. e. , given that God is wholly good, creator of the
universe...).
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There are in fact times when we do seem to be dealing with a theodicy of
sorts, an integration of evil into God's life which appears to amount to
a de facto theodicy, if we continue to believe that God is perfectly
just. There are always others when the justifiability of evil is denied.
This makes for a complex mix, and makes a study of Moltmann and the
issues he raises an exploration of some of the fundamental ingredients of
the theodicy debate. I conclude that Moltmann's position is ultimately
incoherent, with its claims for a righteous God, but one for whom the
theodicy principle is anathema. This must not be understood as a purely
gratuitous and negative critical move. The claim being contended would
if demonstrated as coherent, something we could suppose to be true,
overturn conventional thinking on the subject of the problem of evil. It
would if accepted mark one of the most important advances in this area
of thought: very probably the most important advance. It thus deserves
close attention.
In chapter one I shall begin by looking at what R Swinburne says on the
use of words. If words are to have some meanings and not others, then
there are conditions as to how we use them. The relevance of this to
theodicy should then become clear. Next we will come to J L Mackie, whose
anti-theodicy arguments are grounded on the kind of understanding of
meaning and entailments portrayed so clearly by Swinburne. They are the
kinds of argument which stimulate theodicy response, and for apparently
good reason. That is, they are arguments which suggest why it is
dangerous for Christians to leave theodicy aside. The chapter concludes
with a look at M B Ahern, to see how his Christian a-theodicy can be
called into question, and what implications this might have for how we
look at Moltrnann.
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The second chapter opens with a discussion of key theistic attributes. It
has to be seen in some further detail why critics like J L Mackie are
pursuing arguably real, and not phantasmal problems of Christian belief.
What is implied in the conventional attributes, vis a vis theodicy? How
far are the attributes 'flexible', and what happens if we jettison one or
other of them? I then look at a number of theodicy options, asking if
they present immoral cases which are blatantly incompatible with the core
elements of Christian belief. I conclude by arguing that apparently they
do not.
Chapter three is a general survey of Moltmann's thinking on the problem
of evil and the issues of theodicy. It precedes a detailed examination of
the major Moltmann texts. In each chapter there is an account of the
overall development of the text, although with emphasis on the problems
of suffering, followed by, or inter-leaved with, a more concentrated
discussion on theodicy questions. Chapters four, five, six, seven, and
eight follow this pattern. In chapter nine I look at questions of the
openness of Moltmann's theology to critical evaluation such as is usual
in the field of theodicy debate. The conclusion follows.
The basis of theodicy's concern with justifiability can be set out in
the form that God is coherently supposed to be p (omnipotent/potent,
omniscient or prescient, supremely wise and perfectly good), only if q -
(where the evil that occurs is arguably compatible, or at least not
demonstrably incompatible with these attributes). Seeing what is implied
in the attributes, what the conditions in 'only if q' are, and why, then
looking to see how, and for what reasons, Moltmann's view of theodicy,
the righteousness of God, and the injustices done to the sufferer, fares
ill or well in respect of its dismissal of this criteria (allowing us, or
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failing to allow us to maintain that his picture of God is one we could
suppose to be true), is the aim of this study. Is it possible that
Swinburne, Mackie, Ahern, and others, are wrong in their arguments for
what a coherent God-concept implies? Moltmann's work may be either
breaking new ground succesfully and without major problems, or failing
in certain key respects to escape already well-established areas of
difficulty. The particular strengths and weaknesses revealed will point
as to how a re-formulation of Moltmann's theology could be gone about. I
will not though attempt a detailed re-structuring; the kinds of changes
which I would like to see should become evident in the discussion, and I
would hope clearly so.
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CHAPTER ONE
As an example of the way in which theodicy can begin to be seen as a
natural and indeed logical upshot of the fact that traditional and
contemporary Christian belief involves certain assertions or claims about
God and the world (which are held to be consistent with each other), I
have chosen to begin with Richard Swinburne's concise account of the
limits to the theological uses of language (see The Coherence of Theism
p50ff). In his case it is held that God in Christian faith is
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good, and that the evil that there
is in the world is compatible with the existence of such a God. At this
stage I do not want to discuss the implications of the attributes
themselves in any detail, but the way in which they come to have these
implications. The attributes, with I believe, perfect goodness as
inescapably paramount for the problem of evil, seem unavoidably to
generate the need for a justificatory account of evil through the
meaning they carry, and the way in which this appears prima facie
incompatible with so much of what happens in the world. How is such
meaning established? Meaning is given by circumscription, and words,
if they are to mean some things, must not mean others. It is for these
kinds of reasons that, once their sense has been agreed upon, ideas of
power, responsibility, freedom, perfect goodness, and supreme wisdom or
prescience, have, at least in conventional usages, tended to sustain the
significant problem when suffering and the existence of God is
considered.
Here, it is not the range of possible theodicies that is the subject of
discussion, but some of the underlying reasons for the necessity of
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embarking upon justificatory theodicy at all. In due course the
theodicy that Swinburne has developed will be looked at.
Dealing with the problem of evil in his paper for the symposium 'Reason
and Religion' (Reason and Religion. pSlff), Swinburne starts with a
definition:
"God is... omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. By 'omniscient' I
understand 'one who knows all true propositions.' By 'omnipotent' I
understand 'able to do anything logically possible.' By 'perfectly
good' I understand 'one who does no morally bad action', and I include
among actions omissions to perform some action." (ibid)
On the basis of these attributes he goes on to give a brief outline of
the problem of evil, which we will come to later. In his book The
Coherence of Theism. Swinburne provides a quite detailed discussion of
divine attributes. I shall touch upon his treatment of these in chapter
two. He also discusses such related issues as what constitutes a
statement; why credal sentences are statements; and what is a coherent
statement. It is these topics which are looked at below. As we shall see,
the problem of evil arises because words have their life in language, and
language has rules which give words, and conjunctions of words such as
"wholly-" or "perfectly-" "good", certain possibilities regulated by
syntactic and semantic factors. It is on this basis that Swinburne and
others have come to understand that the God who is wholly good is not one
who permits ultimately unjustifiable evils.
In The Coherence of Theism. Swinburne is most concerned with the
question of what it means that a God exists: if it makes no sense t-o
suppose that he exists, questions of establishing existence are
redundant. Swinburne is sure most people would accept that the concepts
of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness, are coherent, or are
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concepts which could be coherently formulated. The sense in which they
could be coherent, where we could think of them as being true, can be
established through their articulation in language, language not of an
overly-stretched analogical type that prevents reasonable proof of
coherence being arrived at (see below). But are credal statements such as
God is perfect love, claims, statements which we could require to be
coherent?
There are a number of conditions for the coherence of statements.
Swinburne holds that statements are sentences, strings of words, of a
certain kind. Not only are these sentences grammatical, if they are to be
meaningful they are also composed of meaningful words. They are as
statements, meaningful indicative sentences of the kind that usually make
a claim (CT pll). Some meaningful indicative sentences may be
performatory, as in "I owe you £10" (this can of course be seen as a
claim). Again, others, of the important kind "Capital punishment is
wrong", have been thought to make no claim, but simply to convey
disapproval. Swinburne on the other hand, thinks a statement of this kind
may do this, and may lead people to campaign against capital punishment -
but that it will do so in addition to making a claim. He holds that a
claim/statement, "unlike anything else expressed by a sentence, is true
or false. Commands, questions, or performative utterances are not true or
false" (ibid pl2). And he argues that not only sentences such as
"Capital punishment is wrong" are claims, but credal sentences too. Thus
credal sentences are claims about the way things are. People use them in
referring to a reality, not simply to express how they feel; nor in some
special religious sense where theology "makes no claims about the past
history of men or the future experiences of any individual; and no claims
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about any supra-sensible reality which explains the observable world"
(ibid p91). It is said:
"Certainly God's love may not be quite like human love, and theists
may only use the word 'love' because it is the word nearest in
meaning to the word which they would like to use but have not got.
But if God's 'love' is not similar to the love of a person, shown by
care for well-being, readiness to forgive faults, etc. etc., why talk
of love?" (ibid p93)
It is with these words that Swinburne finally rejects D Z Phillips
attitudinal approach to theological statements (see esp. p90ff. I shall
discuss D Z Phillips in chapter nine, along with the background to
Swinburne's criticism). Swinburne argues that: "the vast majority of
those who have used religious language have certainly treated the
affirmation that God created the world as the confident propounding of a
hypothesis explaining its existence." And that "This can be seen by the
fact that they have abandoned their faith if they have come to believe
that 'matter alone exists' or there is nothing beyond the Universe and
the people in it' or some such claim" (ibid p92). Swinburne's contention
that credal sentences make claims, or that certain credal sentences will
have to be seen to do so, if traditional belief is to continue, is, I
believe, one that would be widely accepted.1
Statements making a claim can be coherent or incoherent. That is, there
are those we can conceive of, along with any statements entailed, as
being true, and those which we cannot (and a Christian credal utterance
is one we would expect to be true). There are some basic procedures for
establishing the coherence of a statement. Tests on freedom from self-
contradiction/the illogicality of the denial of an entailment. Thus, for
instance, "a statement p entails another statement q if and only if p
and negation of q are inconsistent" (ibid pl3). A standard example of
this is "all men are mortal" entailing that all Englishmen are mortal.
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It is clearly inconsistent to hold that if the former is true, then some
Englishmen are not mortal. Hence: "If a statement p entails another
statement q, then a man who asserts that p is commited also to the claim
that q; the claim that q lies buried within the claim that p. " (ibid: of
perfect goodness one could thus argue for the entailment that God never
performs any morally bad actions). A statement and its entailments may be
coherent (logically possible), even if it is false. However, it cannot
make sense to say of an incoherent statement that it might be true (it is
with this threat in mind that we can argue that accepting that God is
perfectly good and just, and performs, or permits, or enables inalienably
evil choices or happenings which are unjustifiable, is to commit oneself
to an intellectually untenable position). It can also be added that
clearly self-contradictory statements are by nature incoherent, although
not all incoherent statements are blatantly self-contradictory (i.e, they
do not explicitly say something is so, and, it is not so). If then we
take a coherent statement to be one that it makes sense to suppose might
be true, are there formal criteria of proof of coherence? Swinburne
discusses this in chapter three of The Coherence of Theism.
Detailed consideration is given to this issue of the proof or disproofs
of coherence (CT p30ff). One fundamental point is that the coherence of
a statement cannot be grounded on whether or not its entailments are
coherent (there are an infinite number of entailments which are not
incoherent even if the statement is, i.e., a square has five sides is
incoherent - but this entails that some squares have sides, which is
coherent). One can turn to the proof of showing that statement p is
already entailed by r, where r is a coherent statement. Deductive proof
from r to p offers a way of approaching agreed grounds for coherence -
although the assumption has to be made, or if necessary clarified through
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reference to further propositions (only perhaps) finally mutually agreed
as themselves coherent, that r itself is coherent. Or some other
proposition from which p is arguably entailed might be tried (ibid p39).
Swinburne's discussion of the theological use of words is clear. It
demonstrates that use of such terms as omnipotence and perfect goodness,
if they are to be made sense of at all (and it seems they can be - see
chapter two), must not involve stretching language to the point where
or
it is useless to think of what it might be for them to be true,A fatally
compromise attempts to understand what their entailments would be. What
kinds of meanings then can words have within a meaningful indicative
sentence? (CT p31) They can be used either in their normal senses, or
with a new meaning given through new syntactic and/or semantic rules
(ibid). Syntactic rules governing the use of a word may operate through
verbal definition, or description of function and/or restrictions on use.
Semantic rules indicate or coherently describe examples of objects/kinds
of objects to which a term may/may not apply, or conditions for its use
in a sentence (ibid p32). If a word is not being used in its normal
sense, it must be a word "whose meaning is explained by means of ordinary
words or observable phenomenon" (ibid). Words are meaningful if they are
used in language; they become meaningful when a use is given them by
syntactic or semantic procedures. It is held: "A word is vague if the
rules do not give clear guidance on use; a word is ambiguous if there are
two distinct sets of rules for its use" (CT p36). Will either of these
problems viciously beset ideas of omnipotence/ potence, omniscience/
prescience, and perfect goodness? This seems unlikely. There are for
instance arguably clear parameters as to how perfect goodness could be
understood: clear enough to make theodicy an apparently inescapable
obligation (see chapter two).
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Swinburne first looks at words used in their ordinary sense. In talk
about God, the theologian will recognise that words retaining their
normal sense are used in a way in which the ordinary properties denoted
are "manifested in unusual combinations and circumstances and to unusual
degrees" (CT p51). There are limits to whether all properties can be
coherently posited to co-exist, nor are all properties to be conceived of
as existing to any degree. Still, whilst maintaining that good is used
theologically in its normal sense, Swinburne will not deny that 'good'
said of God and of Florence Nightingale is something widely different.
However, it is not used in a ' new' or analogical sense.
Using words in a new sense (CT p54f), will not imply, if our statements
are still to be meaningful, that they are given entirely new senses. For
"There is more in common between 'wisdom' attributed to God and 'wisdom'
attributed to man, than there is between 'wisdom' attributed to God and
'folly' or 'weighing ten stone' to man" (CT p55>. As has been stated,
such new senses require amendment of the syntactical and/or semantic
rules applying to old words. Swinburne rejects two suggestions as to the
way in which such new senses are provided. First, the private and
peculiar experience of the believer (most believers do not have such
peculiar experiences as require/demand radically new senses), and
secondly, the believer giving public examples of new applications: "The
theist never gives you any other public examples of 'persons' other than
those which we would normally call 'persons', of 'good' deeds other than
those which we would normally call 'good'" (CT p57). When applied to God
though, words such as ' person' are being used in a ' wider' sense than
before. The meaning is 'loosened' or 'extended.' The semantic rules say
for a property W may be changed to allow the new sense 'W' to apply to a
wider range of phenomenon. Thus:
"an object is correctly called 'W' if it resembles the standard
examples of W objects in the respect in which they resemble each
other, either as much as they resemble each other or more than it
resembles standard examples of objects which are not W." (CT p58)
However, in this case syntactic rules also require modification (rules of
the kind that a loud noise cannot be soft) if the new use is not to be
over-tied to the relations of the old use. That is, say that an object is
a ' W', and if so an ' X' - and if 'X', either ' Y* or 'not - Z. ' If the
semantic rules (relating to standard examples) for ' Y" and 'not - Z' are
not changed, and neither are the syntactic rules for 'VI', then: "although
the new semantic rules for ' W' might by themselves allow various objects
rightly to be called 'VI' which were not so called before, nevertheless by
the semantic rules for ' Y' and 'Z' those objects might count as 'Z and
not - Y'" (CT p59). What is new that is let in by the change in semantic
rules for 'VI', may be excluded by unchanged syntactic ones, and so on.
The process can be complex. The more rules are modified, the more widely
a term can be applied. Thus sentences previously incoherent may become
coherent. The opposite may also be the case (CT p61 - and for a term to
have coherence the original sense should have been applicable to some
object, and the new one not be applicable to all). With these analogical
senses, proofs of coherence or incoherence are difficult to obtain, for
if one loosens the syntactic rule it is harder to deduce a specific
conclusion from, as Swinburne puts it: "... a statement expressed by a
sentence which contains the word, or to deduce from some other statement
a statement expressed by a sentence containing this word" (CT p61). With
loosened semantic rules, if one says something is rightly termed ' W'
despite its not resembling standard objects to the extent that they
resemble each other, but resembling them more than it does other objects
non-'W', then it is difficult to know what an object or property VI of
which we have no experience might be. It might be coherent to say of such
an object or property that it can be both W and P, or that W excludes P.
To establish coherence of a statement we need to refer to some other
coherent statement ~ but if the links between standard examples and ' W'
are loose, and in fact ' W' is greatly dissimilar, then "it becomes
unclear what suppositions about things which are W* (viz. things
correctly called ' W' in the new use of this term) are evidently coherent"
<CT p62). Thus it can be highly problematic if we resort frequently to
analogical language and loosen the rules beyond certain limits. 3
Swinburne attempts to show which aspects of theism can be regarded as
describable using only ordinary senses of words (as in 'good' where it is
used of God in an ordinary sense, although 'good' of a degree not found
in 'mundane' objects), and which, if they are to be coherent, in an
analogical sense (i.e., that God is a person).3 I shall not follow this
discussion, and I leave Swinburne's follow up to his thinking on the
theological use of language - his outline theodicy, and to a lesser
extent, his handling of the attributes, until chapter two. It remains to
say that his account of this aspect of the use of words is one with
which I agree.
We have seen what Swinburne understands as the basic conditions for
meaningful use of language, and that he thinks credal utterances are
statements making claims. We move now to look at some of the arguments
on the problem of evil forwarded by J L Mackie. Mackie is an example of
the way in which atheist anti-theodicists typically argue very much from
the philosophical basis of the theodicy problem. The kinds of arguments
which he advances are not new, but they are presented with clarity, and
even apparently slight refinements may be very significant. In the
introduction I attempted to outline why there was a 'problem of evil'. It
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seemed to rest on fundamental tenets of belief being in prima facie
conflict (i.e. , there is a wholly good God; the world is marked by great
suffering: how can these appparently opposing, indeed incompatible
factors be reconciled?). In fact J L Mackie's arguments represent the
type of critical case being made on fairly widespread readings of what is
involved in Christian belief, and on how we can go about resolving such
issues. The way in which he views theological/philosophical concepts in
his critique of theodicy defences, is based on the idea that we cannot
dilute the meaning (and so loosen the entailments), of our terms beyond
certain limits. We can see what Swinburne has described, applied, or
'in the flesh', and as as it relates to our problem. Even before
looking in any detail at the attributes and their implications, it is
evident that meaning and coherence have an apparently central place in
talk of God, goodness, and evil. I do not intend to argue over whether or
not Mackie's case is definitive evidence of incoherence in Christian
belief. We could say he shows that certain kinds of belief held by
Christians are incoherent. He did not make a claim to have shown
ultimate incoherence in Christian belief, and my interest here lies more
in the kinds of argument that are used, and why.
I have already given one of Mackie's formulations of the problem of
evil. He thinks it a problem which at least seems to show that
traditional theism is 'positively irrational' in that some of the pivotal
doctrines are inconsistent as a set <MT pl50). It is, he argues, a
logical problem, not to be solved by practical action, or by
discoveries of the kind we might hope for in science. Thus the theodicy
of a necessary contrast good/evil (i.e. good requires evil in order to be
seen as good) can be refuted by clear steps. If a property is truly
universal it is possible that it might not be picked out in any language
by a predicate, rather less plausibly, it might not even be noticed. But
it is not plausible that if nothing lacked a certain property, then that
property would cease to exist. And even if we grant the principle of
contrast or necessary counterpart, why need evil be present in more than
the logically necessary minute quantities? Of course, we might want to
question Mackie's argument here. We could say that all sentient
creatures, for instance, express a particular kind of goodness. They are
free in some important and worthwhile way. They are free to choose other
than the good, and they do.
Of more direct interest for mainstream justificatory theodicy are the
three arguments advanced on ppi52-156 of The Miracle of Theism. These are
as follows. First, we can help justify evil by saying that it is a
necessary means to the good. This seems reasonable, since human agents
tend to think that they learn from their mistakes, and so improve.
Likewise animals suffer pain, but pain helps protect and warn; and where
pain does not fulfill these functions it is usually causally connected
with that which is 'beneficial'. Yet Mackie rejects this as a theodicy
argument. It is, he claims, irrelevant, applying only to beings limited
by "independently existing causal laws". We put up with evil for the sake
of the good that comes from it. However, God is not such an agent. As
omnipotent, God should have power over causal laws; he made them. God
does not need to use means to attain an end (MT pl53>. Mackie's
conclusion may seem ovei—hasty, excluding Irenaean or free will
theodicies, and even a theology of creation, but even so, it is arguable
that even if God wants humans to develop within a certain limiting
framework, and with freedom, neither of these factors can satisfactorily
explain why there is the evil that there is: given that God is
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. For if God does employ means
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to an end, such as endowing finite agents with free will, in order that
they may freely love him and each other (or is this an end in itself?),
those means which might be compatible with his nature may be overshadowed
by realities which are not. Mackie, as will be seen, holds this position.
He now turns to a second theodicy argument; that evil may be a
"contributory factor to the good of an organic whole". This argument can
take the form of an aesthetic analogy (as in the contrasts in a piece of
music) or that of a Kantian progression towards the good, where this is
better than the goods' unalloyed sovereignty. Physical evil is the main
object of concern in this approach, and it can be argued that physical
afflictions make possible such goods as heroism, the "struggles" of
doctors, and so on. Mackie puts the argument in the following terms. If
evils be called first order evils, and happiness and pleasure first order
goods, then there are second order goods which arise out of first order
evils (where these exist as a vital component); out of an "organic
whole". First order evils are in fact logically necessary for the
existence of second order goods. Good may be the decrease of first order
evil and the increase of first order good, or, for instance, the sympathy
expressed for those who are suffering. The argument works by showing that
even if God could eliminate evils, it is not logically possible for him
to do so and obtain such second order goods. But does this really
convince? That is, are all the evils that exist, absorbed evils? Mackie
advances the plausible argument that there are surplus first order evils,
and furthermore, that there are second order evils equivalent to second
order goods (such as sympathy) - i.e., "malevolence, cruelty,
callousness", and so on. The problem remains therefore, that there are
unabsorbed evils.
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The third argument^ is perhaps the best known and most important, the
free will defence (MT ppl55ff). Mackie formulates it as unabsorbed
evils existing solely because of the bad choices of human free will.
But why give creatures a freedom they could misuse? It seems that this
free will will have to be a higher third order good which outweighs the
evil that can be its consequence, or that it at least outweighs the evils
forseeable by God when he bestowed it; or that it is logically necessary
for other third order goods. Of bad choices freely made, it could be said
that "neither they nor their effects can be ascribed to God". Still, it
needs to be maintained of such beings that the good of their freedom
outweighs their bad choices and consequent evils - such that "a god might
reasonably choose to create such beings and leave them free" (ibid).
Mackie thinks the free will defence the only one which offers hope of a
solution to the problem of evil. It has valuable characteristics; it is
the argument which allows the theist to accept that there are some
unabsorbed evils: "some items which the world would, from however broad
and ultimate a perspective, be better without (so that this is not the
best of all possible worlds). And:
"yet at the same time to detach their occurrence from God, to show
them as not having been chosen by God, who none the less seems to
have been given a reason, compatible with his complete goodness and
omnipotence, and perhaps with his omniscience too, for bringing about
the state of affairs from which they arise and for allowing them to
occur." (MT pl56)
So central does Mackie consider the free will defence that he devotes the
bulk of the rest of his dicussion to examining it. The remainder deals
with some other theodicy arguments, and I will look at these briefly
before returning to the critique of the free will defence.
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It can be said that God's good is not ours. His goodness is not
intelligible on the criteria of human goodness. But here, arguably, good
is being stripped of its meaning and has become viciously honorific. Thus
John Stuart Mill's father regarded religion as inimical to morality: God
is called good, but in description is bad - sometimes "childish", a
"petulant tyrant" or "mischievous." In fact, ascribed such motives, it
could be argued that God's omnipotence is of a kind compatible with
what would normally be termed evils. Using the argument "God's good is
not ours", is to abandon the substance of the belief that God is
omnipotent, omniscient AND wholly good (MT p56).
Another approach could be that it is wrong to minimise evil, because it
is crucial for faith (MT pl57). Thus some of the deepest believers have
emphasised the realities of evil, whilst not seeking to offer a theodicy.
However, whilst it may be true that religion depends on the existence of
evil, is this, asks Mackie, a fact which resolves the problem of its
(evils) existence? Hume's Demea argued as follows: "'This world is but a
point in comparison of eternity... The present evil phenomena, therefore,
are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of
existence. ...[my abbvtn]." (Dialogues bk X: MT ibid)) This is certainly
one way of neutralising the emphasis on evil, although not of great help
if one is trying to infer the attributes and existence of a God. s Even if
at some remote time there is a future life of incomparable bliss, this in
itself would fail to explain how those evils that have occurred have
done so in a way compatible with the central tenets of theism.
What of the suggestion that sinfulness is necessary for redemption and/or
for our realisation that we are utterly dependent on God? (MT pl58)
Mackie holds that God's omnipotence excludes the possibility that he uses
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"deplorable means" to obtain his ends. The more convincing argument he
feels, is that which says 'soberly', that sin plus repentance is better
as an organic whole than sinlessness (MT pl59). Thus of the parable of
the prodigal son, whilst he questions the likelihood that a father would
prefer a prodigal son rather than constantly good children, he thinks
this something humanly comprehensible. What is more difficult, is
accepting that such thinking can be transferred to an omniscient God (we
may also ask to what extent a figure like Hitler might fit into the type
of the prodigal).
Rolf Gruner (Theology 83 p416-?4.) has argued that evil can be
circumvented as a problem by demonstrating that it is incoherent for the
sceptic to demand a world free from evil. Mackie suggests that this is a
mis-representation. The sceptic is not making a request for a world free
from evil, but enquiring whether an "apparent inconsistency" can be cured
(MT pl59>. Whilst it is reasonable to suppose that a world, unlike God,
would be limited, and have what might been be seen as deficiencies, it is
not demonstrated that unabsorbed evils in such a world would be
compatible with God's nature. Mackie states: "Gruner clearly thinks it is
paradoxical that 'Christianity depends on the very fact which is said to
disprove it' . There is indeed a paradox here, but it lies squarely within
orthodox theism" (MT pl57).
The paradox of omnipotence6 presents an interesting problem, but although
Mackie argues that it still suggests difficulties for theism (MT p 162;
and see chapter two), he turns to the free will defence granting the
notion that it is coherent for an omnipotent God to create free
creatures, beings whose actions he cannot control. What does the defence
involve? Distinguishing physical from moral evils shows that some
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natural evils are partly the result of human wickedness such as cruelty.
However, whilst there must be something of natural evil in the provision
of opportunities and conditions for such deeds, the great majority of
natural evils are unconnected with human choice - and thus it seems that
they cannot be answered for in the free will defence. Plantinga has
argued that fallen angels are responsible, but whilst possible, it is an
arbitrary supposition which cannot give positive support (we may also
note that problems with the free will defence apply to angels as well as
to people). Mackie makes an important point; that the demarcation between
moral and natural evil is often unclear. There are, he argues, "conflict
traps":
"There are circumstances of injustice, situations in which peoples are
led to the extremes of inhumanity by steps each of which seems
reasonable or even unvoidable. These circumstances of injustice are,
therefore, an important variety of natural evils which are constantly
intertwined with moral ones." (MT pi63)
Plantinga's angels could therefore be given the discredit for more than
he has reckoned. If the free will defence is to succeed, it must cover
natural evils. Mackie argues that it does not do this, but sets this
problem aside to examine the defence in its reference to human evils
alone (MT pl64ff). Does God know beforehand, when creating people with
free will, what choices (or kinds of choices) they will make/are likely
to make? If yes, it follows (in the case of the proponent of the free
will defence), that it is better people can choose freely and sometimes
err, than that they are "innocent automata" whose actions are wholly
determined. But are these the only alternatives? For:
"If God has made men such that in their free choices they sometimes
prefer what is good and what is evil, why could he not have made
them such that they always freely choose the good?" (ibid)
It appears that there is no reason for an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly
good God not to prefer this alternative. If this is so, the theist who
rejects it, and who acknowledges that people make "bad free choices",
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is taking up an untenable position. Difficulties arise too where the
theist looks forward to heaven or a new earth. There created beings
always freely chose the good: "If such a state of affairs is coherent
enought to be the object of a reasonable hope or faith, it is hard to
explain why it does not obtain already" (ibid).
Is it incoherent to suppose that people could be such that they would
always freely choose the good?'7 Mackie thinks not. It would be incoherent
though to compel people to freely choose the good. It might be objected
that beings who would always freely choose the good would be free from
temptation and without the moral value of resisting it? Let us say that
there could be either agents of free will and an innocent inclination, or
free agents with good and bad inclinations, yet who always control such
inclinations. Whichever ideal might be chosen by the theist, in reality
neither is instantiated. What then of the logical impossibility of God's
creating people who always freely choese the good? (MT pl65) Some have
argued that freedom entails that what is done freely must on occasion not
be done. This rests on the premiss that freedom entails variation. This
is problematic if freedom is thought to be a higher good which outweighs
the evil of bad actions. If freedom "definitionally" involves variation,
then it cannot be such a higher good. For, arguably: "What special value
could there conceivably be in the variation between good and bad choices
as such?" (MT pi66) Moreover, of any notion of freedom in the free
will defence, it must not be logically impossible that "all men should
always freely choose the good; and, as we know, it is only logical
possibility that matters here" (ibid). Is it though a logical
impossibility that all persons be "such that" they always freely choose
the good? The answer to this depends on whether the compatibilist or
incornpatibilist position is held. The compatibilist sees choices stemming
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from what we are antecedently (deterrninist); that they are free from
external constraints which could make their actions dependent on that
which is other than their natures. The argument runs:
"So what a deterrninist calls free choices flow determinedly from the
nature of the agent, and it follows that if it is possible that men
should always freely choose the good, it must equally be possible
that they be such that they do so." (MT pl66)
However, if compatibilism is rejected, this last step becomes debateable.
What then of libertarian incompatibilism? What is the evidence for it,
and what might contra-causal choice be? In an interesting discussion
Mackie concludes finally that there is no conclusive evidence for freedom
from antecedent causation in choice, nor any for causal determinism <MT
pl68). Yet if actions may not be caused, how else might they be
described? They may be purely random; or random within limits; or
represent events subject only to statistical laws. But is randomness of
such a value that it outweighs the badness of bad choices? Freedom can
also be doing what one wishes, without constraint or duress; acting in a
certain way because it is valued; choosing without neurotic compulsion;
acting rationally. These freedoms are however, compatible with the
determinist position. Perhaps one of the reasons why compatibilism is
disliked is because it is suspected that "there is a real me, distinct
from the one that is believed to have a causal history" (MT pl70>. But
again, how would such an "extra-causal" self operate? Kant's idea that
the freedom of rational beings arises from their being able to function
as such without determination from external causes, together with his
argument that "we cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being
consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgements" also fails
to show how being induced to believe in the wrong kinds of way renders
the following crucial argument invalid: "a serious practical judgement
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does not need either to be or to see itself as uncaused; it needs merely
to see itself as not being improperly caused" (MT pl73).°
Here we have reached the concluding section of Mackie's discussion. The
point has been reached where it can be said that it is not logically
impossible "that men should be such that they always freely choose the
good" (MT pl72). Is it a logical possibility that God might create them
so? Yes, if he is omnipotent and omniscient. If one objects that to have
a created nature is to compromise one's freedom, then what is it for God
to leave natures to arise from nowhere? Such a freedom has an arguably
"obscure" value. If Mackie's contention be accepted, then the
of evd
conventional free will defences fail to explain presence "in a
world with a perfect creator. If free will defenders seek to
satisfactorily explain unabsorbed evils, then they have not succeeded.
Mackie concludes with a final look at the free will defence in an
adjusted form. If there is a kind of freedom in which it is valuable that
an agents choice not be antecedently caused, and even an omniscient God
cannot know what will be chosen, this places very severe limitations on
God (a God with modified omniscience). He could not foresee in 1935 the
tragic events of the next 20 years, and he knows little more than we do
about the final decades of this century. If he cannot have known what
Adam and Eve would do, he still would surely have known what they might
do (this is compatible with extreme libertarianism). In this case
he took a great risk in creating. Is the value of the freedom to make
unforeseable choices so great that it outweighs the possibility that
people might have acted more wickedly than they actually have? God has
not knowingly produced evil, but is guilty of gross negligence. Mackie
concludes that all forms of the free will defence fail (MT pl76), and
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that the only path for the theist lies in adjusting the doctrines of
theism, without giving up something central. This is not established as
impossible, even if we think it unlikely.
Mackie presents strong arguments. They are developments of those which
have had a perennial importance in theodicy debate. Crucially for us,
they are arguments founded on a certain implicit understanding of how we
use words in theology and elsewhere. Words gain meaning through
circumscription, and meaning some things, and not others, they have key
entailments. The consequence of this is that if theologians or others
dilute meaning beyond certain limits, there is loss of meaning,
entailments are vague, those with relevance to the theodicy problem say,
are impossible to secure. We cannot say what a statement means; we cannot
hold that it is coherent, something we could suppose to be true. This
would be disastrous for such beliefs as 'God is wholly good'. But in
fact, Mackie thinks that there clearly are various intelligible beliefs
in Christianity which we can test to see if they are consistent as a set
- since they have certain entailments.
By this stage it should be apparent that there is a good case for the
incoherence of a faith which, for example, abandons certain attributes:
one which might say that God is wholly righteous but not perfectly good,
or supremely wise and prescient, but not free from mistakes and
miscalculation. Such attributes as divine moral perfection are not
optional in the theodicy debate if it is to be a real one. At this point
it seems arguably self-evident that only a theism of a certain kind can
generate the theodicy problem, and that justification of evil is its only
solution. Mackie*s arguments throw light on the kinds of difficulties
facing theodicists who think that a coherent concept of perfect goodness
is central to Christianity: that it has certain entailments which include
the condition that the wholly good God only permits evil that is
ultimately justifiable. At the very least he shows, from one side of the
theodicy debate, how certain major issues are identified and seen as
needing to be addressed in specific ways. One need not accept that his
particular formulations of problems are the definitives in order to
recognise this. What is crucial is that there are vital core questions
which are seen as rational and legitimate, and apparently inescapable
minimum criteria for success in meeting them.
I now turn to M B Ahern. My interest is in his argument that the theodicy
question cannot be resolved prior to the eschaton. The relevance of this
issue, or the conclusions that can be made about it, for a study on
Moltmann, is that if it can be shown that Moltmann should modify his
position on theodicy, he will have to enter the conventional debate
fully. That is, he will not be able to say that there is a great problem
in showing how exactly evil is justifiable (even though we believe it to
be justifiable), one so difficult that we must be content to leave the
answer to God and the future.
To the arguments of Ahern (The Problem of Evil -MB Ahern, RKP 1971).
His division of labour follows the sequence: (1) The general/traditional
problem - is it true that God's existence is compatible with any evil?
(PE p22ff); (2) The specific abstract problems - is it true that God's
existence is compatible with specific evils? (PE p43ff); (3) The specific
concrete problems - is it the case that the conditions for the
compatibility between specific evils and God's existing are met with
reality? (PE p53ff) To the last he answers that he thinks it impossible
this side of an eschaton, to answer yes or no. Whether his position is
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sustainable here is the real significance of his position, vis a vis
the atheist anti-theodicists, and the possibilities for theodicists.
Fundamental is his holding that the problem of evil is one where the
issue of compatibility between God's existence and that of evil is alive
on the basis of the threat of logical incompatibility, and that the
Christian solution lies in the justification of evil. Yet more important
is this claim that this issue cannot have a pre-eschaton resolution.
Naturally, if we examine Ahern's position on delayed verification, we
find that it is hardly compatible with Moltmann, since he (Ahern) is
committed to arguing (falsely, given his own suppositions: see below)
that if God exists, then all the evil that has occurred is necessarily
justified (because of what is entailed in being wholly good: PE p75).
This attachment to justification is what binds him to Swinburne and
Mackie. But he would probably receive little support from them for his
putting the resolution of such issues beyond the reach of finite reason,
and expecting it to be logically necessary that if a 'God' exists, this
must be the perfectly good God so widely hoped for. This does not follow
at all.
It is possible to argue that God's supposed moral perfection can never be
known by beings whose reasoning is inadequate to know, concretely, what
would constitute an irredeemable evil. To say that God's existing would
be evidence that all evil is justified is to beg the question of how one
knows that the God who exists is morally perfect, omnipotent, and wholly
wise: to argue that reason would be empowered to know this, raises the
important question of the morality of a presently disempowered reason,
and of human identity. And that an empowered reason would have the
necessary understanding of this situation (yet one that is arguably
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only consistent with an infinite being), is again problematic: ultimate
chv/ine
inter-connections, as Ahern supposes, can only be made in the A mind,
and no human would claim to be like God, even as a finite immortal. Thus
he argues:
"We can know neither all of the world's evil, all of the world's good,
nor the connections, if any, between the good and evil. Hence it will
never be possible to devise a theory to justify all evil which can be
shown to be true... It is no argument against theism that it is
unable to do what cannot be done." <PE p71)
Is it then something other than reason that could help us to 'know'
tod A Will we feel or sense that God is wholly good and omnipotent,
much, in respect of perception of justice and right, as children in the
pain of the scolding, feel (wrongly) with immediacy that they are
wholly unloved? Or is it more 'rational' than that? Can it be simply
trust, and a freedom from all previous evil, from any evil at all, which
convinces: or is this inadequate? For if this state of new life were
subsequent to even necessary suffering (suffering necessary to reach this
particular reality), and its supposed justification, could we (being
irredeemably finite) ever really cease to doubt the morality of the
unique, 'wholly good' act of creation. That is, knowing the suffering of
sentient and insentient life, and that emotion in itself is incomplete as
human fulfilment; that unconditional joy for the resurrected from the
ashes of Dachau, and the lime pits of 'King Cholera', is not fully
conceivable without understanding. Humanly, the two should go together
(emotion and understanding). Further problems arise for his theodicy
case, when Ahern seems to accept that there are good philosophical
reasons for questioning the concept of life after death, but these are
not of relevance here (PE p73).
So, given the above, if the criterion of justifiable evil is accepted,
is it not mistaken to assume as Ahern does, that its actual satisfaction,
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its working, would not ever be accessible to finite beings, if such a
wholly good God existed? Would a wholly good, omniscient and omnipotent
God create contingent beings who can only know that for all the suffering
of the world, that there might be a divinely-alone comprehended, omni-
justificatory necessary inter-connectedness between evil and surpassing
good, or a god not morally perfect or omnipotent; creatures who can only
guess at a necessity for unabsorbable/unjustifiable evils, at a
rationale? Or what if there is no necessity? (the incoherence of this
last option suggests the difficulties related to a non-justificatory view
of evil). There are I think, real problems for Ahern, following from
the arguments of p74-75 of The Problem of Evil.® and unless the problem
of evil is to vanish, presumably along with concepts such as moral
perfection, a requirement to examine the possibility of theodicy; to
establish concrete conditions of fulfilment on terms open to finite
comprehension, and to recognise the challenge of atheist critique on the
subject of absorbed evil. Ahern is familiar with the arguments of figures
like J L Mackie and H J McCloskey, and accepts that they show
"convincingly that none of the solutions theists commonly offer
satisfactorily solves all of the problems" (PE p72). He argues though
that it is impossible for non-theists to demonstrate that the evil that
occurs is not justified. This is because:
"To show that actual evil is not justified, it would be necessary to
establish a negative fact, namely, that good which could justify it
will never exist. This cannot be done without exhaustive knowledge of
the world's good which is not available to us." (ibid)
But is it necessary to compile an exhaustive account of the world's good
on the part of the non-theist? Neither an exhaustive account of good or
evil is required. What is important here for the non-theist is the
inability of finite beings to comprehend the nature of the interplay of
good and evil, to ever understand the sense of their suffering and joyful
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existence to the point where the possibility that God does not exist,
or is flawed, is excluded: to ever feel able that they can affirm, that,
from the Christian evaluation of our experience, the world and existence
in it, are fundamentally worthwhile. This is in fact an argument against
the existence of a wholly good God.
It may appear absurd that the 'fate' of God is apparently being decided
In these grounds. However, there would be no theodicy debate if it were
universally self-evident that a wholly good God's existence is compatible
with the evil that there is. One would merely have to indicate casually
the way in which the earth is so clearly characterised by good
proportionate to the evil. But we cannot do this. If it is not shown to
be impossible that there is a humanly accessible case which establishes
that the evil around us can be compatible with a wholly good God's
existing, one especially for which there is no defeater argument, then,
given that the latter arguably must be the case if we are to ever know
that God is, or rather, could be wholly good, we should explore, argue,
and counter-argue. Again, the simple fact that we may be confronted by
arguments which make mainstream Christian positions on evil untenable, or
hold that the question of evil is utterly beyond us, should not lead to
resigned and false hopes of eschatological verification, but to finding
ways of showing that it is possible to say that Christian belief on God
and evil is coherent, and that we can secure compatibility against
defeat (although there is a further problem: we can hardly know the
intentions of this 'god', nor all that has been in the past, or might be
in the future. Perhaps this is a suitable place for trust to overcome any
doubts - see the discussion of Meynell).
40
In this chapter I have attempted to follow up the initial outline of the
problem by looking at some of the fundamental reasons why it exists, and
takes the form it does. Swinburne and Mackie illustrate an apparently
rational sequence - from basic concerns about meaning and entailments, to
the kind of argument which is met with in theodicy discussion: an example
of Swinburne's understanding of use of words in practice. Looking at the
issues raised by Ahern has shown that if we come to accept that the
justifiability of evil is an entailment of holding that God is wholly
good, then we cannot emphasise the grotesque suffering that occurs in the
world, without being prepared to discuss how it is compatible with the
existence of such a God. To defer to eschatological verification on the
grounds that we do not like to compromise our faith with rationality in
the face of the mysterious infinite, that the infinite alone can
comprehend such matters, is not, I believe, a sustainable position. The
need for vigorous defence of belief from the threat of what some see as
increasingly effective criticism of established Christian positions, and
the question of integrity when we are aware that the intellect is
attempting to hold together contradictory thought and desire, mean that




The understanding that terms such as goodness, knowledge, and power are
used in a way whose meaning can be imagined without resort to lengthy and
complex analogical procedures is implicit in the discussion which
follows.1 They are nevertheless words whose implications require
clarification if we are to understand their role in generating the
theodicy debate. We now look briefly at the three divine attributes
which figure so prominently in the traditional theodicy question. How
might they lead us to ascribe to the principle of the justification of
evil?
As part of the framework for discussion, I make reference to some of
Swinburne and Mackie's positions. The discussion of attributes will be
followed by an examination of a number of theodicy positions. The
objective is stated at the beginning of that section.
OMNIPOTENCE/DIVINE POWER:
Swinburne's modified account of omnipotence arises from discussion of
such questions as the paradox of the stone (CT pl52ff).2 For Moltmann*s
model of theism, its relevance lies in its demonstration that if God
were omnipotent, this is not a bar to God's becoming less than
omnipotent. When it comes to considering God as limited by his creation,
by the freedom of creatures for instance, the theist would not be
compelled to say that God is omnipotent in some incoherent (and
cM hot-
tyrannical) sense, Ctu(Wl that God was omnipotent but clearlyA haVA the
power to become less than omnipotent. It is not true, the theist might
argue, that an omnipotent God, the God of theism, could not suffer (where
this is said to imply powerlessness), if he decided to.3 Such a modified
omnipotence can be strongly defended.
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However, there is no reason to believe that a perfectly good God might
not exist, and be a God with quite limited powers: powers less than
those of greatest logically possible degree. This is not an option
immediately apparent in Swinburne's discussion of modified omnipotence,
the main elements of which are as follows. The paradox of the stone is
intended to show that the concept of omnipotence is incoherent. God can
create a stone he cannot lift, or he cannot. In either case there is
something that the omnipotent being cannot do. One response is to say
that for an omnipotent being to create a stone he cannot lift is self-
contradictory: for God cannot do the logically impossible i.e., create
something which in so doing involves the contradiction of omnipotence.
But this misunderstands the paradox which is intended precisely to show
that omnipotence is an incoherent concept. Swinburne's own reading is
that it is an ability of an omnipotent being to cease to be omnipotent.
Thus it is possible for an omnipotent being to make a stone too heavy to
lift, though a person may always remain omnipotent because they never
exercise their power to create such stones (CT pl58>. So he avoids the
problem of asserting that there are certain things God cannot do.
However, Swinburne still wants to assert that God is omnipotent in the
sense that he has not exercised his power to cease to be so. Why? Perhaps
this reflects an attachment to a conception of metaphysical perfections.
But Swinburne's treatment is founded on a desire to see if a coherent
account can be given of a claim that theists have often "wished" to make
<CT pl49). He makes no argument for the necessity of omnipotence. One
such argument might be that if God's nature is infinite, it must embrace
such characteristics as omnipotence. That if it does not, then God cannot
be the highest and most perfect being, a being who exemplifies all that
is not incompatible with perfect goodness. That is, in perfection, God
exemplifies all compatible characteristics to the highest degree. But if
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it is not accepled that God has to fit this definition in the first
instance - in fact we merely hold God to be perfectly good, the creator
and ruler of the universe - then there seems little to stop one
abandoning omnipotence. There are though, other arguments that can be
made in favour of omnipotence.
Of a God who is not necessarily omnipotent, we may say that it is
possible to conceive of things arranged better if he were omnipotent.
However, with the key criterion here being that the evil that there is
be justifiable, the less than omnipotent God's existence will only
(conventionally) be open to disproof on the grounds of the problem of
evil, if the condition of justifiability is not met. For this is the
criterion that is to be met, and not one which demands that what is
created be the best logically possible for a God who can do all that is
logically possible. And yet, surely God's power does have a bearing? If
he is less than omnipotent, won't there be a threat of some suffering
which is unjustified, beyond his control? As I will argue however, if we
say God is wholly good, we will have to hold that the evil that there is
is of a kind which would not be incompatible with this. The less than
omnipotent God would not permit that which was not justifiable (my aim
here is not to show how this whole issue might actually be resolved, but
to indicate what the conditions attached to making statements about God
and evil are).
The fact that a God who is not omnipotent cannot do all that it is
possible for an omnipotent God to do, does not seem a bar to attributions
of genuine creative power; power of creation ex nihilo. Nor to the
characteristic of perfect goodness manifested in creation through that
which expresses love, and so on. Lack of divine freedom to realise all
logically possible goods, can appear problematic. One arguable attraction
of Swinburne's modified omnipotence is that God is free to create
whatever is logically possible and for the highest good, whereas a less
powerful God is restricted in the range of possibilities for the
expression of their perfect goodness. Even so, they may still be
perfectly or wholly good. The God of limited power creates only what is
compatible with their perfect goodness. We could say that God is wholly
good where he/she achieves loving ends through always justifiable means
(i.e., good proportionate to evil).
Aversion to a less than Swinburnianly omnipotent God might arise because
a less than omnipotent nature freely arrived at from the position of
loving omnipotence, a dramatic kenosis, seems more re-assuring than a
state of similarly restricted power which is itself the initial condition
for divine creative action. Yet if God's purpose requires that he create
free agents, and this is a significant limitation on his power however
powerful he/she may have been, and we do not in the first instance need
to qualify the goodness and wisdom of a God simply because he has decided
to become less than omnipotent, only if he is incompetent - and this
world might in fact have been created by a less than an omnipotent God,
and be worthwhile, then this cannot be a good argument for upholding the
necessity of ascribing omnipotence to God the creator.
Apart from accepting such arguments, on connections between omnipotence
and divine freedom in realising the maximum good, or from the desire for
metaphysical perfection in the ground of the universe, it would not seem
necessary to ascribe omnipotence to God, unless we know that this world,
indeed all that exists, together comprises all that it is logically
possible for an omnipotent and wholly good being to do. This claim is
unlikely to be advanced.
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Swinburne says that God may make stones too heavy to lift, or even
universes too wayward to control (ibid), but need never do so. One should
add that one reason why these actions should not perhaps be attempted,
or even logically possible for God, is that there are moral limits to
what God can do. Swinburne recognises this when he explores moral limits
under the concept of divine freedom, in chapter 8 of The Coherence of
Theism. God is free for instance, in that he cannot effect possibilities
for evil unless for the good. His actions are uninfluenced by non-
rational factors. He cannot act without reason. If one accepts these
kinds of conditions, then God's perfect goodness cannot be abandoned in
order to enable otherwise logically possible actions to be performed.
God's power is limited by what it is logically possible for him to do,
and that includes what is morally possible. The theodicy problem would
no longer exist if it were not: God's moral perfection would be fatally
compromised.
There is a further variation on the paradox of omnipotence. This concerns
human free will. J L Mackie outlines the issues in his discussion in The
Miracle of Theism (p. 160ff). An omnipotent God can be argued both to be
able to create beings whose choices he cannot control, and not able. In
the first case, such beings are omnipotently made uncontrollable, but
this does not have vicious consequences for omnipotence, for omnipotence
is constrained, like all else, by what are logical possibilities and
impossibilities. In the second case, God is unable to create beings whom
he cannot control, for the idea that there are things which an omnipotent
being cannot control is self-contradictory. But for the same reasons as
seen above, this kind paradox and its exploration is arguably less
important to theism than it might appear. One can argue for instance,
that God has been omnipotent in the Swinburnian sense, and has
omnipotently limited his power to satisfy the moral purpose of creating
free beings: sentient beings whose actions he cannot control, intervene
in, wrongly cause. In such a case the logical possibilities of
omnipotence are not abused, and the moral purpose of God is recognised.
So the paradox can be avoided if we accept that God has a moral purpose
in creation, and that to modify his power is his prerogative. There is,
as we have seen, no apparently overwhelming reason why omnipotence is a
necessary attribute of a perfectly good God, creator and ruler of the
universe.
It seems that modified accounts of omnipotence are in order. Those which
say that if a being is to be 'omnipotent' it should be in a way which is
logically possible and morally permissible - without the power or the
ability to enact or permit that which it is better to refrain from doing.
It also seems that whilst omnipotence is not an indispensable attribute,
perfect goodness is <1 will look at the latter attribute shortly). This
is important when we are confronted by claims that theists must believe
in a God who is omnipotent, who cannot suffer, or be limited by his
creatures.
We can conclude that for any formulation of God's power, so long as it
relates to a God of perfect goodness, a justificatory approach to evil
will apparently be necessary, whether they are able to do all that it is
logically possible to do, or are not able to do all that it is logically
possible to do.
OMNISCIENCE:
I shall not refer to Swinburne's discussion of omniscience,A since I am
concerned rather with the minimum condition that when God's knowledge is
such that he knows all the possibilities that it is logically possible to
know as arising from any given state of affairs (or less than these, if
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one thinks so). God can only bring about the possibility of things
happening, when such possibilities are compatible with certain conditions
being met: when it is not such that it would be better to refrain from
creating any such possibilities. A position which implies the following
proviso: God's knowledge of any potentially vicious limitations of his
knowledge (limitations of what can logically be known of what is
possible, or perhaps related to an inability to know all it is logically
possible to know), will mean that he refrains from creating states of
affairs where it is not a known impossibility that they might give rise
to unjustifiable evil. Swinburne is concerned with logical difficulties
over God's foreknowing and the issue of human and divine free will. The
solution he offers is based on support for the thesis of contra-causal
choice. Thus God cannot know in advance what we will do, although, we
might add, he will know the possibilities. It is also possible to opt
for a compatibilist position, of which Mackie develops an important line
(see MT p!66ff). Whichever route is taken, the need to comply with the
entailments of perfect goodness remains arguably unavoidable, which
means in principle that the evil that occurs be justifiable; As Aquinas
maintained: "The [divine] Will cannot aim at evil unless in some way it
is proposed to it as a good" (SCG. 1.95.3). For instance, I would argue
that dangers of unjustifiable evil which cannot be a priori excluded as
the consequences of any particular state of affairs are enough to merit
the non-instantiation of such a state of affairs. God may not know all
the possibilities it is logically possible to know, and even if he/she
does, there may be significant limitations. If awareness of such
limitations is not carried over into how God acts, God cannot be
perfectly good. For whilst God's action would perhaps be intentionally
good, if creation gave rise to unforseeable unjustifiable evils, God
would not be perfectly good in the normally understood sense that
theists would accept. That is, that in reality, God performs or permits
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no unjustifiable evils: that, crudely, but effectively, it cannot be
said of God: "the road to hell is paved with good intentions". If we
wish to hold that God sees all things at all times 'simultaneously',
then, aside from the question of freedom of agents, this would strongly
imply, given the criterion of justification, that the evil that occurs
will have to be justifiable. God could not, prior to creation, be unaware
of what the evils that would occur would be. This raises the problem of
how God could always be aware of the events of world history, and ever be
in a position to have chosen to created otherwise, if there were
unjustifiable evil, seeing that such a decision based on actuality
presupposes that the key events will really occur, and are so present to
the divine mind as actuality.
WHOLLY GOOD.
If God is wholly good, it seems that he never performs actions which are
morally wrong (CT pl79). e This I think would seem to include setting up
possibilities for creaturely actions which bring about unjustifiable
suffering, or natural evils which cause unjustifiable suffering. These
are arguably basic conditions for making sense of the concept of a being
wholly good, and creator. Yet again, what if he/she freely does that
which gives rise to evil which is unabsorbable, which can never be come
to terms with, and does so unintentionally? A further condition of
perfect goodness would be that where God can never be said to allow such
evil to come about intentionally, and if he/she has the perfection
normally ascribed to God, it should never be said that there is the
possibility that such evil arise unintentionally. The condition is not
grounded in detail, as, arguably, the descriptive element alone of the
God idea allows one to set up these parameters, as noted above.
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What does Swinburne understand by morally good and morally wrong actions?
He thinks the former category encompasses those which we have no
obligation not to do, and is exclusive of those we ought not to do. The
latter are those actions we ought not to do (ibid). Can more detail be
added to what characterises moral goodness? I cite Swinburne's account:
"...God does whatever it is of over-riding importance that he should
do, including any actions, if there are any such, which are of over¬
riding importance although they bring no happiness to humans or
other sentient beings." (CT pl81)
In passing he dismisses a definition whereby a moral action is what is
good for sentient creatures. Still, it is hard to see how, at the very
least the ultimate welfare of his creatures could not be a fixed
consideration for God; nor how God is perfectly good if this means
following principles which bring no happiness to creatures in a way which
would involve unjustifiable suffering. However, whatever precise
definition we give to the final good, the negative criterion that God
refrain from doing or permitting that which is not compatible with this
good seems by itself sufficient to establish the principle of
justification. For what would an unabsorbed evil be? An evil self-
contained and for which no meaningful talk of higher good can be
conceived (in the life of the individual and/or the community and/or the
creation); one that stands outside the possibility of being balanced,
rendered into something better; un-related to opportunities and
necessities for worthwhile goods. If this is so of some of the evil in
creation then God is not wholly good. For it would be morally wrong to
permit unabsorbed evils, so defined, even if many other evils are
absorbed: that is, if we wish to retain the word "good" of God in a
sense which excludes some crucial possibilities, such as inter-
changeability with what we consider evil; destructiveness, dis¬
integration, maliciousness, delight in suffering an end in itself, and so
I have so far concentrated on attempting to show what the most basic
entailments of divine power, knowledge, and moral perfection seem to be.
The situation can be summarised as follows.
Omnipotence is not necessary to the establishment of a justificatory
principle. The justificatory principle applies both if God is omnipotent,
or less than omnipotent by nature or resolve. Divine knowledge too, in
its knowledge of its limitations and responsibilities, cannot be
qualified to a point where the permitting of unjustified evil is no
longer a problem: this is true where we retain the normal sense of
perfect goodness, where God as God, does not (even unwittingly), permit
unjustifiable evils to come to be. Thirdly, perfect goodness can be
seen as opposed to evil in such a fashion that the evil that is possible
never stands unrelated to possibilities for good. As yet, it appears
evident that a wholly good creator is bound to create in a way which
excludes certain possibilities for evil, one in which all the evil that
is possible is justifiably so.
The kinds of possibilities which are conventionally excluded is a
question which can be further clarified through looking at the arguments
of theodicists and non-theists. The key feature to be excluded is always
instances of evil which cannot be justified. This covers for example,
purposeless evil which might not be causally related to that which is
beneficial; and in the case of some atheist anti-theodicists, moral evil
per se: they wish to show that creation actually includes that which
should be excluded in a system brought into being by a perfectly good
God. Where for instance, true freedom would be being 'such that' one
will freely always choose the good, given that it is implied that this is
how we will be in the new creation. .
5!
I started by noting Swinburne's introductory definition of God in his
contribution to a symposium on the theodicy problem. Very briefly, what
is the nature of the problem he sets out? And what, in the broadest
terms, would count, for a theodicist, as its resolution? The problem is
by now familiar, and seems to arise even if we modify our concept of
God's power, for all that exists is created by God's power exercised
freely, and if so, should necessarily be compatible with his being wholly
good:
"if God exists, then being omniscient, he knows under what
circumstances evil will occur, if he does not act; and being
omnipotent, he is able to prevent its occurrence. Hence, being
perfectly good, he will prevent its occurrence and so evil will not
exist." <RR p81)
So it can be held, prima facie, that God's existence entails that there
be no evil. However, theists will deny that God's being omnipotent,
perfectly good, and omniscient excludes his permitting the possibility of
evil.
A toothache, suggests Swinburne, is not grounds for thinking that God
does not exist. He agrees though that difficulties arise with more
profound evils (we may also conclude by extrapolation that tooth-ache
occurs in worlds where there is an extremely high probability of other
and greater suffering). Here, the theodicist "will claim that it is not
morally wrong for God to permit or create the various evils, normally on
the grounds that doing so is providing the logically necessary conditions
of greater goods" (RR p82: if this can be shown, the problem will be
resolved).
I will now look at some of the arguments made to show how evil is
justifiable. The principle of justification seems central when one is
trying to reconcile the evil that occurs, and is possible, with the
existence of the wholly good God. My intention is not to attempt to show
51
if any of the arguments are decisive, ones against which the non-theist
could not possibly advance defeater arguments. If Mackie is right, and
God could have created, at the beginning, agents who were such that they
freely always choose the good, and this is what being truly free means,
then there clearly will be great problems for theodicists. Ascertaining
whether, say, Mackie or Swinburne have advanced arguments which are
unassailable, is not my task. Swinburne, Hick, Meynell, and others, show
us the fundamental options which we have to develop if we are attempting
theodicy. So far we have seen Mackie's critique of generalised theodicy
positions, and have looked at the grounds which would lead us to argue
broadly in the fashion he has, and about the principle of justification.
Now we look at positions on free-will, responsibility, soul-making, as
they are held by theodicists. Are they fundamentally incompatible with
Christian belief? Do they reveal, crucial as they are to the theodicy
case, that the notion of justifiability is basically flawed: that it is
not one we could attempt to sustain as Christians, once we have looked at
human existence, and the kinds of goods we really do hold to make us
distinctive and blessed? Perhaps the ideas of freedom, noble action,
sympathy, are though, one's we must argue for, even if we disagree with
some of the ways in which certain theodicists have gone about this. I
shall conclude each section with a brief summary on whether or not what
is said is evidently incompatible with Christian belief, if it
undermines the principle of the justification of evil. Clearly, there
will be areas which are frequently contested by anti-theodicists. This is
an important spur to development, but the key interest is in the question
of the centrality of the general thrust of these arguments; if they are
about things which Christians hold as vitally important, and which, if
shown to be impossible, would make continued belief also impossible.
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The following outline of a theodicy is given in Reason and Religion
(p81ff). Swinburne starts by distinguishing between the evil that happens
to people and animals, and that which people do. The first category
covers physical suffering, mental suffering, and 'state' evil, this last
relating to mental states such as hatred, but also to such situations as
the disfigured beauty of the world. This general category is termed
passive evil. The second category is that of moral evil. Many of the
passive evils will be the consequence of past or present moral evil.
Swinburne is perhaps thinking of the arguments advanced on the subject of
free will by J L Mackie when he writes that the "' anti-theodicist'
suggests as a moral principle. . . that a creator able to do so ought to
create only creatures such that necessarily they do not do evil actions"
(RR p84). Swinburne cites Alvin Plantinga's formulations of the free
will defence as an argument the theodicist will surely employ against
this principle. I shall discuss Plantinga's argument separately, but
essentially, its conclusion is that it is not logically possible for God
to create beings who freely perform good actions only. The potential for
a free agent to do evil cannot be avoided if the good of free action is
desired, of authentic free love. Swinburne expands on this. Some agents
might have choice, but not the capability of moral choice. They might
lack discriminatory powers; be subject to external control; or see with
is
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absolute clarity that which it right to do, with temptation to do only
the right, not that which is wrong. By contrast, where human free agents
are concerned, we are dealing with agents with the 'power' and
'opportunity' of exercising some "sufficient moral discrimination" over
good and bad actions, and susceptible to temptation, though not
overwhelming, to do the bad. Theodicists, Swinburne holds, will argue
that it is good for such agents to exist (RR p85). Also, that it is
logically impossible to make humanly free agents such that they always
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refrain from performing morally bad actions. As Swinburne admits, this
last point is hotly debated (see the section below on J L Mackie). He
proposes to "circumvent" the question here by arguing that humanly free
agents are agents whose choices "do not have fully deterministic
precedent causes" (RR p86). Granted this, he argues, it will not be
logically possible to create free agents whose choices "go one way rather
than another" (ibid). He adds:
"Surely as parents we regard it as a good thing that our children
have power to do free actions of moral significance - even if the
consequence is that they sometimes do evil actions." (ibid)
We now move to the second stage of the proposed theodicy. Up till now,
the compatibility of moral evil with God's existence has been defended.
Still, what is needed is an argument which shows that the evil which
flows as a consequence from moral evil is compatible with God's
existence. The anti-theodicist may bring forward the principle that God
create a world of free agents where the consequences of moral evils are
not evil, or certainly do not affect others (ie, none other than their
perpetrators). Swinburne rejects this principle. A world where wrong
actions did not affect agents would not be one with responsibility.
Therefore it is not mistaken for God to create agents "responsible for
each others well-being, able to make or mar each other" (RR p87; or
themselves, we may add). It may be, continues Swinburne, that the anti-
theodicist says the world should be one where responsibility is for
giving or withholding benefits, but does not involve the possible
infliction of pain. But this is to rob responsibility of its depth. If I
can choose to give you sweets, but not to break your leg, my influence on
your future is weak. Withholding benefits too, involves deprivation, and
this can cause suffering. According to Swinburne, this kind of
correlation between action and kind of consequence is not arguably worse
than the situation in a world where no such pattern occurs (although of
course, we might want to argue that we can be free without suffering at
55
all, that we are not forced to make a choice between a world where
suffering is appropriately connected to action, or not so connected).
So, overall, it can be argued that the possibilities for passive evils to
be experienced by those not responsible for the moral choices behind them
are logically necessary if we are to have "great responsibilities".
Swinburne moves next to the question of character formation. As we do not
intervene constantly in the quarrels of developing children, so as not to
rob them of experience of growing responsibilities, of responsibility
itself, so God will not impose an already formed character on human
agents. To do so would be to give the agent "a character which he had not
in any way chosen or adopted for himself" (ibid). Still, it is noted that
the theodicist may object on a different level. Are there not limits to
fch£ suffering a parent would p£fWit children to inflict upon each
other? God may rightly tolerate a childs quarrel, but the terrible misuse
of responsibility in Belsen? Here Swinburne argues that the theodicist
does not need to deny that God will prevent affairs from reaching too
evil a state. For indeed "there are limits to the amount and degree of
evil which are possible in our world" (RR p89).
He thinks that anti-theodicists have a 'crunch' question to offer
theodicists in the issue of the sheer quantity of evil. Why cancer and
war, rather than just backache and disagreement? (RR plOO) The answer to
this question on natural disasters and disease is that they allow
opportunities for "working together for good" ibid. So the theodicist
has an answer to an anti-theodicist principle, that God as creator is not
to allow evils which are not the result of choices by free human agents .
They are logically necessary to bring about 'noble' kinds of action. The
same is true of war (the possibility of such conflicts also, presumably,
giving us great responsibility).
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Swinburne accepts (in part) Plantinga's argument that passive evil not
caused by moral choice is the work of fallen angels; it helps explain why
certain animal suffering existed before the development of humanity (RR
p93). Yet Swinburne does not think it required for the defence of human
suffering and the pain that relates to physical malfunctioning (ibid).
These are, he holds, the greatest areas of passive evil outwith human
responsibility. They are also phenomena necessary for the growth of
courage, patience, and tolerance.
It appears to Swinburne that God has three basic options in creating a
universe. A universe, good, without need of improvement, and in which
human agents, free, "know what is right, and pursue it": Where "they
achieve their purposes without hindrance. " Or one basically evil, where
all needs improving, yet can be improved. Or one half finished, basically
good; a world in which we come to know what is right, and overcome
obstacles, and finally achieve our purpose (RR p95). It is this last
world which God has evidently chosen to create. He continues:
"The universe may be such that it requires long generations of
cooperative effort between creatures to make it perfect. While not
wishing to deny the goodness of a universe of the first kind, I would
suggest that to create a universe of the third kind would be no bad
thing, for it gives to creatures the privilege of making their own
universe." (ibid)
Swinburne digresses to look at a criticism and defence of the free will
defence. In response to the argument that it is logically necessary for
ends to exist in order for certain good actions to be performed, the
anti-theodicist may say that only the appearance of suffering is required
to elicit sympathy. But this, it is argued, is to propose a systematic
deception, so that feelings are not represented by behaviour. And a world
without evil in this manner would be one where the noble actions
referred to earlier could not exist. Still, if we accept that in the free
will defence it is right that God allow creatures to inflict suffering on
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each other, the anti-theodicist again may respond that it is God* s duty
to stop people hurting each other beyond certain limits. To this the
theodicist can reply that it is not God's duty to intervene where it is
clearly ours (RR p91). Our doing so depends on knowledge of the probable
outcome of certain situations. And, crucially, where God is considered,
with his knowledge of consequences, he knows more than we can do about
outcomes. Given the nature of our responsibilities and their importance,
and God's understanding of the connections between suffering and goods,
"God may very well have reason for allowing particular evils which it is
our duty to attempt to stop at all costs, simply because he knows so
much more about them than we do" (RR p92). God has "parental rights" to
let us experience suffering for the good of our soul (ibid).
How does Swinburne see God's intention in forming human nature as it is?
We will have to have some kind of nature. There are natural purposes -
obtaining food, sleep, procreating. Assuming that the universe is 'half-
finished' and requires improvement, there are further purposes in the
existence of human agents. God may aid humanity in taking the right path
towards improvement. He could incline if not compel us to improve things,
to do what is good. But this, thinks Swinburne, is to impose character.
Instead, he could provide strong causal reasons to improve affairs.
Character is not imposed, and the agent is causally inclined to perform
an action. Such a reason could be a feeling of pain or sense of
deprivation. It could not be a pleasant feeling, for linking a desired
goal to a pleasant feeling as motivation is contradicted by the fact that
only present feeling can be effective in leading us to act (Against this
it is possible to argue that knowledge of higher good could be sufficient
intellectually and spiritually to cause one to reach towards it, for by
extrapolation from experience of present good to a higher one, one could
overcome the bar of present direct feelings to anticipations of those
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that are greater. However, a sense of deprivation would be involved).
Swinburne's contention is: "For men to have reasons which move men of any
character to actions of perfecting the world, a creator needs to tie its
imperfections to unpleasant feelings, that is, physical and mental evils"
(RR p97). This, he argues, is considerably true of the world. Pain and
suffering elicit sympathy and efforts to bring about a better state of
affairs; no character is imposed, both saint and sinner, irrational and
rational being given inductive evidence that care of the body and
improvement of the world lessen the possibilities for suffering (ibid).
So, Swinburne's theodicy envisages a struggle to overcome evil, which,
in his own words, is no parlour game. His principal supposition is that
it is good that God make "a half-finished universe and create immature
creatures, who are humanly free agents, to inhabit it." Also (p99):
"... that he should allow them to exercise some choice over what kind
of creature they are to become and what sort of universe is to be
(while at the same time giving them a slight push in the direction of
doing what is right); and that the creatures should have the power to
affect not only the development of the inanimate universe but the
well-being and moral character of their fellows, and that there
should be opportunities for creatures to develop noble characters and
do especially noble actions."
Therefore it is not, we can argue, morally bad for God to create the
kind of universe there is (and Swinburne thinks that there is no easy
proof of incompatibility between the kinds of evils we find in the world,
and the existence of God).
Here then Swinburne exemplifies some of the most widely used arguments in
theodicy. Are they arguments which we would wish to support if we were
Christians? Or more decisively, are they arguments or positions we cannot
deny if we are to remain Christian? I do not want to define Christianity
in terms of Richard Swinburne's thinking, but it does seem that he is
defending beliefs very basic to mainstream Christian thought. For
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example, he thinks that we will have to affirm that there are worthwhile
goods, and that our being free is one of these. We may not agree exactly
with how he makes the case for there being such goods, but arguably we
cannot repudiate that something similar is close to the heart of our
faith in this world as the work of the wholly good God. We cannot hold
that there are no goods to counterbalance the evil; that we are automata;
that pain is not tied up at all with what helps give us the ultimately
good and worthwhile existences we have, without making talk of the wholly
good and loving creator, meaningless.
Hugo Meynell considers the problem of evil the most serious objection to
theism (references are to Meynell's God and the World p66ff). He
accepts the idea that theism implies God's omnipotence as well as perfect
goodness, and that given the evil in the world, there is an at least
prima facie contradiction between God's existing, and this evil's
existing (GW p66>. Even if we are not committed to any single solution
for the problem of evil, Christianity has to have one: "It is not
possible to be both honestly and clear sightedly a Christian, and to
hold that while there is evil in the world, Christian belief excludes the
very possibility of there being evil in the world" (ibid). Meynell
defends the idea that God permits first order evil in order to bring
about second order goods; goods for which such first order evils are the
logically necessary prerequisite. His case responds to the criticisms of
J L Mackie.
Briefly, Mackie argued that for second order goods, there are second
order evils, and so on in relation to third order goods and higher.
Meynell's references are to Mackie's arguments in Mind. 1955 (p200-12).
Thus, as second order good is the kind God is held to promote, so second
order evil (Mackie is quoted)will, by analogy, be the important kind
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of evil, the kind which God, if he were wholly good and omnipotent, would
eliminate. And yet evil (2) plainly exists.'" Therefore the conventional
arguments on graduated goods and evils fail. However, Meynell argues that
an infinite regress of orders of goods and evils can be avoided if we
posit a third order good. If we hold that first type evils occur as a
prerequisite of second type goods, but that there are second type evils
which oppose second type good and promote first type evil, we can still
argue for a third type good which is "that moral goodness in an agent
which will ultimately prevail over real possibilities of second type evil
in the agent himself, and over all first- and second type evil with which
it comes into conflict in the world" (GW p74). If, as theists believe,
there is no third type evil to thwart God's purpose that third type good
should prevail, then Mackie's regress is blocked.
Meynell also opposes Mackie's criticisms of the free will defence,
arguing that rejection of determinism (of which Mackie's version is
'being such that') does not entail that one is left with purely random
choice <GW p73). Even if an action "... could not have been predicted
with certainty on the basis of knowledge, however complete, of what
preceded it" (GW p51), deviations from plans are not necessarily
arbitrary: "An action may be arbitrary in relation to one plan of action,
but not so in relation to another" (ibid). And:
"Just because [an agent]... follows one comprehensible course of
action, rather than another, it by no means follows that an observer
in possession of all the relevant facts would be able to judge it
impossible that he should have acted in any way differently from the
manner in which he did in fact act. From the intelligibility of one
course of action, even when all the relevant circumstances are taken
into account, the absolute arbitrariness of any alternative by no
means follows, unless the thesis of determinism has been assumed
from the start." (GW 51-52)
Meynell's argument seems to hinge on the way we understand rationality.
If the decision to go one way rather than another is not purely
arbitrary, what is it? What is it that allows us to say of many important
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human decisions, thoughts, or actions, that they simply cannot be
predicted from an account of our mind state at a given time, but neither
are they foisted randomly by synapse activity? Meynell makes the
following case for the difficulty of holding to the determinist position
and the sense of thinking that our reasoning is the exploration of
rational possibilities (and impossibilities), whose outcome cannot be
predicted from knowing what we hold or think at the start of our
ratiocination:
"Rational beings characteristically behave in accordance with plans
which they believe to be appropriate to their situation. Material
objects behave according to laws which the scientist can discover.
There is an interesting question how these forms of explanation fit
together in the case of human beings, who are of course, both
material objects and rational beings. One obvious solution is that
rational choices are made from choices which are real in that, given
the causal preconditions, any one of them might have occured. This
solution is open to the libertarian, but closed to the determinist,
who does not believe that there are real possibilities of this kind."
(GW p54)
Meynell continues:
"For him, it seems to me, there are two possible solutions. Either all
propositions about acting for reasons can be reduced to propositions
about behaving owing to the operation of causes, in that any
statement of the first type can be shown to be identical in meaning
with statements of the second; or there is no logical connection
between acting for reasons and behaving owing to the operations of
causes, though the former depends entirely upon the latter. To take
the former alternative: I cannot see how one would begin to show
that, for example, 'I drew that figure on the paper to demonsrate the
truth of Pythagoras' theorem' is really identical in meaning with a
series of statements about electrical currents running through the
nerves..." <GW p54-55)
And:
"The latter alternative seems to lead to the even more implausible
conclusion that it is just by a colossal coincidence (or perhaps by a
special divine providence?) that a series of electrical and chemical
events, obeying the laws intrinsic to such things, really direct our
reasoning, which appears to follow very different principles; that our
reasoning is really an epiphenomenon of these brain processes, which
can have no relation to truth and plausibility such as it is proper
for reasoning to have." (GW p55)
This is not a question which we can take further here. I believe Meynell
is arguing along lines which we will need to follow if we are to avoid
certain serious problems. For instance, if we hold that freedom is not
being free to have acted otherwise than we did, but acting in accordance
with laws which would allow us to predict what people would do if we knew
enough about these laws, and the totality of things, then people would be
acting in ways which they could not refrain from doing. If this is the
case, then a theologian confronted with the awful suffering there is,
will have to acknowledge it as God's responsibility. What would it mean
to say God is wholly good? And we could hardly be described as
responsible agents. If one holds that we are truly free in that we are
beings who are 'such that' we freely always choose the good, then either
one's concept of good is confused, or one is not seeing the world as it
really is. And for a being who is 'such that' they freely always choose
the moderately good, or, say, the morally unjustifiable course of action,
then one's idea of the creator of such a being would have to exclude
their being wholly good. It may be that being 'such that' we freely
always choose the good is a notion that Christians will want to defend as
a future possibility, but they can hardly accept that we have been, and
are at present, radically unfree, without incurring major problems.
Consider one radical enunciation of the consequences of the idea that
there is no freedom as traditionally thought of. Nietzsche wrote:
"What alone can our teaching be? - That no one gives a human being
his qualities: not God, not society, not his parents or ancestors, not
he himself... No one is accountable for existing at all, or for being
constituted as he is, or for living in the circumstances and
suroundings in which he lives. The fatality of his nature cannot be
disentangled from the fatality of all that which has been and will
be... One is necessary, one is a piece of fate, one belongs to the
whole... thus alone is the innocence of becoming restored."
(Twilight of the Idols: 'The Four Great Errors' - 8)
Neitzsche of course has got rid of God. But the same sense of fatality
will apply to the theology which rejects the tradition of human freedom
defended by Meynell. So the possiblity of the justification of evil
relying on notions of free choice as something worthwhile, and tied in
with arguments for our choosing from a number of real possibilities, to
exercise responsibility, compassion - to reason with a real variety of
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possibilities, to be creative, will collapse. We are left with God as
tyrant, the being who creates creatures who suffer from delusions that
they could act and exist otherwise than they do; who can not do other
than suffer such delusions. What could be worthwhile here? But I do not
think we need to develop this further. Arguably, Christianity does not
involve such fatalism, and if it did, there could be no genuine moral
responsibility. Since theologians wish to affirm that the world God has
created is good, and that we are free in the sense that we could have
rationally done otherwise than we did, theodicy will have to pursued. For
instance, theologians will not want to deny that we are finite; that we
are limited in what we know, that we do not always act rationally, that
we are tempted, and that there is much natural suffering, and that there
has been much moral evil. Since the alternative is a doctrine of
determinism (or of randomness), and we want to maintain that God is just,
we will hold to the idea that we are free in an important sense: that it
is possible not to do evil', to respond to those who have suffered evil,
or who have been compelled to do evil, as beings whose true rational
character requires the right to have real ranges of possibility in
choice, the rendering possible of which requires we exercise our freedom
for the good. This finitude, freedom and responsibility, if it is to be
affirmed, requires we con accept the world as
ultimately worthwhile. If we think we are finite, free, and responsible
beings who cause and suffer great evil, which is unjustifiable, then we
do not accept the world as worthwhile. We cannot accept that a determined
world would be a worthwhile one either (delusion of human
responsibility). In these situations we would be forced to conclude that
God is not wholly good, or does not exist. Ultimately, we must accept
that the free will defence, and other classic notions of responsibility
and worthwile behaviour are made redundant at the risk of incoherence.
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Meynell also argues against the proposition that an agent is without
responsibility when they act in a way not determined by character. Thus:
"It is just when we wish to say that, given the kind of person the agent
is, he could not have done otherwise than he did, that we deny his
responsibility" (ibid). He holds that goodness is something meaningful in
the context of possibilities for good and bad choices - at least goodness
as normally understood (GW p75). The goodness seems to consist in
rejecting the bad (where we might actually have chosen the bad) as much,
or more so, the critic might say, than in any intrinsic goodness residing
in rational choice of the intrinsically good. But this kind of
objection pre-supposes an interpretation of free will which Meynell has
rejected. And anyway, what moral good is there in a world where there can
be no good of responsibility, since status as agents who are free to be
responsible does not exist? We would simply be inter—acting in pre¬
determined ways. Again, the critic might argue that an agent which
chooses the good rationally could be aware of what would happen if it
were to choose the evil, but that this latter event would never be
realised since there can be no rational justification to perform such an
action, nor would any implanted and deeply irrational temptation to do so
be compatible with God's perfect goodness. For choosing what a theodicist
would describe as the good, brings wholeness and joy, whereas choosing
the bad brings misery. But this is abstract. Theodicists (who I am not
going to claim are ultimately right), want to accept the world as one of
finitude, and good nevertheless. This is part of the reason why they
propose that making mistakes, experimenting, gradually evolving, living
in finitude, in recognition of grace, is valuable and justifiable,
whereas instantly formed wholly rational agents, might perhaps be
valuable, but were not the path God chose when he wished to bring about
the particular worthwhile goods (otherwise unobtainable), involved in the
human form of existence.
6.5
Meynell notes that the Augustinian emphasis on the good of free agents
prior to the fall is problematic. Why sin when good? An Irenaean theodicy
seems more plausible (ibid p79). Here, God creates an immature humanity
and permits evils, in order that a third type good of Meynell's kind be
achieved; one that is consummatory and justificatory. What are Meynell's
conclusions?
A God who is omnipotent and supremely good has been held so on the ground
of a future consummation of creation (that is, if there were none, there
would be a fundamental lack of justice, and the wholly good God would not
exist). Meynell thinks that holding this belief is consistent with
holding to the idea of cosmic justice of the kind central to traditional
Christian belief (GW pill). Still, anti-theodicists claim that God is
not wholly good if he has permitted the evil that there is. Meynell has
brought forward the free will defence. He argues that only in a universe
of this kind can there be morally good people. But is this good worth the
cost? This perennially occurring question is not something Meynell
believes can be given a universally accepted answer, and "perhaps
rational discussion will not do much to decide the issue" (GW p82).
Meynell's conclusion is an important one. I earlier argued that theodicy,
where we accept the problem of evil as one of justification, is not
something that can be laid aside. I held that Ahern's position on
eschatological verification and the inability of the finite mind to know
if the evil that has occured was justifiable, was inadequate. There
remained the problem, if we do apparently need to know every intei—
connection between the goods and evils in creation, how can we, finite as
we are, ever reach a conclusion? If we look at Meynell's position, a
resolution suggests itself. All human life seems to have certain
characteristics, in varying degrees. There is joy, love, freedom,
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courage, thought and creativity, for instance, and we can affirm,
despite the inability to describe the precise intei—connections of goods
and evils for every being, that in the history of creation, and for every
human being, these are fundamentally worthwhile goods (the question of
animal life and suffering is difficult, but it would seem that we have to
affirm/recognise that this life is valuable and worthwhile also). This
affirmation will involve a hard justification which I will discuss later.
If we are unsure about the morality of suggesting that the child who dies
of diarrhea in Ethiopia has had a worthwhile life, then we may decide
that soul-making must extend to a realm of justice in a post-mortem
existence.
I think that Meynell — by his claim that we cannot reach a universal
consensus on values -has indicated how we might argue that what we affirm
as good more than proportionate to evil is not something we can
necessarily force others to recognise and accept. This does not mean that
we are unsure of whether or not we have good grounds for holding to our
affirmation. Christians will argue that life and the world is good, even
if has its tragedies. Arguing this case will never be easy, but it must
be done if we are to avoid relying as Ahern apparently does, on our human
minds comprehending what only an infinite mind can, and if we are ever to
affirm that the world there is, is indeed compatible with the existence
of a creator God who is wholly good.
I now look briefly at John Hick and his development of an Irenaean
theodicy (in Evil and the God of Love). In many ways his arguments bear a
close resemblance to those of Swinburne and Meynell. The key similarity
lies in the idea of the necessity of evil, or of its possibility, in the
process of maturation and 'redemption' of responsible and free human
agents. Hick argues: "There is no room within the Christian thought world
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for the idea of tragedy in any sense that includes the idea of finally
wasted suffering and goodness" (EGL p280).e
He thoroughly rejects the notion of the fall of finite free and good
agents, as is conceived in the Augustinian tradition (EGL p286). Wholly
good beings cannot sin. And if we resort to a pre-destination to fall,
matters are only made worse. Hick also finds the 'Jamesian' turning away
from God of the collective human soul unsatisfactory. Such ideas fail by
their reliance on an inexplicable creatlo ex nihilo of evil (EGL p289).
As is well known, Hick opts for a "soul-making" theodicy. The world was
never meant to be a paradise. It is the scene though, for the
"realization of the most valuable potentialities of human personality."
God is like a parent, and "to most parents it seems more important to try
to foster quality and strength of character in their children than to
fill their lives at all times with the utmost degree of pleasure" (EGL
p295). Hick is alive to the realities of suffering - moral evil,
physical pain and so on. As with the two previous theodicists he finds
its justification in the process of maturation: likewise he sees the free
will defence as playing a central role in the problem. He refers to the
Flew-Mackie attack on the defence, which can be summarised as the
question of why does God not create agents who freely always chose the
good, if it is logically possible for him to do so? (EGL p307> Hick
believes that genuine freedom involves freedom of choice over against our
maker (EGL p311). He argues that it is logically possible for agents to
be such that they always freely act rightly towards each other, but not
for God to create agents who are made such that they authentically love
him. 'A' cannot freely love 'B' whilst ' B' has constructed 'A' such that
this love is inevitable (EGL p311). It is not an authentically free
response. There are, it might be suggested, difficulties with this
defence, such as the criticism that creating agents who can only really
mature in a certain direction is to construct a pathway of maturation,
and to model responsibilities such that truly responsible decisions can
only be those of a certain kind. There is thus a framework of the right
and the wrong, and what is authentic right choice will be determined by
the structure of good and bad. But, we might say, if we accept that
there is an objective ethic, rather than an amoral universe, or an
arbitrary morality, is it not true that there is nothing wrong in making
rational creatures such that they may if they wish choose the good,
whilst also making them creatures who are finite, who grow in
understanding, who are sometimes mistaken; who make discoveries, have an
inexhaustible creativity, can come independently to realise the value of
love and mutual acceptance? I think this will be the necessary course for
theodicists to take if they are trying to account for the apparent
'downside' of human behaviour, of a freedom developing without coercion,
but with many mistakes and evidence of suppressed, distorted, or evolving
rationality, frail social institutions, and violence. No doubt there are
weaknesses in such a case, where we might argue that social pressure,
deep-set cultural conditioning, emotion, human drives, attenuate the
chance of any realistic freedom to do what we may think it is right to
do, or even that of achieving an adequate appreciation of the real
possibilities and conditions of existence. But that is a topic for
theodicy which cannot be gone into here.
The argument for what constitutes rational non-arbitrary choice is an
interesting one. Hick holds that we cannot say that action is
undetermined by the character of the agent (ibid). What is it to say of
actions that they are his or hers if they are random? Nevertheless, he
wants to retain an element of "unpredictability". Actions are "largely
but not fully pre-figured in the previous state of the agent. For the
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character is itself partially formed and re-forrned in the very moment of
free decision" (EGL p312). Again, we are in a complex area. I do not want
to enter into lengthy discussion of this problem. I think it is apparent
that if we deny what theodicists like Hick are saying in the free will
defence, then all that human beings have done and will do has been fully
pre-figured, and we could not have done otherwise than we have (this
problem holds where we are held to be 'such that'; for being other than
such that we always freely choose the good, problematic enough in itself,
clearly not the case, we are then beings whose character determines our
acting in immoral and frequently unjustifiable ways). This destroys the
idea of responsibility, as each individual becomes a 'piece of fate'.
Nietzche rejoiced at the fall of the free will as a marker in the demise
of Christianity. However idiosyncratic the argument, an abandonment of
free will is indeed hardly compatible with a Christian anthropology.
Hick thinks that human autonomy almost pre-supposes emergence from
apedom. That "God must be a hidden deity, veiled by his creation" (EGL
p317). This allows us the "momentous possibility of being either aware
or unaware of our maker". And: "Man exists at a distance from God's goal
for him, however, not because he has fallen from that goal, but because
he has yet to arrive at it". The journey towards that goal as one
producing special worthwhile goods is thus the key to understanding
Hick's theodicy, as it is those of Swinburne, Meynell, and Plantinga.
He takes horrendous suffering and the demonic, seriously (EGL p324). It
would seem that moral evil is out of control, but he affirms that God
will have foreseen it: "We must not suppose that God intended evil as a
small domestic animal, and was then taken aback to find it growing into a
great ravening beast" (EGL p325>. Nothing of suffering is wasted
(although an anti-theodicist might question the worth of freedom in
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comparison to the great negatives of genocide, individual suffering and
so on). Hick emphasises the moral liability of the individual for their
actions, as well as recognising the ovei—arching responsibility of God.
In dealing with physical evil, he points to its biological functions.
Unnecessary pain, as often occurs in disease can be justified by its
usefulness in preserving the human organism against physical injury when
in a normal state of health. Pain also prevents us from becoming simple
'lotus eaters' <EGL p343). As the principle behind creation can be said
to be that of soul-making (EGL p344), and God desires particular kinds of
good, this world, with its pain, can be seen as the logically necessary
environment for obtaining these goods. But can all the pain in the world
be justified? Animal pain, argues Hick, is not as problematic as it might
seem. Animals lead uncomplicated lives, with a "thin thread of
consciousness", and are part of an organic whole (EGL p349). We might
disagree with Hick's views on the animal mind, but it is arguably
essential for a theodicist to be able to assert that on its own terms,
such life is worthwhile, and not characterised by unjustifiable torment;
or that animal suffering is justified when its logically necessary role
in an overall worthwhile world is considered (although this reliance on
organic justification can raise problems over the suffering of insentient
creatures as particular beings). As to a world without pain, laws govern
the consequences of actions. When we do certain things we get certain
results. We should ask what kind of world it would be if this were not
so. This argument ties in with those on free-will and pain and suffering,
as being logically necessary for certain otherwise unobtainable goods.
For Hick says the world brings banes and blessings such that "not even an
unfettered imagination can see how to remove the possibility of the one
without at the same time forfeiting the possibility of the other" (EGL
p364).
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Hick wishes to avoid rationalising suffering in the sense that there are
direct correlations between goodness and badness, and joy and suffering.
Clearly there are not on any 'just' consideration which wanted to
apportion good and bad in relation to action. Here I think we need to
agree that if we argue for the real possibility to do evil as the
condition for freedom, responsibility, for allowing ennobling courage,
sympathy, and so on, in a complex society of finite beings, and allow for
all kinds of maladies, mistakes, and natural disasters, hope of
arithmetical distribution of joy and suffering on the grounds of virtue
is unrealistic. On 'dysteleological' evil Hick hovers between ascribing
the occurrence of irrational suffering to 'mysterious' processes, and
more or less explicitly (and truly) rationalising it as the 'mysterious'
which contributes "to the character of the world as the place in which
true human goodness can occur and in which loving sympathy and
compassionate self-sacrifice can take place" (EGL p372; see also p389).
Ultimately, given that he holds God to be aware of the possibilities, and
perfectly good, the theodicy rationale behind suffering,
dysteleological or otherwise, moral or physical, must be said to triumph
(worthwhile goods otherwise unobtainable). After all, Hick has argued
that there can be no wasted suffering in God's world.
The eschatological in Hick is crucial. Theodicy requires an after-life
for the bringing to completion of the soul-making process, for the
fulfilment of lives (EGL p375). But what of the terrible evil that has
scarred this world? Is it not real evil after all? Hick thinks that the
dualistic vision of good and evil reflects the valid human perception,
shared by Jesus on the cross, which views evil as a demonic reality, as
utterly evil, irreconcilable to God. On the other hand, the monistic view
understands that there is a purpose in our suffering, and that is soul-
making. Evil is truly evil, but there is a goal and justification. On
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this issue Hick expresses something we have seen as arguably central to a
coherent theology/theodicy. First, he expresses horror at the
extermination camps:
"These events were utterly evil, wicked, devilish and... they were
wrongs that can never be righted, horrors which will disfigure the
universe to the end of time... It would have been better - much much
better - if they had never happened." (EGL p397)
Nevertheless, despite the obvious difficulty of the path trodden here, of
those extermination projects it can be said (and this is implicit in
Hick's ovei—all position and conclusion), that they:
".. will be seen to have been used as stages in the triumphant
fulfilment of the divine purpose of good." (EGL p400)
Here one can look at Hick's favoured method of counter—factual
hypothesis. What if this were not the case? What if such evils are really
purposeless, purely destructive, so awful as to be incompatible with the
creation of free and responsible, finite and tempted agents whose
existence is an expression of the divine goodness and its purpose, a
purpose which is not thwarted or or made a nonsense of by the course of
history? Would one be forced to conclude that a God who somehow permits
and constructs such possibilities for great good but greater evil, would
not be God, would not be wholly good? Why would have such agents, and
such all too real possibilities have been created? This is a question
which, arguably, every Christian should ask.
Turning briefly to A C Ewing, I shall note only his defence of the idea
of organic unities. Ewing, following Wisdom (Mind 44 1935), finds in G. E.
Moore's Principia Ethica. that the principle of unities can be applied to
the problem of evil (Ewing: Value and Reality p215ff). Moore held that
an organic whole could possess a particular good derived from the
relation of its parts. While we may argue that the means to an end are
irrelevant if the ends can be achieved otherwise, it is possible that the
goods of some organic wholes cannot be achieved otherwise than through
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certain relations of particular parts. A part of such an organic whole
cannot be considered a dispensable means to the good. For instance:
"Suppose the part removed, and what remains is not what was asserted
t.o have intrinsic value; but if we suppose a means removed, what
remains is just what was asserted to have intrinsic value. And yet...
the existence of the part may itself have no more intrinsic value
than the means." (Principia Ethica p29: CUP 1976)
Ewing develops the details of this argument at some length. The principle
of its application to the problem of evil should be evident. What is
itself bad, may, as Ewing points out, contribute organically to a whole
of great value. Are there then evils which are a necessary condition for
the bringing about of certain goods? Ewing is at one with Swinburne,
Meynell and Hick when he argues that there are. Worthwhile goods include
courage, sympathy, self-sacrifice, love, the conquering of evil itself
(VR p216-7). And he holds that: "The more different kinds of good there
are the better the world, provided they are not purchased at too high a
price in evil" (ibid). This latter proviso is of course the concern
central to theodicy. So far, I think, we have not had reason to say that
it is incompatible with Christian belief, or to doubt that if it were,
and good was purchased at a price acknowledged as too high, that we would
be attempting to sustain an empty concept of what perfect goodness
involves. In fact, it seems to embody what would be basic to a Christian
notion of justice and love, one which did not involve sadism, masochism,
or unintelligibility. Ewing's argument here is a variation on the theme
of logically necessary possibilities. It is hard to see what a Christian
theology of nature would be able to say if the various aspects of reality
and existence which involve suffering and challenge were ruled to be
wholly or unjustifiably bad, and not at all necessary as possibilities in
the first place for God to bring about the goods which he apparently
wants. Ewing thus presents a further case for integrating suffering or
its possibility into a vision of God's fundamental plans for the world,
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I conclude this review of basic theodicy moves and conditions by looking
at Alvin Plantinga and J L Mackie on free will. Is this the kind of
argument that Christian theists and theodicists must become involved in?
Plantinga's arguments are a rejoinder to those like Flew (see New Essays
in Philosophical Theology pl49ff : SCM, 1959), and Mackie who argue that
God could have created beings who are such that they always freely choose
the good; created a world in which beings are free always to do what is
right and pleasing to him; one in which the agent S freely abstains from
doing wrong (see for instance Mackie, MT, 1982, pl74). Part of the
strength of Mackie's case doui rely on the fact that he thinks the world
does contain unabsorbed evils, which clearly God would have avoided
permitting if he were wholly good, and would have been wholly able to
avoid if he could have created beings such that they always freely choose
the good. Whether there are unabsorbed, unjustifiable evils is crucial to
this case, as is the related question over whether God really should
have created beings who were such that they freely always choose the
good. It might be equally good if he did not, and created a rich and
complex world such as theists claim he has, one which has a logically
necessary character for the goods it brings about; goods otherwise
unobtainable (although Mackie also questions the coherence of a non-
compatibilist idea of freedom). This was the kind of argument against
which Plantinga postulated trans-world depravity (GAF p49ff). Plantinga
puts the question, is it possible for God to create a world containing
moral good, but without moral evil? He thinks not.
Plantinga wants to show that it is a possibility that of all the worlds
God is not able to actualize, were included those containing moral good,
but no evil. If a man is offered a bribe, and free to decide either
way, and takes it, then it is the case that God could not have created a
world in which the man decided otherwise. If he refuses the bribe, the
latter is true again. Take S - the state of affairs that the bribe is
offered: one which precludes neither acceptance or rejection, and is as
similar to the real world as possible. To maximise this similarity, the
real openness of the situation, S does not include either the acceptance
or the rejection of the bribe. Posit two worlds which include S ("every
possible state of affairs that includes S, but isn't included by S, is a
possible world".): W in which the bribe is accepted, and W' in which it
is rejected. S "is what remains of W when. . . taking the bribe is deleted;
it is also what remains of W* when. . . rejecting the bribe is deleted"
(GAF p46). Take a world W' in which the individual is "significantly"
free, and never does the wrong. When the situation S is considered, then
its actuality in W' would mean that this individual would have chosen the
wrong: thus W' is not a world that can be actualized. Neither could God
compromise the significant freedom by causing the individual to choose
the right. Plantinga calls the situation in which a significantly free
individual in any world W and where S pertains; one that neither
includes nor excludes that persons doing right or wrong in regard to a
morally significant action, and where the wrong is chosen if S is actual,
an example of transworld depravity. We may all suffer this condition,
and if this is so, then God could not create any of the possible worlds
where those people who do exist, would always do the good without at
least once choosing the wrong. However, as we shall see, there are
problems with this argument coming from the ideas behind individual
essence.
Plantinga argues, could God have created other people than those who do
exist? Say that all persons are instantiations of essences (E), then it
is possible that all essences suffer from transworld depravity and that
thus "S includes E's being instantiated and E" s instantiation's being
free with respect to A and A's being morally significant for E*s
instantiation/... S is included in W but includes neither... [performing
nor refraining from a morally significant action: my abvtn. 3" And: ". . .
if S were actual, then the instantiation of E would have gone wrong with
respect to A" (GFA p52ff). Plantinga maintains that: "if an essence E
suffers from transworld depravity, then it was not within God's power to
actualize a possible world W such that E contains the properties is
significantly free in to and always does what is right in W" (ibid). But
further, Plantinga thinks it possible that every created essence suffers
from this transworld depravity. And if so, "it's possible that God could
not have created a world containing moral good but no moral evil" (ibid).
Mackie thinks that Plantinga's proposition that every creature suffers
from transworld depravity is implausible unless God is faced with a
limited number of creaturely essences (MT pl74). It is not logically
impossible, he believes, that even a created person can always choose
to do the good, and additionally, Plantinga supposes the limit to the
range of possible persons is a logically contingent one. Yet: "how
could there be logically contingent states of affairs, prior to the
creation and existence of any beings with free will, which an omnipotent
god would have to accept and put up with?" (ibid) Again, for Mackie,
Plantinga's idea of individual essences is confusing, in that, presumably
non-causally, they determine how an individual will act, choose freely,
in each set of circumstances. Thus:
"The concept of individual essences concedes that even if free
actions are not causally determined, even if freedom in the important
sense is not compatible with causal determination, a person can still
be such that he will freely choose this way or that in each specific
situation." (ibid)
Given that this were so, an omnipotent God with an unrestricted range of
all the logically possible individual essences from which to create would
have been free to create creatures who were such that they would always
freely choose the good (ibid).
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As I have noted though, it is not necessarily the case that God would
anyway need to create creatures who were such that they would freely
always choose the good. We are in fact interested in holding that there
are worthwhile goods which are obtainable or present only in the kind of
world, and with the kind of existence, we actually have. Plantinga's
defence is an interesting one, and is one way we might attempt to show
that it is wrong to think Christians could be wedded to the idea that a
wholly good God could create beings 'such that' they always freely choose
the good. Nevertheless, Mackie shows that there is a real problem with
the idea of essence, and this seems to undermine Plantinga's position.
I shall not go further than this, for I have merely wanted to explore
some of the things theodicists feel are essential in making the case for
the justification of the evil that there is in the world, and which look
to be positions whose defence is crucial for Christian belief.
Plantinga's idea of transworld depravity is not one of these, since I
think that whether theodicists wish to defend the notion that we will in
heaven be 'such that' we will freely always choose the good, or not, they
have to defend the idea that we are presently free in some important
sense, and that moral evil can be justified. The other thinkers I
have looked at all touch on major themes in theodicy. I do not think that
in intention and working any argument was incompatible with Christian
belief: all wanted to justify evil, reconcile it with the existence of
the wholly good God. As to whether or not convincing defeater arguments
for the cases put by theodicists can be found, this is an open topic, and
not one which we need seek to resolve in this particular study of
Moltmann and his attitudes to the problem of evil. I believe why this is
so will become evident when, in the next chapter, we start to explore the
fundamental issues his thinking raises, related to whether or not
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What then of Moltmann's attitude to the theodicy question? He understands
the question in a manner which puts the emphasis on eschatology for its
resolution, but not in a way that would be comprehensible to theodicists
with their justificatory concerns. In fact, the theism of the theodicists
(with its usually careful description of attributes and exploration of
attributes), is rejected. Along with this rejection there thus seems to
go a disavowal of detailed analysis of concepts of responsibility,
perfect goodness, and justice. I believe that this particular rejection
of theism involves a loss of theological coherence, especially where the
problem of evil is concerned. I will look first at the portrayal of
theism in The Crucified God, for its view of why people should reject
theism, why there is atheism, offers insights into the reasons behind the
overall unsatisfactory handling of the question of evil. It is not clear
if Moltmann takes account of the potential for doctrinal modification
available to theists. Nor is it apparent that he understands the way in
which atheism based on the problem of evil, whilst commonly tied to
theism, can also follow from critique of non-theistic theology of the
kind he attempts to develop. A move away from theism and its responses
towards evil is not necessarily a move towards coherence. After this
preliminary stage, further material from The Crucified God is looked at,
where it gives information on how the theodicy problemm is understood, or
apparently misunderstood.
Following this, discussion will concentrate on his statements dealing
most explicitly with the issues of justification and the vindication of
God's righteousness. Texts looked at come from The Church in The Power of
the Spirit. The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. God in Creation, and the
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new SCM Dictionary of Theology. There follows the detailed exploration of
the major texts, in chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
In The Crucified God, theism is identified with the attribution of such
characteristics as omnipotence, absolute causality, wisdom, being the
best and highest (CG p219-221). 1 Moltmann sees the theology of the cross
as standing against this theism, and against the kinds of analogical
thinking which are its foundation. The analogical tradition of thought,
criticised through discussion of Luther, is that found typically in the
1 sentences' of Peter Lombard. It presupposed the possibility of natural
knowledge of the invisible God. The universe was permeated by divine
rationality: man was able to know nature, and through nature's
correspondence with God, to live a life in harmony with God. Moltmann
argues that even if the Stoic element was transformed by the notion of
the difference between creator and creature, the belief in an analogia
entis prevented a substantive break. He sees the medieval view of human
excellentia embodied in this leading to an exaltation of man.
So, the analogical principle is questioned. Yet Moltmann is cautious. He
continues by arguing that it is only "probably" questionable whether
everything in fact "corresponds to God and is connected with his being
through an analogia entis..." (CG p210>. It is then held: "Logical
inference really only advances correspondences of being to
correspondences in knowledge" (ibid). Thus, given that humanity is
corrupted, it becomes difficult to discriminate between that which
corresponds to God, and that which does not. There are a number of
difficulties with this position, given that I see it undermining the
analogical approach. First, even if we are not sure as to what exactly
corresponds to God's love, we will have to affirm that since God is
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wholly good, and this is something with certain entailments, then his
creation expresses this goodness in important ways, and is not ultimately
incompatible with it. So, secondly, whilst we may be painfully aware of
distortions in human behaviour, we must, if we are not to get involved in
a highly dangerous rejection of the world, hold that there is good reason
for an analogical grounding to our faith. To deny that in true harmony
with nature we can live in harmony with God, is to so diminish the fact
of the world as expression of God's essential love that we may have
reason to wonder what the divine creative and sustaining love is if it is
not to be senseless.
Atheism, it is said, looks at the world and sees only absurdity,
injustice, and nothingness. As with theism, atheism perceives a finite
world, and attempts to work to its causes and its future. Of course, it
reaches different conclusions. For, states Moltmann: "as the world has
really been made, belief in the devil is much more plausible than belief
in God" (CG p220>. Indeed:
"If one argues back from the state of the world and the fact of its
existence to cause, ground and principle, one can just as well speak
of 'God,' as of the devil, of being as well as nothingness, of the
meaning of the world as absurdity." (CG p221)
Atheism is characterised as a pre-occupation with the negative in
existence. For: "In this atheistic, de-divinized world, literature is
full of the 'monotheism of Satan'", and: "the history of Western atheism
becomes at the same time the history of nihilism" (ibid). Again, perhaps
rather dangerously: "With just as much justification as that with which
theism speaks of God, the highest, best, righteous being, it speaks of
the nothingness which manifests itself in all the annihilating
experiences of suffering and evil" (ibid). Here Moltmann makes a
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statement, characteristic of his arguably loose handling of the theodicy
problem, one whose implications are not followed up satisfactorily, at
least in The Crucified God. He ventures to question if protest atheism
can still live if metaphysical theism dies? Of protest atheism he writes:
"For its protest against injustice and death, does it not need an
authority to accuse, because it makes this authority responsible for
the state of affairs? And can it make this authority responsible if
it has not previously declared it to be behind the way in which the
world is and exists?" (ibid)
To this we might say - clearly, responsibility for the world is the basis
for the theodicy debate. If God is not responsible for the way the world
is, then it is unreasonable to expect him to justify his perfect
goodness, as 'creator', in relation to the suffering of 'his' 'creation'.
Indeed the problem of evil will disappear, along with the Christian
doctrine of God as sovereign creator of the universe, and as wholly good
and just. Now, if God is responsible in some fundamental way, then we do
have a real justificatory question to face up to (granted that we give
'wholly good' or 'justice' the kind of sense which it is essential to
have if any problem is to be perceived in the first place).
Moltmann continues his offensive against theism (CG p219~21). He believes
that theism is in conflict with the theology of the cross, the latter
alone being the theology which can speak of God in terms of his suffering
love for the weak. Metaphysics sees the divine in terms of unity and
indivisibility, immutability, eternity and so on. It attempts to secure
finite being on a divine ground which excludes all determinations against
being. The divine is, in Moltmann's words, the "zone of the impossibility
of death" (ibid). It was this conception, he thinks, which led to the
death of real trinitarian theology, a theology able to deal with
incarnation and passion (CG p215). A theology which takes the death of
the Son of God seriously, will understand God from this event. The
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metaphysical perception of divine being will be transformed: "It must
think of the suffering of Christ as the power of God and the death of
Christ as God's potentiality" (ibid). Still, "it must think of freedom
from suffering and death as a possibility for man." Whilst theism says
God cannot die, in an attempt to secure finitude from non-being,
Christian faith is to say that we might live and rise again in his
future" (CG p216). Moltmann goes on to describe how the forgoing of an
omnipotent God effects liberation from childish illusions and desires for
a father figure (ibid). Nevertheless, there are strong parallels between
theism and Moltmann's view of the theology of the cross.
He argues that the theology of the cross sees, like the 'metaphysical'
view, that all is subject to transitoriness. Yet it also sees nothingness
as vanquished, and "the prospect of the hope and liberation of all
things" (CG p218). The metaphysical desire for infinity and the
intransitory is transformed into the eschatological hope for the new
creation (ibid).
As we shall see, it is not clear in what way this theology of the cross
differs fundamentally from theism in its desire to see finitude given
radically new determinations, exclusive of those which threaten being,
and in its pessimistic evaluation of present modes of being. And indeed,
here Moltmarm does not think that the theology of the cross marks the
termination of 'metaphysics', but takes it up anew in its consideration
of the history of the world as history within God's horizon for the world
(CG p218-19). For:
"The event of the resurrection of the crucified Christ makes it
necessary to think of the annihilation of the world and the creation
of every being from nothing." (CG p218)
And:
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"The cross is 'set up in the cosmos to establish the unstable,' ...
There is a truth here: it is set up in the cosmos in order to give
future to that which is passing away, firmness to that which is
unsteady, openness to that which is fixed, hope to the hopeless, and
in this way to gather all that is and all that is no more into the
new creation." (CG p219)
What then can be established about Moltmann's views on theism and
theodicy so far? First, despite similarities between a theology of the
cross which cannot accept the present transitoriness of reality, and
theism, theism as the ascription of certain traditional attributes to God
is rejected. It engenders and supports illusions connected with immature
attempts to secure stability. It involves an omnipotent God who cannot
suffer. A God, who unlike the God of the cross, we are told, "sits over
man's conscience like the fist on the neck" (CG p216). About theodicy,
we have seen little yet. But related subjects have taken on a shape which
occurs throughout Moltmann's theology. Moltmann rejects the world as it
stands ontologically. Suffering is thus deeply woven into the texture of
God's creation (something we shall see increasingly). This fact helps set
up the question which we will later seek to answer. How is this state of
affairs seen as compatible with God's goodness? Does Moltmann rightly
exclude the exploration of reasons why the world is as it is, and the
usual connections between these issues and the divine nature and
responsibilities?
Moltmann is concerned with the roots of protest atheism as lying with the
omnipotent God who cannot die. As we have seen, omnipotence can be
modified as an act of omnipotence. If this is accepted, and as long as
this action is not seen as incompatible with perfect goodness, it seems
that there is in fact no reason why death within the trinity should not
be a possibility for at least some theists. The Moltmannian critique of
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omnipotence, apart from God's not being able to die, is that such a God
cannot love; can only be "almighty" <CG p223).
In Schiller's ode to joy, it is noted, a great reward is promised to
humanity in a future life, a theodicy of German idealism (CG p221).
Against this kind of thinking, Dostoyevsky's reflections in The Brothers
Karamazov, the classic form of protest atheism, were directed. a Moltmann
argues, without adding strength to his own case, that such a statement
of suffering is not to be answered by cosmological arguments for the
existence of God, nor by any theism, but is rather "provoked by both of
these" (ibid). This would seera to leave the believer in the just and
responsible God in great difficulty. Keeping in mind the attack on
analogical thinking in theology, Moltmann will eventually have to face
the problem of outlining a theology which fails to provoke deep theodicy
questioning, whilst at the same time retaining a sense of what God's
perfect love and justice is in creation - but presumably avoiding the
kind of definitional interest of the theists, which has arguably helped
us feel the sting of the suffering in the world in the kind of way which
makes us ask: 'If God be wholly good, whence then be evil?'
While as we shall see, the problem of evil is taken with great
seriousness, Moltmann holds that in the situation that humanity finds
itself in, God is revealed as opposed to "all that is exalted and
beautiful and good, all that the dehumanized man seeks for himself and so
perverts". Indeed, God is "not known through his works in reality, but
through his suffering..." (CG p212). It is clear, here at least, that
Moltmann has little place for a doctrine of natural knowledge that is
sustaining or saving knowledge, although this fact will eventually be
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less problematic then the theology of creation itself, with which it is
of course inter-related.
So, humanity is dehumanized, but why? Why is it that knowledge of God "is
not achieved by the guiding thread of analogies from earth to heaven, but
on the contrary, through contradiction, sorrow and suffering" (ibid)?
Why is it the case that God's evident ability to love the other, but in
this case the suffering and de-humanized, is so called upon? On this
track one is asking first why there is suffering and evil, what causes
it, rather than the wider question, can it be justified (the answer to
this second question depends of course upon the response to the first,
and when the originator of all is held to be perfectly just, we also
cannot avoid asking the second question}. It is necessary to keep
this question of the grounds of suffering, of human brokenness in mind
when considering a theology which opposes the justification of evil, but
which is so alive to the inhuman and de-natured state of creation;
witness Moltmann's handling of atheism and its recognition of the
'nothingness' in the world. But is it necessary to be very specific here?
Looking at the question of evil and of justification, one is aware that
the central issue is that of the compatibililty of evil with the
existence of the God who is wholly good. Because of this, one does not
need to pinpoint certain isolated events, but can point to perceived
general features in existence which one would need to hold to be the
case. Such as freedom, courage, the beauty of the world; the fact that
human existence conceived of as divinely ordered will be worthwhile (this
limited requirement stems from my position as investigating Moltmann's
view of the problem of evil, rather than being in that of a theodicist
who has to attempt to show that in the kind of world there is, good is in
fact proportionate to evil). What starts as a question of origins will
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become one of a divine responsibility which cannot be burdened with
having permitted the possibility of unjustifiable evils.
Moltmann's response to the positions of Camus and Dostoyevsky (CG p222),
to hostile and rebellious reaction to the God who cannot die, is to
assert that God can suffer. Indeed, "a God who cannot suffer is poorer
than any man" (ibid).3 The suffering and helpless, mortal human being,
is thus richer than the almighty God. However, as we have seen it is not
true that the theist necessarily believes in God who cannot suffer. But
more important when looking at the question of evil, in the Moltmannian
switch from the picture of the inadequate omnipotent being to the
suffering God, one is left with the question of responsibility quite
untouched. Is a less than omnipotent God not responsible for the
suffering in his creation?-4 If a wholly loving God does what it is simply
logically possible for him to do (not everything that is logically
possible is in fact within his power to bring about), is there not yet an
innate bar to creating that kind of world which will give rise to, or
enable unjustifiable evil? Suffering has to be possible before God can
suffer. In this world it seems probable that all higher creatures suffer
at some time or another, and indeed almost inevitably so. If God is
responsible for evolutionary systems, generational organic development,
with the consequent suffering involved, then Moltmann's attitude to death
and nothingness will require clarification at certain points (see
especially God in Creation: there is though a general hostility to
mortality in creation). If these aspects of creation are seen as not
justifiable, or a giving rise to unjustifiable events and opportunities
for inflicting suffering on the innocent (incompatible with the wholly
good God), then it appears either that God is responsible, but not the
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loving God. Or that he is loving, but not responsible because of some
dualistic conflict behind reality as it is.
Moltmann takes up Horkheirners challenge to theism and atheism. Whilst
there is no theistic answer to the problem of suffering, "far less is
there any atheistic possibility of avoiding this question and being
content with the world" (CG p224).s Moltmann cites Horkheimers
statement that it is impossible to believe in the existence of an
omnipotent and all-gracious god. Horkheimer infers this from the
suffering and injustice that there is. The incompatibility between the
existence of such a God, and that of the evil that there is, is however,
hardly one that can bring relief to theologians, or so the atheist anti-
theodicist, or the theodicist would say. If God is not sovereign, all-
gracious, wholly good, then what is he? If he is not able to do all that
is logically possible and compatible with perfect goodness, surely this
does not mean that control over the realisation of what is not compatible
with his perfect goodness is lacking? What would it mean to say that he
was in reality perfectly good? Looking at the world as it has been
created, Moltmann holds:
"If innocent suffering puts the idea of a righteous God in question,
so conversely longing for the righteousness of the wholly other puts
suffering in question and makes it conscious sorrow...If we call the
sting in the question unde malum? God, then conversely the sting in
the question an Deus sit? is suffering. Cosmological theism answers
this double question with a justification of this world as God's
world. In so doing it passes over the history of suffering of this
world. Either it must be tolerated, or it will be compensated for by
the second world in heaven.
This answer is idolatry." (CG p225)
In fact, rejection of compensation in the new creation only heightens
difficulties. For, if the rightousness of God is ever truly put in
question, and the question does not relate simply to eschatological time¬
tabling, that must be because there is an at least prima facie moral
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incompatibility between what is expected of such a God, and what exists.
Such an incompatibility must rest on what is attributed to God, such as
responsibility in creating, perfect love, and so on. If a situation is
awaited, in which God's nature gives rise to exactly the kind of whole
and joyful world which is not present now; one which deeply contradicts
aspects of this suffering world - a world which gives rise to the
question 'when is the new world coming, with its expression of God's
righteousness', then certain questions can be asked. If the new creation
is compatible with God's being, why in crucial areas, is this world not
(in the sense that it simply cannot be justified, even if seen in
necessary inter-relation to the coming world)? What kind of creative
relationship can God have to the foundation of this new world which was
not the case with the first creation, and which will allow us to ascribe
responsibility for what is good, when we cannot ascribe responsibility
for what is unjust in the make-up of this world?
If we reject compensation as Moltmann does here, we are in danger of
being incoherent. That is, compensation can be of two types. An injury
can be done. Nothing will remove the suffering that occurred, but a new
life can be built on the basis of financial and other support. In this
case, the compensator accepts responsibility. The injured party was
innocent. Nothing can remove the naked fact that the responsible party
was in the wrong, guilty. Secondly, perhaps less actuarial, compensation
is in a sense inherent in the suffering. That is, without the suffering,
or its possibility, there would not be the potential for personal
responsibility, freedom, moral choice, character development, care, and
so on. This would be a possible theodicists reading of compensation.
There are second order goods involved, otherwise unobtainable. This
position is of course open to criticism. Thirdly, there is Moltmann's
position in The Crucified God. Since God is not responsible, at least on
one reading, it is clearly inane to suggest that compensation of the
normal kind might be involved. The innocent have suffered. There is no
conception of second order goods to compensate and offer explanation.
Usually, it would be held that only if God is not responsible for the
suffering in the way in which he is usually understood to be, as in the
free will defence, is he freed from justificatory obligations. But in
fact this freedom from direct moral responsibility cannot be for a God
who freely creates out of nothing, and whose morality is such that no
theodicy is worthy of contemplation. If God is responsible, but accepts
that compensation is not possible, what then? Compensation is presumably
not possible because it overlooks the reality of the suffering of those
who are after all innocent. As J C A Gaskin argues:
"If a human agent makes some ghastly moral error he may repent and
try and recompense his victim. With God the situation is worse. With
God the notions of error and repentance have no place; and if mundane
suffering is such, or in any part such, as God could have prevented
but did not, then no eternity of cakes and sweets will remove the
moral imperfection of him who could have prevented the innocent
suffering but did not do so. The innocent suffering stands for all
time as innocent." (TQFE pi23)
Moltmann does not disagree that innocent suffering is forever innocent
suffering. But for Moltmann the question of the longing for God's
righteousness can be answered, or at least made no longer relevant. And
with it, the question of responsibility also appears to fade into
obscurity.
He argues that critical theory and theology share two open questions:
"the question of suffering which cannot be answered and the question of
righteousness which cannot be surrendered" (CG p225). If the question of
suffering really cannot be answered, this is of major consequence. For if
God is not morally responsible, in that human beings exercised genuinely
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free choice in a way which produced second order goods which outweighed
the bad, (we shall omit physical evil here), then the question of
suffering is answered, and the question of righteousness can be
surrendered. However, if no such explanations are permissible, how is it
ever possible to conceive of a completion of creation where unmitigated
joy is the key-note of existence, rather than sadness and puzzlement, and
the struggle to remember what has passed in the face of the now present
joy aspect? What if the horrors of the first creation are unsublimated in
righteousness then ever be surrendered? And is that not an argument
against God's being wholly and perfectly good: seeing that he did not
refrain from creating? I think it is.
Moltmann's procedure on page two-hundred and twenty-six following, well
represents the problems which confront a theodicist seeking more or less
conventional answers to the problem of evil within this theology. First,
it is declared that, given the question of suffering which sets up evil
against the righteousness of God, an apathetic and glorious God enthroned
in heaven is inadmissible. It is said of Camus that "he understood well
that Christ's cross must mean that God himself renounced his longstanding
privileges and himself experienced the agony of death ("Though he could
not see "the cross and the deathly anguish of the godforsakenness in God"
ibid). Theology then, is to recognise how God is the suffering God in
the suffering of Christ. Thus the contradiction between God and
suffering, as it stands in atheism and theism, is overcome. That is,
"God's being is in suffering and the suffering is in God's being itself,
because God is love" (CG p227). Yet as we have seen, theism allows of
modification, and it is not inconceivable that even an omnipotent or
extremely powerful God could have the strength to renounce 'longstanding
the evolution of God new creation? Can the question of
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privileges', and suffer. Further, when Moltmann characterises theism and
atheism as maintaining and sharing the notion of contradiction between
God and suffering, his models are narrow indeed. He sees two kinds of
atheism. There is "Crude atheism for which this world is everything",
this is "superficial". And protest atheism, which is a protest against
injustice "for God's sake" (both CG p226). In this way the range of
fundamental critique of God is apparently exhausted.
Moltmann points up where he himself is weakest in handling the question
of evil, in citing the quip that the best excuse for God would be for him
not to exist (CG p225). This is protest atheism as theodicy, one is told.
Indeed it is, and highlights the essence of the classical theodicy
problem. If it is impossible to justify the evil that has occurred,
because it is incompatible with the existence of the wholly loving God,
then the atheists are arguably right to say that such a God does not
exist. Reality would be transparently joyful if .he did exist, or at
least free from evils incompatible with God's love: but it is not, and he
does not exist. This position is arguably more convincing than holding
that if the contradiction between God and suffering as Moltmann
understands it is overcome, then Moltmann's theology has surpassed in
some major way, the theistic and atheistic options. It is not a straight
contradiction between God and his redemptive loving and active suffering
that is of primary interest in theodicy, but the contradiction between
perfect love and (unjustified) evil. Is there an incompatibility between
the two? Naturally, if there is no incompatibility, and the suffering
that occurs falls within acceptable parameters, then God's suffering with
his creation rightly becomes a focal point. Yet if God is considered a
remote authority who allows suffering for its production of justificatory
goods, otherwise unobtainable, and this idea is rejected, what of the
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feeling and wholly good God who presides over a creation of inexplicable
and unjustifable suffering, which is yet his creation, and who suffers
too? Where will the breakthrough lie? Arguably there is none.
I continue this survey of theodicy passages in The Crucified God by
looking at sections 6, 7, and 8 of chapter 6, where the trinitarian
dialectical stream in Moltmann is prominent. This creates tensions with
the earlier statements on the unjustifiablity of suffering. He argues
that with a trinitarian theology of the cross God is not remote and
other-worldly, but this worldly. And Jesus' death on the cross is not the
death of God, but the start of the God-event where the "life-giving
spirit of love emerges from the death of the Son and the grief of the
Father" <CG p252). Is this then a theology where suffering will have a
reason, a necessary role? Is the second stream in Moltmann, the
dialectical? This is an issue which we will touch on periodically, as we
come across Moltmann's apparently Hegelian passages of thought, and a
question which I will seek to answer in the final chapters. If there are
grounds to conclude that there is a second stream, then there is a major
contradiction at the heart of Moltmann's approach to the problem of evil,
founded as it is on the ground of perfect righteousness as manifest in
God; for there will be no way to avoid imputing divine responsibility for
unjustifiable suffering, or highlighting an amoral, or immoral dialectic.
Moltmann calls protest atheism the "only serious atheism" <CG p252).s He
then asks if Christian trinitarian thinking can give some response to the
problems of suffering, and the desire for righteousness. Those who
suffer without reason, consider themselves god-forsaken ; on the cross
the cry of forsakenness was there too. Because of this, God is, deeply,
the human God: "who cries with him [ie, the suffering human being] and
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intercedes for him with his cross where man in his torment is dumb." A
theodicist or atheist anti-theodicist might still ask what the origin and
justification of such suffering might be. In The Crucified God (pages
253-256) we have a good example of ambiguity where these issues of
responsibility, necessity, and justice are concerned. If the theodicist
ventures that God's intercession to God on behalf of a suffering and dumb
humanity raises the issue of reasons, justification for suffering, two
responses can be drawn.
First, love can be seen as having a causal relationship to suffering in
the sense that love requires suffering. God is loving, and wants us to be
loving, and hence suffering has its place as a necessary component, a
pre-requisite for a genuinely loving and worthwhile creation. Thus "Where
he [God] has suffered the death of Jesus and in so doing has shown the
force of his love, men also find the power to continue to love, to
sustain that which annihilates them and to ' endure what is dead,'
(Hegel). Hegel termed this the life of mind" (CG p253). This is followed
by quotation of an important passage from the Phenomenology of Mind
(93), which it is worth citing in order to highlight the tensions in
Moltmann's position, certainly in The Crucified God:
"But the life of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of
destruction; it endures death... It only wins to truth when it finds
itself utterly torn asunder. It is this mighty power, not by being a
positive which turns away from the negative, as when we say of
anything it is nothing or it is false, and, being then done with it,
pass on to something else; on the contrary, mind is this power only
by looking this negative in the face, and dwelling with it... (my abvtn
- Phenomenology, ibid: CG p254)
It is hard to know the extent to which Moltmann is in agreement with the
opinions quoted or described. If Moltmann tells us that Hegel termed
God's suffering of the death of Jesus, the life of the mind, does this
mean that Hegels' dialectic is what is encountered in the the theology
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of the cross? It seems evident that Moltmann does follow Hegel here.
That suffering is a part of the life of the triune God. There is little
to cause one to doubt this. Moltmann cites Hegel's words that human
finitude, the negative, '"is itself a divine moment, is in God himself"
(CG p254: from Philosophy of Religion 111 98). And there is yet another
apparently highly significant quotation, in which the following sentences
appear:
"The reconciliation believed in as being in Christ has no meaning if
God is not known as Trinity, if it is not recognised that He is but
is at the same time the Other, the self-differentiating, the Other in
the sense that this Other is God himself and has potentially the
divine nature in it, and that the abolishing of this difference, of
this otherness, this return, this love, is Spirit." (PR 99ff: CG ibid -
my abbvtn)
Moltmann holds that the trinity is open to the future, and that it should
not be viewed as a closed circle. It is in fact a "dialectical event" (CG
p255). The trinity is the history of God, in our terms "the history of
love and liberation". The trinity "presses towards eschatological
consummation" (ibid). It does this:
"so that the 'Trinity may be all in all', or put more simply, so that
'love may be all in all', so that life may triumph over death and
righteousness over the hells of the negative and of all force." (ibid)
And the trinity is:
"... transcendent as Father, immanent as Son and opens up the future
of history as the Spirit. If we understand God in this way we can
understand our own history, the history of suffering and the history
of hope, in the history of God. Beyond theistic submissiveness and
atheistic protest, this is the history of life because it is the
history of love." (CG p256)
The first of these statements appears problematic when we remember what
was said about theism and its justificatory approach. In other words if
we are to take seriously Moltmann's citations of Hegel, it seems that
the whole trinitarian consummation process is aimed at overcoming the
negatives which are themselves posited by God (and are indeed an
essential part of the life of spirit). If this is so, and if one is to
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maintain God's goodness in the sense that was earlier argued, then God
must have foreseen the negative and judged that it was necessary for the
attainment of a higher and worthwhile good. It does seem at this point
that for Moltmann the negative dimension is a pre-requisite for the full
life of the trinity, the history of love. And he writes "Can it really be
said of the first creation that in it God was 'all in all'?" (CG p261)
He argues that the new creation will be something better than the first.
The possibility of sin will be removed (ibid), and "consequently,
redeemed existence must be more than created existence" (ibid).
Moreover, "the new freedom of the children of God must be greater than
the first freedom of men" (ibid).
The question then arises if Moltmann sees the lesser freedom of humanity
as something which is: A) The consequence of God* s being less than all in
all; and in its existence in the first creation a necessary step in the
process which will lead him to be all in all. That is, God cannot create
a really free humanity until he has evolved with and through the
suffering of humanity, and his suffering, to the stage where this new
creation is possible. If we try and reconcile this with Moltmann's
position on suffering for which there can be no theodicy, then there is
clearly unjustifiable suffering incurred in the process: although how
much due to lack of real freedom, and how much to natural physical evils
is never quite clear (this position would be unacceptable on conventional
terms). Or R) The result of a positive Irenaean type progression for
humanity. This is not taken up by Moltmann, but its possible
justification of moral evil at least, would help to lessen the
potentially destructive implications of the Moltmannian doctrine that
our history is a history taking place within the horizon of the history
of the trinity. But since this destructive aspect comes from the
rejection of the possibility of justification of all the evil that there
is, which means that God creates a history of unjust suffering, relief in
the form of the Ireneaen approach would involve contradiction of what we
have seen Moltmann say. The belief in our life as taking place within the
horizon of the history of the trinity is nevertheless presented without
any major doubts as to the coherence of the non-justificatory position,
as can be seen in the maintaining of hope in the action of the
(presumably) wholly good God:
"... only with the resurrection of the dead, the murdered and gassed,
only with the healing of those in despair who bear lifelong wounds,
only with the abolition of all rule and authority, only with the
annihilation of death will the Son hand over the kingdom to the
Father. Then God will turn his sorrow into eternal joy. This will be
the sign of the completion of the trinitarian history of God and the
end of world history..." (CG p278)
Problematic, it seems, are the implications of the consequent statement:
"Even Auschwitz is taken up into the grief of the Father, the surrender
of the Son and the power of the Spirit. That never means that Auschwitz
and other grisly places can be justified, for it is the cross that is the
beginning of the trinitarian history of God" (ibid).^ However, we do not
need to become involved in a lengthy debate as to whether or not these
events appear to have some place in a process, for the very admission of
unjustifiability alone raises immense, and arguably decisive problems. Of
course, absorbing such happenings into patterns of divine life and
consummation, whilst still maintaining the aspect of unjustifiablity
could be even more puzzling, although arguably no more damaging in
absolute terms when we see how theodicists would react to the fundamental
idea of goods not proportionate to the evils (implying from their point
of view that God as wholly good does not exist).
The Crucified God ends on a tantalising note for those interested in the
question of the degree of necessity in Christ's suffering. It is held
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that "Christ is more than necessary; he is free and sets free. He belongs
both to the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, because he is
himself the transition" (ibid). A brief digression to examine a little
further this notion of freedom and necessity as it relates to God, takes
one to The Theology of Joy (p47ff). Here Moltmann notes that
traditionally the incarnation was seen as the necessary remedy for human
sin. So the tradition could explain why God became man. Yet it failed to
account for the contingency in his becoming one man at one particular
time and place. This 1 randomness' , according to Moltmann, indicates the
freedom of God "within the polarity of man's need and divine redemption
from that need". Most interestingly, for Moltmann, God's freedom means
that he is not compelled to redeem humanity (TJ p48>. This seems to
imply that there can be no moral responsibility for earthly suffering on
God's part: and if this were the case, normally at least, it would also
imply a free will defence. Assuming, in the absence of a free will
defence, that God has responsibility, is he not obliged to redeem
humanity from its suffering? But this points out the complexity of the
theodicy issue. For if God inflicts suffering on humanity, without its
being justifiable as the consequences of genuinely free choices on our
part, what can the justification of suffering be? That is, surely it must
then be a pre-requisite for some worthwhile good not related to our
exercise of a free or unfree choice. Perhaps it is unavoidable that we
are sinful, not fully free, and subject to death, because God is not all
in all, and cannot create a world without these negatives: and it is in
overcoming the negatives that a re-created and new non-mortal existence
will be possible. One which will make all the suffering that has occured
worthwhile as developmental suffering, an unavoidable means to a glorious
end. Yet in this case surely God is responsible, and obliged to redeem
humanity, existing as it does within the horizon of the history of love?
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So, if God is not compelled to redeem the unjustly suffering in creation,
what are we to make of Moltrnann's concepts of divine freedom and
goodness? Is Moltmann saying that God could have decided freely not to
redeem the world, even if it were only just that he should? He in fact
argues that, between the extremes of necessity and caprice, there lies
another way. Thus: "Even if the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is not
necessary for God himself, it does not constitute caprice; rather it
corresponds to God's deepest nature... God was not compelled by human
misery to come in the flesh, but he came because of his own free and
uncaused love" <TJ ibid). This is a concept of freedom developed in
greater detail in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. How one is to
evaluate such statements in terms of conventional theodicy debate?
If God creates the world in perfect freedom and goodness, and as part of
the history of love, humanity suffers, one can see how God does not
value something because it is subjected to evil, but as the God who is
love, is 'compelled' by love to help redeem those involved in suffering.
This seems to be what Moltmann is saying. Here God's redeeming action is
integral with the freedom for God to be what he is, love. In this
important sense, it is necesary for God to love the suffering, for not to
love the suffering would be self-contradiction. God, it can be held,
would not be God. This highlights potential difficulties with Moltmann's
notion of God's free love. If it is genuinely so, and God's action
corresponds to his deepest nature, then unjustified evils in the world
would arguably constitute a very major, indeed fatal problem. That is, if
God is such that he could not do otherwise than redeem, out of his deep
and unflinching love, we may wonder how any unjustifiable evil could be
tolerated in the first place as a component of creation. There is also
difficulty if we believe that God is free in the sense that he could
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just as well, when confronted by the reality of suffering creation,
decide not to redeem, as to redeem. One could then question whether such
redemptive action at all "corresponds to God's deepest nature".
To return to The Crucified God, the latter sections of chapter 6 are
concerned with the pathos of God. This is relevant material, but I shall
leave its discussion till the following chapter. For present purposes, an
introductory look at its handling in The Trinity and The Kingdom of God
will be adequate. I end with a quotation from Moltmann's reflections on
the place of suffering in God. It appears to point to a positive
integration of suffering into the divine life. As we have seen, this
would be puzzling for those who would be opposed anyway to the idea that
belief in God as wholly good and creator is compatible with holding that
there is unjustifiable evil. Yet although such dialectical passages add
complexity to the exploration of Moltmann's handling of the question of
evil, it is perhaps the fundamental understanding that a unjustifiable
suffering is tolerable to a wholly good God which is the main problem.
The dialectical stream would only appear to make this problematic stance
more confusing, through its addition of a clear sense of necessity in the
divine toleration of unjustifiable evil:
"... a trinitarian theology the cross perceives God in the negative
element and therefore the negative element in God, and in this
dialectical way is panentheistic. For in the hidden mode of
humiliation to the point of the cross, all being and all that
annihilates has already been taken up in God and God begins to
become all in all." <CG p277)6S
As with The Crucified God. I shall leave the outline of the overall
structure of The Trinity and the Kingdom of God until the chapter in
which it is dealt with at some length. This book contains important
material on Moltmann's understanding of the problem of evil. In chapter
2, section 6, "God and Suffering", Moltmann clearly repudiates the notion
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that all the evil that has occurred is justifiable. It has seemed at
times that if we take this seriously, we will have to give up the idea of
a wholly just and loving creator God. But Moltmann evidently believes
that this is not so.
To begin with, there is the dramatic statement that: "The suffering of a
single innocent child is an irrefutable rebuttal of the notion of an
almighty and kindly God in heaven" (TKG p47). That is, "... a God who
lets the innocent suffer and who permits senseless death, is not worthy
to be called God at all" (ibid). It will help if a number of questions
are asked here. First, why might the death of an innocent be an
irrefutable rebuttal of the theistic God's existence? Previously,
Moltmann argued that a God who does not suffer cannot be a loving God.
This problem was related to belief in divine omnipotence, and so to
theism. The statement above indicates a new problem for theists: it lies
in God's letting the innocent suffer. The problem would seem to be the
classic difficulty confronting theodicists: that an all-powerful (or
powerful), and, one would assume, wholly good God, would do all that it
is possible to do to eliminate evil, and would not permit the
circumstances in which an innocent and/or unjustifiable death could
occur. If the theodicist's task is seen as hopeless even on the death of
a single innnocent, we must then ask what makes it possible to believe in
the existence (or at least the coherence of the notion of the existence)
of a post-theistic God, whose creation is also marked by innocent
suffering and death? A God who is also perfectly righteous, wholly good,
wholly free. Moltmann himself highlights the destructive awfulness of
suffering: "There is no explanation of suffering which is capable of
obliterating. . . pain, and no consolation of a higher wisdom which can
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assuage it" (TKG p47). Still, the question remains: what is it that puts
Moltmann's God beyond the reach of conventional critique?
In line with the apparent failure to analyse adequately the problems
facing theodicists, Moltmann advances an interesting argument on protest
atheism, the "rock of atheism" (TKG p4S>. The argument runs that it is
precisely the charge against God which shows that the desire for life and
righteousness is what makes suffering what it is. Without a desire for
justice there could be no rebellion against the suffering of the
innocent. Moltmann is now making a leap from an argument from suffering
as evil because contrasting with what is good, to one for the necessary,
self-evident existence of God. Thus: "If there were no God, the world as
it is would be aU right" (my emphasis). This is followed by the claim
that only the thirst for God "turns suffering into conscious pain". And
if one were to counter this by arguing that it is possible to experience
pain and anguish without belief in God, or even perhaps because one
believes God does not exist, there is an indirect argument against this.
For Moltmann holds that "... the atheism for which this world is all
there is runs aground on the rock of suffering too. For even the
abolition of God does not explain suffering and does not assuage pain"
(this sounds like a case for agnosticism). Moltmann has already stated
that no higher wisdom can obliterate pain. But atheism does not claim
this. Perhaps the focus of attention should be the explanatory aspect. If
modified theism is incompatible with innocent suffering, and atheists do
not feel compelled to give any reasons as to why the brute reality of a
complex universe without a loving God as its creator should not involve
the suffering of those beings which evolve within it, what advantages
might post-theistic theology have in such a situation?
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Moltmann does not attempt to show how God's love is compatible with
innocent suffering in the sense that he is in some way responsible,
although all will be for the good. Neither does he provide an account
which satisfactorily places it beyond the divine responsibility. Still,
there are places where even innocent suffering fits in with Moltmann's
explanations of divine creativity and trinitarian history. In this way,
Moltmann does seem to give some kind of explanation, although, since
injunctions against the justification of (unjustifiable) evil are never
retracted, confusion must arise over divine intentions. If we take
Moltmann at his word, that no theological explanation can be given, then,
since non-Christians can arguably give explanations, it is possible to
maintain that they have a more plausible position. If it is accepted that
there is no undisputed evidence for the worlds being created by a being
who never permits or does immoral actions (actions whose possibility
cannot be justified by causal connection with the logically necessary
conditions for higher goods), or that this God is incompatible with the
existence of the world as it is, then arguments for the biological basis
of behaviour come into their own, as opposed to merely being evidence
against the God idea. Here there is no need to resort to theology to
explain why human society is not perfect, and is not free from sin. If
atheism can explain suffering without God, then part of Moltmann's case
is gone. Suffering is not the rock of atheism that Moltmann made it out
to be (TKG p48). Instead, it threatens belief in the divine creation of
the world by a wholly good God.
On the basis of the finding that theism cannot answer the problem of
suffering, nor atheism 'abolish' it, Moltmann outlines the "open-
question" of theodicy. If we ask if God is just, we only do so because of
our longing for God over against suffering. But against God's being just,
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hangs the problem of suffering. This is what Moltmann terms the dialectic
of theodicy's open question (TKG p49>. He then makes a debatable
assertion. These questions of God, and of suffering find a "common
answer". For "Either that, or neither of them finds a satisfactory answer
at all". The implication seems to be strongly that of an eschatological
verification of justification. Thus: "No one can answer the theodicy
question in this world, and no one can get rid of it" (ibid).
Nevertheless is Moltmann really saying that it can be answered in the
next? Clearly not. For humanity is to live with this qestion of
suffering, seeking that future in which "the desire for God will be
fulfilled" (ibid). It is the satisfaction of this desire which is
primary, and not an answer to a theoretical question. This can be seen in
the way Moltmann formulates his dialectic of the theodicy question. The
question, is there a just God? - has as its sting, the experience of
suffering. But the overall emphasis is on the presence of a just God. It
is not the theodicy question as normally understood at all. If God
creates a new and sinless, deathless world, then he is just. To ask if
there is a logical problem in maintaining that there is a God who is
eternally good and loving, and who will create the new creation, is not,
it would appear, something which Moltmann would consider, even if there
is unjustifiable suffering in the world. Moltmann*s question is one about
the future, and not about whether an answer on compatibility is possible,
and if not, what the consequences might be. He writes of the theodicy
question, it:
"... is not a speculative question. It is a critical one. It is the all-
embracing eschatological question, it is not purely theoretical, for it
cannot be answered with any new theory about the existing world, it
is a practical question which will only be answered through the
experience of the new world in which 'God will wipe away the tear
from their eyes.' It is not really a question at all, in the sense of
something we can ask or not ask, like other questions. It is the open
wound of life. In this world... The person who believes will not rest
content with any slickly explanatory answer to the theodicy
question... The more a person believes... the more passionately he asks
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about God and the new creation." (TKG p49)
What then of religious theorising about suffering? Moltmann looks at the
connections made between sin and suffering and death - from Romans 6:23,
to Augustine and the Latin tradition. However, whilst Moltmann is
prepared to accept that there are clear links between sin and suffering,
these cannot serve as a "universal" explanation of suffering. And it is
important for an understanding of Moltmann that the following is noted:
"We cannot say, 'if there were no sin, there would be no suffering'" (TKG
p50-l>. And the succeeding sentences go to the heart of much of
Moltmann's theology. Thus:
"Experience of suffering goes far beyond the experience of guilt and
the experience of grace. It has its roots in the limitations of
created reality itself. If creation-in-the-beginning is open for the
history of good and evil, then that initial creation is also a
creation capable of suffering, and capable of producing suffering."
(TKG p51 >
An observer of the conventional theodicy debate would ask why the
creation is open for good and evil, and with what consequence for the
moral status of the creator. Does this openness reflect a possibility for
evil necessary in the obtaining of an ultimate overall and justificatory
good? Was it within God's power to create a worthwhile state of affairs
otherwise than has been (presumably) attempted in this creation? This is
a question worth pursuing, since God will be creating such a different
state of affairs in the new creation. If so, what were the kind of
reasons which made him choose to bring about the world there is? If
unjustified suffering or its possibility is not necessary to the God who
creates a world free from the negatives, why does it exist? That is, if
suffering or its possibility is not necessary, can there be any defence
of the justice of a God who reserves a just setting of affairs to a
second dispensation, and excludes it from his first? The outlook for any
such defence looks bleak.
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Moltmann makes a significant move in his discussion of innocent
suffering. Innocent suffering is a truly hurtful characteristic of
reality. Even with the suffering of the guilty, one can find elements of
innocent suffering (TKG p51). Moltmann identifies the connection between
guilt and suffering as a moral and judicial link which in fact increases
suffering, giving it "permanence through the archaic religious idea of a
world order that has been spoilt and has to be restored" (ibid). But it
is also said that "the suffering of one person is the guilt of another"
(TKG p50). So it seems that the concept of guilt is not necessarily tied
to ideas of restoration of a besmirched world, but can be related to
knowledge of transgression. Is the idea of connections between
spoliation, sin, and guilt, an archaic idea then? If Moltmann thinks it
so, then the traditional concept of responsibility and stewardship is
undermined. It is responsibility which allows the concept of guilt to
persist. Without our misuse of responsibility guilt would be meaningless.
If guilt is the corollary of having freely abused responsibility (I am
not though defending guilt-complexes, or the unforgiving labelling of
individuals), then there is a way in which the responsible individual
takes on moral responsibility for their action. I am noting this at some
length because I think it important that responsibility has a crucial
moral dimension. If this burden or privilege applies to people as free
and responsible agents, it will also surely apply to God. In creation,
God's actions were free, expressing his nature, and his power to express
his nature. Therefore, looking at the concept of divine perfection and
responsibility, it seems that the way the world is, is not unintentional
on God's part: neither is there a way in which God who is wholly good,
morally responsible, can escape the condition that the world be
expressive of that fact, and not incompatible with what would make sense
of its being true.
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Moltmann's statements weaken any idea that the he thinks the possibility
of evil is one that exists as a corollary of free choice as worthwhile
good; of an order of reality where certain acts have undesirable or
unholy consequences, and where others are authentically free decisions
for the good. Moltmann is not interested in a defence where possibilities
of choice for good are free in the sense that we could have chosen
otherwise, perhaps even evil. He is though committed to an account of
freedom where this is equated with expression of what one is, one's
nature (more or less identical with J L Mackie's view). This raises
problems. This lack of discussion on the subject of human freedom and
evil, is matched in its contribution to unclearness on the question of
evil, by the way in which the world and its suffering reflects divine
processes which, as such, seem to beg a justificatory defence on the
basis of divine responsibility. Moltmann himself holds that "the
experience of suffering goes far beyond the question of guilt and
innocence, leaving it behind as totally superficial" (ibid). The details
and implications of this position will be explored later.
This brings one to the question of love in Moltmann's theology. In
theodicy terms, to say that God is love, is to affirm something which
complements the idea that he is wholly good. The overlap, and the
distinctions could be very complex; it would seem though that perfect
love cannot involve anything incompatible with being wholly good.
Interestingly, for Moltmann, love sees only innocent suffering (ibid).
However, there is relatively little sign of his wanting to detail the way
in which divine love relates to the origins of unjustifiable evil, the
moral implications of this in terms of divine responsibility for a world
in which even the perpetrators of evil are presumably innocent sufferers:
beings who have become warped, caught up by corrupting forces:
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"The desire to explain suffering is already highly questionable in
itself. Does an explanation not lead us to justify suffering and give
it permanence? Does it not lead the suffering person to come to
terms with his suffering, and to declare himself in agreement with
it? And does this not mean that he gives up hope of overcoming
suffering?" CTKG p52)
Again the critical concerns at the heart of conventional theodicy are not
touched on. There seems no possibility that God's being wholly good in
the way that he cannot permit or be otherwise responsible for immoral
actions is at issue in the theodicy question. Why for instance, if one
should not come to terms with one's suffering now, should one ever do so?
To understand why Moltmann rejects the idea of an explanation which
justifies suffering, of a coming to terms with suffering, it is necessary
to look at his idea of creative love. The Trinity and The Kingdom of God
has an important section on God's love (p57ff). At this stage I shall
only note some of the points which seem to highlight the need for a
theodicy, and one or two of those which appear to indicate that Moltmann
has a conception of love that renders conventional theodicy unnecessary
(whilst undermining his attack on theodicy).
First, love is the communication of the good (TKG p57). It is to be
distinguished from 'destructive passions'. Love is life-giving and wants
to "open up the freedom to live" (ibid). Importantly for the
consideration of other statements on love, Moltmann emphasises its
ro
positive nature. As self-comunication of the good it does not embrace
"self- renunciation", nor does it involve "self-dissolution". The lover
gives himself to the loved, enters into the other, "but in that other he
is entirely himself" (ibid). Again, crucially, "The unselfishness of
love lies in the loving person's communication of himself, not in his
self-destruction" (ibid). Taking Moltmann up on his definition of love
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as positive self-communication of the good raises problems, or so it
seems.
We find Moltmann almost immediately describing how love involves self-
differentiation. The greater the self-differentiation the more
"unselfish" the self-communication: the problematic nature of Moltmann's
position on theodicy now becomes evident. That is:
"When we say 'God is love,' then we mean that he is in eternity this
process of self-differentiation and self identification; a process
which contains the whole pain of the negative in itself." (ibid)
There is an argument which would say that any premium on an unselfish
love involving ever greater degrees of self-differentiation, is
ultimately selfish. In giving rise to an other who is alien in the sense
that relationship to this other involves the whole (unjustifiable) pain
of the negative, one is positing the other to fulfill flawed conditions
of true love and unselfishness.
One finds Moltmann saying here that the divine love inextricably involves
suffering: "creative and suffering love has always been a part of his
loves' eternal nature" (TKG p59). Moltmann discusses the theology of
C E Rolt with what can only be approval, as part of his treatment of a
"remarkable wealth" of English writing on the subject of God and
suffering. In fact it is found that: "Rolt shows very well how in world
history God's suffering love transforms 'brute force' into 'vital
energy'" (TKG p33). Love is "life's pre-eminent organizing principle in
the deadly conflict of blind natural forces". And also of Rolt's
theology, "God's eternal bliss is not bliss based on the absence of
suffering. On the contrary, it is bliss that becomes bliss through
suffering's acceptance and transformation" (ibid p34). But arguably, even
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transformed suffering, if it is still unjustifiable, cannot be an answer
to the theodicy question.
Divine self-humiliation is another inescapable aspect of creative love.
This doctrine of self-withdrawal, suffering and humiliation is developed
at some length in God and Creation, to which we shall come in due course.
In The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, references occur on pages 27-30.
They seem to imply that Moltmann has affinities with theodicists such as
Richard Swinburne. The dichotomy in God, beteween the divine life and the
activity of suffering along with his people is "based on the pathos and
the initial self-humiliation through which the Almighty goes out of
himself and becomes involved with the limited world and with the freedom
of his image in that world. The freedom of his creatures is seemingly
paramount as an expression of love, and this would therefore seem to be
an argument in favour of justifying the possibility of moral evil. "Love
seeks a counterpart who freely responds" (TKG p30>; "Love humiliates
itself for the freedom of its counterpart" (ibid); "Love of freedom is
the most profound reason for 'God's self-differentiation", and so on
(ibid). Moreover, Moltmann continues by writing: "The most moving
potentiality of this theology is that it allows us to comprehend the
Jewish people's history of suffering as... as the history of the
suffering of the tortured divine Shekinah" (ibid). We can see that this
does not explain why innocent suffering, which must in part be the
corollary of the obvious 'freedom' to inflict suffering, is an argument
against the existence of the theist's God in the way that Moltmann earlier
claimed. God must see such possibilities as more than counter-balanced by
the worthy claims of a genuinely loving relationship with his creatures.
If God cannot be thought to think this way, it is arguably impossible for
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Moltmann to make pronouncements on the immorality of theodicy. Ideas of
God's goodness would also edge towards unintellligibility.
If God decided, prior to creating, that although there will be immense
suffering, not all of it the consequence of moral evil, this is to be the
counterpart of real freedom and responsibility, both as worthwhile goods
(will physical evil be the testing ground for moral responsibility?),
then even the worst suffering must be inter-connected with this freedom
and responsibility, and therefore fall within the bounds of
acceptability. Although requiring a strong concept of justification, this
has the strength of attempting to maintain coherence. '"My head is heavy,
my arm is heavy", says a Mishnah, talking about the way God suffers with
the torments of the hanged" (TKG p30). Now we must ask, what if such
torments are not acceptable, morally justifiable, in the sense that we
say, ' it is better that such possibilities had never been?' What then?
What if the death of a single innocent is truly incompatible with the
existence of the almighty and kindly God? What too of the concept of
freedom which one would expect to be possible for the image of God, as
much as for God himself: that freedom where human beings are truly free
to express their deepest nature, as with God in creation? To be a 'piece
of fate', and to suffer unjustifiably, is arguably too much for created
beings to experience at the hands of, in the world of, a wholly good God
- and expect them to affirm that this God is indeed wholly good. As we
shall see in the later discussion of The Trinity and the Kingdom of God.
human beings are not truly free. This would explain, in part perhaps, why
the free will defence is never forwarded.
I conclude this brief look at The Trinity and the Kingdom of God with a
final series of quotations. They are important, and a paraphrase would
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miss much. Moltmann is elaborating the theme of suffering love. It is
difficult to reconcile this stance with the earlier pronouncement on the
death of a single innocent child. Moltmann's God is not almighty, but all
that exists was, it should be remembered, freely created by hirn, and he
is a God whose deepest nature is self-communication of a good which
p
involves or pre-supposes neither self-dstruction nor self-dissolution.
But if suffering is integral to the life and victory of love in the new
creation, then a conventional justificatory theodicy seems more clearly
in order than ever. God is not, so far as we know, wrestling with
elemental forces in an eternal dualistic conflict. God is responsible for
permitting and enabling suffering, and God is wholly good. God is also
free, not under duress, under pressure or constraints which would thwart
him in creating something which expresses his deepest nature. Does this
not mean that the evil that occurs is ultimately not of a kind that it
would have been better to eliminate as a possibility? Surely the closer
suffering is to the life of spirit, the more deeply we can affirm that it
is in fact interlocked with good. Moltmann argues as follows:
"Creative love is ultimately suffering love because it is only through
suffering that it acts creatively and redemptively for the freedom of
the beloved. Freedom can only be made possible by suffering love. The
suffering of God with the world, the suffering God from the world,
and the suffering of God for the world are the highest forms of his
creative love, which desires free fellowship with the world and free
response in the world." (TKG p60)
Then:
"This means that the creation of the world and human beings for
freedom and fellowship is always bound up with the process of God's
deliverance from the sufferings of his love. His love, which
liberates, delivers and redeems through suffering, wants to reach its
fulfilment in the love that is bliss... In this sense, not only does
God suffer with and for the world; liberated men and women suffer
with God and for him." (ibid)
And:
"The theology of God's passion leads to the idea of God's self-
subjection to suffering. It therefore also has to arrive at the idea
of God's eschatological self-deliverance. Between these two movements
lies the history of the profound fellowship between God and man in
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suffering - in compassionate suffering with one another, and in
passionate love for one another." (ibid)
So far as this theodicy investigation is concerned, there is little
information here which would go to resolve decisively questions about the
origin and necessity, or non-necessity of suffering in Moltmann's
theology (suggestive though the passages may be). Suffering would however
seem to be compatible with God's nature as love, and the passages tend to
hint, if no more than this, that it is part of the process of divine love
of the other; though whether the full pain of the negative previously
referred to is truly part of a pattern of divine movement, and,
crucially, incorporates unjustifiable evils, is not clear. More on
this later. I will now look briefly at ideas of justification in The
Church and the Power of the Spirit, and in God and Creation.
In The Church in the Power of the Spirit, we find a portrayal of a
suffering creation. Why there is such suffering, and the moral issues of
theodicy, are issues it is difficult to find a clear position on, at
least at this stage. When talking of Christ's death under the law, the
law is described in a way which blurs the responsibility for its being
the way it is. It appears in fact to be simply part of the structure or
system within which humans have to exist. Law is understood as the
foundation of the systems of existence with which "people try to defend
themselves politically and psychologically against chaos, evil and death,
yet by so doing disseminate chaos evil and death at the same time" (TCPS
p8S). Here one asks if human beings are fully responsible for this
situation, for following that law which, as Moltmann states, "humanity in
its misery has taken up". Why has it taken up this law? Moltmann is
consistent in his language of liberation and feasts (TCPS pl04ff), but
gives little to clarify the nature of the evil and deprivation which
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necessitates the law and the freeing of humanity. The notion of
indwelling is an idea that reflects Moltmann's belief that God was in
some sense not fully with his creation in the beginning (ibid and pl02).
Thus: . . the indwelling of the divine glory in all beings brings
protection against futility, chaos and wickedness, t sol earthly
s
protective measures and human represions become superfluous and void.
Then freedom is fulfilled in the sphere of the new creation free of all
dominion" (ibid). More on this later.
One also finds a further emphasis on the positive aspect of suffering,
something which goes some way to countering the portrayal of innocent
suffering as so wicked as to make the existence of the theistic God
inconceivable. Perhaps moral wickedness is often unjustifiably wicked,
but at least some of the suffering stemming from this field of great
(apparent) freedom and responsibility seems beneficial. Thus: "people who
are now capable of acting must rediscover the meaning of suffering. It is
only the dignity of solidarity in suffering which makes people capable of
fellowship" (TOPS pl67). Moltmann criticises the Western striving to
reduce suffering. For "The ideal of life without suffering makes one
group of people apathetic and brutal towards other groups, which are
supposed to pay the price" (ibid). There are in fact "limits to the
conquest of suffering" (ibid). This means that there "can only be an
equal and just distribution of the burden of suffering that cannot be
overcome" (ibid). So, suffering that cannot be overcome looks as if it
is built into the system. And it appears to be that there are
restrictions on how far progress can be made, short of the in-breaking of
the new creation. Only the new creation can bring actual final freedom
from the negatives of sin and death (TCPS pl95). I would argue that these
limitations, and God's knowledge of them, since suffering is part of the
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eternal nature of his love, make it seem reasonable that this bedrock
potentiality for suffering of the most extreme kinds, be justifiable.
Here we can try looking at this issue of justifiability and
compatibility in two ways.
First, God loves. Yet love is not something which turns from the making
possible of states of affairs where suffering of a non-justifiable nature
occurs. God loves, and is also, with the best intentions, immoral. That
is, he does that which is incompatible with being wholly good. One can
see how this might be so, by looking back at the Trinity and the Kingdom
of God. and the concept of open system, one which surfaces again in God
in Creation. Moltmann writes, interpreting the old testament
understanding of creation: "It is a creation open to time, open to the
future, and open to change. It is an 'open system', full of every
potentiality. Consequently it also has to be understood as a threatened
world: it is surrounded by chaos. The powers of corruption reach into the
midst of it, in night and the sea" <TKG plOO: see also pl90). This
openness, or potentially deadly ambiguity where a straightforward
communication and sharing of the good might instead be expected, is
reflected in the following words from The Church in the Power of the
Spirit: "... the new life in the spirit of freedom has a fragmentary
form. This form cannot be identified with the general ambiguity of
history and the ambivalence of all historical activity, but is the
particular ambiguity of historical experience and practice between life
and death" (TCPS pl96: my emphasis).
One potentiality which has been realised is death, which is, as we shall
see, a principal evil in Moltmann's order of things. By the conclusion of
this study it should be evident that it's realisation is rooted in the
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fundamental structure of reality. It is nevertheless something opposed to
God, and where the unjustifiable death of a single innocent is enough to
end theism, it must be considered problematic for the coherence of
Moltmann's own theology as well: "The Son is given over to the power of
this death, a power contrary to God" (TCPS p95). Death is, or has been,
a great force which once established began to be exerted destructively
in the world, even if that dominion is broken: "As the church now
understands it, with Jesus' resurrection from the dead the power of death
and all the domination built up on the power of death have already been
overthrown and their end is already in sight" (TCPS p99). It appears
that death is a consequence of human behaviour: "The 'body of death' does
not only mean physical death; it also means a deadly cohesion to which
all life belongs. This cohesion has been broken in principle, but not yet
in fact, through liberation from the power of sin" (TCPS pl95). In
this case it is hard to see how God could not know the potential
destructiveness of human misbehaviour, the connection with death, and the
way it would be exerted - the way in which we could almost say it would
begin to exert its corrupting power by its own dreadful negativity (now
without any pretence to just inter—relationship with human freedom and
responsibility). It is evident that God does not act to eliminate the
possiblities in his creation for unjustifiable evil. If death of the
innocent is abhorrent and presumably always unjustifiable, and we include
the 'natural' world's universal and inbuilt patterns of decay as the
destruction of innocents, then this initial possibility of death, and its
present certainty for all, is puzzling. If all death subsequent to the
inbreaking of the power of sin which establishes it as an inescapable
feature of existence, is in some deep sense, the death of an innocent,
the implications for Moltmann's God as being wholly good, seem
threatening.
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Second, one could argue that conventional notions of responsibility,
proportionate goods and evils, have to be abandoned. God cannot, and does
not bear a moral responsibility for what he has created, and the way it
has evolved, even if the suffering that occurs is not fully the
responsibility of created agents. But if the idea of responsibility does
not apply to God, who is the creator, the being who acts, or has acted
with the highest degree of freedom, why should it apply to lesser, less
free finite agents? And if being wholly good or loving does not exclude
certain things: the possibility of unjustifiable evils (as if a genuine
evil could be justifiable, or so this has seemed questionable from
Moltmann's perspective), how can ideas such as 'good' and 'loving'
retain their meaning: an old problem. We are back with the problem facing
the theodicist, which in fact makes theodicy arguably so necessary. I
will turn now to God in Creation, to see in a preliminary fashion if this
major work has much to say on the nature of the problem of evil. I will
conclude by looking briefly at his article on theodicy in the new SCM
Dictionary of Theology.
God in Creation is characterised by a desire to see God as deeply
involved in, immanent in, the world (CG pl3ff). God animates his
creatures, guides them towards the future. Here, "Creation is... the
differentiated presence of God the Spirit, the presence of the One in the
many" (CG pl4). God's relationship to the world is an intricate network
of "unilateral, reciprocal and many-sided relationships" (ibid). Thefe is
no room for an antithetical setting of God and creation with a
trinitarian doctrine of creation. Still, there is tension in God's
creative activity. God is in creation, but he stands "over against his
creation," and thus against himself (GC pl5). Moltmann uses two
concepts to comprehend this element of tension and self-differentiation.
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The doctrine of sheklnah, which also appears in The Trinity and the
Kingdom of God, and a doctrine of the trinity. In the doctrine of
shekinah, God suffers with the suffering of the creatures he has created.
In the doctrine of the trinity, God goes out of himself freely, in the
"overflowing rapture of his love". Moltmann states that: "The overflowing
love from which everything comes that is from God, is also the implicit
ground for God's readiness to endure the contradictions of the beings he
has created" (GC pl5). Here we have the problem of evil highlighted.
Love is good. God creates out of love, but has to endure the
(unjustifiable) suffering that arises within his creation (which he only
can do because his love is so profound and perfect, whole). God creates
beings, and endures their contradictions. From whence do these
contradictions come? Are they generated after creation from already
existing contradictions which are necessarily part of the created order
if it is to be free, or moving towards freedom? Are they of a kind which
is incompatible with the creation of the world by a perfectly good and
wholly loving agent? Or are they compatible after all? If they are, then
their possible consequences must be compatible with God's being wholly
good, and where the problem of evil is retained as a genuine problem,
that arguably means that in any positive answer, the evil that occurs
must be held to be justifiable (it being concepts of goodness and
justice which generate the question). Or is this kind of thinking
irrelevant? We find that: "The evolutions and catastrophes of the
universe are also the movements and experiences of the Spirit of
creation. .. That is why the divine Spirit transcends himself in all
created beings" (GC pl6). With this kind of statement it looks as if
suffering is somehow intrinsic to God's creation, and that Moltmann has
succeeded in retaining the power of the question as a motor for hope,
transcending those issues which formerly gave it real intellectual
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significance. I do not think he has yet shown that these issues are
satisfactorily handled in his approach.
I move to chapter four of God in Creation, entitled God the creator (ibid
p73ff>. Creation is brought into being through the exercise of the free
will of God (GC p75>. Emanationism is rejected because it compromises
this free will. Yet Moltmann wants to avoid the impression that God's
creative act is arbitrary. God has created freely, out of his love, the
love that is his essential nature. God's love is engaged in the
communication of goodness. He creates what is different to him, but that
which also corresponds. For Moltmann, this involves God in "unheard off
condescension, self-limitation and humiliation" (GC p78). The critic may
ask if the possibilities for Auschwitz implicit, as it turns out, in this
creative act, are adequately dealt with by a theology of condescension
and self-humiliating love on the part of the God "who is incomparable";
the God for whom "heaven and earth are neither divine nor demonic,
neither eternal like God himself, nor meaningless and futile. They are
contingent. They are his goodly work in which he has his pleasure. No
more than that, but no less than that either" (GC p73).
If God is to be responsible for his actions, he has to be free. Free to
manifest his nature. This means that his love, his essential nature is
communicated in creation. For it to be otherwise would imply that the
act of creation could be an arbitrary one, sundered from his essential
nature. So if God parents freely, and creation is utterly contingent on
his nature, and his nature is to love, and communicate the good, then to
speak of his self-condescension and humiliation is to do so in a special
sense, one free from images of destructive subjection to independent
forces: God creates and what he creates is good. So humiliation,
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referring to bringing low to the earth or ground (but usually implying
degradation), is unique of God in respect to creating, since unlike the
humiliation, or self-humiliation of contingent human beings, there is
neither corrupted environment or broken society. It is humiliation in an
entirely free, loving, and good sense. It may well be that creating the
world has involved a tremendous act of self-alienation. But what if the
sense of self-humiliation in this creative and sustaining act is related
to a dire level of unjustifiable abjectness amongst the creaturely
possibilities towards which God is knowingly lowering himself, will be
continuing to lower himself, even if willingly? If it is, then I do not
see how we can reasonably say this God is wholly good and just. For if
the humiliation, and all that is implied in this, is something God does
most freely and in fullest self-correspondence, it seems it should be
positive self-humiliation (loving lowering into the good finite), and
step towards self-fulfilraent involving good proportionate to evil.
But how aware is Moltmann of the well grounded conventional expectations
of divine justice and goodness? Take for instance the following
statements. We can view the eternal life of God, as "a life of eternal
infinite love, which in the creative process issues in its overflowing
rapture from its trinitarian perfection and completeness" (GCp84). This
picture is profoundly complicated by another statement following soon
after. Talking of the doctrine of zimzum,9 Moltmann explores the
implications of the nihil which is opened up in the space left by the
self-contraction of the being of God:
"The nihil in which God creates his creation is God-forsakeness, hell,
absolute death; and it is against the threat of this that he
maintains his creation in life. Admittedly the nihil only acquires
this character through the self-isolation of created beings to which
we give the name of sin and godlesness." (GC p88)
The questions which come in here concern the extent to which creatures
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are responsible for their actions, and to what extent their wrong actions
are magnified by the existence of creation in an abyss of
Godforsakennes.1° That is, would genocide or physical death be possible
without the presence of the nihil? The nihil, if it is not absolute
death, and so on, is certainly potentially so. If human beings are not
fully free, is one to wonder that their choices are not always for the
right. That is, if we take freedom in the 'Mackiean' sense of freedom to
express one's nature (as Moltmann seems to do; but see the discussion in
chapter seven of this study), then the nature of humanity cannot be
wholly loving and rational, since it is clear that human beings have
chosen wrongly. Some would anyway say this concept of freedom is
misguided: it is only a pseudo-freedom. If we take a concept of freedom
where one is free to choose otherwise than one did (but to rationally
choose evil?), then it may be that this full freedom has been abused. But
humanity is not fully free, or so Moltmann has said (this is a general
theological problem: in Moltmann's case the emphasis on the enslavement
and bondage of all creation must raise doubts as to what genuine freedom
and responsibility really means in this world: see for example GC p68-9).
Therefore the wrong choices that exist cannot be ascribed to a freedom in
existence which we can be sure would have always allowed one the
possibility at the moment of choice to rationally choose otherwise than
one did, nor to a free expression of one's created nature as Moltmann
describes the divine freedom, unless this nature is by nature corrupt. So
sin then seems to stern from inadequacy. But this is an unsatisfactory
regress when the question of unjustifiable evil and responsibility is
being debated. I leave more detailed discussion of the role of the nihil
in bringing about such evil until chapter eight. Attempts to analyse this
type of problem raised by Moltmann's theology will perhaps always be
fraught with difficulty.
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The following remarks exemplify a particular approach to questions of
evil and justification which require a clear and consistent exposition:
"... the experiences of Auschwitz and Hiroshima raise questions for
which no answers are endurable, becau.se the questions are
fundamentally protests. Even Hegel found that there was a Negative
which could not 'be turned to good' in any dialectic. He therefore
left the 'unresolved contradiction'... out of his dialectic altogether.
Ernst Bloch too was able to see nothing in the incinerators of
Maidanek... the passion for life cannot do away with the death that is
utterly meaningless."
But, paradoxically, from the theodicists position, the statement
continues:
This idea of the negative is really Manichean. It cannot do more than
'keep Nothingness at bay.' It cannot abolish or overcome it... The hope
of resurrection therefore brings even the Nothingness of world
history into the light of the new creation, [but] ... The protest
against annihilating Nothingness must not lead to the suppression and
forgetfulness of the annihilated; and equally, hope for the
annihilated must not permit us to come to terms with their
annihilation, [however] ... Even 'the end of the world' can set no
limits to the God who created the world out of nothing, the God who
in his own Son exposed his own self to annihilating Nothingness on
the cross, in order to gather that Nothingness into his eternal being.
And this is true whether the end of the world is brought about by
natural catastrophe or human crime. How should the Creator-out-of-
nothingness be diverted from his intention and his love through any
devastations in what he has created?" (GC 92-3)
Here Moltmann shows a veritable gulf between his articulation of the
problems, and that found in conventional theodicy debate. Moltmann, in
indirect fashion, is clearly accepting what Hegel and Bloch have to say
on the meaningless of certain suffering. It cannot be fitted into a
dialectic: it is meaningless and purposeless. It can never be come to
terms with. Or is that we are never to come to terms with the
annihilation of peoples whilst they are still dead, and before their
resurrection? What precisely would constitute coming to terms? The
problem of God's righteousness has usually involved coming to terms with
the suffering of the innocent, or even of all creation, when the creator
is wholly good and perfectly free. As J C A Gaskin argued, "innocent
suffering stands for all time as innocent" (ibid). That is, if we refuse
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to accept that suffering experienced involuntarily and without its being
' deserved't whether of moral or physical type, is not excusable or
intelligible on grounds of its being causally connected with exercise of
noble characteristics such as sympathy, nursing of the dying, or by
connection with the opportunity of people to choose freely, even if
sometimes wrongly, then we cannot come to terms with it, ever. On the
other hand, Moltmann's final sentence above seems almost callous. One has
called to mind the shades of Hegel's problematic statement in the
Lectures on the Philosophy of History, which certainly seems to go a long
way to incorporating great evil into the dialectic:
"World History occupies a higher ground than that on which morality
has properly its position, which is personal character and the
conscience of individuals... Moral claims which are irrelevant must
not be brought into collision with world-historical deeds... The litany
of private virtues...must not be raised against them." (op.cit. p70:
trans by J Sibree, London, 1902)
Moltmann's attitude to the theodicy question is highlighted in his
article 'Theodi cy', for the new SCM Dictionary of Theology. He
characterises the theodicy found in enlightenment protestant orthodoxy
thus. Evil was set in the context of God's overall rule of the universe.
Hence: "God allows evil without endorsing it; he directs evil so that it
brings about good; he sets limits to evil and will overcome it in the
end.... God permits moral evil for the sake of the freedom of the human
will and uses physical evils to punish and educate" (DT p565). But
Moltmann rejects this. With the Lisbon earthquake Europe rightly reacted
against such optimistic models of the world. It is stated: "where tens of
thousands die a senseless death, all theodicy turns to lies" (ibid).
Equally important is his outlining of three questions facing theology
after Auschwitz. First, the issue of the justification of God in the face
of evil "cannot be answered, but it can never be abandoned." Secondly,
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post-Auschwitz theology has to understand the theology "in Auschwitz."
God was the companion of those suffering in Auschwitz, thus he "gives up
hope where no more can be hoped for." Thirdly: "The question of theodicy
remains open until a new creation, in which God's righteousness dwells,
gives the answer." The first and third points reflect difficulties found
in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God and which have been noted
previously. It calls the question unanswerable, but not to be abandoned:
further, it is one that is finally answerable (in an affirmative way, one
presumes). Is this a coherent stance? That is, why is it unanswerable,
and what are the implications? If it is unanswerable because all theodicy
moves are blatantly failures in attempting to justify the unjustifiable,
say the death of the innocent, then is Moltmann saying there is a
justificatory case after all? But if all theodicy genuinely "turns to
lies", and theodicy is justification argued on a definitely limited
number of options, then the question genuinely is unanswerable. So
Moltmann actually rejects the possibility of justification of suffering,
whilst maintaining the conventional form and importance of the question
which arises from this demand.
The only answer to the continued putting of the theodicy question would
appear to be that this is a misguided activity. That the evil that occurs
is genuinely evil and without the kind of tie-ups to second order goods
that would be expected of a God who was going to create a world where his
abundant love and wholeness would be fully and freely expressed, and
where suffering was to be a possibility.
It has turned out that evil is a realised possibility; and God must have
known that the innocent would die. But the conventional theodicist would
probably say that if we reject the idea that there are justificatory
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links between this possibility and necessary conditions for freedom,
solidarity, and so on, then God is guilty of having permitted or actively
encouraged wholly undesirable evil to arise: evil so bad in itself that
the goods with which it is apparently causally connected, such as
freedom, can in no way be said to justify the (as it is increasingly
evident) concomitant evil. Since such unjust and destructive suffering is
contradictory to God's nature and intentions, it therefore would have
been better for God to have refrained from creating. Therefore it seems
that if Moltmann is saying that the theodicy question cannot be answered
affirmatively, its final resolution cannot really lie in the new
creation. The new creation will either eternally beg the question of past
suffering by its starkly contrasting wholeness; or be the occasion of a
'slick' theodicy answer where the ghastly evil that has occured is
justified, integrated into the scheme of things.
Moltmann writes "The question of God lives on in an irresistible hunger
for righteousness" (ibid). Nevertheless, the fact that the nature of
the thirst and hunger appears irreconcilable with the divine
righteousness which is its object is problematic: for God has created the
world which is its pre-requisite, a world is marked by evil for which
there can be no justification. With a senseless death, as we have seen,
". . . all theodicy turns to lies". Yet, as we will see, and do so
increasingly, this rejection of thodicy does not always fit comfortably
with world images which Moltmann presents (passages from God in
Creation):
"In play, the world displays its beauty. As play, the world hovers
over the abyss. That is why the kingdom of the world belongs to the
child... It is only in play that human beings can endure the
fundamental contingency of the world... In play they weigh up the
chances of a fortuitous world and the forces of their own freedom.
The kingdom of freedom is the kingdom of play." (GC p310)
And:
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"The deeply felt contingency of the world in general, and the
continually experienced contingency of events in the world, lose their
terrors for the human being if he sees them as part of the great
game which is being played with the world in its evolution, and with
himself in the history of his own life. It may often seem a cruel
game, unless he can put his trust in providence." (GC p311)
Keeping still to this book, God in Creation. Moltmann has written: ". . .
hope for the annihilated must not permit us to come to terms with their
annihilation" (GC p92). If this is truly so, then their murder is an
event for which God can have had no purpose, which can never be
meaningful; never have been connected in the divine mind with goods and
characteristics in creation whose benefits and quality were to be seen as
balanced against real and shameful possibilities flowing from these same
characteristics. For what if they were so considered? Either they were
morally outweighed and justified by their causal connection with the
existence of otherwise unobtainable second order goods; or they were not
so justified. This second eventuality has two possible implications.
Suffering is meaningless in the sense that it is of no account to God as
real pain, real agony, darkness. Therefore to enter it a a debit against
the 'good' is not conceivable. Or, God is aware of the real agony of
suffering and death, which is surely what Moltmann does say, but no
connection is to be made between the ordeal of the passion, and the
suffering of creatures, and the position of responsibility, foresight,
wisdom occupied by the God who would never permit that which is evil to
happen (normally, without justification). This second position is
completely unconstructive, and as problematic as the first. It would
represent an arguably useless and failed bracketing of the problem. These
then are some of the issues which will have to be looked at closely.
Their importance is highlighted when one asks if meaningless death is
compatible with God's creating a world where there is suffering, when:
"There is no dark side to God - no side where he could also be
conceived of as the destroyer of his creation and of his own being
as Creator. If God is himself supreme goodness and truth, then the
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wealth of his potentialities is determined by his essential nature.
'All things are possible with God' does not mean his undetermined
omnipotence; it means the determined power of his goodness" <GC
pi 69).
Strangely, there does seem at times ' pre-liminary* air about creation
which may explain suffering, and de facto allow us to integrate it into
God's plans for creation. Although "God is the actor and producer of the
world's drama" (GC p309), this is not a play wholly centred on the
present reality. For: "Creation is more than merely a stage for God's
history with men and women. The goal of this history is the consummation
of creation in its glorification" <GC p56). Perhaps this could mean that
the 'determined power' of God's goodness in its creating of an
evolutionary universe is compatible with the existence of meaningless
death. How in Moltmann's theology this actually appears to be assumed to
be so in places is something which we will explore. I would argue that




In the last chapter I looked at the way in which Moltmann formally
approaches the theodicy problem. It appears that his perspective differs
from that of those involved in mainstream theodicy debate. The
implications of this difference soon become evident in the way in
which his theology develops. In this chapter, and those following, I will
attempt to describe and analyse Moltrnann's positions on divine love and
suffering through discussion of key texts. Starting with Theology of
Hope, Religion Revolution and the Future, and Hope and Planning. Moving
then to The Crucified God, and (very briefly) The Church in The Power of
The Spirit. Then to The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, and finally, God
in Creation. In discussing each text I keep to the following framework.
Topics will be looked at as they relate to a specific line of enquiry:
how does Moltmann conceive of divine love/ righteousness? And is there
any incompatibility between suffering and this love. Also, what is the
nature of the incompatibility between his visions of divine and cosmic
history and 'conventional' views of divine goodness and responsibility?
I believe that this approach will permit a concise and justifiable
assessment of Moltmann's handling of the problem of evil to be made. It
allows his views on the theodicy question, and those of others, to be set
alongside the substance of his developing thought on the nature of the
suffering of the infinite and finite, and of the divine righteousness.
I have followed the chronological order of texts so that developments
are seen in sequence. Each presentation and critical discussion is of
course aimed at giving a fair impression of the texts central or most
relevant characteristics as they stand in relation to the crucial issues
of righteousness and suffering.
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THEOLOGY OF HOPE
"From first to last, and not merely in epilogue,
Christianity is eschatology, is hope." (T/H pl6)
An idea of the order of approach Moltmann takes to the subject of this
book will clearly be found in the chapter headings. Since the text is
(selectively) presented chapter by chapter, its governing ideas and the
ways in which they are developed will hopefully soon become evident.
There are two central themes which emerge, and which are relevant to the
theodicy question. They are: (a) Moltmann's understanding of the 'God of
Promise' - and the nature and content of the promise. For instance, the
way in which the risen Christ reveals the 'future horizon' of creation,
(b) And inextricably linked to this, his identification of the as yet
all-pervasive negativity in this creation. These issues dominate his
Theology of Hope.
Theology of Hope was sub-titled "On the Grounds and on the Implications
of a Christian Eschatology." A principal understanding was that
eschatology must play a central role in theology. Thus:
"The eschatological is not one element of Christianity, but it is the
medium of Christian faith as such... For Christian faith lives from
the raising of the crucified Christ, and strains after the promises of
the universal future of Christ." (TH pl6)
Also:
"There is therefore only one real problem in Christian theology, which
its own object forces upon it and which it in turn forces on mankind
and on human thought: the problem of the future." (ibid)
And:
"The God spoken of here [Molt. is referring to the
biblical tradition] is no intra-worldly or extra-worldly
God, but the 'God of Hope' (Rom. 15:13), a God with 'future as his
essential nature' (as E Bloch puts it), as made known in Exodus and
in Israelite prophecy... A proper theology would therefore have to be
constructed in the light of its future goal. Eschatology should not
be its end, but its beginning." (ibid)1
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Despite this, Moltmann felt that eschatology had become marginalised.
Christian hopes' real power of hope had been understood, or rather
welcomed only by fanatical sects, whilst in the mainstream of the post-
Constantinian Church it "led a peculiarly barren existence at the end of
Christian dogmatics"; hope had "emigrated" from the Church (T/H pl5).
And, perhaps ironically, considering Moltmann's own tendencies to
deprive the world of justificatory goodness, it is said that those
millennarianists having hopes of the following kind, pursued an
unfruitful and damaging eschatology:
"... the return of Christ in universal glory, the judgement of the
world... the new creation of all things. These end events were to
break into this world from somewhere beyond history... But the
relegating of these events to the 'last day' robbed them of their
directive, uplifting, and critical significance for all the days which
are spent here, this side of the end, in history." (T/H pi5)
He stipulates that eschatology should never wander off into speculation,
and must be seen married to christology. Rather than being the
predictable, the future is about the new. Thus the future of reality is
indistinguishable from that of Christ. In addition:
"... the question whether all statements about the future are
grounded in the person and history of Jesus Christ provides it with
the touchstone by which to distinguish the spirit of eschatology
from that of utopia." (T/H pi 7)
In his initial pages Moltmann also introduces one to the harsh reality
of a contradiction in existence: a contradiction which remains in place
in "history", this side of the eschaton:
"Present and future, experience and hope, stand in contradiction to
each other in Christian eschatology with the result that man is...
drawn into conflict between hope and experience." (TH pl8)
And:
"Everywhere in the New Testament the Christian hope is directed
towards what is not yet visible; it is consequently a 'hoping against
hope' and thereby brands the visible realm of present experience as a
god-forsaken transient reality that is to be left behind," (ibid)
Life lived in decay and despair is contradicted by the hope held out in
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the life of the resurrected Christ, an evei—present therae. And: "To
believe does in fact mean to... be engaged in an exodus" (T/H pl9).
Likewise, eschatology "... must formulate its statements of hope in
contradiction to our present experience" (ibid). And "... this happens
in a way that does not suppress or skip the unpleasant realities. Death
is real death, and decay is putrefying decay" (ibid). Indeed: "Guilt
remains guilt and suffering remains... a cry to which there is no ready-
made answer. Faith does not overstep these realities into a heavenly
utopia... It can overstep the bounds of life, with their closed wall of
suffering, guilt and death, only at the point where they have actually
been broken through" (ibid). So, it is only in the light of Christ's
victory over death that anything can be hoped for. Faith in Christ, and
what has become of him, is the ground for hope, and faith without hope
is: "fainthearted and ultimately a dead faith." Moltmann 'earths' this
faith:
"In this [eschatologicall hope the soul does not soar above our vale
of tears to some imagined heavenly bliss... For in the words of
Ludwig Feuerbach, it puts 'in place of the beyond that lies above our
grave in heaven, the beyond that lies beyond our grave on earth, the
historic future, the future of mankind." (TH p21)
Yet, perhaps not so differently after all:2
"... on the other hand, all this must inevitably mean that the man who
thus hopes will never be able to reconcile himself with the laws and
constraints of this earth... Those who hope in Christ can no longer
put up with reality as it is, but begin to suffer under it, to
contradict it. Peace with God means conflict with the world, for the
goad of the promised future stabs inexorably into the flesh of every
unfulfilled present." (ibid)
Such radical and subversive hope contradicts and disturbs human society,
which attempts to "stabilize itself as a 'continuing city'". This is a
hope which is oppressed by, and contradicts this "world of death" (T/H
p21) This sense of mortality as radically bad finitude is a definitive
feature of Moltmann's theology, as we shall come to see (its negation is
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an essential part of his understanding of the universalisation and
intensification of the promise).
The discussion "Does Hope Cheat Man of the Happiness of the Present" (T/H
p26ff), introduces the characteristic criticism of the presence of the
eternal in the present. Attempts to live the "present" without seeking
its transformation in a genuinely eschatological faith are linked to
thinking in terms of the "epiphany of the eternal present". Parmenides
is given some prominence: "The god of Parmenides is 'thinkable', because
he is the eternal, single fulness of being. The non-existent, the past
and the future, however, are not 'thinkable'" (T/H p28). But "The 'now'
and 'today' of the new Testament is a different thing from the 'now' of
the eternal presence of being in Parmenides, for it is a 'now' and an
'all of a sudden' in which the newness of the promised future is lit up
and seen in a flash..." (TH p31).
It is held that: "Only in the perspective of this God can there possibly
be a love that is more than phllia, love to the existent and the like -
namely agape, love to the non-existent, love to the unlike, the unworthy,
to the lost, the transient and the dead; a love that can take upon it the
annihilating effects of pain and renunciation because it receives its
power from hope of a creation ex nihilo" (T/H p31-2). I shall discuss
this reliance on the new creation as the expression of God's
righteousness in in due course.
The second, and particularly the third chapter with its discussion of
Christ, examine the ground of the theology of hope. In chapter two
("Promise and History") Moltmann states that he wants the Old Testament
to "pose the problem" of revelation, and provide the answers. An approach
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differentiating Old Testament thinking from other traditions is adopted.
Comparison is made between religions of "Epiphany" and "Promise".
Settled peasant religion in the orient was, like the faith of the
Caananite, one of "epiphany gods that sanctify land, life and culture"
(T/H p97). Moltmann is not, ultimately, concerned whether particular
epiphany religions are mediated, polytheistic, or pantheistic. It is
enough that they have a basic similarity in the emphasis which they put
on the phenomenon of self-disclosure; the epiphanies are in themselves
central features of the religion, granting man and his culture
"correspondence" with, and "participation" in the eternal cosmos of the
divine (T/H p99>.
Against this, the experience of the Israelites is notable for one
reason: as nomads, their experience was that of a God who journeyed with
them. Here: '"The goal gives meaning to the journey and its distresses;
and today's decision to trust in the call of God is a decision pregnant
with future. This is the essence of promise in the light of
transmigration'" (ibid - quoting from V Maag 'Malkut Jhwh'VT Suppl. VI1.
1960 pl40). Thus it is the concept of promise which is most adequate to
describing the heart of the faith of Israel. The history 'initiated' by
the promise breaks the cyclical nature of reality.3 In contemporary
terms:
"It is not evolution, progress and advance that separate time into
yesterday and tomorrow, but the word of promise cuts into events and
divides reality into one reality which is passing and can be left
behind, and another which must be expected and sought." (T/H pl03)
God's promise is such that in the human experience, disappointment takes
on a new aspect:
"It is ultimately not the delays in the fulfilment and in the parousia
that bring men disappointment. 'Disappointing experiences' of this
kind are superficial and trite and come of regarding the promise in
legalistic abstraction... Man's hopes and longings and desires, once
awakened by specific promises stretch further than any fulfilment
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that can be conceived or experienced." (T/H pl05)
The human spirit, once fired by the strength of God's promise is
existentially integrated with the dynamic of "overplus" (T/H pl06).
For we "remain restless and urgent, seeking and searching beyond all
experiences of fulfilment, and the latter leaves us an aftertaste of
sadness" (ibid). We are gratefully orientated towards an horizon of
expectation, drawing upon the inexhaustibility of God - who is never
expended in "any historic reality", but rests only in that which is fully
correspondent with himself (T/H pl06).
The God who is revealed in this history of the promise and the overplus,
moving gradually towards fulfilment, is not in the nature of a
"transcendant Super-Ego". This God does not maintain an optional relation
to his creation. His revelation is one of faithfulness to self in the
outworking of promises to the creation, and his name stands as a surety
that he is faithful to this promise. This hope in the fulfilment of God's
promises is not limited to the future of the person of God, although
clearly there will be no future without God. Creation as a whole is
always included in the spectrum of this hope (T/H pi 19).
What of present alienation from God? Moltraann states: "The God who is
present in his promises is for the human spirit an ob-ject (Gegert-stand)
in the sense that he stands opposed to (entgegen-steht) the human spirit
until a reality is created and becomes knowable which wholly accords
with his promises and can be called 'very good'" (T/H pl20). Again, as
we shall see, this kind of thinking is potentially highly problematic
when such alienation from God in the reality of the created world is held
to generate unjustifiable suffering.
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Following from the provisionality of things, the laws of the covenant
are read as "injunctions that are bound up with the promise" <T/H pl24).
The entire range of present human activities, values, hopes, is to be
seen as lying under the expectation of radical transformation. The law
itself has "as much a future tenor as the promises" (T/H p!22>, It is
open for transformation, as its goal is the human dignity which comes
through fellowship with the God of promise (T/H pl22).
Discussing the relationship of the prophets and their eschatological
conceptions of promise to the "historifying of the cosmos" in
apocalyptic eschatology, Moltmann explores the growth of the universal
horizon of hope central in his theology. Two events are specially
relevant to understanding the growth of eschatological beliefs in the
classical period of prophecy. First, as we have seen, the survival of a
promissory faith despite settlement in Canaan, and then, the experiences
of the 7th and 6th centuries, in which "faith in the promise undergoes
tremendous expansion" (T/H p!27). The judgement of Yahweh over his
people implied the subjugators were his too, he their Lord and Judge. The
"coming salvation of Yahweh" enters the dimension of the eschatological.
The eschatologies are "Israelo-centric" (T/H pl30), but extended to all,
and thus incapable of being seen as purely a return to the beginning.
Alongside the prospect of God's rule over all peoples, there gradually
developed the idea of the negation of death as "intensification" of the
promise (T/H pl32). Concomitant with Moltmann's enthusiasm for this,
his assessment of apocalyptic's eschatological content is positive:
"This historifying of the world in the category of the universal
eschatological future is of tremendous importance for theology...
Without apocalyptic a theological eschatology remains bogged down in
the ethnic history of men or the existential history of the
individual." (T/H pl37-8>
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Indeed, although apocalyptic tended to a fatalist cosmological
eschatology, it marked the beginning of an eschatological cosmology,
even an "eschatological ontology". The hope for history would "set the
cosmos in motion" (T/H pl37). And:
"In a struggle of this kind eschatology naturally suffers serious
losses. Yet we must not look only at these, but must also see what
is gained in them. The 'universe' is no longer, as in pagan cosmology,
a thing to be interpreted in astro-mythical terms... Instead, it splits
into aeons in the apocalyptic process - into a world that is coming
and one that is passing away... Not only the martyrs are included in
the eschatological suffering of the Servant of God, but the whole
creation... The suffering becomes universal and destroys the all-
sufficiency of the cosmos, just as the eschatological joy will then
resound in 'a new heaven and a new earth'". (T/H pl37>
This then is a summary of the way in which Moltmann paints the onward
nature of the promise in the history of Israel; opening horizons, giving
every present the potential for radical re-interpretation in the light of
the future. The distinctive feature is that the dimension of ovei—plus in
the promise has allowed the rise of a cosmic eschatological history.
And, crucially: "The New Testament did not close the window which
apocalyptic had opened for it towards the wide vistas of the cosmos and
beyond the limitations of the given cosmic reality" <T/H pl38>.
Future promise is pivotal in Moltmann' s understanding of the "revelation
of God in Christ" (T/H pl40). Thus "Christology. . . deteriorates if the
dimension of the 'future' of Christ' is not regarded as a constitutive
element in it" (ibid). However, the importance of the future horizon of
promise is threatened from two fronts. One, already noted, is the "Greek"
approach of divine immutability, the other the "modern", where the
nature of man is understood from the historic character of his existence.
These ideas may not be incompatible with Old Testament traditions, but
they are "universals". Properly, one starts with the particular
existence of this man Jesus, and then works to the universal.
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His response to threats of stabilisation in regard to a fixed divine
reality, or to emphasis on historicality, is to argue that: "We take the
past promises up into our own eschatological future as disclosed by the
gospel, and give them breadth. We do not interpret past history. We do
not emancipate ourselves from history altogether, but we enter into the
history that is determined by the promised and guaranteed eschaton. . . "
(T/H pl54).
Having as its subject Christ's future, Christian eschatology contrasts
with Old Testament promissory faith. Contacts between the tradition of
late Jewish apocalyptic and Christianity are in important respects
broken. The Easter narratives reveal not the "course of history", but:
"the future of the crucified Christ for the world" (T/H pl93).
Justification of sinners, the ground for the universal resurrection is
established for all in this one man. Christ takes the place of the
Torah, and his death, rather than obedience to the law, is central. So
the hope of the Christian comes from the unique events of Easter; from
what is revealed as the "inexhaustible future" of Christ, with its
significance as "Gods future for the world".
The Easter events are central to understanding the nature of the
eschaton. It is through them that we share in the resurrection - through
obedience whose dynamic source is hope. Whilst: "Christ is risen and
beyond the reach of death... his followers are not yet beyond the reach
of death. . . " For in the history made possible in the light of the
eschaton ". . . it is only through their hope that they here attain to
participation in the life of the resurrection" (T/H pl60).
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Moltmann describes a reciprocity between the events of the death and
resurrection of Christ, and those which are to come: "... the Christ
event is presented within the framework of an eschatological
expectation... and the future expectation is grounded in the Christ
event..." (T/H pl62). Christ is here the ground and guarantee of "a
still outstanding fulfilment" (T/H pl63>. His eschatological lordship is
not in itself the "eternal presence of God" (ibid). This presence is
considered:
"... the eschatological future goal of history, not its inmost
essence. Creation is therefore not the things that are given and lie
to hand, but the future of these things, the resurrection and the
new being." (T/H pl64)
With the emphasis on the quality of the new being, it is evident that
the eschatological outlook proposed is one which will take the "trials",
"contradictions", and the "godlesness" of the world as it lies to hand,
with seriousness (ibid). The dimension of suffering and its
relationship to the promise, is brought to one's attention with the
statement: "The promise which announces the eschaton, and in which the
eschaton announces itself, is the motive power, the mainspring, the
driving force, and the torture of history" (T/H pl65). As we shall see,
the main reason that this is so, is because "Creation is. . . not the
things that are given... but the future of these things." This raises the
question of promise as motor of an unjustifiable dialectic; the
possibility that it is consciously made the mainspring and torture of
history, since God reserves the divine presence to bestow as the essence
of a new world. If this is so, then divine responsibility for
unjustifiable evil will threaten a deepening of the crisis of coherence
for the idea of the God who is wholly good.
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The section "The 'Death of God' and the Resurrection of Christ" (T/H
pl65ff), discusses the way in which this death and the resurrection, the
basis of the Christian hope, can be approached. The Easter Kerygma binds
together three key questions concerning "the fact, the witness and the
eschatological hope" (T/H pl66). They cannot be asked separately. Put in
expanded form, they deal with; (A) the factuality of the resurrection
(historicity/possibility); (B) what one is to do (ethical/existential);
(C) for what one may hope (eschatological). I shall look at (A) and
shoertly after, (C>, and as we shall later see, Moltmann's response to
each generates siginifleant problems.
(A) What one recognises as (qualifying as) reality, and will therefore
shape one's view as to the reality of the resurrection, is something
which the resurrection itself may very well call into question. Rather
than approaching Easter with some single critical criterion, such as
historical probability, or potential underlying meaning, one needs to
ask a question that illuminates the situation out of which (all)
contemporary questions on the resurrection arise. Thus, a "... question
which embraces the whole modern experience of the world, of self, and of
the future, a question which we ourselves constitute with our whole
reality" (T/H pl67). And: "... it is no accident when this situation is
interpreted by expounding the statement of Hegel and Nietszche: 'God is
dead'" (ibid). 'God' of Christ's resurrection, understood as 'God' in
the formulation "God is dead" (an idea undei—pinning atheistic
contemporary culture) brings the question of the resurrection new
relevance. By this means one overcomes the optional way in which the
resurrection proclamation is read (with 'God' as simply an object of
history, human experience). Only if this is understood "is the
proclamation of the resurrection, and only then are faith and hope in
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the God of the promise, something that is necessary, that is new, that is
possible in an objectively real sense" (T/H pl68).
Moltrnann refers to two "God is dead" statements. The German Romantic poet
Jean Paul has Christ say to the dead awaiting the Last Judgement: "There
is no God. I was mistaken. Everywhere is only stark staring nothing..."
<My Abvtn. T/H pl68, Moltmann quoting G Bornkamm, Studien zu Ant ike und
Urchristentum p245f, 1959). For Jean Paul the necessary connection
between resurrection and the existence of God was clear. The reference to
Hegel is more substantial, with a quotation from Glauben und Wissen
(1802, Ed. F Meiner, 1962, pl23), illustrative of his giving
"philosophical existence" to the speculative Good Friday. Here then, the
feeling in modern culture that God is dead expresses, speculatively, in a
universal form, thought, the reality of the Easter cross. It sees the
"abyss which engulfs all being" and recognises, philosophically, the
absolute suffering which is a necessary element, moment, of the highest
idea. This godlesness is alone the grounds on which: " - the highest
totality can and must rise again in all its seriousness and from its
deepest foundation, as also all-embracingly, and in the most cheerful
freedom of form." Atheistic consciousness is the universalising of the
historic Good Friday; which becomes a speculative Good Friday of the
"forsakeness of all that is" <T/H pl69).
Moltmann holds that a theological perspective on Hegel will read one
thing clearly in what is said. The "god-forsakenness of the world" is the
theatre of God's future: resurrection cannot be the experience of Christ
alone (T/H pl70). The precise extent of intended appropriation or
identification is as usual unclear, but Moltmann does wish to distance
himself from Hegel's understanding of the abyss as a moment of the
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"highest idea". The cross is not''be viewed as part of "the
divine process", and as such "immanent" in God (T/H p 171 >. This would
be to introduce the idea of the "self-movement of absolute Spirit", and,
according to Moltmann, to think in terms of a "dialectical epiphany of
the eternal as subject" (T/H pl72), so undermining the historicity of
Christ (see also critique of speculative theology in TKG pl07). I shall
refer to this issue of dialectic later.
His closing words in this section offer only a little light on how the
issue of the death and resurrection of Christ is to be approached, now
that Hegelianism has been publicly put to one side. The death of God can
be the moment of the deification of man, or give "... the world that has
established itself upon the corpse of God its proper setting in the
historic process of the future of the truth. The world is then not
engulfed in the abyss of nothing, but its negative aspects are taken up
into the 'not yet' of hope" (T/H pl72). It is not quite clear what the
historic process of the future of truth is, particularly the extent to
which great creaturely suffering is a necessary and inevitable component,
or not at all.
The question of the 'not yet' is developed in the discussion of the
historical approach to the Easter events. In a critical reference to E.
Troeltsch (On History and Dogmatic Method 1898: p729ff - T/H pl75ff),
Moltmann argues that the need to establish essential similarity between
events has vicious consequences for attempts to comprehend the new.
Troeltsch "ontologically grounded" the method of analogy, as a
"correlation which exists between all historical processes" (ibid). This
is described as unacceptable. The cognitive potential of understanding
should not be limited to noting recurring patterns, similarities, and
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"comparative dissimilarity", but be able to comprehend and respond to the
new - the "hitherto non-existent". For, it is said: "Only if the whole
historical picture, contingency and continuity and all, could be shown to
be in itself not necessary but contingent, should we come within sight
of that which can be called the eschatologically new fact of the
resurrection of Christ" (T/H pl79).
That is, all suppositions are to be provisional; the resurrection is a
"new possibility altogether" for the world and for existence (ibid).
As nova creatio it is only intelligible when the full implication of the
reality of things as ex nihilo in contingentia mundi is fully understood
(ibid: this seems to be saying that all is disposable, that God can
change reality or call up a new one which is much better. In the light of
the difficulties which mount up on the question of evil, critics may
begin to wonder why God didn't create a 'good' world at the start).
Moltmann indicates that there is an "eschatological history" to which
the world is subjected (T/H pl80). Given that without the eschaton there
can be no progress, the rejection of the resurrection as a "possible
process of world history" (T/H p!79-30), appears to further indicate that
from the first there must have been a gloomy prognosis for the world if
it were to deviate. Still, it is not clear if such an eschatological
history is tinged with aspects of the 1 self-movement* of spirit Moltmann
so dislikes, translated into a drama of ontological re-structuring,
although without Hegelian coherence vis a vis the real integrity of the
world process. Moltmann argues that the resurrection makes history and
will conflict with existing concepts of history (and surely of reality)
which are "ultimately based on other 'history-making events, shocks, or
revolutions" (T/H p181). This suggests future difficulties with a
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positive doctrine of creation and the natural world (see particularly
chapter eight of this study).
With the question "'For what may I hope?'" (C), historical and
existential questions are earthed in the promissory significance of the
resurrection. Moltmann here rejects the idea that he is placing events
within a "teleology of universal history". Nevertheless something
arguably similar seems to follow. The horizon of the Easter experience
and judgement is that of eschatological expectation. The narratives of
Easter stand within "the special horizon of prophetic and apocalyptic
expectations, hopes and questions" founded round the promise (T/H pl91).
Easter itself sets up a horizon that is changed. Traditional promises
are universalised; answers come from Easter "within the eschatological
horizon of this event" (T/H pl92).
The horizon of promise and mission, is where the "question of 'true human
nature' arises", and where it receives its answer. The "new being" in
Christ is the way through which "true human nature emerges" (T/H p!96 -
the aspect of 'not yet' becomes important again). In the new being in
Christ, "the still hidden and unfulfilled future of human nature can be
sought" (T/H pl96). This openness of Christian existence is not some
factor in the created human make-up, a modification of the cor inquieta.
It derives from the historicising promissio inquieta: "The resurrection
of Christ goes on being a promissio inquieta until it finds rest in the
resurrection of the dead and a totality of new being. . . the contradiction
that is always and everywhere perceptible in the unredeemed world, and
the sorrow and suffering caused by that world, are taken up into the
confidence of hope, while on the other hand hope's confidence becomes
earthly and universal" (T/H pl96).^ Or as it is put:
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"Any kind of docetic hope which leaves earthly conditions or
corporeal existence to the mercy of their own contradictoriness and
restricts itself to the Church, to the cultus or to believing
inwardness, is therefore a denial of the cross. The hope that is born
of the cross and the resurrection transforms the negative,
contradictory and torturing aspects of the world into terms of 'not
yet', and does not suffer them to end in 'nothing'" (T/H pl96-7).
The righteousness of God will provide the grounds for a new creation.
(T/H p204-5) The "mystery of Jesus Christ" is the "realisation and
revelation of a new divine righteousness" (T/H p205). This consists not
only of the remissio peccatorum, but of the promised lordship of Christ.
Where the power of God is at work, so there is the tension of
expectation. The justified man stands in contradiction to this world,
although, it appears, constructively: "He must in obedience seek the
divine righteousness in his body, on earth, and in all creatures" (T/H
p206). In the process of the imputation of righteousness to the
unrighteous, God "attains his rights over against his creation". The
struggle of the justified in the world is a prelude to God's lordship,
and once more, to the attaining "to his rights over his world" (T/H
p207).
Always of importance is the overcoming of death. In Moltmann sin and
death are often linked. The overcoming of unrighteousness invariably
includes "reconciliation and redemption of the mortal body". Refering to
Rom. 6. 10-11:
"The divine righteousness which is here revealed finds its measure
not in the sin it forgives, but in that new life in the glory of the
risen and exalted Christ which it promises and to which it points...
Along with this goes the fact that since the gospel of divine
righteousness has its ground in the dying and living of Jesus, sin
and death are seen together. 'The wages of sin is death; but the gift
of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.' (Rom.6.23 cf. I
Cor. 15.55ff) Sin is therefore to be understood as unrighteousness,
as having no ground and no rights, as being unable to stand. This
includes both being lost in revolt against God and in falsehood, and
also dying and being swallowed up in nothingness. The divine
righteousness which is revealed in the cross and resurrection of
Jesus accordingly embraces both reconciliation with God and
justification of life. It embraces forgiveness of guilt and
147
annihilation of the destiny of death. It embraces reconciliation and
redemption of the mortal body..." (T/H p206)
(Sin and death are somehow linked, but the nature of the connection is
not clear. Death is the 'wages' of sin, It is 'seen together' with sin.
It is a 'destiny'. Nowhere is it seen as a biological necessity, given
that God has created a realm of evolving, organic, variegated beings: see
also TKG p50-l. God in Creation will be particularly interesting on this
question. It remains to be noted that if the view that the body became
mortal through sin is repudiated, problems still follow from the fact
that it is seen to require redemption because death is absolutely
undesirable and incompatible with God's coming rule. That God, who has
created ex nihilo this world from out of all that is logically possible,
who will create in a flash a realm of immortal beings, has chosen to
create mortal beings whose mortality has no justification, is anathema,
is problematic).
Moltmann offers a characterisation of the 'Jewish' attitude to death.
The 'periphery' of Old Testament thought, and late apocalyptic offered
some hope of resurrection, not on an anthropological or cosmological
basis, but on theological grounds. Thus Ezekiel 37:11 (Then he said to me
'Son of man, these bones are the whole house of Israel. Behold, they say,
"Our bones are dried up, and our hope is lost; we are clean cut off'"),
leads on to Eziekel 37:5 (Thus says the Lord God to these bones: Behold I
will cause breath to enter you and you shall live), a promise which is
without conditions. Late Jewish conceptions of creatio ex nihilo and
resurrectio rnortuorum "mark the eschatological extremities of the
religion of promise". They announce the "victory of God over the absence
of God" (T/H p210). This too, in its way, is the significance of the
resurrection of Jesus; the raising of Jesus is the negation of the
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negation of God, "(Hegel)", it overcomes the curse and damnation of the
death which ended his life. Previous hope of resurrection thought in
terms of "proclaiming the victory of praise and therewith of life over
death and over the curse of godforsakenness," - the "victory of God over
the absence of God" (ibid).
The resurrection of Jesus is "a conquest of the deadliness of death... a
conquest of judgement and of the curse, as a beginning of the fulfilment
of the promised life, and thus... a conquest of all that is dead in
death" (T/H p211). The resurrection is the beginning of the "abolition
of the Universal Good Friday, of that god-forsakenness of the world which
comes to light in the deadliness of the death of the cross" (ibid).
Again, the resurrection is fundamentally the conquest of the "death of
God", and as such it breaks the "universal bond of death" (ibid). This
antithesis between death as god-forsakenness and eternal life as
righteousness is something which will require exploration. For Moltmann's
look at the 'Future of Life" reveals that "... eternal life... is the
consummation of all things" (T/H p212). We may wonder if there is a
consumrnatory process involved, and if so, if there is no justification
for the suffering, what possible defence of it there can be. But if there
is no necessary (Irenaean style) process, and we have fallen previously
from a state of consummate existence, and become mortal, what is there to
prevent this happening in future? Yet our being will be new and stable.
This begs the question of the instability of our past and present
existence, given that it has led to great and terrible suffering. There
seems to be no reason why God should have created us this way: in a
fashion, and in a world that has brought evil for which there can be no
talk of proportionate good. What can it mean to say that God is wholly
good and perfectly loving? Questions for later.
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There is here then, an agenda for the future. The future is to be the
overcoming of a now apparent paradox. That paradox is the 'hidden'
nature of those qualities of existence which are yet the consummation of
things. It is a hiddenness, revealed in the Christ event, and from then
on passing away, There is "dissension" <Entzweiung) between the self and
the body (T/H p213) and "expectation of the creature" for the new
creation, the unfolding of those things latent in Christ; eternal life
and God's justice. Christian eschatology is (again) an eschatology of
all things, and, potentially damaging when one considers unjustifiable
evil in terms of divine negligence, it is held:
"If the kingdom of God begins as it were with a new act of creation,
then the Reconciler is ultimately the Creator, and thus the
eschatological prospect of reconciliation must mean the reconciliation
of the whole creation, and must develop an eschatology of all things.
In the cross we can recognise the god-forsakenness of all things, and
with the cross we can recognize the real absence of the kingdom of
God in which all things attain to righteousness, life and peace." (T/H
p223)
Moltmann hints at some element of stewardship of creation for man: ". . .
he [the man of hope] is compelled to accept the world in all meekness
subject as it is to death and the powers of annihilation, and to guide
all things towards their new being" (T/H p224). This new being will mark
an end of the "negative present" (T/H p215), as correlative of the "'new
heaven and new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness' (II Peter 3. 13)..."
(T/H p215). There, "'God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and
there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall
there be any more pain.' (Rev. 21. 4). . . " (ibid). Till then, "As long as
'every thing' is not 'very good', the difference between hope and reality
remains" (ibid).
Of Moltmann's review of the theology developed in this lengthy section,
certain areas stand out. He is, as earlier, opposed to a view of human
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development related to a dialectic of world history (T/H p226>.
Resurrection as creatlo ex nihilo has a clear message; the real dialectic
is of an apocalyptic kind. There comes the promise, and with it a
decisive factor; progress comes not through a linear betterment of the
present but by its radical contradiction. This is in line with what
Moltmann understands as the introduction of a truly historic possibility
of existence with the promise. But, and perhaps in some tension with what
Moltmann has said above, and indeed, with what soon follows, he wishes to
qualify this coming of the new, arguing that it is not "totally separate
from the reality which we can now experience" (T/H p227). It is,
however, a future which is "really outstanding" (.ausstehende).
When one thinks of the presumed consistency of God's righteousness,
Moltmann's attempts to clarify the nature of the novum (ibid) through
its relation to the Christ event, and the future of Christ, are somewhat
puzzling. The danger is that God is seen as promising to be righteous,
when present circumstances might dictate that such a promise be queried
as the promise of a righteous creator.s The basic points for conceiving
revelation are the poles of promise and fulfilment. Revelation is not an
unveiling of what is, but a dynamic of fulfilment. The Christ-event does
not ultimately fulfil what it promises in the sense that the final
revelation is the "sequel", being an unveiling of what already is. The
"universal fulfilment" of Christ's actions is not the dissolution of this
world in the face of a Platonic realm, as Moltmann calls it, but a new
world.
"The Christian expectation is directed to no other than the Christ
who has come, but it expects something new from him, something that
has not yet happened so far: it awaits the fulfilment of the promised
righteousness of God in all things, the fulfilment of the resurrection
of the dead that is promised in his resurrection, the fulfilment of
the Lordship of the crucified one over all things that is promised
in his exaltation." (T/H p229)
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Thus there is creation's looked-for experience of the Lordship of
Christ, to be fulfilled in the nova creatio. Till then we are in mission,
as the future draws closer. The section "The Humanising of Man in the
Missionary Hope" (T/H p285ff) is particularly interesting. Moses, Isaiah,
and Jeremiah: three examples of how recognition of the human situation
becomes clear only in the context of call to mission. It is a
recognition of inadequacy. We cannot know what we have been, and what we
really are. God's promise that he will be with us is the only possible
grounds for our coming to an understanding of our nature, and the sole
basis of a "new ability to be". We are not an "'established being'" (T/H
p286). We are hidden from ourselves, as homo absconditus (ibid). So
". . . man attains to knowledge of himself by discovering the discrepancy
between the divine mission and his own being, by learning what he is, yet
of himself cannot be" (T/H p285). It is knowledge of "... the
impossibility of one's own existence in face of the possibilities
demanded by the divine mission" (ibid). Thus mission and call involve
not the mere possibility of uncovery, review, and understanding of
human being, but a summons to new possibilities. The Old Testament call
was directed particularly to individual persons and communities, whilst
we experience with the gospel a universal eschatology:
"The comparison with nature and with the animals, or the comparison
with other men in the present and in history, does not yet bring out
what man's nature is, but only the comparison with the future
possibilities which are disclosed to him from the direction of his
life, from his intentio vitalis." (T/H p286)
Again, human beings are ex-sistent, rather than sub-sistent (T/H p287);
their nature intelligible only from the perspectives of orientation
towards the future and certainly not through any illusory conception of a
substantia hominis.
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Moltrnann later talks of human expectation in the pain of contingent
flawed existence, past and present (T/H p291). This phenomenon, it is
held, leads to possibilities of the analogical understanding of a
dimension of human existence across time: seemingly constituted by the
fact that human beings are in a statu nascendi: "Hoping in the promised
new creation by God, man here stands in statu nascendi, in the process of
his being brought into being by the calling, coaxing, compelling word of
God" (T/H p287). Moltmann argues, perhaps problematically from a
theodicy perspective (and especially in the light of his later explicit
dicussions of theodicy), that the scriptural witness on the history of
humanity does not discuss history in terms of human existential
possibilities, but concentrates on the new possibilities which shape the
future. The world is mutable, essentially an "open process" (T/H p289).
There are too (as previously noted), "boundless Iriesi^er] possibilities
for good and for evil" (T/H p 289).
In a passage which seems to contradict notions of a history to which the
world is subjected, mission "regards the world as an open process in
which the salvation and destruction, the righteousness and annihilation
of the world are at stake" (ibid). Further, perhaps paradoxical in
part, if the righteousness of the world is truly at stake in the reality
of this world, mission "does not ask about the hidden wholeness by which
this world, as it is, is intrinsically held together, but about the
future totum in which everything that is here in flux and threatened by
annihilation will be complete and whole". And, the "... totality of the
world is not here seen as a self-dependent cosmos of nature, but as the
goal of a world history which can be understood only in dynamic terms"
(T/H p289). We might say that if the dynamic is centred on present
energies and possibilities within the world, it would seem helpful that
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they are given due respect - not something which would necessarily
involve idolisation of a self-sufficient, un-God-related static cosmos.
Of course, Moltmann may be saying that their tendency is to be future
orientated upon a new but contiguous reality. Still, the theology of
nature is dangerously weak: "The call and mission of the 'God of hope'
suffer man no longer to live amid surrounding nature, and no longer in
the world as his home, but compel him to exist within the horizon of
history" (ibid). Nevertheless: "This horizon... requires of him
responsibility and decision for the world of history" (ibid). The two
demands, however, appear incompatible. e
Man, he continues, should not resort to the idea of the human subject's
ability to make history at its whim (ibid). For properly "his thinking
adjusts things to the coming messianic reconciliation" (T/H p290): "He
does not link things, as in technical positivism, with his own
subjectivity. Rather, he adjusts (vermittelt) being to the universal,
rectifying future of God". Still, Moltmann insists that this
reconciliation has its foundations "laid" by the world-transforming
obedience of those called by the promise, an obedience grounded as
follows: "... the world can be changed by the God of his hope, and to
that extent also by the obedience to which this hope moves him" (T/H
p290).
The obedience "that comes of hope and mission forms the bridge between
that which is promised and hoped for and the real [ realenl possibilities
of the reality of the world" (T/H p289). Certainly this appears to
suggest a major role for transformative obedience, although the nature of
the "real possibilities" of the world, and the power of obedience, as
opposed to, or in comparison with God's transformatory actions,
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remains ambiguous. On p288 of Theology of Hope, the information that
creating 'objective possibilities' of a meaningful nature covers such
crucial areas as creation of a new cosmos out of nothing, and the
abolition of death, tends to relativize the ideals of missionary
practice even when portrayed as 'world-transforming': "The theory of
world-transforming, future-seeking missionary practice does not search
for eternal orders... but for possibilities that exist in the world in
the direction of the promised future". This seems more modest. Rightly so
when the ". . . call to obedient moulding of the world would have no object
if this world were immutable. The God who calls and promises would not
be God, if he were not the God and Lord of that reality into which his
mission leads, and if he could not create <Sendung> real, objective
possibilities for his mission."
Indeed as the Lord of its possibilities, God can change the world. For
the human being, once more, "World reality [therefore! does not become...
as in the modern age, the material for the exercise of duty or
technique" (ibid). Rather, "understanding consists in the fact that in
sympathy with the misery of being he tie. we! anticipates the redeeming
future of being and so lays the foundation of its reconciliation,
justification and stability" (T/H p290). As we shall see, in The
Crucified God, and Religion. Revolution and the Future, human liberation
and justice for all is meaningless without new creation, and on its own
merely amounts to "renovation of the prison" (see RRF pl05).
Moltmann comes to a terse estimation of understanding history in regard
to theodicy issues:
"The glory and misery of past ages do not require to contain the
justification of God or of reason." (T/H p291)
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Even if: "The world. . . appears as a correlate of hope. Hope alone really
takes into account the 'earnest expectation of the creature' for its
freedom and truth" (T/H p289). Freedom and truth may well impell people
to explore critically what it would be for God for the misery of past
ages to be unjustifiable.
The retro-active aspect to the promised freedom from annihilation
reaches back to an alien and alienated past, and redeems it by
supercession of the tyranny of the negative, through ontological re¬
structuring: "'Perspectives must be created in which the world looks
changed and alien and reveals its cracks and flaws in much the same way
as it will one day lie destitute and disfigured in the Messiah's
light...'" (my abbvtn, Moltraann quoting from T. W. Adorno Minima Moral I a
1962, p333ff). It is in this sense that there is a solidarity between
past and present, a "certain contemporaneousness both in the historic
alienation and in the eschatological hope (T/H p291). More importantly:
"Only this solidarity in the earnest expectation which groans under the
tyranny of the negative and hopes for liberating truth, takes historic
account of history and performs among the dead shades of history the
service of reconciliation" (T/H p291). We are with the language of new
being. Luther is cited:
'"... a strange language and a new grammar... For his will is, because
we are to be new men, that we should also have other and new
thoughts, minds and understandings and not regard anything in the
light of reason, as it is for the world, but as it is before his eyes,
and take our cue from the future, invisible, new nature for which we
have hope and which is to come after this wretched and miserable
nature..."'(Moltmann quoting WA 34, II, pp.480f., T/H p290)
Hence Christianity's message, if it is not already clear, is one of
transformation. Evidently, non-conformity with the world, in conformity
with God, involves not some purely inward process of obedience, but a
change to the face of society, in the context of a expectation of more
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fundamental change (or more problematically, as we shall see especially
in Religion. Revolution and the Future, only effectively in the new
creation itself). New kinds of human relationship to others, and to
things is essential. In fact Christian hope is "... in search of 'other
institutions', because it must expect true, eternal life, the true and
eternal dignity of man..." <T/H p330>.
Moltrnann cites Hegel: "A thing is only alive when it contains
contradiction in itself and is indeed the power of holding the
contradiction within itself and enduring it EG. W. F. Hegel, Werke IV,
p.671" (T/H p337). This adds to the intermittently Hegelian tone of his
theology the idea of one's only being alive when possessing interior
contradictions, and the strength to hold and "endure" these. It apppears
that God has lived through great contradictions, succesfully endured
them. It is still doubtful though, if God can be wholly good in an
intelligible way, and his world not be required to be one of good
h
proportionate to evil; worthwhile, ultimately justifiable suffering.
In Moltmann* s understanding of the contradiction between God's
righteousness and this world (whichever way this relates to the Hegelian
tradition), risk is apparently central. Still, it is the horizon which
exists in the light of the resurrection which makes such spending of self
meaningful. Indeed: "If... we are thus to risk expending ourselves, then
we need a horizon of expectation which makes the expending meaningful...
Faith can expend itself in the pain of love. . . because it is upheld by
the assurance of the hope in the resurrection of the dead" (T/H p337~8).
So this possibility of self-expenditure becomes a human reality "within
that horizon of expectation which transcends this world" (ibid). Thus:
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"For love, we always require hope and assurance of the future, for
love looks to as yet unrealized possibilities of the other, and thus
grants him freedom and allows him a future in recognition of his
possibilities.../ this present world... becomes open for loving,
ministering, self-expenditure in the interests of the humanizing of
conditions... It is therefore the world of possibilities, the world in
which we serve the future, promised truth and righteousness and
peace. This is an age of diaspora, of sowing in hope, of self-
surrender and sacrifice... Thus self-expenditure in this world, day-
to-day love in hope, becomes possible and becomes human within that
horizon of expectation which transcends this world." (ibid)
This raises questions on the historically limited opportunities for
genuine love and self-giving implicit in the relatively recent arrival
of the Christian message: a matter which I shall look at soon. If in the
long run, Moltmann seems to say that causal connections between freedom,
courage, love, and suffering are not enough to justify the latter's
possibility, then the world becomes something arguably impossible to
describe as worthwhile. If this vitiation of a theology of the world is
the case, huge sweeps of history (if not all), marked by catastrophic
suffering, and without the horizon of the new creation, become arguably
absurd and meaningless delays to an eschatological in-breaking of
righteousness. At this point, having reached the end of Theology of Hope.
I want to go back to look at the opening sections of Theology of Hope.
and very briefly look at Moltmann's attitudes to Kant and Bultmann.
Moltmann refers critically to the Kantian ethical reduction; eschatology
as realisation of the self, according to precepts of moral and practical
reason. In another direction several statements of Kant's are picked out.
Such as: "'The abiding and unchanging 'I' (of pure apperception) forms
the correlate of all our representations'" (Critique of Pure Reason: ET
N. Kemp Smith 1929, pl46, T/H p47) - "'Thus the time in which all change
of appearances has to be thought, remains and does not change'" (op.cit. ,
p213: T/H p47). And: "'Time is nothing but the form of inner sense,
that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state'" (op. cit.,
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p77: T/H p47). Moltmann argues: "The conditions of possible experience
which were understood by Kant in a transcendental sense must be
understood instead as historically flowing conditions. It is not that
time at a standstill is the category of history, but the history which is
experienced from the eschatological future of the truth is the category
of time" (ibid)."-^
This appears to be the Copernican revolution in reverse, with the
suggestion of passive non-subjectivity, humanity as cognitively totally
at one with whatever new reality or altered dimension God wishes to
create about his creatures: a kind of absolute realism hingeing on
complete identity of subject and object, so that distanciation, or
perhaps better, subjectivity, dissolves. If though, God's eschatological
history is to determine the category of time, Moltmann appears to be
confusing content, what is to happen, and all that implies in its own
right for our future as human beings, and our understanding of the world,
with the question of the conditions of perception which are arguably
inalienable to us as human beings. If it is apparently not possible for
God's rule to exist for beings with the created perceptual integrity
first 'given' them, then it seems unfair to make them such as their wrong
actions are punished by mortality till the true conditions for
righteousness are introduced. I am not asserting that human perception
cannot to some extent be learnt: but Moltmann seems to suggest that
possible conditions of experience as conditions for enabling us to live
in the truth, are determined and re-determined by God in relation to a
point beyond our present and past experiential, perceptual possibilities.
This leads strongly to the conclusion that the historically flowing
conditions of past human experience have been conditions of god-
forsakenness. The reference to the category of time may seem unimportant
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in dealing with the question of evil. However, by implication, if all
conditions of possible experience are so conditioned by God-driven
history, the divine responsibility for any lack of integrity in past
experiential conditions cannot avoid being highlighted. God can change
the conditions of possible human perception and experience without
compromising our humanity. What then can be the justification for
permitting and creating a world where unjustifiable suffering would be
favoured by the conditions of possible experience?
Perhaps most significant from the point of view of the theodicy question,
Moltmann concludes, that with a fully eschatological understanding of
revelation, Deus dixit reveals a promise which "would be a new perception
of history's openness towards the future. Not all ages would have an
equally immediate relation to God and an equal value in the light of
eternity, but they would be perceived to be in a process determined by
the promised eschaton" (T/H p58). The question of what it is to be
ontologically different not only in terms of mortality and freedom, but
in those of fundamental possibilities of perception, appears part of this
issue of inequality, and can hardly be without a bearing on how the
problem of evil and human/divine responsibility is to be viewed in
Moltmann's theology.
Moltmann is also concerned with Bultmann: with his "correlation of God
and self" (T/H p61>. According to Bultmann, the eschaton is the present
possibility of liberation of human existence from the threat of
objectification (T/H p62>. Moltmann rejects this as a de-natured
eschatology. He sees it as a symptom of the setting up of an antithesis
between the inward subjectivity of the self, and the world which is
consigned to the realm of objects and from which all subjective
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relationships are abstracted. That is, the dichotomy of understanding
oneself either from the world or from God. This antithesis has to be
overcome. He argues that Bultrnann's theology of the event of proclamation
and the understanding of revelation which it embodies, the coming to an
original and final authenticity, lacks a coherent understanding of
promissio. The problem it is said to have with the world contrasts with
the expectation of an eschatology of 'not yet': "in which faith stretches
out towards the future... tin which] it becomes possible to perceive a
world that is not identical with 'world' in the antithetical sense in
which the doctrine of justification uses the term to denote the epitome
of corruption, law and death..." (T/H p69). In eschatological faith "The
world itself is subjected... to vanity, in hope" (ibid). Indeed:
"Talk of the openness of man is bereft of its ground, if the world
itself is not open at all, but is a closed shell. Without a cosmic
eschatology there can be no assertion of an eschatological existence
of man. Christian eschatology cannot reconcile itself with Kantian
concepts of science and reality. (ibid)
This perspective, with its hope of the redemption of the corporeal enters
into a solidarity with creatures (ibid). For: " 'future' is that reality
which fulfils and satisfies the promise because it completely corresponds
to it...": as only "... that event which is spoken of as 'new creation
out of nothing', as ' resurrection of the dead', as ' kingdom' and
'righteousness of God'..." can do (T/H p85). For with hope we are in
harmony with ourselves "in spe", but in disharmony "in re". The hoping
person is seen as a "riddle" to themselves. They are an "open question
addressed to the future of God" (T/H p91).
We have now reached one of those tantalizing points where the issue of
problematic deficiency or incompleteness seems about to be resolved by
Moltmann's approval of a Hegelian approach. Thus the promise opens us up
to the "dreadful power of the negative" as something positive, and in
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fact, the hallmark of the life of the spirit - several major extracts
from the Phenomenology of Mind affirming this:
"If revelation encounters him as promise, then it does not identify
him by disregarding what is negative, but opens him to pain, patience
and the 'dreadful power of the negative', as Hegel has said. It makes
him ready to take the pain of love and of self-emptying upon himself
in the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead and who quickens
the dead. 'Yet it is not the life which abhors death and keeps itself
pure of corruption, but the life which endures it and maintains
itself in the midst of it, that is the life of the spirit.' 'The power
of the spirit is only so great as its outgoing, its depth only so
deep as the extent to which in its expending it ventures to spread
itself and lose itself.' Thus the promised identity of man leads into
the differentiation of self-emptying. He gains himself by abandoning
himself. He finds life by taking death upon him. He attains to
freedom by accepting the form of a servant. That is how the truth
that points to the resurrection of the dead comes to him." (T/H p92
- Hegel quotations from Baillie translation, op.cit., pp93 and 74)
So we gain ourselves by abandoning ourselves. Yet as we already know,
Moltmann is not prepared to accept that this occurs within a divine
process other than that of the defeat of death as the prelude to the
coming of righteousness. That is, there is no apparent
explanatory/justificatory process involved, even though in certain
places, as above, it is hard not to feel that a classical dialectic is at
work. Overall, taking the hostility to Hegelianism with seriousness, all
we know so far is that the world is bad, rather than very good: that it
contradicts God's righteousness: that God created it: that he will create
a new world: that self-giving love is good; and that Hegelian dialectic
is unacceptable self-movement of Spirit.
Ernst Bloch is quoted: "To hope there belongs the knowledge that in the
outside world life is as unfinished as in the Ego that works in that
outside world." (T/H p92: Das Prinzip Hoffnung 1, 1959, p285. ET, The
Principle of Hope. p246ff Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986) So hope requires a
world in historic flux (T/H p92), runs Moltmann's argument, which
continues by implying that the world is by itself a closed system of
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cause and effect, necessitating for the sake of the promise, for hope,
that God open it up to his possibilities.® One is almost bound to ask why
this great and painful drama is being played. Apart from telling us how
the world is being 'fixed' there is little on this key subject. Thus:
"... hope has a chance of a meaningful existence only when reality
itself is in a state of historic flux and when historic reality has
room for open possibilities ahead. Christian hope is meaningful only
when the world can be changed by him in whom this hope hopes, and is
thus open to that for which this hope hopes; when it is open to all
kinds of possibilities (possible for God) and open to the
resurrection of the dead. If the world were a self-contained system
of cause and effect, then hope could either regard this world as
itself the fulfilment, or else in gnostic fashion transcend and
reflect itself into the supra-worldly realm." (ibid)
Creation, if such situations are to be avoided, requires possibilities of
a nature inconceivable within the world system, possibilities possible
for God (T/H p92). Clearly the world as it is cannot bring fulfilment;
nor is the continued existence of a flawed world tolerable when hope in
righteousness requires the existence of one which is actually just, and
corresponds to God.
Moltmann concludes this section with a challenge to 'non-historical'
existence; a "cosmologico-mechanistic" way of experiencing reality;
reason's seeking to abolish chance, creating a world of institutionalised
relationships; a fear of the end of history. Whilst:
"The experience of the world as history can hardly take the form of
again considering the experience of history either in terms of fate,
in that passivity in which we suffer birth and death, or in terms of
chance... [the] scientific and technical efforts of the modern age
have... been aimed at bringing about the end of this kind of history,
the end of the history of chance, of contingency, of suprise, crisis
and catastrophe." (T/H p93)
As Moltmann has just argued, the world requires possibilities for joy of
a nature not conceivable within its systems, and it is thus not suprising
that society should seek to control catastrophic forces, and often resent
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those of what is described as fate. Why there are such forces is though
far from clear.
He makes a distinction between scientific millenarianism, and the
eschatological history which rises from the event of the resurrection:
"the 'end of history' in the 'modern age' can no more be promised and
expected than the modern age (Neuzeit> can be the 'new age' (.neu Zeit)
in the apocalyptic sense - as this expression <Neuzeit) was surely meant
to be" (T/H p94). So: "Christian theology has one way in which it can
prove its truth by reference to the reality of man and the reality of the
world that concerns man - namely by accepting the questionableness of
human existence and the questionableness of reality as a whole and taking
them up into that eschatological questionableness of human nature and the
world which is disclosed by the event of promise. " For:
"'Threatened by death' and subjected to vanity' - that is the
expression of our universal experience of existence and the world."
(ibid)
Questions taken up as the sentence goes, "In hope" by a theology which
"directs them to the promised future of God" (T/H p94). I will look at
what Religion Revolution and the Future, and Hope and Planning add to
this after discussing how Theology of Hope relates to the theodicy
problem.
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The first question I wish to ask, concerns the nature of God's love. On
page thirty-one of Theology of Hope. Moltmann tells us that "love does
not snatch us from the pain of time, but takes the pain of the temporal
on itself". The temporal in this sense embraces the realm of suffering
and transience in the present creation. Is there some reason or necessity
for creating a reality which encompasses such evil? On page thirty-two
there appears to be some kind of justification for the creation of a
deficient world CI believe I am right in saying that a reading of
Theology of Hope leads to the conclusion that it is condemnatory of the
present conditions of existence, and characterises them as deficient). It
is stated:
"Only in the perspective of this God [of the promise] can there
possibly be a love that is more than philia, love to the existent and
the like - namely agape, love to the non-existent, love to the
unlike... to the lost, the transient, the dead; a love that can take
upon it the annihilating effect of pain and renunciation because it
receives its power from the hope of a creatio ex nihilo."
In this context agape appears most highly valued. God promises a new
creation because this creation is so deeply flawed. In so promising, God
recognises the existence of the dying and the lost. In pointing to the
new cosmos where there shall be no such suffering, he expresses special
love: that which expresses itself in loving the unlike, the downtrodden;
which derives its power from the ability to indicate the certainty, with
creatio ex nihilo, that such suffering shall come to an end, that it has
no place in God's kingdom of righteousness. However, the condition of
there being agape is immense suffering, insofar as it is to be love, not
simply of the finite, but the lost, the transient, and the dead.
A small example. If the suffering involved in the natural famines in
India and China for which estimates of fatalities are available,
28,800,000 deaths between 1769 and 1901, is taken as a modest and
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(outside these areas) almost forgotten part of the agape scenario, then
difficulties conventionally arise: especially if agape and ideas of
responsibility and care are the principal justifications. So I think most
theodicists would recognise. How does one do theology after Doji Bara
(the 'skull famine' 1790-2), and Orissa (1866): in a world which God
creates ex nihilo, and for which he/she, is in some real sense,
responsible? One theodicy position is that God wants free creatures to
evolve, to suffer, and grow, in love; to take responsibility themselves.
But apart from making things difficult by repudiating the need for
justification of the way the world is and has been, where the horror of
natural famine might be redeemed by any pedagogical value: its
opportunities for famine relief, if possible, and expressions of
sympathy, or its inevitability in a wonderful but necessarily harsh self-
regulating world, Moltmann subtly undermines, in another direction, the
way in which this creation is something we could lovingly and
constructively take responsibility for:
"Expectation makes life good, for in expectation man can accept his
whole present, and find joy not only in its joy, but also in its
sorrow, happiness not only in its happiness, but also in its pain."
This involves an arguably questionable concept of happiness and joy, one
which might explain how God as creator ex nihilo of this world could look
forward to the time when its suffering, even if unjustifiable and
obscene, could be embraced in joy (for what joy in a creation where this
was not the case? And yet, the most damaging suffering almost by
definition falls outside such a positive vision). In order for this
criticism to stick, and acknowledging that Moltmann doesn't here say
that God wants to bring joy out of suffering, the following has to be
considered: that the expectation which allows us to find joy in present
suffering has its roots in the deficiencies which make the expectation
possible: moreover, deficiencies which many do argue are incompatible
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with the creative endeavours to be expected of a wholly good God. One can
find relief in the thought that what is tormented will be liberated. Yet
it is hard to accept that one could permit that someone or something be
perhaps unjustifiably tormented in order that they might experience escape
from suffering and annihilation and the coming to the wholeness which is
their true ontological state; something which they could not anyway
obtain without one's intervention. This is damaging when it appears, as
we shall see, that almost the only joy in Moltmann*s model of life is
that which stems from the hoped for supercession of this world.
Certainly, it seems the only intelligible account of why the Moltmannian
creation is so fundamentally warped is that some kind of history of hope
involving suffering love and happiness in pain and hope is essential to
God's initiative. If this option is foregone, then we really are dealing
with a problematic creation: one perhaps impossible to reconcile with the
existence of a wholly good God - where 'wholly good' could be rendered
meaningfully, in something related to basic useage and conditions of
entailment.
For Moltmann, this is a tormented world. Take the world suffering without
hope, that is, in great ages preceding the distinct promise of God
(although, according to Moltmann only the promise really set up a genuine
sense of suffering. Let us say then, all the ages in which there has
been despair). Moltmann says:
"... it can be said that living without hope is like no longer living.
Hell is hopelesness, and it is not for nothing that at the entrance
to Dante's hell there stand the words: 'Abandon hope, all ye who enter
here." (T/H p32)
Perhaps superscription could be placed over the first creation, as
described by Moltmann, and, realistically, upon the lives of many of
God's creatures who have existed in that creation without the Christian
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hope in the new creation. That is, according to Moltmann's own
statements, insofar as they might hope to find fulfilment in their lives
and in this world, and falsely so: or as they felt that the world was a
theatre of absurd and unjustifiable suffering, and deduced from this to
their own satisfaction, the un-likeliehood of its being created by a
wholly good God; or of there being any God at all.
So, agape is love which can say, 'you are suffering', but this suffering
will be ended in the new creation. In other words:
"The hope that is staked on the creator ex nihilo becomes the
happiness of the present when it loyally embraces all things in love,
abandoning nothing to annihilation but bringing to light how open all
things are to the possibilities in which they can live and shall live"
(ibid).
For the notion of theodicy and of its problems to work, we must accept
that even if God was not 'all in all' when he first created, he was still
wholly good, as he has always been. If God was not wholly good; even a
mixture in which good tended to predominate, and which is somehow moving
towards a perfect goodness, then it would still be unreasonable to ask
that all evil be justifiable. It might be, but there is no necessity that
it need be so - even if God would on the whole like this to be the case.
Besides, here one would simply not be talking of the God of Christianity.
If agape takes its power from pointing to the future where suffering is
no more, but this suffering does not need to be justified by the
existence of agape itself (or anything else), then the idea that agape,
and the creation in which it operates, is a manifestation of a divine
love which is wholly good, is a contentious one. It is clear that in the
new creation, agape of the kind which involves love of the 'non¬
existent', transient, dead, and dying, is not possible. This is because
the new creation expresses God's righteousness. But the implications of
present god-forsakenness do not seem to trouble Moltmann. One could agree
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with Moltmann's apparent assumption that philia, or love of like for like
cannot possibly exist between God and finite creatures as a kind of self-
reflection and indirect self-worship. Still, it can be asked if the
making of a whole, joyful finite realm, where, in being whole, there is a
real difference and similarity - but something which for an obscure
reason requires a prior ontic state to exist; one whose consequences
are held not necessarily morally justifiable, and whose distinctive
feature, in terms of love, is the agape predicated on terrible suffering
and empowered by the good future, is a plausible proposition? Agape is
aimed at the elimination of that which is its cause, at deep
contradiction. Yet this is part of a painful process seen as without need
to satisfy a moral rationale. Moreover, the whole ground and hope of
redemption rests upon God's perfect righteousness and upon the power of
creation ex nihilo, both of which God freely exercised in bringing this
first creation into being. If God is perfectly free and wholly loving,
how can this relate intelligibly to the state of the world and creation?
In the theology of a future cosmos of righteousness, what is possible
"arises entirely from God's word of promise" (T/H p85). What is possible
in the promise is not possible within this cosmos. What is embodied in
the promise "goes beyond what is possible and impossible in the
realistic sense. It does not illuminate a future which is somehow already
inherent in reality" (ibid). And "'future' is that reality which
fulfills and satisfies the promise because it completely corresponds to
it, and accords with it". What is promised is, one understands, what is
involved in God's being righteous. Thus, it is "... only in that event
which is spoken of as 'new creation out of nothing,' as 'resurrection of
the dead... that the promise... finds a reality which accords with it..."
Yet again there are difficulties. Why understand God to be righteous when
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one knows that things to be created are correlative with righteousness,
and others that have been created, are not? By comparison, let us look at
a story of 'human affairs.'
A motorway is to be built. A responsible task, involving deep
consideration by the designer, or design team, of the value of life and
what can be done to safeguard it. The designer of the motorway is simply
the best. So, at least, the public have been told. However, the road
proves to have many flaws. This is suprising, as the designer really did
have total control over materials and construction, and a supposed
mastery of dynamics, stress theory, and so on. It is suprising because
the designer's agent has without hesitation described him as completely
competent, not just as 'almost totally so'.
There are no other motorways to make comparison by. Even so, there are
expectations which stem from the concept of competence, of being
'completely' so, and from the declarations of the all caring designer.
Standing on a bridge overlooking the road, the designer is confronted by
mayhem and tragedy. Much innocent and irreperable suffering is occurring,
the consequence of major design failures and omissions. People are
eventually promised that a new motorway is under construction, and will
open some time in the future. Until then, the emergency services and
drivers can take encouragement from this promise, and from the fact that
although many victims suffered horribly, and are dead, they can be
resuscitated to share in this new and altogether happier experience. It
will come true: the designer is all caring and wholly competent, and the
decisive manner in which the promise is announced, and the sweeping
nature of the improvements, only go to strengthen this impression.
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Asked about present inadequacies, clearly admitted in the radically re¬
designed new motorway, the designer is not so much apologetic, as after
all, rather up-beat. Perhaps, it is suggested, although he is genuinely
torn by the suffering of people, he is really trying to teach them the
values of road-comradeship, or avoidance of dangers on a badly designed
and hazardous motorway. But why? Such lessons have no applicability on
the new motorway. And if the deficient motorway was constructed to
demonstrate how the designer who was wholly competent would not rest
until he had made a road which demonstrated this fact, then one would
suggest a moral failure, or indeed, incompetence. Perhaps this is so. The
designer has after all specified that only inadequate drivers can use the
road, whereas all driver skill on the new road, and conditions in
general, will be such that serious accidents cannot happen. This is
something not possible in the present situation, as there are fixed
boundaries, indeed vicious parameters, to human wholeness.
Certain apologists for the designer do not condone any justificatory
moves. Whilst these moves recognise the designers responsibility for so
many crucial features of the road, they do not take on board the full
implications of what it is to be all-caring and wholly competent. For
trying to reconcile these qualities with what has happened is impossible
and even blasphemous. Nevertheless, the fact that the designer's son has
suffered as a result of a tragic incident does little to improve
confidence amongst critics. Perhaps the designer is sincere. But are
they competent? Do they mis-represent themselves?
This kind of analogy points, I believe, to real difficulties in a
position where no justification is held to be necessary for the suffering
of the present world. In Theology of Hope the decision to include a
171
discussion of theodicy should not have been something entirely optional,
as it apparently was. Arguably far from it. Moltmann abstains from
saying more than that the misery of the world requires no justification,
and as if to support this, the theology itself is devoid of a rationale
for suffering. Where, as in Moltmann, the theodicy problem is at least
set up from within belief in God's righteousness, and is highlighted by
misery endemic to this creation, this state of affairs cannot be passed
by without question.
For instance, in this world, according to Moltmann, we are not free or
truly ourselves. Death and dying is our destiny, all to be changed.
Theology in these terms is evident in what Moltmann says on page ninety:
"... 'natural theology' - theology of existence and of history - is a
halo, a reflection of the future light of God upon the inadequate
material of present reality, a foretaste and advance intimation of
the promised universal glory of God, who will prove himself to all
and in all to be the lord..."
And of the theology of promise:
"... it does not have the appeal that its statements are 'self-
evident', but it is essentially polemical... We shall have to turn the
proofs of God the other way about and not demonstrate God from the
world, but the world from God, not God from existence, but existence
from God..."
So God's creatures have to struggle to proclaim what it is to exist from
God with reference to a future period, and use this polemically against
what already exists. This is disquieting. So too, is Moltmann's thinking
on God's inexhaustibility.
On page one hundred and six it is said that: "The 'not-yet' of
expectation surpasses every fulfilment that is already taking place now".
There is a problem here. If what existed was very good, but what was
possible and approaching was even better, then one could rejoice. Rejoice
in the fact that "... the reason for the overplus of promise and for the
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fact that it constantly overspills history lies in the inexhaustibility
of the God of promise, who never exhausts himself in any historic reality
but comes to rest only in a reality that corresponds to him" <T/H pl06).
But if much of what exists is at best amoral, and even very bad, and of
so much evil there can be no justification, then the following range of
alternatives can be plotted. [A] God is overflowing, abundant, and wholly
good. He creates what is expressive of and thus compatible with himself.
In his inexhaustible goodness he therfore creates a cosmos of eternal
life, of truly free and human creatures; for whom there is no such menace
as vicious transience, nor has there ever been. E B1 God is overflowing,
abundant; or perhaps he is something less than all in all, still though,
perfectly good. He creates a world of suffering and transient creatures,
but promises to create a new world radically different.
E A] is unproblematic, unless one is a Hegelian; or perhaps a Christian
too. A number of consequences arise from EB1. Excluding the severe
problem of unjustifiable evil, it seems there has to be some necessity
for creating a world of transience. It hardly seems likely that God's
corning to be all in all and/or creator of the new creation is unrelated
to what he is enacting and letting be in creation. If this were the
case God could simply have waited until he felt able to create a world
without sorrows and death. It would seem that, given the contradictory
nature of creation, there has had to be some necessity in God's
creating the first creation as it is, even if we do not wish to say that
there was a necessity to create. I suggest another analogy.
A designer builds a truck. It carries a large number of passengers across
difficult terrain (we can leave aside the question of whether or not the
designer has also manipulated the terrain for experimental purposes). The
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truck is deficient in several important respects, and there are many
problems for the passengers. Meanwhile, the designer flies on ahead. At
the end of the course he unveils a wonderful new truck, its powerful
lights pointing down the course, and inspiring the exhausted and
suffering passengers (the designer's son goes part of the way, is
injured, and then flown to the end). Or is that the promise that a new
truck is waiting sufficient? On arriving, the passengers say they
couldn't have completed the journey unless the lights had been shining
so.
Had the designer been learning from the experience of the first vehicle
in constructing the second? No, it turns out. He had the resources and
the know-how to create the new vehicle from the beginning. Still, he has
suffered agonies watching its predecessors perilous journey. Why then
were the passengers given a dangerous vehicle: one which wasn't even to
play the role of essential proto-type or 'proving-ground' ? Perhaps the
passengers were to learn and develop responsibilities. 'No', says the
designer. 'I would never inflict such hardship, when as you can see, I am
totally good, and that kind of experience would stand in contradiction to
my wishes - and the new vehicle is a world apart in specification. On
be
arrival the crew willAallowed to rest so that they feel new people, and
can face an altogether different experience'. It is said perhaps that
only a cruel designer would follow such a path of mis-conceived, indeed
un-ethical experimentation (here I am actually drawing on the
implications of Moltmann's statements in other texts: some already met
with in chapter three, others to be looked at in due course. Since in
Theology of Hope Moltmann already goes so far as to say that no
justification need be offered for the history of the world, I have
assumed that this account of the eschatological future of a deficient
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creation can be looked at with occasional reference to the more explicit
and repeated criticism of theodicy in later writings).
It would seem then that for the sake of justice and coherence, that the
designer would need to travel with his people, learning with them - and
that this would have to be a necessary process: in making people fit and
worthy of the new creation, and being the route which God would have to
follow in setting up a life of spirit outwith, and in communion with
himself. But this still carries the threat of incompetence. Surely the
perfect designer could foresee basic hitches? To think in terms of the
analogy, of a lack of seat belts, of the choice of an unecessarily
difficult and dangerous terrain. And then of course, there is the
arguably crunch question of justifiability. Was it worth it? Were the
innocent to die? Can one accept a situation in which, whatever traumatic
and possibly ultimately morally unjustifiable events occur, a permanent
limitation on intelligibility allows little more than a blind faith that
the future will 'turn out right?'
The problem is that when we take it that there is no real dialectical
process involved, in the classical sense, i.e., other than the simple
overcoming of contradiction in the suffering world confronted by hope,
then a model of Moltmannian 'inexhaustibility' takes on a dangerous
shape. It appears that if there is a level '10' at which things are very
good and expressive of God's perfection, one starts at '1' and moves by
'stages': purely because divine inexhaustibility likes to show that it is
not exhausted in the pre-planetary dust swirl, or the famine prone static
agrarian society; or even in organic life. One would usually say that the
suffering, or the possibility of suffering, in the deficient levels was
to be justified in the ascent to '10' through a balance of otherwise
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unobtainable second order goods. Yet Moltmann does not say that there is
such a justificatory ordering of goods and evils: God is somehow beyond
the need to satisfy this kind of requirement. What would he say if one
argued that a truly abundant God who is wholly good would not want to
instantiate famines, diseases, oversee newly technological societies
predictably overwhelming technically 'primitive' societies, and so on, in
order to make a stately progress to '10', or suddenly decide to impose
'10' (which is after all, what is affirmed as compatible with God) upon
one? Would not want to do so unless there is some justification, as with
worthwhile goods otherwise unobtainable. If there be any reason for doing
so outwith those usually considered in theodicy, Moltmann has failed to
provide it.
Is it perhaps that Moltmann's God sets his creation on the road of
history just so he can demonstrate his faithfulness to his promise? This
would be absurd if it was from the beginning possible to be faithful to
oneself and to others. So does being seen to be faithful require that one
fulfil a promise over time? It could be argued that where the situation
prior to fulfilment involves the toleration of unjustifiable evils, then
one has lost the right to be believed to be wholly good. That is, if
one inflicts great suffering on humanity and on other species in order
to simply show that one sticks to one's promises: even if this is the
only way in which one is able to be seen to be a fulfiller of promises to
contingent beings created ex nihilo. Moltmann has written : "To know God
means to re-cognize him. But to re-cognize him is to know him in his
historic faithfulness to his promises... The identifying of two
experiences is possible only where there is self-identification, or the
revelation of historic faithfulness, because this God guarantees his
promises by his name" (T/H pi 17). This implies that God does not want to
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be known directly, i.e., simultaneous with the creation of his agents,
but that one needs to come to know God. Nevertheless, setting up a
situation where people long for righteousness would seem to defeat the
purpose. That is, God may be competent and wholly good when he chooses,
but choosing to highlight this competence by way of contrast with a
world of unjustifiable evils is not a defensible option.
There does seem to be something of a justification for suffering on page
ninety-one, where self-emptying is identified, not for the only time,
with the life of spirit. Thus for the recipient of revelation as promise:
"... it does not identify him by disregarding what is negative, but
opens him to the 'dreadful power of the negative', as Hegel has said.
It makes him ready to take the pain of love and self-emptying upon
himself in the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead... 'The
power of the spirit is only so great as its outgoing, its depth only
so deep as the extent to which in its expending it ventures to
spread itself and to lose itself.' Thus the promised identity of man
leads into the differentiation of self-emptying."
Still, if we take account of the fact that Moltmann has said elsewhere
that he will not embrace classical dialectic (one where evil would for
theodicy purposes need to be justifiable), then this is rather like
saying that the practical and caring skill of the surgeon in treating
multiple tumours is only so deep as the amount of experience allows. And
that such utilisation of caring potential (given the way the world is) is
a good and worthwhile thing to come by. This blurs the differences
between the God who creates out of nothing, and contingent creatures.
Where evils are unjustifiable - appear, as in Theology of Hope, as
incompatible with the rule of God and viciously unintelligible, it is
arguably pointless to think of God and spirit, wholly good, as
'deepening' themselves by entering into untold sufferings. The theodicy
debate conventionally suggests, and with good reason, that suffering
cannot be seen as unjustifiable where God is claimed to be wholly good.
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What is the thinking on human dignity in Moltmann's theology here? It
seems that real dignity is a matter of the future. Of the comandments it
can be said that "Their goal is the reality of that human dignity which
is vouchsafed to men through fellowship with the God of promise" (T/H
pl22). Moltmann, as we have seen, favours a cosmic overview of the
human situation. Thus 'being' itself becomes 'historic' (T/H pl37). And,
"Without apocalyptic a theological eschatology remains bogged down in the
ethnic history of men or the existential history of the individual".
Indeed, we need to look to "the wide vistas of the cosmos and beyond the
limitations of the given cosmic reality" (ibid).
One way of clarifying the coherence of Moltmann's attitudes to such
situations would be to see what he has to say in real detail about God's
goodness. Yet ' good' is a term which rarely appears, and where it does,
it is often tied to critique of 'Greek' metaphysics. Thus, in such a
critique of a metaphysical conception of Jesus: "... the highest eternal
idea of goodness and truth has found its most perfect teacher in him"
(T/H pl40). And then, if:
"... the divinity of God is seen in his unchangeableness, immutability,
impassibility and unity, then the historic working of this God in the
Christ event of the cross and resurrection becomes as impossible to
assert as does his eschatological promise for the future." (ibid)
There is a tendency here to speak of everlasting goodness alongside
notions of dangerous immutability. I am not suggesting that Moltmann
thinks the idea of God's being wholly good falls with doctrines of
immutability. It is simply that this is the context where it is referred
to, and there is no adequate analysis of what this statement might mean
in terms of compatibility, entailments, and the theodicy question,
elsewhere. There is the puzzling theme that God delays the full
revelation of his righteousness, and that this is the kind of flexibility
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we should look for in God. This feature not only characterises Theology
of Hope, but Moltrnann's other work. As will be seen in The Trinity and
The Kingdom of God. Moltmann does not wish to assert that God changes in
any essential way. This is of course not incompatible with his living
with a joyful and free creation. But its compatibility with the kind of
cosmic picture Moltmann paints is questionable.
At this point it is as well to note the paradoxical attitudes shown in
Moltrnann's treatment of the 'Greek' view of God, where we may equate this
with an emphasis on eternal values and unchanging righteousness, even
freedom from death. At one point Moltmann holds of God: "His attributes
cannot be expressed by negation of the sphere of the earthly, human,
mortal and transient..." (T/H pl41). Nevertheless, it is God's promise
which allows us to see that righteousness is opposed to death and
transience. God most essentially means that which gives and preserves
life, lovingly and for ever. Is there a tension here? Where, for
instance, it is said of the promise that it: "places the one who receives
it in a position of insurmountable antithesis and hostility to the
existing reality of the world"? (T/H pl43>
I believe that where Moltmann attacks notions of history as facade, where
the gospel supervenes as the revelation of eternal truths, his own
position is relatively vulnerable. Is it the case that the righteousness
of God is an eternal truth, and that this righteousness is never deviated
from? The point would be irrelevant were it not for Moltmann's 'weak'
reading of history, where its integrity and meaning is in question. The
ostensible rejection of dialectic, and the intense emphasis on the
futurity of things and their integrity, makes the historicity of reality
a record of deprivation and transcendence. By contrast, the nature of the
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new creation is fully compatible with everlasting values which truly
encompass God's righteousness. So is the pre-history that is this
creation a tableau of unjustifiable suffering ended by the artifice of
the deus ex machina? There is a danger of it looking like this.
On the question of ancient metaphysics of stability to which Moltmann
opposes the concept of genuine history: what if one falls victim to the
cultus of the presence of eternity? Moltmann writes: "History. . . loses
its eschatological direction. It is not the realm in which men suffer and
hope, groaning and travailing in expectation of Christ's future for the
world, but it becomes the field in which the heavenly lordship of Christ
is disclosed in Church and sacrament" (T/H pl59). Is this any more
affirmative of actual human history and growth than a creed of qualified
world-God correspondence? The alternative is a theology of flawed
creation, where: "The resurrection has set in motion an eschatologically
determined process of history, whose goal is the annihilation of
death..."? (T/H pl63> Where: "... eschatology of promise... makes faith
and obedience possible. . . by enabling us to believe.. . in the overcoming
of these contradictions by God" (ibid). There seems to be no middle way.
On the topic of eternal presence, Moltmann differs in his view of its
timing. It is certainly desireable. He writes:
"Eternal presence is... the eschatological goal of history, not its
inmost essence. Creation is therefore not the things that are given
and lie to hand, but the future of these things, the resurrection and
the new being." (T/H pl64)
The statement, which comes shortly after, that the promise becomes the
'torture' of history (T/H pl65), makes sense when we realise the profound
depth of the inadequacy of this world in this schema. Moltmann utilises
Hegel's conception of the speculative Good Friday of all that is. If Good
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Friday is "conceived... as the abyss of nothingness that engulfs all
being, then there arises on the other hand the possibility of conceiving
this foundering world in theological terms as an element in the process
of the now all-embracing and universal revelation of God in the cross and
resurrection of reality" (T/H pl68>. Until The Crucified God. The
Trinity and the Kingdom of God, and God in Creation, it is arguable that
we get no consistent idea of why this process should be happening at all;
and even in the later texts it is inexplicable why this situation should
be considered compatible with God's being perfectly good.
Is Moltmann an Hegelian? Consider the following. It is stated, in the
context of a number of references to epochal Hegelian utterances, that:
"... the romanticist notion of the 'death of God'... is an element that
has been isolated from the dialectical process and is therefore no
longer engaged in the movement of the process to which it belongs."
(T/H pl69>
Or is he not an Hegelian? When:
"... the god-forsakeness of the cross cannot, as in Hegel, be made
into an element belonging to the divine process and thus immanent in
God. A theology of the dialectical self-movement of absolute Spirit
would then only be a modification of the dialectical epiphany of the
eternal as subject." (T/H pl71-2)
In the light of the second statement we can interpret the first as a
description of the fact that God loves his lost Son so much, that being
God he will bring him back to new life: that it is mistaken to think
otherwise. This does not help to explain why this 'god-forsakenness of
r
the cross' has occured as something compatible, correlative, with the
existence of a God who is wholly good. Ultimately, I have come to believe
that whether we chose to interpret Moltmann as modifying the Hegelian
tradition, or as bitterly opposed to such dialectical processes, or as
alternatimg between these positions (and there is some room for debate
here), neither position, taken along with his thinking on suffering and
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theodicy, is able to prevent a legitimate call for radical re-structuring
being made. That is, once we recognise the implications of unjustifable
suf fering.
Moving on, theodicy demands are arguably only strengthened when it is
held that the world must be understood as wholly contingent upon God.
Only on these grounds does the resurrection, itself contingent, "become
intelligible as nova creatio" (T/H pl79). God's sovereignty and
creative freedom is emphasised. This makes it more difficult to
understand the basis of the following view, where the cross and
resurrection are contrasted. We must remember that only in this world is
the cross possible or intelligible: "The two experiences [cross and
resurrection] stand in radical contradiction to each other, like death
and life, nothing and everything, godlesness and the divinity of God"
(T/H pl98>. Because of this antithesis and the threat of
unintelligibility, it is as important as ever to try and understand why
the deficient world, the suffering world, the world of the cross, has
been created. Again, at times it seems as if there is a divine inter¬
action at the root of things, as on page two hundred and twenty. There,
in the event of cross and resurrection, "God confesses to God and reveals
his faithfulness". And resurrection "... must then be understood as the
eschatological coming to pass of the faithfulness of God, and at the same
time as the eschatological authentication of his promise and as the
\
dawning of its fulfilment," God is being faithful to God. But is this
being faithful to what it would mean to be wholly good, when the
dimension of contingent suffering is causally connected with the
opportunity for the manifestation of such faithfulness? I will argue
against this being so.
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So far as creation is concerned, God's righteousness is to come in the
new creation (T/H p204-5). Indeed "The righteousness of God then refers
not merely to a new order for the existing world, but provides creation
as a whole with a new ground of existence and a new right to life"
(ibid). And: "... Hence with the coming righteousness of God we can
expect also a new creation" (T/H p205). Moltmann sees righteousness not
simply as remission of sins, in which it does not find its "measure", but
as new life in the risen Christ (T/H p206). This would suggest that the
kind of world where God forgives major sins is something secondary to
that world in which a complete existence is experienced as a human right.
As is said, the divine righteousness "embraces forgiveness of guilt and
annihilation of the destiny of death" (T/H p207). So, are life and death
irreconcilables? In the religion of promise "We have our life in praising
God, hoping in him and giving thanks to him. Death therefore means that
we are far from God and he from us" (T/H p209). Resurrection hope
proclaims "the victory of praise and therewith of love over death and
over the curse of god-forsakenness, by announcing the victory of God over
the absence of God" (T/H p210). For a theologian who never proffers a
theodicy, who indeed comes to make scathing comments upon it, the
equation of death with the absence of God is problematic. Where has God
been? Did he abandon the world, and not forsee what would happen? Keeping
in mind the reasons for the future bracketing of any real answer to the
question of evil, prospects for understanding what it means to say that
God is wholly good are worsened when Moltrnann holds that: "In the cross
we can recognize the god-forsakenness of all things, and with the cross
we can recognize the real absence of the kingdom of God in which all
things attain to righteousness, life and peace" (T/H p224). In fact, the
world "cannot bear" the resurrection: we need a new world (T/H p226).
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In the theodicy question, it is normally taken that God is responsible
for the world in the sense that evils not justified by the free will
defence, are to be justified directly as events created/permitted to
provide an environment and structuring of reality and life which are
causally connected to the bringing about of worthwhile second order
goods. Moltmann holds that God can create "real objective possibilities"
for his mission. In which instance, in regard to Moltmann's overall
position on theodicy, we ask why he did not from the beginning create
possibilities specifically excluding the possibility of unjustifiable
evils? For instance, on page two hundred and eight-nine it is stated
that the world has "boundless possibilities for good and evil". No
rationale need be given for why a perfectly good God would tolerate them.
The new creation is however free from "nothingness" The advertised
differences between it and this world seem its main attractions. It is
asserted: ". . . the glory and misery of past ages do not require to
contain the justification of God or of reason" (T/H p291). And we are
attaining "... freedom from the powers of annihilation" (ibid).
Certainly one question which many conventional theodicists and atheist
anti-theodicists would ask, is if there is perhaps no justificatory
rationale behind the suffering in the first creation, then why is there
such a creation? I now look briefly at Religion. Revolution and the
Future. and Hope and Planning. to see how they develop aspects of
Moltmann's theology relevant to the theodicy question.
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CHAPTER FIVE
I shall not give a description of these texts prior to offering a
critique: presentation and critique is combined. First to Hope and
Planning (1969). 1 Much of what is said in the essays is similar in
spirit to Theology of Hope. Thus the first chapter "The Revelation of
God and the Question of Truth", deals in part with the question of
eschatological revelation and present contradiction. If revelation is
understood as the resurrection of the crucified one, then "truth must
also be understood eschatologically and dialectically" (H/P pl5). What
is Christian does not correspond to reality. This, Moltmann notes, can be
an argument against not only what is Christian, but reality itself. What
is done? We are directed to consideration of the contradiction of the
cross, suggesting as it does that "God and reality are analogies which do
not yet exist". Faith overcomes the contradiction in the hope engendered
by the resurrection. God's "future and his glory" intercede for creation.
Here: "... conformity with his word is possible only in confession to the
cross; anticipation of the future of his truth is possible only within
the experience of history, that is, in solidarity with the suffering of
the eager expectation of creation" (HP pl6-17). It is clear that
anticipation of righteousness involves suffering.
The passages "The dialectic of love in alienation" and "The dialectic of
hope in death" (H/P p46-50>, make the affirmation that death is a
profound negation, negated in the resurrection. The 'dialectic' is that
of the humanising of the dying, tortured, and the alienated (see H/P
p47-8>. Moltmann states:
"How can I identify myself with physical life when I have still
physically to await death and the decay of happiness - and I
experience it daily in loss and disappointments? Conversely, how can I
live at all without identifying myself with this transitory, guilty,
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and mortal existence? Love in which a man surrenders himself and
identifies himself with this vulnerable earthly life and hope in the
resurrection belong together... The resurrection hope prepares the way
for a life of total sacrifice." (ibid)
Significantly:
"Love is supposed to be stronger than death, yet love experiences
death as a power which is inhuman and contrary to God. Therefore the
dialectic of love in alienation still once more points out beyond
itself. Certainly it is itself already the power of the transformation
of life, but only under the conditions of agony and death. It does
not conquer death... It does not save creation. It is, however, the
analogy to that qualitative transformation of existence and therefore
lives from the hope of the kingdom. We now come to the final and
broadest horizon of the interpretation of the God-event in the
crucified Christ. It is the eschatological horizon in which God is
confronted with the misery of all creation, which cries to heaven."
(HP p49)
This reflects the most pessimistic elements of Theology of Hope. Misery
is the key-note of this world as it stands, and as it will ever be
without the hope and the reality of future wholeness. What of the
dialectic of 'love in alienation'? It involves our love of the suffering,
entry into suffering, in the power of the resurrection. As yet though, it
has the appearance of a problematic transformation scene (however
genuine the love), rather than that of an intelligible dialectic, or
one which in its evaluation of common experience looks like offering a
positive resolution to the question of evil (for death to be a natural
feature would make Moltmann's approach untenable in its emphasis on the
contradiction between death and God's creative righteousness, whilst the
idea of universal and terrible mortality as a consequence of sin has
severe moral problems too).
"Exegesis and the Eschatology of History" (H/P p56ff) argues that God's
faithfulness to man is the essence of our historicity (H/P pl08). We
acquire our future thence; not through any resort to cyclical patterns,
technology, or the "ever-tempting subterfuges of history into nature.,"
(ibid). The seriousness with which Moltmann takes the question of true
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future orientated historical being in the eschatological horizon which
God has opened up for us, is evident in his discussion of Christian
social ethics. Natural law (Ellul); unchangeable basic structures
(Brunner); conditions of man's historical life (Althaus); God's
"fundamental structures... for... human society", are all ideas rejected
in the light of the impossibility of normative social realities.
Impossibilities in a process driven by the successive actions of God in
relation to his eschatological people of the future (H/P pll5-18):
"The eschatological community of God cannot be absorbed or fitted
into a social structure.../ The dilemma of Christian social ethics is
decisively attached to the fact that theology dares to give man hope
for himself but not for the conditions in which he works and suffers,
in which love requires that he sacrifice himself." (H/P pi24-5)
In chapter six, "The End of History", Moltmann reflects for a time on the
phrase "Eschatology swallows up history" (H/P pl68). Its significance is
in its potency as a "nai've expression" of a sense of something present
already: its hope expresses less about the future than about human
nature. In fact though, God's relationship to the world promises
revolutionary consequences:
"As identity is promised to man and comes into view, he observes his
permanent non-identity in historical terms. As the full lordship of
God and physical freedom is promised to men and brought into view,
he (humanity) begins to suffer from the God-forsakenness of the
world and the inhumanity of man in it... In this difference he
experiences in himself solidarity with all the eager longings of
creation, which is subject to futility (Rom 8.18ff)." (H/P pl72)
With this, the futility of creation, one requires a "hope... which is
directed towards. . . the solution of real contradictions, towards the
negation of the negative through the God of the resurrection" (H/P pi 74).
And in this hope: "one can make the stones of historical circumstances
dance when one tries to sing that melody which, on the basis of the
transcendence of death and whatever is transitory, allows the future of
reconciliation to resound over its [the worlds] cemeteries" (H/P p!77).
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In "Hope and Planning" (H/P pl78ff), Christian hope is a "transcendent
impetus": the exhaustion of anticipatory dispositions in realised
possibilities does not hide this. For Christian hope is aimed "not only
towards the overcoming of this or that inconvenience, but ultimately
towards the overcoming of death... [it is] a 'hope against hope'." (ibid
pl95). Such hope brings suffering, not only from "earthly anguish but,
even more a suffering from the anguish of the world" (ibid). The
distance between hope, expectation, and the final realisation of
anticipations is (once more) the motor, the mainspring, the torture of
history (H/P pl96).
The interesting essay on theology and science (H/P p200ff) strongly
implies a dialectical understanding of the realisation of God's presence
in the world. In this it stands apart from the others, and even
contradicts them: there are also puzzling internal discrepancies. It is
argued that the Cartesian distinction between res cogitans and res
extensa encouraged a conception of mind or spirit as divided by a gulf
from nature (H/P p202), the consequence being theological self-
rnutilation, a natural world without salvation; a "retreat into the
ghetto", and unproductive opposition of subjectivity and objectivity.
Whereas they are in truth related, together constituting what is
described as "the totality of historical existence". Salvation of the
whole is "gained or lost within the historical process of reconciliation
between man and nature" (H/P p205: c. f. treatment of Bloch's 'home of
identity' in R/RF). The concept of openness in history is prominent here.
There is a totality which "is not only hidden from knowledge but does not
yet itself exist". Crucially, reality moves towards this whole in an
"open history" (H/P p212). There is real mediation and differentiation
in history. Humanity, as the subject of knowledge and work stands not
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only in a subject-object relationship with nature, but also as such "with
it in a history". Indeed, Moltmann goes on to describe a human/nature
dialectic. For:
"He [man] has nature and grasps hold of it and, in this way, is at the
same time himself that nature which develops itself further within
him and his world. In that open future... The subject-object
relationship between subjectified man and objectified nature becomes
obvious in his dialectical entanglememt. It both has history and
brings about history." (H/P p213>
Man is a being on the move, and as long as the question of truth is an
open question, he is aware of the "finiteness and temporality of his
plans" (ibid). And so: "He finds no rest in his own plans and pictures,
but with them moves out into the openness of history" (ibid). 12
One of the questions that might be asked of the passage p212-4, is
whether Moltmann sees a creative dialectical pattern emerging in the
life of reality moving towards the truth or the whole? A pattern
independent in its integrity, of the Christ-event as crucifixion and
resurrection: of the whole inextricable theological nexus of Easter's
overcoming absolute death, negativity, god-forsakenness, and closed
horizons? The answer is no. For the outline of the putative dialectic of
man and nature is immediately followed by the argument: the cross is
understood in its "universal significance" from the crisis of everything
in the last judgement. The resurrection is:
"understood only in the context of a transformation of the world...
Seen from this future of history the appearance of Christ becomes
meaningful... through his appearance, the consciousness of a universal
end of history has come into the world." (H/P p214)
Nevertheless, on page two hundred and twenty the future of salvation is
that of the whole, which is "more and more at stake here in human
history". However, humanity must reconcile the "historical goals of human
activity" with the ultimate future of crisis. In practical terms this is
rather sketchy. For instance, theology is to "enter into that
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intermediate area between world preservation and world consummation"
(ibid). It is said:
"The future of salvation, like that of condemnation, has never
transcended history so that one could surrender oneself to it in
fatalism or indifference, but rather in the process of history already
acquires a shape so that one will only be able to find it by
searching for it." (ibid)
It seems here that the future promised in the Christ event is somehow one
that can be set alongside, and not external to the human/ nature
dialectic. Still, critically, it cannot be said to originate there; it
explodes the human-nature dialectic, at least insofar as it subjects the
status quo to radical transformation out with its dialectical horizons.
Perhaps one can read the shape of the future salvation by looking at
history, as Moltmann does, as a record of death and sorrow. The shape of
salvation then becomes the negation of the negatives of the world.
One is told that "natural knowledge" is placed in the "open question of
the ultimate future" (H/P p215). This open question is seeking an
answer to give meaning to existence, though not apparently expecting any
from the dynamics of this world:
"If this is a hope which is not only directed towards the possible
consequences of activity and its results, but also reaches out beyond
all things visible and possible towards a meaning for everything
that happens here, then it is a hope which receives certainty in the
face of total uncertainty: Death where is thy sting? Hell, where is
thy victory?' (I Cor.15.55)" (H/P p217)
Religion. Revolution and the Future is a collection of essays on
eschatological themes. They cover the conception of the church
appropriate to the horizon of hope; Bloch's messianic Marxism; the
present sociological significance of a new creation; and intimations of
what this new creation might be in itself. Moltmann's understanding of
the world to be negated is underlined in the following words:
"I believe that Rauschenbusch was right when he said: 'Ascetic
Christianity called the world evil and left it. Humanity is waiting
for a revolutionary Christianity which will call the world evil and
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change it." (R/R/F p34-35, quoting Rauschenbusch Christianity and
Social Crisis New York 1964 p91)
With such a reference evil might be conceived of as the present
social/political reality. Yet, as is now evident, there is more:
"What is the abundance of life? The death of death. What is complete
freedom? The elimination of nothing-ness itself, which threatens and
cajoles everything that exists and insults everything that wants to
live but must die." (R/R/F p34)
Page thirty-five is headed "The vision of God and the new creation". The
biblical creation faith has two highly significant features. Creation out
of nothing is a creation "within the sea of nothingness". Creation out of
chaos is creation "within chaos" (Moltmann's emphasis). This, it is said,
is the Genesis account's figurative expression of the fact that creation
embodies being and non-being. It is a creation open for destruction and
redemption. Destruction is an immediate possibility. Realisation of its
perfectibility will only result from "process". The "experimental field
of destructive and constructive possibilities is laid out" (R/RF p36).
Moltmann feels this experimental field has become exhausted of/
inadequate in constructive possiblities: "The resurrection pictures,
which have been attempted, are pitifully inadequate because the colours
for painting the future must be taken from the already spoiled pallette
of life in the here and now" (R/RF p35).
Of interest again is the distinction between creation as an expression of
God's will, and its perfection as God's actual in-dwelling, in a new
creation in which "affliction, pain, and work are overcome" (R/RFp36). As
we shall see, this distinction occurs elsewhere. The potent symbols alpha
and omega occur: "Omega is more than alpha. Only if the ' end is good' can
all things be called 'good.' The vision of the new creation is the vision
of a succesful world experiment" (ibid).
191
Here Moltmann has made an apparent gesture in the direction of theodicy,
albeit a risky one. There are arguably three broad options available (in
respect of the statement). Position one is that of those say that where
an end situation is of itself pleasant and 'good', that does not mean
that it is one whose value is immune from questions such as 'were there
great evils perpetrated or permitted in order to reach this state, and
were they morally justifiable?' If they are unjustifiable, then if
necessary to bring about omega, omega is neither desirable, nor the work
of a wholly good being. The second position could be termed by
supporters of the first, 'naive.' Its adherents would be aware of
previous unjustifiable evils, but cast the supposed virtue of the
present, and its status as the expression of the love of the wholly good
being over the problems of the suffering which it has displaced, and so
de facto obliterate them as genuine 'problem'. Exactly how is never clear
(in its genuine form, this problem has two possible outcomes; (1) there
is evil which is incompatible with the existence of a wholly good God;
(2) the evil which exists is not incompatible with the existence of a
wholly good God; there is also the position that we do not yet know the
answer. The resort to simple eschatological verification is arguably
unsatisfactory, since, as I have argued, the fact that a god exists is no
evidence that we are in the presence of a wholly good god (God). Moltmann
seems to rely on a god's making himself known, and being good to us to
resolve the issues. Still, the occurrence of even cosmic epiphanies is
hardly enough to let the crucial theodicy questions lapse). The third
position is one of 'amnesia'. The omega present is good, and that is all
one need dwell on. Moltmann tends to position two, even if he claims at
times that unjustifiable suffering leaves permanent questions. For to be
within position one requires a conventional theodicy approach, and
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overall, Moltmann is apparently prepared to tolerate indelible
unjustifiable suffering so long as there is 'omega'.
More than this the first creation is in its openness to deficiency an
apparently essential preliminary to a wholeness characterised by the
"infinite richness of the new" and "eternal play" before God (ibid). As
God comes to dwell in the midst of this new creation, "all beings will
take part in his creativity". And "The deadly antagonisms of present
history will be transformed into the dialectic of eternal life according
to the analogy of the transformation of work into play" (ibid).
With God's new creation there cannot be the kind of "ambivalence" between
being and non-being which distinguishes this creation (ibid). Moltmann
states: "... the future new being with which history experiments here
cannot be tediously repetitious" (ibid). He continues in a manner which
casts doubt over the appropriateness of the analogy of work transformed
into play: "The new creation is to be a creation without the penetrating
shadows of the 'night' and without the threatening 'waters of the flood'.
It is no longer. . . a creatio in nihilo, but a new being which
participates in the infinite creative being of God" (R/RF p36). Thus the
"quantitative" future of our tommorrow is "infused with the qualitative
future" of the new creation (R/RF p37). The quantitative future is the
sphere in which the new creation will work some of its magic, as the
morning may greet the new day. But to look to the past is to be in its
power, as a "wasteland" where "things cease to exist" (ibid).
Moltmann looks to concrete Utopias where the present historical
negatives, economic, political and racial alienation ("definite
estrangements of man from his true essence and his future") are overcome.
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A vision of God and of the new creation allow current initiatives the
strength to succeed (R/RF p38-41). Unfortunately some parts of the
discussion are unclear. The list of present negatives and their remedies
appears within the scope of humanist visions of reconciliation, if they
indeed function as the ground of the central alienations. With an
understanding of Moltmann's theology of a god-forsaken cosmos, it seems
that they are not at all the central alienations. They may be symptoms of
something deeper. Of what consequence then to historical existence are
the non-historic alienating negatives? (ie ultimate negatives), most
especially since Moltmann can clearly envisage, here at least, a concrete
utopia where the other alienations alone are negated?
The concept of productive antagonisms is introduced in the vision of a
new creation, as the overcoming of "the present negatives of life" <R/RF
p40). This new creation will be realised in "concrete Utopias" which
summon and "make sense out of" "present initiatives" for doing away with
the present negatives. Such ambiguity as to how present negatives relate
to non-historical negatives is confusing. Overcoming of economic,
political, and racial alienation in the present is undermined by
Moltrnann's perception of the evil of death, and the nothingness around
us; is rendered somehow secondary to the joyous realisation of the
manifesto of God's righteousness in the new creation itself. It of course
raises the problem of God's existence being at all compatible with the
existence of such fundamental deficiencies.
The following words from the chapter "Resurrection as Hope" are
suggestive of the conventional theodicy problem which I have already
outlined. However, its criteria are supplanted by an image of the
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theodicy question resolved in the satisfaction of a hunger for a world
that is recognisable as God's:
"The last great philosophies and theologies of history, from Bossuet
(and Voltaire) to Hegel and Droysen, among others, were at their core
always theodicy projects. After the catastrophes of our century we
know that history writing is incapable of a theodicy. But even though
we are unable to come up with a justification of God from the
processes of history, the question of the meaning of history
continues to remain open in spite of the failure of our attempts at
justification. To raise the theodicy question, and along with it to
question the future of history, does not already mean to be able to
answer it. But suffering and evil, on the one hand, and the indelible
memory of hope, on the other, raise this question for us. In a
godless world we hunger for righteousness upon the earth, that is,
for a world which we can recognize as God's world." (R/RF p55)
Moltmann then introduces the possibility of an unusual theodicy. For:
"If the world, the way it is, would proffer a theodicy, we would need
no faith. But if there were no theodicy question, where would the
risk of faith be? (Martin Buber)." (R/RF p55)
It is being claimed that faith revolves around the commitment in risk to
the idea that God exists and loves the world. If it were to become self-
evident that such a God exists, the kind of valuable faith we now have
would evaporate. Therefore the kind of world in which we cannot know that
God exists, given the possibility that evil may be justifiable, or not
justifiable, is one that is good in that it requires a particular
commitment to God. I am not sure whether Moltmann means this to be taken
as merely an important by-product of uncertainty, or as an argument in
favour of it being the kind of opaque world it is. Certainly, if the
latter, it is a theodicy argument. But it is also a theodicy argument
which requires some complex and emotive balancing to be performed if one
is to put real emphasis upon it: this would be un-Moltmannian. The
theodicy question soon rears its head again (R/RF p59-60>. Moltmann
argues that nature "with its orders and chaos" cannot give an answer to
this question, nor can history, a mere "'mishmash of error and brute
force' (Goethe)." For:
"An answer can only come from the future, from the new creation. With
this expectation we attempt to change the present, so that the world
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becomes the world of God."
Echoing previous thought:
"... such a presence of God can be fulfilled... only if the negatives
of death, suffering, tears, guilt and evil have disappeared... in a new
creation... in which ontologically speaking, being and non-being are no
longer intertwined." (R/RF p61)
Nevertheless, what of the importance of political and social liberation?
Pre-rnodern cosmologies imaged the problem of evil and suffering in a way
very different to that of contemporary thought, says Moltmann. The
theodicy question therefore no longer has its traditional guise, but
again, "has become more of a political and social question" (R/RF plOO).
The consequences of this are that "persons and groups of men are to find
their identity in history - not apart from it". This identity is located
"only in concrete historical identification with projects directed toward
overcoming human misery and enslavement" (R/RF plOl).
Are there such projects? Indeed - : "Many of the revolutions which today
go through Africa, Asia... embody the right to be free and to determine
one's own destiny so that one can live in a truly human way and find his
own identity" (R/RF pl05). But, as Moltmann makes clear, social and
political (for instance secular independence) action by itself is
limited, and Christians should "actualize the freedom of faith in an
unfree world and justification in a repressive society" (ibid). Moreover,
"The social and political commitment of Christians errs if there does not
stand behind and within it the vivifying expectancy of God's own
presence... If there were no hope for the coming of God himself,
everything else would be only a renovation of the prison" (ibid). There
needs to be hope against the "metaphysical evil of nothingness, and
against the religious anguish over the pain of mortality" (R/RF pl06).
There is a "nothingness" at whose "boundary everything everything that is
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exists" (ibid). So, one hopes that with the corning of the presence of
God, "contradictions wholly other than social, political, and personal
ones shall cease" (ibid). God's presence will change the "ontic
condition of all things and relationships" (R/RF pl07): will end the
political suffering of the world in which humanity "struggles against,
but also brings forth evil" (R/RF plOO).3
So, God's rule is directed towards that "full humanity which is denied by
poverty, hunger, illness, and suffering" (R/RF pl22~3). It is
nevertheless curious how his righteousness is never seriously brought
into question by the overwhelming ontic deficiencies in creation, of
which these factors are arguably symptoms. Critics might ask, where, if
full humanity is denied by illness, mortality fits in? Was it moral to
create a world where the sin of some would snowball into the certain (or
seeming) annihilation of all? If illness is de-humanising, then universal
death as punishment or consequence of past behaviour is intolerable in a
system which, in its moral sensitivity, rejects the feasibility of
theodicy. Even death as a natural but dehumanising feature becomes
inexplicable. Significantly, Moltmann ends his chapter on "New Frontiers
of Christianity" with a pessimistic assessment of this creation, although
he is not without hope:
"all our social programs, declarations of independence, and humanistic
designs encounter such a void that their courses seem to disappear
into the sands of 'nothingness'... the man of faith has reason to hope
for the destruction of this 'nothingness' by the God who creates out
of nothing." (R/RF pl27-8)
Moltmann straightforwardly emphasises the "deadliness" of death, The
Christian hopes in the God who creates out of nothing, who takes
seriously the fact that this deadliness of death comes from the nihil.
"Death is not one phenomenon among others, of which none affects the ego"
(R/RF pl69). Life can find no point in which it gains immunity from
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death. There is infinite antithesis (ibid). Yet there is this
"dialectical point of transformation constituted by the resurrection of
the crucified Christ". Life can then be accepted as "life unto death" in
faith in him who creates "life out of death" (ibid). Life in trust can
"lose itself and be gained precisely in so doing". Moltmann quotes from
A Camus' The Plague: Rieux's words - that the plague had "'robbed
us all of the capacity for love and even for friendship. For love
requires a little future, and for us there was nothing more than
moments'" (R/RF pl69). So, Moltmann holds: "Love always requires a
little future". Indeed the life of love positively requires the
expectation of resurrection in order to function (ibid). With faith
in the God who so raises, love can in Hegel's words, "'hold fast what is
dead'" (R/RF pl70). But:
"... the reverse is also true: The future which is gained by the
resurrection of Christ is truly recognised and truly accepted only in
the love which expends itself even unto death." (ibid)
There is a problem here. Let us say that human beings have existed for a
million years, if not far longer. Real people: and that a million years
be represented by twenty-four hours. Then Moltmann's real promise of
resurrection has entered upon the scene of life and death shortly after
three minutes to midnight. Why is it that we are granted an extra¬
ordinary privilege, which would have allowed our ancestors to have loved
and lived truly? At least forty thousand generations dead. Why so long to
make the stones of historical circumstance dance? We can hold fast what
is dead. But what of them, not now, but then? These are important
questions, which if what Moltmann says about love and existence is true,
would demand an answer. I do not think Moltmann can give an answer. His
critical contrast of two passages, one of Thomas Miinzer's writing, and
the other of Martin Luther's (R/RF p171), heightens the sense that his
stance on human ontology is centred on a perception of our glaring
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inadequacy (still unintelligible, in the light of God goodness, and
dislike for the way things have been set up in this world). For MUnzer,
and others of Bloch's claimed antecedents, did not know: "... the love
which accepts the earth's pain and the suffering of obedience in love
because it finds hope for the earth and for the body" (ibid - my
emphasis).
I conclude discussion of Religion Revolution and the Future with a brief
look at the section "The Future as New Paradigm of Transcendence" and the
chapter "Hope and History". These contain provocative and interesting
ideas that thread their way through Moltmann*s major texts. For example:
"Only a future which transcends the experiment of history itself can
become the paradigm of the transcendence and give meaning to the
experiment 'history'. The 'utopia of the beyond' explodes all known
world conditions." (R/RF pi96)
However Moltmann is aware that two problems need mentioning in order that
the dialectic be made clearer. One can over-emphasise the qualitative
distinction between present and the eschatological future. But one can
also over-emphasise a sense of continuity and correspondence. In the
first instance history becomes a "vale of tears"; resignation ensues
(R/RF p!97). With the second, continuity leads us to think of a never-
ending transcendence of the present as the "essence of history itself":
Moltmann thinks there must be some mediative way out of his dilemma:
"A meaningful mediation seems to result only if the transcendence
which is beyond history is linked with man's act of transcending
within history; if in the midst of the critical difference one
believes in the possibilities of correspondence, and if conversely, in
the possibilities of correspondence, the qualitative difference is
kept in mind." (R/RF pi98)
Further detail comes with the idea that: "'systematic transcendental
criticism' joins itself with 'systematic immanental criticism', and the
openness of a qualitatively new future is linked with concrete steps for
bringing about a qualitatively better correspondence" (ibid). Given the
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qualitative antithesis though, I would argue that this does not yet
appear to mediate effectively between the historical, and the
eschatological which explodes "all known world conditions", Moltmann
presents Christ as the immanence of the transcendent, in solidarity with
the oppressed. The impact is lessened by his having already characterised
social action as 'renovation of the prison'. Nevertheless there is some
sense of active anticipation:
"The transcendence of the future of a 'wholly other' begins
dialectically in establishing those who, in a settled present and in
static societies, are 'the others.'" (R/RF pl99)
This though seems to beg the question of why there should be a
creation, which, in its openess to, and inextricability from the nihil,
wholly transcends the eschatological new creation.
With "Hope and History" (R/RF p200ff>, the theodicy question is
identified as fundamental (R/RF p204ff). There is more. Eschatology
reveals the "reality" of the world as history. Faith in Christ allows one
to view history, past and present, as the "history of the future of God"
(R/RF p202). Unsuprisingly, Moltmann feels that differences between the
church and other social institutions are relativised in the light of the
overwhelming lines of separation between the power of the past, and the
power of the future (ibid). Division is not spatial, but temporal. The
power of the future world is brought through Christianity into the
present.
It is hard to see how this transformative power of the future can be
thought of in terms of the retro-active power of a future wrought
dialectically from the present - a vicious circularity: future
established on the present securing the present, in order that the
present might be transformed into that future. Moltmann is apparently
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talking of the present power of God (as perhaps in the repeated phrase,
the 'power of the future') which will enable the present to become the
future: of that which seems future to us, but is always a present
possibility to God. But this seems to break the dialectical logic
Moltmann is developing on the future of being. For instance: "Reality
is not a permanent cosmos and does not consist in repeatable orders.
Neither is it a chaos. It is the historical process of the coming
fullness of being" (R/RF p217). But in contrast to this, whilst: ". . .
process theology . . . speaks of the ' becoming God' in the context of the
dynamics of the world process. Eschatological theology... Con the other
hand] speaks of the 'coming God' in the context of the dialectical
dynamics, circumscribed by the symbols of creatio ex nihilo, justificatio
impii, and resurrectio mortuoruiti' (R/RF p210). Still, Moltmann talks of
the present historical sphere in risk language:
"The present becomes the frontier where the future is gained or lost.
Traditional differences and conflicts become relative, if we can find
the future together only in a common effort. Either we will all hang
together now or we will all hang separately (Franklin)." (ibid)
And he once more sees the horizon of eschatology necessitating the
emergence of the political dimension of theology: another sign in favour
of a strong dialectical approach. In his treatment of the shift to an
existential framing of the theodicy question - in the question of
authentic humanity (cf. Theology of Hope), he again argues that the
identity question "cannot be answered apart" from the social, political,
and historical "particularities" of man. Man and world are mediated in
history (R/RF p206), which means in "social, political, and
technological" history. We will not find "inner identity" without
"humanization" of the world (compare above). Here though, we must take
account of Moltmann's penultimacy drive and its implications. It is not
clear in what ways God's corning to be all in all is related to the
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dialectic at work in the world. In his presentation of Pauline theology
Moltmann sees Paul ask not only if God is, but "when he would become God
fully" (R/RF p207). So, the problem of Christian theology is put as that
of the future when "God will be God universally" (ibid). This may well be
a different problem from that of the world dialectic, for God seems to
burst open the world, rather than allow it to mediate his creativity and
love in an unfolding of potential.
The discussion of "Future as God's Mode of Being With Us", returns to
the subject of Old Testment notions of epiphany. Beside spatial
characterisations of God in epiphany, there were also the temporal. Thus
"The divinity of God will become manifest and real only in the coming of
his unlimited reign" (R/RF p208). Here Moltmann wants to strengthen the
concept of God as future, as well as God above, or God in us. The
impression is of a God who is at one with a transcendent dialectic of
some kind, one which masters and supercedes that of the evolving world.
Thus:
"God is present in the way in which his future takes control over the
present in real anticipations and prefigurations. But God is not as
yet present in the form of his eternal presence, the dialectic
between his being and his being-not-yet is the pain and the power of
history... we are seeking his future, which will solve this
ambiguity that the present cannot solve." (R/RF p209)
The future is not a "far away condition" but a power which "already
qualifies the present". And, as "this power of the future, God reaches
into the present" (ibid). So: "... God becomes the power of protest
against the guilt that throws us into transiency and produces death, and
he becomes also the ground of the freedom that renews life" (ibid).
Perhaps more important than understanding just how Moltmann views the
power of God's future: whether as the innate but still unfolding power
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which will allow God to become all in all; or as something already wholly
to hand, is the realisation that this energy is directed against the
present world. As the creative power of love it in fact seems unrelated
to our creation, and distinctly interventionist - anyway, not in
genuinely constructive partnership. We are also brought up against the
question of responsibility. Why is God's righteousness directed against
the world as it stands? Because God is righteous and cannot tolerate
death and sorrow. But is this state of affairs God's fault? Is there
ever a sense that the world was created by a righteous God who did not
ever intend creatures to suffer so? One would conventionally assume that
if God did know the potential for suffering in the world he set up, it
was potential such as only existed in relation to connected justifying
goods. Whether God is evolving this way or that towards his or her
future, this question of righteousness is central. Moltmann avoids the
powerful Hegelian tradition because of an apparent dislike of processual
thought, and an emphasis on a personal conception of divine freedom. God
may freely choose what to do. But surely this cannot contradict what is
most deeply God's: the characteristic of being wholly good. If Moltmann
wants to talk of God moving towards his future in any particular way,
this cannot be at the expense of God's righteousness.
This brings us to what is said about guilt hurling humanity into
transience.A Guilt producing transiency and death. A belief like this
appears to assign sin and guilt to an order of humanity originally
without transience, a possibility casting severe doubt over the worth of
the future life. Yet surely this is metaphorical talk. Have bears and
tuna fish, fruit bats and sloths, sinned? Does the guilt of the howler
monkey or the hump-back whale hurl it into transience, expose it to
disease, open it to nothingness? And what about stick insects? No. It is
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generally agreed mortality and disease are natural <1 will discuss this
important point in chapter eight). Diahorrea, the disease which,
worldwide, can kill up to eight thousand children a day, is a plainly
natural phenomenon. Of course, human behaviour can increase greatly the
potential for suffering and death. People actively seek to bring death to
others, and knowingly fail to alleviate poverty and its causes. No one is
murdered quite in the way that fruit falls from the branch. This is where
analysis of freedom and responsibility would greatly help, Yet with
Moltmann, such issues seem really secondary to the ontological
deficiencies: massive short-comings which undermine the credibility and
morality of assigning guilt and thus mortality to unfree creatures who
are after all, mere shadows of their intended selves. It is this which
raises the question of God's righteousness particularly strongly in
Moltmann* s theology.
In his final essay, the sense of positive creative process appears
somewhat thwarted:
"The future realizes itself in history and as history and yet always
rebounds from its own realisation in history... Every historical
reality has in itself the intention to be an enduring, eternal reality,
for everything which is wishes to remain and not vanish. But no
historical reality is already that prevailing historical reality;
therefore, the prevailing reality transcends all historical realities
and renders them once again historical realities." (R/RF p216)
We seem to be dealing with creative possibilities doomed, in this world
at least, to a relativity signifying their incapability of reaching
fulfilment, escaping from deadly transience. It is God who enables
anticipation of the substantial future, and who in places seems to
completely overshadow the creative process of history. Moltmann has
distanced himself from process theology (R/RF p210>, and has set out the
reference points of the divine drama: those dialectical dynamics,
circumscribed, as I have previously noted, by the symbols of "creatio ex
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nihilo, justificatio impii, and resurrectio mortuoruid' (R/RF p210). The
way in which one symbol leads to the next is unclear. But as if to
forestall a fatalistic conclusion, Moltmann brings the book to a close
with the section entitled "Creative Eschatology - Political Theology".
Christian hope is to realise the Kingdom in the "conditions of history"
for "we are construction workers" (R/RF p217). In looking to the future
as the ultimate liberation of the world, the salvation of the "enslaved"
creation, we must strive for the future, and "realize it already here
according to the measure of possibilities" (R/RF p218). So Moltmann
wants to talk of political theology. Indeed, Moltmann again thinks of the
theodicy question as squarely occupying the political dimension (R/RF
p219). If evil has become a political question then: "Christian faith
in the creative righteousness of God and the liberation of the world out
of its self-inflicted misery must become practically responsible exactly
at this point" (ibid). But is it true that the world's misery is self-
inflicted? For after describing the messianic tasks of humanity,
Moltmann argues that:
"... exactly at this juncture we must consider that it is unreal to
anticipate and work for the future if this future does not come
toward us. The future in which we hope is never identical with the
success of our activity, for our actions are as ambivalent as
ourselves insofar as we are historical beings." (R/RF p220)
Because of this, eschatological faith should aim at the reconciliation of
its better future, with the hoped-for future (ibid). He concludes:
"The liberating future of God enters into the possibilities and
impossibilities of our history in a two-fold way: as exhortation of
redemption from the guilt-laden coercion, which binds us to the past
and hurls us into transience, and as demand for the renewal of life."
(ibid)
In The Crucified God. Moltmann portrays the divine/human drama in great
depth. And it is to this text that we must turn in order to see how his
handling of the problem of evil develops. The questions arising from
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Moltmann's conception of the nihil in present creation will be resolved
against a wider and deeper theological presentation than either Hope and
Planning or Religion Revolution and The Future were capable of providing.
Meanwhile I would suggest that the burden of guilt and transience only
prompts one to ask of the significance for our understanding of God's
righteousness, of the need for a new creation in such contrast to the
old. As for contributing to a theology of liberation, liberation from
'guilt-laden coercion' seems fine; so long as one remembers what Moltmann
has said:
"What is the abundance of life? The death of death. What is complete
freedom? The elimination of nothing-ness itself, which threatens and
cajoles everything that exists and insults everything that wants to
live but must die." (R/RF p34)
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CHAPTER SIX
This chapter attempts to outline the central themes of The Crucified God.
with emphasis on the way they relate to the problem of evil. 1 The
critique is interwoven with this presentation.
The Crucified God, the second of Moltmann's major texts, is set the task
of explicating the theological nexus of Jesus - cross - crucified God:
excepting chapters one, seven, and eight. Each of the latter chapters is
concerned either with the contemporary situation in which this
explication takes place - a crisis of identity; or the implications for
psychological and political liberation.
The short introductory section "In Explanation of the Theme", opens with
the words: "The cross is not and cannot be loved. Yet only the crucified
Christ can bring the freedom which changes the world because it is no
longer afraid of death" <CG pl>. In its way, this encapsulates much of
the problem for Moltmann, where death and transience is so great a part
of the tragedy of human existence, a state of affairs incompatible with
the rule of God's righteousness.
The theology of the cross is to be the obverse of the theology of hope,
and it gives strength to the latter through its apprehension of the pain
of the negative, and its ability to give power to the visions which lead
to action. There is a clear statement on how this treatment of the
theology of the cross stands in relation to eschatological theology:
"Theology of Hope began with the resurrection of the crucified
Christ, and I am now turning to look at the cross of the risen
Christ." (CG p5>
He is, he says, moving from a Blochian theology of hope to look at the
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questions of T Adorno's3 "Negative Dialectic" and M Horkheirner's3
'critical theory', and also the insights and experiences of early
dialectical theology and existentialist philosophy (ibid). More
immediately, in the first chapter of The Crucified God, the issue of
context in articulation of a theology of the cross is discussed under
the heading "The Identity and Relevance of Faith".
Moltrnann sets out to put the cross at the centre of how to do Christian
theology (CG p7). Todays question of what is Christian theology has a
background in the problem of a faith struggling to be relevant, and
identifying itself in contemporary concerns, or seeking to retain
traditional dogma and becoming irrelevant.
The answer to this identity crisis, as Moltmann sees it, is the route
into non-identity. It is by this way alone that true identity and
integrity will be found. The wrong question to ask is what is
specifically Christian. Rather: "... a man abandons himself as he was and
as he knew himself to be, and, by emptying himself, finds a new self.
Jesus's eschatological saying tells us that 'Whoever seeks to gain his
life will lose it, but whoever loses his life will preserve it'" (CG
pl5>.
Wanting to leave one's present identity, and looking for Christian
"non-identity" in engagement with society's current concerns is merely to
become involved in a "religion of society" (CG p!7). True Christian
existence can only be experienced in the best of "all possible
societies" (ibid). Nevertheless, that society too can "only stand under
the cross." This is important. As in Moltmann's perspective on Bloch's
home of identity,d Christians will be alien even in a society without
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conflict (ibid). For the cross:
"... does not make the world equal by bringing down the night in
which everything looks alike, but by enabling people to criticise and
stand back from... partial historical realities..." (ibid)
Overall, it appears that the maxim of the critique of incompleteness, of
partial realisation, is directed at all historical realities - or rather,
realities of life lived in pre-history (see also the account of 'vicious
circles' CG p330ff, for clarification). It is in exile in present
reality that home is sought, and in alienation that identity is pursued
(both home and identity lying in the new creation). This understanding of
alienation seems part of a dialectical understanding of the life of
spirit. For: "love is revealed in hatred and peace in conflict" (CG
p!8). More on this shortly.
The critique of present social existence is revealing. The Kingdom of God
is often conceived of as involving the individual's freedom, as having to
do solely with persons. But Moltmann rejects the notion that individuals
can be changed without reference to their circumstances: "Capitalism,
racism and inhuman technocracy quietly develop in their own way. The
causes of misery are no longer to be found in the inner attitiudes of
men, but have long been institutionalized" (CG p23). Alternatively, he
notes, it is said that the Kingdom is an affair of changed circumstances
and structures. Yet, although arguing that structures can be broken down,
he concludes: "no guarantee is attached that men will be happy" (ibid).
The basis for this assesment lies in the following claims:
"The true front on which the liberation of Christ takes place does
not run between soul and body or between persons and structure, but
between the powers of the world as it decays and collapses into ruin,
and the powers of the Spirit and of the future. In inner experience
of the Spirit in the liberty of faith, certainty and prayer are just
as much anticipations of the future of Christ and of the liberating
of creation as the opening of a ghetto, the healing of a sick person,




"There is no vertical dimension of faith opposed to a horizontal
dimension of political love, for in every sphere of life the powers of
the coming new creation are in conflict with the powers of a world
structure which leads to death." (CG p24)
A theology of the cross takes identification with the crucified Christ as
central:
"Christian theology finds its relevance in hope, thought out in depth
and put into practice, in the kingdom of the crucified Christ, by
suffering in 'the sufferings of this present time', and makes the
groaning of the creation in travail its own cry for God and for
freedom." (ibid)
Here we see how Moltmann considers the world as unfree, suffering,
collapsing.
In his statement on "Revelation in Contradiction and Dialectic Knowledge"
Moltmann expands on this theme of identity with the alienated, the
"other" in society. The church in a "Christian" world could find
correspondence between itself and society. The end of this compatibility
has highlighted the need to take up 'dialectical' thinking. Moltmann
refers to the Aristotelian principle of 'like seeks after like', and the
Platonic 'like is known only by like'. With theology's adoption of this
analogical tradition, the knowledge of God by what was unlike God became
impossible (CG p27). It is argued: "If like is known only by like, then
the Son of God would have had to remain in heaven, because he would be
unrecognisable by anything earthly" (ibid). If Moltmann is attacking a
hypothesis which says that the infinite can be known by the infinite
alone, then there is clearly good reason to support his position. But he
appears to be making a different move.5 As Schelling stated the
axiomatic dialectical principle, it runs: "Everything can be revealed
only in its opposite. Love only in hatred, unity only in conflict" (ibid
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- quoting from K Rahner's 'Opfer' LthK VII, 1174). Moltmann draws the
profound, and I would argue, difficult implications of this for an
epistemology of the cross. God is in fact only revealed as such in his
opposite. That is, God as God is (only) revealed in the paradox of the
cross (ibid). More particularly, "He revealed his identity amongst those
who had lost their identity" (ibid). Because of this the unrighteous
rather than the righteous came to recognise him. It is said:
"The epistemological principle of the theology of the cross can only
be this dialectic principle: the deity of God is only revealed in the
paradox of the cross... One must become godless oneself and abandon
every kind of self-deification or likeness to God in order to
recognise the God who reveals himself in the crucified Christ." (ibid)
This, he holds, is not to replace the analogical principle - "like is
known only by like", but to make it possible. It is because God is
revealed in his opposite that he can be known by "the godless and those
who are abandoned by God" (ibid). In this they are brought into
correspondence with God, and as in John 1:3.2, are enabled to have the
hope of being like God. The dialectic brings heaven down to earth,
opening heaven to the godless. Hence: "The theology of the cross must
begin with contradiction and cannot be built upon premature
correspondences". And: "If a being is revealed only in its opposite, then
the church which is the church of the crucified Christ cannot consist of
an assembly of persons who mutually affirm each other" (CG p28: my
emphasis). I do not see how this follows. It is added that the love in
question here is not philia but agape; justification is that of the
alien and not the similar.
It is not clear whether this dialectical principle (God is only revealed
in his opposite) is axiomatic in the sense that (a) God must from the
beginning reveal him/herself through its outworkings in transient world,
cross, and resurrection: or (b) whether given that somehow there just is
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bad finitude (a view which illegitimately obscures the topic of
responsibility; see also the very weak analysis of human responsibility),
God as righteous God has to reveal himself as that which contradicts the
world.e Option (a) seems contrary to what Moltmann has said about
dialectic. It heightens questions of responsibility and what it means to
say that God is wholly good, just. Option (b) really needs to answer why
such bad finitude has arisen, when this world is created by God ex nihilo
like the new creation. Is 'premature correspondence' of people to the
righteousness of God being objected to where people are strangely flawed
and sick but ultimately through no fault of their own - something
outwith any intelligible analysis when we wish to examine the
compatibility of this with God's nature? Or where there is some
inescapable process of distanciation and reconciliation? This appears
unlikely, given Moltmann's avowed rejection of the Hegelian tradition.
There is another option: that sin and unrighteousness is the full
responsibility of those who commit it, and that our unjustifiable
suffering is the consequence of human free choice wrongly exercised. But
this is questionable as any kind of defence when the suffering incurred
is still held to be unjustifiable, and when we deal with a pre-human
humanity, unfree and transient. Anyway, as we shall see in The Trinity
and The Kingdom of God. Moltmann breaks the connection between sin and
suffering, though even with this move, God is ultimately responsible for
permitting such a state of affairs to come into existence. Still, there
is a tendency in Moltmann to think of evil as afflicting humanity
because of some primal unrighteousness. This position too is problematic,
when God is wholly good, and knowing the potential for such suffering is
also in a real sense the responsibility of God; and if some suffering
is unjustifiable, then God is (at least conventionally speaking), not
wholly righteous.
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There is another point to be noted. Moltmann claims that God as God is
only revealed in his opposite, in the paradox of the cross; that God is
revealed in what is normally understood as not being God-like, in
humility, self-sacrifice, and death. And it is only because God is
revealed in abandonment and crucifixion that he can be recognised as God
by those abandoned by God. So the idea apparently is that it is only
when the creation is characterised by God-forsakeness, conflict, and
alienation, that God is revealed as the God who is wholly good, perfectly
loving and just. The really interesting thing is not the contrast between
an omnipotent God whom we would never expect to suffer, and a suffering
God, rather the arguable underlying contradiction in a God who is
perfectly righteous and wholly good, but who is revealed as such in that
which pre-supposes, expresses, a god-forsaken world marked by
unjustifiable suffering.
On a more sympathetic note, we could say that it hardly seems plausible
that the suffering of Jesus is opposite to God in some fundamental way,
and that this is surely not what Moltmann's thought implies. One assumes
that the life of Jesus is what God is all about, in his love for the
other. God is perhaps in his opposite in the sense that God's creative
love is not from the beginning about wanting to be god-forsaken and in
conflict with forces of exploitation and death arising from a collapsing
world. God is suffering as all his creatures suffer, in degradation of
being. What I mean is, God would not ever want there to be a world in
which his Son is executed. Thus more than the simple contrast with an
omnipotent apathetic God, there is the distinction between the
overwhelming creativity and love of God's essential nature, and the love
in the suffering in bearing what is contradictory to righteousness. But
what is problematic about Moltmann"s dialectic of revelation in the
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opposite, is the intrinsic notion that the divine suffering is somehow
essential, and has as its pre-supposition the possibility of
unjustifiable creaturely suffering. The opposition between God and
suffering here becomes a 'pseudo-opposition'. Moltmann's support for
Schelling's statement that 'Everything can only be revealed in its
opposite, love only in hatred, unity only in conflict, ' means that God
must reveal himself as God in the life of a suffering human being,
finally god-forsaken. For this to be instantiated, requires there to be a
god-forsaken world: in what other kind of world would the Son of God be
put to death, and die god-forsaken? This is a world then in contradiction
to God's righteousness, into which he comes to reveal himself as God. It
may be that the world has fallen, or that it is evolving in creative
risk. Surely though it cannot be necessarily god-forsaken? Yet in so much
of Moltmann's theology this idea of god-forsakenness or absence of God in
the world, and an emphasis on the retroactive power of the future, is a
key-note. In fact I will conclude that there is an inevitability about
the fate of the present world in his thought, which stems from alarming
deficiencies or features in creation, and that this is something for
which divine responsibility cannot be disclaimed. This is the crucial
point for a discussion of Moltmann's theology in relation to the question
of evil. If there is a strong case for divine responsibility, then
Moltmann is clearly under an obligation to justify this suffering openly.
For if it cannot be justified, then his theology is in the grip of a
terrifying dialectic. On the other hand though, even if we could not
point to characteristics of creation and the creative process which made
suffering arguably inevitable, the very fact that as his theologising
progresses, Moltmann is more and more unwilling to countenance theodicy
and open to the reality of unjustifiable suffering, still makes his
position on God's perfect goodness an untenable one.
214
Having said something about the general principles of "dialectic",
Moltmann precedes to discuss the "Resistance of the Cross Against its
Interpretations" The "dialectic" is developed in the theme of the
"profane horror and godlessness of the cross". The cross was repugnant
to antiquity's sensibilities: crucified Jesus went against ideas of the
aesthetic symbol in the quest for the good and the divine. Goethe too,
was unable to reconcile the stark cross with humanity and reason, and
offended by Hegel's image of reason as the "rose in the cross of the
present" (Moltmann referring to K Lbwith: From Hegel to Nietszche 1965 -
pi 4-29).
However, the cross can no longer be disguised. In its light Nietszche
conceived the re-evaluation of all values. 7 And indeed, Christianity
must "conquer its own forms" (CG p36). The origin of Christianity is a
liberating circumstance which goes against all that has been humanly
conceived as 'God'. The cross differentiates Christian faith from human
projection. It crucifies "religion" and in so doing, according to
Moltmann, is beyond "modern criticism of religion", standing apart from
the arguments of theism and atheism (CG p37). Indeed, reflecting the
necessity for a new creation:
"Faith in the cross distinguishes Christian faith from the world of
religions and from secular ideologies and Utopias, insofar as they
seek to replace these religions or to inherit their legacy and bring
them to realization." (CG p38)
The theological situation so far can be sumrnrned up as follows. The faith
coming from the cross brings about a painful demonstration of truth "in
the midst of untruth". The cross points out of the church, but it also
calls the oppressed into the church and fellowship with Christ. There is
emphasis of the "contradictory" dimension of Christian faith. In it one
can "abandon one's previous identity as known to others, and gain the
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identity of Christ in faith; become anonymous and unknown in one's
environment and obtain citizenship in the new creation of God" (CG p40>.
As yet Moltmann is not describing the conception of the new creation
other than as something contradicting features of the present. Nor have
any of the implications of the crucifixion for a developed theology of
the cross and image of God been drawn. That does not come for some while.
His next stage is to sketch ways in which the radical once and for all
scandal of the cross has been handled in the tradition (CG p41ff).
The treatment of the cult of the cross mirrors concerns with epiphany
faith in the Theology of Hope. It is directed towards the sacrifice of
the mass - "unbloody" repetition of the events on Golgotha. Perhaps more
significantly, in the mysticism of the cross, Christ crucified was viewed
as the "exemplary path" trodden by the righteous man (ibid). The
importance of this mysticism of the cross is indicated in its presence in
the theologies of the suffering. To the peasants of Europe and Latin
America, and the Southern slaves: "Jesus was their identity with God in a
world which had taken all hope from them and destroyed their human
identity until it was unrecognisable" (CG p48). Christianity is here
the opium of the people in the original sense.
We now come to an arguably false dichotomy. The sufferings of Christ are
not from nature or fate (CG p51). They come "from his actions, from
his preaching of the imminence of the kingdom as the kingdom of
unconditional grace" (ibid). He was not a heroic failure, but claimed
that God was "on the side of the godless". His is active suffering:
"Consequently, his sufferings and death are the messianic sufferings
and death of the 'Christ of God.' His death is the death of the one
who redeems men from death, which is evil. In other words, they are
the pains of love for abandoned men..." (ibid)
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I think the question then arises, 'why are we abandoned?' And does the
fact that we and our world are abandoned, flawed and viciously transient,
really not have anything significant to do with Jesus' experience of life
and death on the planet earth? We in fact find that Jesus seems to suffer
the fate of creation, if to an exemplary degree. His suffering is not
only the ethical suffering of love. He was "most completely of all
abandoned by his Father" (CG p63). Nevertheless, his love as the
preaching of the imminence of the kingdom was able to go out to the
other, to be suffering love. For Moltmann this means that Christian faith
goes beyond private concerns and out into the world: "It changes the
world, in so far as it [the world] puts life into a static situation...
and [it, ie. faith] overcomes the death urge which turns everything into
a possession or an instrument of power". Surely though this reflects the
importance of the state of the world as deficient, in the life and death
of Christ. It may be that going out to the ' other' is something
positive and world-affirming in that it involves going out into "the
domains of economic, social and political life in which men in fact have
to carry out their struggle for 'existence'" (CG p63). Yet it is to be
remembered that this struggle has as its context the world of the
Moltmannian notion of the 'death urge', a flawed creation. The power of
suffering love is not in itself sufficient, because of the need to
recognise the rejection of Jesus by the Father. What are the perceived
implications of this rejection: ". . . it leads beyond... into
metaphysics. . . into the universal cosmic eschatology of the end, into the
abandonment by God of the godless and the destruction of all that exists"
(CG p64). It is difficult to interpret this statement in a constructive
way.
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Moltrnann makes four distinctions in talk of theology of the cross. They
cover: [a] "The apostolic cross of the establishment of the obedience of
faith in a world full of idols..." : C bl The martyr's cross, bearing
"bodily witness" to Christ's lordship: C c 3 Suffering love for abandoned
humanity: [ dl "The 'sufferings of this age', the groaning of the enslaved
creation, the apocalyptic sorrow of the godless world" (CG p65>. With
these categories a Christian is to give a theoretical and practical
articulation of what the cross means. Where theodicy is concerned, the
implications of (c) and (d) are particularly interesting.
Theology has knowledge of God in the crucified Christ as its criterion.
Moltmann raises the question of a (hypothetical?) theology which is
'scientific' in the sense of appealing to Hegel, Schleiermacher and
Rothe (ibid). Hegel's thinking fulfills the need for Rothe-type
theology to present a true philosophy, an account of the present time.
Hegel maintained that only the real was the rational (a statement of
course much discussed), and Moltmann pursues this along the line that
Christianity in terms of world history is then only possible:
"... when what is real is Christian. But what is 'real'? And even if
this theory were ever to prevail, its price would have to be paid;
that of ignoring the 'dialectic of Enlightenment' (M. Horkheimer, T.
Adorno) in the modern world, the misery of the modern age
characterized by the names of Auschwitz and Hiroshima..." (CG p68: in
saying this, Moltmann is arguably in danger of throwing the baby out
with the bath water, to put it crudely. Creation is a whole, however
much we may dislike and be hurt by some of its parts and
possibilities. If we cannot accept the world as a developing whole in
some important sense, then we may be lead to ask, is there nothing
real which is Christian?)
In contrast to this, in the light of the cross, theology can never be
pure theory of God, only a critical theory (CG p69). The God of the
cross contradicts the God of law, the gods reverenced in a political
religion, and the God revealed in creation and history. Theology of the
cross can "only be polemical, dialectical, antithetical and critical
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theory... It is also crucifying theology, and is thereby liberating
theology" (ibid). Luther's theology of the cross was an insight
delivered against the theologia gloriae of the medieval church. It
contrasted the God known through the cross, and that knowledge
ascertained through creation and history. Man does still have indirect
knowledge of God, but this is fundamentally distorted for purposes of
self-deification (CG p71). Here at last one has something on human will
and decision which could perhaps remove some of the difficulties over
the absence of a free will defence. But it is taken no further.
I will give a brief account of the main thrusts in the three chapters
preceding "The Crucified God": "Questions About Jesus": "The Historical
Trial of Jesus": and "The Eschatological Trial of Jesus".
"Questions About Jesus" starts with the basic assertion that Jesus is the
core of Christian faith (CG p82ff). Questions about Jesus arise in the
context of debate between Christians, and with non-Christians, humanists
for instance. With the acknowledgement of Jesus as the central
confession of faith, the question of how one reaches that stage is
pivotal (CG p84).
The first of Moltmann's questions about Jesus is "Is Jesus True God?"
The nature of finite existence has given rise to thought about an
intransient and eternal mode of being (CG p87ff). When Nicaea asked if
God was revealed in Jesus, it thought in terms of a problematic
incarnation of the eternal in the finite. Moltmann goes on to note how
post-Kantian German idealism gave christology a speculative slant: the
idea of God's self-revelation in man. So that: "If man really thinks of
God, then God is thinking of himself in man... If Christ knows himself as
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the Son of God, then God must know himself in him" (CG p90). Fichte and
Hegel were determinative for this tradition, it is noted, Schelling also.
Moltmann dwells on Hegel. He comprehended Jesus in the context of the
"whole", of the self-emptying of God into the alien, and of the return
(Hegel: "The Kingdom of the Son" in "The Christian Religion", Philosophy
of Religion. Vol III, Routledge Kegan Paul 1968). Hegel, we are
reminded, thought the "death of God" crucial to the divine
subjectivity.
However Moltmann criticises speculative christology for rendering the
historical particulars of the historical Jesus and "the arbitrary
occurences of his life inessential" (CG p91). Thinking about Jesus'
history in terms of God's self-realisation will sublimate the historical,
as it occurred, in the apprehension of the historical necessity of spirit
(CG p92). Here we have another firm disavowal of the Hegelian tradition.
Further: "In the crucified Jesus... there remains something which still
resists its sublimation into the concept of atonement. Only a new
creation which is based upon the crucified Christ can sublimate the
scandal of his cross into a pure hymn of praise" (ibid). This is a
juxtaposition of suffering which cannot be fitted into a concept of
atonement, which cannot be seen in the context of the historical
necessities of spirit - with a future which somehow mysteriously
'sublimates' the suffering of the past. In other places, where Moltmann
attacks theodicy, such a concept of sublimation in the presence of
'omega' seems impossible (e.g. TKG p47>. What causes confusion is the
idea of sublimation in a supposedly non-Hegelian, and non-justificatory
theology. What cannot be suppressed is the fact that many will require
that a theology such as Moltmann's do something more than merely
contemplate the paradoxical future sublimation of unjustifiable agonies.
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These are experiences which will, whilst held to be unjustifiable,
n
perenially threaten to render the existence of a wholly good God
incompatible with the history of creation. The co-suffering of Jesus
cannot in itself prevent this.
There is a second christological question: "Is Jesus True Man?" Its
relevance to the topic of theodicy lies in the way in which Jesus as the
righteous man is placed outwith our history. To be human is to be no
longer at the behest of nature. The traditional situation is reversed.
Our future and that of the world will be decided by nuclear weapons,
revolution, the fate of nature. Moltmann says of humanity: "his main
problem is no longer the universal finitude which he experiences in
solidarity with all other creatures, but the humanity of his own world"
(CG p92). I would argue that the two things are intimately related.
Present day christology's questions on the extent to which Jesus can be
called God, hinge on the search for a model of identity, authentic life,
"true humanity". In that case Jesus is viewed as "man of God" rather than
as "God-man", which is a move to the existential problem, and a shift
away from the cosmological/ontological salvation concerns. Ethics
replaces metaphysics, and Moltmann believes, that post-Kant,
Schleiermacher1s discussion of feeling has left many with a soteriology
of the empowered God consciousness <CG p95). This he holds, is
inadequate. Neither can existential faith deal productively with cross
or resurrection. To such faith resurrection is "mythologoumenon" and the
cross is "life consummation".
In reality: "... in the light of his preceding life, no adequate
interpretation of his death on the cross can be found... [for] the
221
crucified Christ... is outside history, outside society, and outside the
humanity of living men" (CG p97-8). On page one hundred and twenty-two
one also finds it said that: "... no continuities in the field of
history, the philosophy of history, the history of language or the
history of existential life can bridge the discontinuity which lies in
his death" (CG pl22). This, I think, concerns not only Jesus, but is a
reflection of the abyssal discontinuity between the fate of the righteous
person in this creation, and that existence which would be lived by them
in the environment and wholeness which is the true home and state of
such being (as in the new creation). There is thus in Moltmann's
theology a very real sense in which any loving and righteous being,
whole and free from the distorted self images generated in this world,
can be seen from the start as "outside the humanity of living men", and
outside of the world in which they must live.
Moltmann holds that the Easter faith is the option of refutation of the
refutation of the life lived and proclaimed by Jesus. The preaching of
Easter is directed against death, and to the proclamation that he is
risen. Significantly: "The purpose of this claim is not merely to achieve
a new understanding of oneself but at a more profound level, to bring new
being out of non-being" (CG pl23).
The rest of the chapter outlines the way to the cross, the history of
Jesus's life of conflict, conflict between "God and the gods". His
preaching had crucifixion as a necessary consequence. Characteristically,
Moltmann wants to avoid imputing an absolute necessity to this conflict
and its fatal result.'3 There was a degree of "historical chance" in his
trial (CG pl33). Yet, "his conflict with the law displays a certain
intrinsic necessity which was bound to lead to his rejection and cursing
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as a 'blasphemer'" (Ibid). This feature is taken up in the Easter faith
which articulates a theological trial in terms of righteousness of works
versus righteousness of faith, justification of the godless against that
of the righteous.
The chapter ends with a discussion of Jesus as the god-forsaken,
emphasising some earlier points. The gospel of Mark, contrasting with
Luke and John has Jesus die with a confused cry and in nothing like a
sense of victory or as an "exemplary martyr" (CG pl47). Jesus's death is
again to be seen as one with indications of a "profound abandonment" by
God (CG pl47). Indeed:
"... for Jesus, according to his whole preaching, the cause for which
he lived and worked was so closely linked with his own person and
life that his death was bound to mean the death of his cause... Just
as there was a unique fellowship with God in his life and preaching,
so in his death there was a unique abandonment by God." (CG pi49)
The christological question as to whom Jesus is is centred on the
question of "what took place between Jesus and his God, between that
'Father' and Jesus, in what was given expression in his preaching and his
actions and was literally 'put to death' in his abandonment as he died"
(CG pl49). In his emphasis on the cry from Psalm 22. Moltmann argues
that God is set against God (CG pl52 esp). Psalm 22 can be seen as a
legal plea, but if one looks to the unique relationship of Jesus to his
Father, these words become a cry which puts at stake the deity of God.
Jesus puts not just his personal existence, but his theological existence
in question. Moltmann gives a deliberately Ci.e. openly] exaggerrated
form: "My God, why hast thou forsaken thyself' (CG p 151). Here we have
"stasis" within God (CG p152), "God against God", even theological trial
between God and God (ibid). This rejection of Jesus is thus central,
more so than the fact that he died a blasphemer and a rebel. For : ". . .
finally, and most profoundly, he died as one rejected by his God and his
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Father. In the theological context of his life this is the most important
dimension" (ibid). Moltmann continues by arguing that it may be that he
was misunderstood by the Romans, but by God? In that case Jesus is a
liar or God not God. So, as a consequence of real rejection: "The cross
of the son divides God from God to the utmost degree of enmity and
distinction" (ibid).
Subsequently there comes the uniting that follows from the
resurrection. In the context of the events following the abandonment of
Jesus in an abandoned world, faith reads the cross in terms of a
universal eschatological hope; in the light of the resurrection,
regarded not as some solitary miracle, but as the prelude to a general
raising of the dead. (CG pl62-3) Indeed
"'Easter' was a prelude to, and a real anticipation of, God's
qualitatively new future and the new creation in the midst of the
world's suffering. So in the light of this prelude to the coming God
and the coming end of this abandoned world it was also necessary to
recall, understand and proclaim in eschatological terms the one who
presented this prelude, Jesus of Nazareth." (CG pl63)
"... the Easter hope shines not only forwards into the unknown newness of
the history which it opens up, but also backwards over the graveyards of
history, and in their midst first on the grave of a crucified man who
appeared in that prelude" (CG pl63). There is thus hope for history and
the god-forsaken.
Moltmann refers to W Benjamin's ninth thesis on history, arguing that:
"This view comes very near to being an eschatological theology of the
crucified Christ, if it is in a position to unfold hope and liberation in
the history of the suffering of the world from the history of the
suffering of the risen Christ" (CG pl65). He does not quote it, but I
think it worth doing so:
"A Klee painting named 'Angelus Novus' shows an angel looking as
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though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are
spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is
turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and
hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken
the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is
blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such
violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm
irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned,
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what
we call progress." (W Benjamin, Illuminations. Fontana, 1982 p260ff)
For Benjamin, says Moltmann: "history is fundamentally a history of
suffering, it cannot itself become pregnant with a messianic future".
Moltmann then remarks of Benjamin: "The messianic history of life runs
counter to the history of the suffering of the world which leads to
death, and approaches it from the future..." (ibid). So, and it is said
with approval: "... the reversed 1eschatological reading of history1 is
not so alien among the general problems of universal history-writing as
positivists might think" (ibid). However Moltmann doesn't explore the
implications of the fact that such a reversed reading of history has as
its pre-supposition a present destitute of meaning. To theodicicts and
atheist anti-theodicists this is dangerous and provocative. It is an
aspect of Moltmann's thinking which sits uncomfortably with a positive
doctrine of creation.
Meanwhile, referring to the Johannine theme of the glorification of Jesus
on the cross, Moltmann thinks one can talk of the movement: "the
transcendent God immanent in Jesus, and conversely the immanent Jesus
transcended in God" (CG pl69). The immanent, or that reality in which the
transcendent became immanent, appears to come off worst here. What of
the importance of transcendence for us? Anticipatory vision in the coming
future of God is the structure in which the resurrection of Jesus can be
spoken of as the "symbol for the 'end of history', of unrighteousenss,
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evil, death and abandonment by God..." (ibid). Nevertheless, why was
humanity god-forsaken? Why given over to death and suffering? More
questions, important ones. Perhaps an answer lies in the following
passages, where Moltmann talks about death, resurrection, and theodicy.
In talking of the nature of the resurrection of Jesus, he makes it clear
that there can be no resurrection into a mortal life - "this life which
leads to death" <CG pl69). For: "the proclamation of the Easter
witnesses that God has 'raised* this dead Jesus 'from the dead' amounts
to nothing less than the claim that this future of the new world of
righteousness has already dawned in this one person in the midst of our
history of death" (CG pl71). Additionally, in contrast to Jewish talk of
the resurrection "of the dead", the Easter faith speaks of the
resurrection of this one man "from the dead" (Moltmann's emphasis). The
difference being that:
"In that one man the future of the new world has already gained
power over this unredeemed world of death and has condemned it to
become a world that passes away ... Thus the 'night' of false life
and unrighteousness and the. 'unredeemed world' is 'far spent'... we
find expressed here a new eschatological understanding of time
Without... this, all the things that the Christian church claims and
proclaims as being present: the forgiveness of sins, reconciliation
and discipleship in love, are fundamentally impossible." (CG p 171)
But if these things are genuinely impossible without the new creation,
were they ever possible without it? Perhaps there was a time when the
world was fresh, and far from spent, and nobody died, and there was
discipleship in love, and real hope that it would always be thus. Though
apart from the good biological arguments against immortality, even if
Moltmann wishes to invoke special creation, there are moral ones too,
which I shall be looking at (based on opposition to the idea that
universal mortality following sin is a moral possibility in a world
created by a wholly loving God). It is also to be recognised that
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Moltmann envisages sorrow and suffering in the new creation <GC p231).
It is not suprising then that with what makes for sorrow and suffering in
the future apparently already with us (or is there to be a new kind of
suffering - hopefully justifiable), combined with mortality and the
'death urge', we find our world a 'night of false life'.
In Moltmann's terms, there is "scandal" in the difference between this
unredeemed reality and that new creation which is to come. In the light
of this "scandal", he gives a fresh formulation of the theodicy question:
"Any look at world history raises the question why in-human men
fare so well and their victims fare so badly. Only on a superficial
level is 'world history' a problem of universal history, by the
solution of which a meaningful horizon can be found for the whole
of existence. At the deepest level the question of world history is
the question of righteousness... If the question of theodicy can be
understood as a question of the righteousness of God in the history
of the suffering of the world, then all understanding and
presentation of world history must be seen within the horizon of
the question of theodicy." (CG p 175)
Here Moltmann's theodicy question seems to be that of conventional
theodicy debate. It is the question 'why?' It has its ground in the
nature of God's righteousness and the need to reconcile the suffering of
the world with this righteousness. Moltmann now turns to look at Daniel's
apocalyptic hope. How did Daniel see God's righteousness prevailing? (CG.
pl74ff) Moltmann views his apocalyptic hope as distant from human
concern for eternal life, or the need for a soteriological symbol,
Rather, it is centred on the concept of God's righteousness. In order
that the righteous and the unrighteous can be judged, God will make them
alive. So, what motivates Daniel, Moltmann argues, is the understanding
that death does not limit God's righteousness, rather than an
anthropocentric hope for resurrection into new life. But, so we ask, are
people not right to expect something? Indeed Moltmann goes on to say:
"Now if the future is taken to heart in the question of
righteousness, then God's righteousness is put in question by the
death of the innocent and also by the death of the unrighteous. Does
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death then set a limit to the righteousness of God? In view of the
belief in the divinity of God this is inconceivable. Daniel 12.2 is
therefore the first to answer this..." <CG pl74: Daniel 12:2 - "And
many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some
to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt")
Daniel, as Moltmann notes, thinks of eternal life for some, but eternal
damnation for others. The reason for looking at Moltmann' s discussion
here, is that the fact that people die, and that death is incompatible
with God's righteousness does not generate the slightest unease. This
would be more understandable if God were liberating the territory of
some other God who thought of death as say a charactei—building feature
of existence: but since God created the world, only he could have set
such an apparently drastic and inexplicable limit to his righteousness.
Because of those who were gassed, murdered oppressed, Moltmann sees a
speculative question as to whether God exists - "Or do the executioners
ultimately triumph over their innocent victims" (CG pl75). It is
stated: "... only where the new man is born who is neither oppressed nor
oppresses others, can one speak of the true revolution of righteousness
and of the righteousness of God" (CG 178). I believe that in these
terms, this (new) being has only existed in Christ, and will only come to
be true for us in the new creation. This still leaves one with the moral
problem of *pre-history' , with its ' death-urges' , power compulsions, and
struggle to survive. The speculative question remains. But implicit in
Moltmann's formulation here is the view that if God does exist, then the
new creation ushered in by this God will wipe away the normal
implications of the unjustifiable execution of innocent victims. The
conventional question is thus by-passed. There is no way in which the
speculative question becomes more than that of the wait for echatological
verification that God exists, whatever way the theodicy debate goes.
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The theodicy question is reformulated, this time as the "phenomenon of
the 'delay of the parousia'" (CG pl34). If the risen Christ is indeed
the crucified Christ, why was there not a general resurrection of the
dead? (one also asks why there are any dead at all if God is wholly good,
and so opposed to death? It seems remarkable that the origins of
something as apparently fundamental to organic existence as the ageing
process is ascribed to primal transgression of ethical codes - resulting
in possibly unjustifiable suffering). Moltmann's answers are somewhat
vague and unsatisfactory. The cross and resurrection are the basis for
the anticipatory hopes of the suffering, dying, oppressed. That is: "His
prolepsis forms the basis of his pro-existence and in it becomes
significant for us" (CG 184). The one who was raised took our place
and died, only in this is there saving significance: "In the crucified
Jesus the 1 end of history' is present in the relationships of history.
Therefore in him can be found reconciliation in the midst of strife and
hope for the overcoming of strife" (CG pl85).
What can be said of God in the light of the resurrection of the crucified
Christ? Moltmann understands that the Jewish Christians saw the
'subject' of the raising of Jesus as God, and the 'object' as Jesus. The
resurrection was taken as being 'at last' the revelation of who God was.
Paul (Rom. 8. 11) speaks of God as the one who has raised Jesus from the
dead: "This means that God has finally, in the end-time, defined himself
through the resurrection of Jesus as the God who raises the dead' (CG
pl88). This, a new eschatological definition of God relativises all
others (ibid). Creation, we are told, has been "made obsolete by human
sin" and the resurrection of the dead is a sign of the new creation now
beginning.
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The action of God in raising Jesus is, as a historical liberating event,
comparable to the bringing out of Egypt. It brings Jesus freedom from
death's tyranny. The distinction between Exodus and Easter resurrection
is that: "the resurrection of a dead man falls outside the framework of
history, which is dominated by death and men's dying" <CG pl89).
In what way is the crucifixion to be understood as God's action, and
even God's suffering? Under the Pauline headings of sending and giving
Moltrnann outlines the implications of the fact that Jesus was sent and
delivered up, made sin for humanity (CG pl91-2). The resurrection is
the constitution of Jesus as Son of God, but in the talk of sending it is
also understood that God: "represents and reveals himself in the
surrender of Jesus and in his passion and death on the cross. . . [in so-
doing].. . he also identifies and defines himself" (CGpl92>. The basic
understanding of the theology of the cross which Moltmann has so far
established is summarised in this passage which exposits Paul, but which
like so much Moltmannian exposition is at the same time a position
statement. Given that the righteous and wholly good God has freely
created this world ex nihilo, some obscurities remain:
"In the action of the Father in delivering up his Son to suffering
and to a godless death, God is acting in himself. He is acting in
himself in this manner of suffering and dying in order to open up in
himself life and freedom for sinners. Creation, new creation and
resurrection are external works of God against chaos, nothingness and
death... God overcomes himself, God passes judgement on himself... He
assigns to himself the fate that by rights men should endure.'"the
cross of Jesus, understood as the cross of the Son of God, therefore
reveals a change in God, a stasis within the God-head: 'God is
other'. And this event in God is the event on the cross. It takes on
Christian form in the simple formula which contradicts all possible
metaphysical and historical ideas of God: 'God is love'." (CG pi93)3
So, ideas of God are changed in the cross (CG pl95). God's freedom
comes to us through this suffering on the cross, contradicting the god's
and powers which crucified Jesus.
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In the key chapter "The Crucified God" (CG p200ff), the question about
Jesus is the question about God (CG p201). Theology of the death of God
has focussed attention on doing theology (famously) "within earshot of
the dying cry of Jesus" (ibid). Moltrnann sketches approaches to the
cross and God's suffering by various theologians, including Rahner, Kting,
Barth and Jiingel (CG p201-3). Most significant for his own approach in
the long term, is the argument that a trinitarian dimension is
essential if theopaschite thinking is not to collapse in on itself. The
trinitarian emphasis avoids the paradox of a simple God both dead, and
not dead (This issue is dealt with more fully in The Trinity and the
Kingdom of God). It is held that "the more one understands the whole
event of the cross as an event of God, the more any simple concept of God
falls apart" (CG p204).
Within a few pages, it is stated that: v"In the cross of his Son, God
took upon himself not only death, so that man might be able to die
comforted with the certainty that even death could not separate him from
God, but still more, in order to make the crucified Christ the ground of
his new creation, in which death itself is swallowed up in the victory
of life and there will be 'no sorrow, no crying, and no more tears'" (CG
p217). Whilst this is compatible with a non-dialectical theology, there
is a sense in which, in the passage below, suffering appears as part of
what God is about. However, the exact nature of the process, as it seems,
remains unclear:
"God's incarnation 'even unto the death on the cross' is not in the
last resort a matter of concealment; this is his utter humiliation,
in which he is completely with himself and completely with the
other, the man who is de-humanized. Humiliation to the point of death
on the cross corresponds to God's nature in the contradiction of
abandonment... God is not greater than he is in this humiliation... God
is not more divine than he is in this humanity." (CG p205)
Again though, given the pre-supposition of intense human suffering, the
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question of responsibility, justice, and goodness, cannot be put to one
side.
To continue, the theology of the cross is able to say that despite seeing
all things as subject "to transitoriness and nothingness" <CG p218), it
has the dimension of hope grounded in the resurrection of the crucified
Christ. Indeed: "'.. . the creation was subjected to nothingness, not of
its own will but of the will of him who subjected it in hope'. Rom. 8.20"
(ibid). This is set in the context of the idea of the history of God,
developed later in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. The cosmos exists
in the "eschatological history of God" (ibid). The world is to be
understood in this history rather than vice versa. New possibilities
rise from God's possibilities, and this history of God is the horizon of
this world, for "the world is not to be thought of as the horizon of his
history" (CG p219>. It is in this way that: "The event of the
resurrection of the crucified Christ makes it necessary to think of the
annihilation of the world and the creation of every being from nothing"
(CG p218). It appears that Jesus is crucified by a suffering world, whose
end is confirmed by the resurrection of this man into a world which is
not the kind of world to crucify sons of God. So Jesus is raised into new
possibilities out of a world with none, at least so far as compatibility
with God's righteousness is concerned. This seems unsatisfactory.
What of problems over the changeability of God in such a dynamic history?
Moltmann feels that the distinction between our passive changeability and
the divine being does not rule out God's changing of himself, by his free
will. God can be thought of as open to suffering, though not in the way
that creatures are, in their being: ". . . exposed to illness, pain and
death" (CG p230). God can suffer in his love, that is, from fulness of
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being, as opposed to any deficiency, and is open for active suffering,
the potential for which is equated with the ability to truly love.
Critically, one can link this to the notion that God's love is also
opposed to unecessary suffering, if there is to be any suffering at all.
Thus there should be some limitations on how far we could assert that God
loves victims, and does so as an expression of his divine love. For
instance, if we maintain that all the helpless people who die premature
deaths of all kinds suffer in a way which can never be justified, but say
that God loves them all, then we may be have reduced the notion of love
to vacuity. Or it may be that God does not love until his own son has
suffered. If suffering is equated with capacity for love, then this is
significant when it comes to his understanding of the alien. For
instance: "... active suffering, the suffering of love, in which one
voluntarily opens himself to being affected by the another" (ibid).
And: "If love is the acceptance of the other without regard to one's own
well-being, then it contains within itself the possibility of sharing in
suffering and freedom to suffer as a result of the otherness of the
other" (ibid). So, as I see it, it is possible for the theodicist or
atheist to say that for Moltmann, God is suffering out of his fulness of
being, affected by the multitudes of 'others' suffering from inadequacy
of being. The cross is the high point of this suffering out of fulness of
being: though it seems so evidently a response to a problem created from
this same fulness. Here we have the problem of non-being, which has to be
overcome by God himself - the God who creates the freedom to suffer:
"Only if all disaster, forsakenness by God, absolute death, the
infinite curse of damnation and sinking into nothingness is in God
himself, is community with this God eternal salvation, infinite joy,
indestructible election and divine life." (CG p246)
Moltmann's line on the nature of the negatives as plainly and
irredeemably evil, is further obscured when he deals with the role of the
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via negativa in conceiving of the life of the new being. If it has been
said that the potential to suffer is a freedom to suffer, then it is not
necessarily the case that God wants us to suffer, merely that love
implies a freedom to suffer with the other. However, it is now said that:
"if change, mortality and corruption are experienced as disaster and
misery..." (CG p230), salvation understood as the negation of this
world, as incorruptibility and immortality, is also perhaps "terrifying
and boring." In fact the negation of the negative does not provide a
positive that arises somehow magically. Moltmann rejects the idea that
the negation is contoured to the negative. It is argued that the
objectives of salvation in the via negativa tradition "negate the
relative goodness of creation and the transitory and mortal happiness of
this life" (ibid). The wholly other is identifiable with 'final
corruption' (CG p231). But is death not wholly other from the creative
being of God? For Moltmann it is, and it is suprising to see that
immortality is described as potentially boring. Sorrowful finitude
followed by infinite boredom would be unjust by any standards.
He wants to move beyond distinctions between God and man, God and the
world: "We become true men in the community of the incarnate, the
suffering and loving, the human God" (CG p231). On a different level
though, his soteriological definition gives implicit recognition of a
clear difference, ontologically, between suffering mortal life as
dehumanised human beings (even if hoping), and status as true men. Albeit
that this latter existence, which negates the negation in a very real
sense (contradicting what has gone before), does not find a home in
'Greek' intransience:
"This salvation, too, is outwardly permanent and immortal in the
humanity of God, but in itself it is a new life full of inner
movement, with suffering and joy, love and pain, taking and giving; it
is changeableness in the sense of life to its highest possible
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degree." (CG p231)
Whereas some theologians might hope for a new life without suffering and
pain, Moltmann brings this phenomenon into post-mortem existence. This
multiplies questions as to why, where pain and suffering are integral
to a reality where there is ' no more sorrow, no more crying, no more
tears', it was previously necessary to combine these aspects of whole
being with absolute death, when they could be had authentically and for
ever in the creation which truly expresses God's righteousness?
How, in the context of such questions of righteousness, is the passion
narrative terminology of delivering up/handing-over/betraying
(paradidonai) understood? In the Pauline approach, justification follows
from the handing over of the Son to godforsakeness. References are to
Romans 8. 31f, II Corinthians 5.21 - 'He made him sin for us', and
Galatians 3. 13 - 'He became a curse for us.' So "It may therefore be
said that the Father delivers up his Son on the cross in order to be the
Father of those who are delivered up" (ibid). For the Son is delivered
up so that he may become lord of the living and the dead. In this event,
the Father is suffering "the infinite grief of love." This grief is of
importance equal to the death of the Son.
The Father suffers, but he does not die. The Son dies, but it cannot be
said that God dies. The death of the Son is the death of the Father's
Fatherhood; the Son experiences Fatherlesness. Also, in Galatians 2. 20,
as in the synoptic tradition, the Son gives himself up (CG p243>.
Jesus does not submit to fate, but faces the path of the cross. This
expresses a "deep community of will between Jesus and his God and
Father... If both historical god-forsakennes and eschatological surrender
can be seen... then this event contains community between Jesus and his
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Father in separation and separation in community" (CG p244). Paul
understands godforsakenness as surrender, and surrender as love (ref. to
Rom 8.32, Gal. 2.20). In fact, John 3. 16, and 4. 16 ('God is love')
signify that the existence of God is constituted in his love. The love of
the event of the cross includes not only this identity of substance and
will, but also the inequality and suffering of the cross. They are
separated most deeply, yet "are most inwardly one in their surrender"
(ibid).
It seems as if Moltmann says that in the triune event of the cross, the
very god-forsakenness of Jesus is also the essence of God's experiencing
real Fatherhood, and is experienced by, accessible to Jesus as such an
ultimate positive. The language here is of course complex. Yet on a
fumndamental level, how is something portrayed as absolute and profound
absence of relationship to be experienced as anything other than total
absence of relationship?'9 It could be said that as where the allied war¬
time agent is necessarily relinquished into the hands of the enemy, to
certain torture and death, understanding the anguish of the colleague,
and knowing that the colleague knows this, there is both utter
abandonment to annihilation, and community. It could then be argued that
the death of Jesus as an event in the 'history of God' is less shocking
than that of those innocents who died slowly and obscurely in the great
Chinese famine of 1877-8. In The Crucified God the nobility of God is in
surrendering in Jesus to sorrowful abandonment by the Father. Genuine
abandonment, willingly accepted. Is there not something different and
less scandalous here (arguably not more so) than in the death of a
village, the decimation of a province: the premature death of profoundly
contingent, to Moltmann's eyes, already viciously transient beings? In
their deaths utterly god-forsaken, and without a profound community of
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spirit with the Father. And whilst we may say that the Father enjoys a
relationship with the Son of a kind deeper than that had with all other
human beings, this also carries the implication that other human beings
are all the less responsible for the brokenness of their lives, given the
god-forsakenness of generation after generation, and the destructive
charcteristics of the world, time out of mind.
What of the ' history of God'?
"All human history, however much it may be determined by guilt and
death, is taken up into this 'history of God', ie. into the Trinity, and
integrated into the future of the 'history of God'." (CG p246>
The term 'history of God' (it is noted) is Hegel's. This history ". . .
contains within itself the whole abyss of godforsakenness, absolute death
and the non-God" (ibid) However, there is no death which cannot be seen
as having been God's death "in the history on Golgotha" (ibid).
Additionally, in placing the cross at the centre for our understanding of
God, we are to think God not as nature, person, authority, but as
'event'. It is from the love and grief of Golgotha that the Spirit is
derived. One can pray 'in' this event (of Easter), and on its basis God
is to be spoken of as differentiated. In this event the believer
experiences something new: "By the death of the Son he is taken up into
the grief of the Father and experiences a liberation which is a new
element in this de-divinized and legalistic world, which is itself even a
new element over against the original creation of the world" (CG p249).
We thus participate in trinitarian history, insofar as this is
determinative for history. And it does seem so:
"The Trinity, understood as an event for history, therefore presses
towards eschatological consummation, so that the 'Trinity may be all
in all', or put more simply, so that 'love may be all in all', so that
life may triumph over death and righteousness over the hells of the
negative and of all force... He [God] is, if one is prepared to put it
in inadequate imagery, transcendent as Father, immanent as Son and
opens up the future of history as the spirit.,. Beyond theistic
submissiveness and atheistic protest this is the history of life,
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because it is the history of love." (CG p256)
Moltmann attacks thinking which wishes a return to some original
perfection (CG p261). The identification of kingdom with creation is
questioned. And does the history of creation not have an effect on its
state at consummation? To deny this, says Moltmann, would be to tend
towards an un-historical conception of things. Moreover: "Can it really
be said of the first creation that in it God was 'all in all'?" (ibid)
He then raises a classic question of the problem of evil: if grace were
only to make things good again, without making sin an impossibility, we
should wonder when to expect the next fall (ibid). The new creation
will have added something to existence. Indeed: "the new freedom of the
children of God must be greater than the first freedom of men" (ibid).
The seeming indirect appropriation, through quotation, of key elements
of Hegelianism, such as at the foot of page two-hundred and fifty-three
of The Crucified God, gives a strong impression that here we see human
love functioning within the wider and more important divine dialectic of
the negative, its overcoming, and our subsequent sharing in this.
Moltmann quotes the by now familiar passage from Hegel: "But the life of
mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps clear of destruction; it
endures death and in death maintains its being. It only wins to its truth
when it finds itself utterly torn asunder... mind is this power only by
looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it. This dwelling
beside it is the magic power that converts the negative into being"
(op. cit. , CG p253). Hegel used the image of Good Friday to describe the
life of mind because in the death of God, love had killed death (CG
p254). That is, Jesus 'sustains the contradiction', and achieves
reconciliation (CG p254). Moltmann also gives one a quotation from the
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Philosophy of Religion (111, 98), stating: "... the human, the finite,
frailty, weakness, the negative, is itself a divine moment, is in God
himself" (ibid). As usual, when Moltmann is confronting one with highly
suggestive references to Hegel, there is little to indicate what is being
agreed, or disagreed with, or if we are on a sight-seeing excursion into
historical theology. Indeed, this passage ends with the tantalising
remark that: "It remains for us to note that at the end of this section
of the Philosophy of Religion Hegel expressly acknowledges the doctrine
of the Trinity, because only this makes it possible to understand the
cross as the 'history of God'" (ibid).
Trinitarian christology with its emphasis on the history of God has a
definite form, and is a living history. The history of the sending of the
Son; his delivering up; resurrection; the transference of rule; and the
handing back of this rule to God the Father. And "Only with the handing
over of rule to the Father is the obedience of the Son, and thus his
Sonship consummated" (ibid). However, the events of the cross are not
just an intervention on behalf of the future consummation. This
"consummation already acquires its permanent form in his suffering love"
(ibid). Here it appears that the suffering of the world, and of Christ
cannot be optional. Looking at the world, death, and godless powers, the
consummation can be seen as the outcome of a dialectic of some sort:
"... in respect of the inner relationship of the Son to Father, the
consummation of the salvation of the world lies in the consummation
of the history of God within the Trinity." (CG p266)
I leave exploration of this topic until discussion of The Trinity and The
Kingdom of God.
The thought of Abraham Heschel is reviewed by Moltmann for its
contribution to an understanding of the relational basis of God's
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pathos.10 Nevertheless, this is done without any consistent attempt to
develop an understanding of the theodicy problem: for instance where
God's suffering unjustifiably under man's actions could be taken
further, and with certain data, seen as a consequence of man's
unjustifiable suffering under God's actions. In Heschel, The pathos of
God is not some absolute quality of being, but a characteristic of his
relationship with his people. It is based on God's freedom, and not on
pure will. His being is 'transferred' into the history of his
relationship to his people, for God "takes man so seriously that he
suffers under the actions of man and can be injured by them. At the heart
of the prophetic proclamation there stands the certainty that God is
interested in the world to the point of suffering" (CG p271). Moltmann
refers to rabbinic ideas of the self-humiliation of God at various stages
of the Israel's history, and to E Wiesel's account of an execution in
Auschwitz (CG p274: quoting from Night p75. London 1960). Three are
hung, two men and a youth. After half an hour the youth alone remains
alive, struggling. Someone asks, where is God now? Within himself,
Wiesel hears a voice answer: "'Where is he? He is here. He is hanging
there on the gallows. . . ' " This, says Moltmann, is the answer which must
be given if one is to avoid blasphemy (ibid).11
Nevertheless, critics may inquire that if God is sharing in the pain and
annihilation which he should have foreseen, and there can be no
justifications for such suffering, why does one continue to talk of God
as the righteous one? A commentator on Moltmann wrote of his words
"'Resurrection, life and righteousness' come through the death of this
one man in favour of those who have been delivered over to death through
their unrighteousness" (CG pl85):
"But the millions of Jews did not really 'qualify' as unrighteous, or
for that matter, as righteous. They were just killed. And they were
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killed because they were Jews... What does it mean to say to the Jew
of Buchenwald or Bergen-Belsen that 'through his suffering and death,
the risen Christ brings righteousness and life to the unrighteous and
the dying'?" (A R Eckardt: JAAR 44 [1976] p685 - his emphasis)
Eckardt also makes a point when he reflects on the burning of Jewish
children:
"... Jesus of Nazareth was at least a grown, mature man, and by all
the evidence a courageous one. On the other hand, we now have a
plethora of souls, and they are children. It may be suggested to
Professor Moltmann that there is an evil in this world which is more
terrible than every other evil... This is the evil of little children
witnessing the murders of other little children, while knowing that
they are also to be murdered in the same way, being aware absolutely
that they face the identical fate." (op.cit. p687: his emphasis)
Eckardt elaborates on the crucifixion, that "... this particular
'abomination of desolation' simply does not stand up as the absolute
horror upon which Christian faith then can and should, dialectically,
build its hope. I contend that in comparison with certain other
sufferings, Jesus' death becomes non-decisive" (op.cit). Here I think,
atheist anti-theodicists would perhaps turn to Moltmann, along with
theodicists, and argue that where God creates a world of dazzling
suffering, unjustifiable, and then enters into it (where Moltmann asserts
that God's suffering has this within it, somehow morally surpasses, all
other suffering), this is not enough. In fact, God's suffering is not
outstanding if it is suffering endured by the creator of the world,
stemming from the ontological deficiencies of the world. Ultimately
Eckardt feels that in Moltmann's theology the cross stands as sign of
simple ' unmitigated' evil in the world.
Moltmann argues that "When God becomes man in Jesus of Nazareth, he not
only enters into the finitude of man, but in his death on the cross also
enters into the situation of man's godforsakenness". Also that: "In
Jesus he does not die the natural death of a finite being, but the
violent death of the criminal on the cross, the death of complete
241
abandonment by God" (CG p276). But natural death is evil, and a sign of
god-forsakness in Moltmann's theology. Is violent death not a feature of
transient existence; one which, wrong, is not entirely unforeseeable in
the world God has freely chosen to create? Death (as we will continue to
see) is a great problem in Moltmann's theology. Indeed: ". . . only with
the annihilation of death will the Son hand over the kingdom to the
Father" (CG p278>. Arguably, the overcoming of death coming about
through the resurrection of a criminal loses its significance as the
symbol of the wholly good God, in a world portrayed in terms of inherent
meaninglesness, subject to the 'death urge' (see below). The emphasis on
the resurrection of Jesus as the overcoming of death highlights the sense
of ontological deficiency as the root of all the worlds ills, and even as
the cause of Jesus*s death. In this way all people that on earth do dwell
may be argued to be innocent victims of some divine incompetence.
There follows a passage in which the negative ("all that annihilates")
appears as something of a dialectical moment. This would of course be of
significance for a stance on theodicy:
"The human God who encounters man in the crucified Christ thus
involves man in a realistic divinization (theosis). Therefore in
communion with Christ it can truly be said that men live id1 God and
from God, 'that they live, move and have their being in him' (Acts
17.28). Understood in pantheistic terms, that would be a dream which
would have to ignore the negative element in the world. But a
trinitarian theology of the cross perceives God in the negative
element and therefore the negative element in God, and in this
dialectical way is panentheistic. For in the hidden mode of
humiliation to the point of the cross, all being and all that
annihilates has already been taken up in God and God begins to
become 'all in all'. To recognize the God in the cross of Christ,
conversely means to recognize the cross, inextricable suffering, death
and hopeless rejection in God... Even Auschwitz is taken up into the
grief of the Father, the surrender of the Son and the power of the
Spirit." (CG p276-7 : Moltmann's emphasis)
I think the sentence ending 'all in all' is the most indicative of
dialectical thinking. However, the sentence following the last of the
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passage above, continues: "That never means that Auschwitz and other
grisly places can be justified, for it is the cross that is the beginning
of the trinitarian history of God" (CG p278). If dialectic there is, it
is not one which can answer the theodicy question satisfactorily. God is
enduring unjustifiable death, and thus conquering it. Moltmann goes on in
a way which again seems to underestimate the complexity of the issues at
stake in the conventional theodicy problem:
"... only with the healing of those in despair who bear lifelong
wounds, only with the abolition of all rule and authority, only with
the annihilation of death will the Son hand over the kingdom to the
Father. Then God will turn his sorrow into eternal joy." (ibid)
Then:
"This will be the sign of the completion of the trinitarian history of
God and the end of world history, the overcoming of the history of
man's sorrow and the fulfilment of his history of hope. God in
Auschwitz and Auschwitz in the crucified God - that is the basis for
a real hope which both embraces and overcomes the world, and the
ground for a love which is stronger than death and can sustain
death." (ibid)
This of course irritates those such as Eckardt, who reacts fiercely to
the 'trinitarianization' of Auschwitz (I shall look at the separate
claim that this is totally non-dialectical theology later). He criticises
the triuraphalism which seeks to integrate the murder of those who would
never have accepted a trinitarian God, into a Christian model (op.cit
p685). It would seem though that a Christian theologian will have to
account of such events within their Christian framework, insofar as
anything is to be accounted within it, and it would be unfair to pick out
Moltmann here.
Perhaps Moltmann's greatest weakness here lies with his imputation of
unrighteousness to little children: in the fact of their god-
forsakenness. At the same time he claims this is all unjustifiable
suffering (CG p278). Further, this merely makes theodicy more essential:
243
for why are we unrighteous when we will not be so in the new creation,
unless for instance there is some free will defence criterion to be met?
Perhaps it is the case, as I earlier suggested, that the history of
hope, so central to Moltmann's picture of things, requires there to be
something against which a new creation stands out as better. What then
if this necessary prior reality cannot be justified given the deep pain
generated by its structures, by that wholeness which follows? It would
seem better for a wholly good being to have refrained from creating such
a prelude.
Moltmann concludes on the topic of the annihilation of death, that: "It
is the ground for living with the terror of history and the end of
history, and nevertheless remaining in love and meeting what comes in
openness for God's future. It is the ground for living and bearing guilt
and sorrow for the future of man in God" (ibid). Still, the ability to
meet evil in openess runs the risk that weakness, vulnerability,
mortality, and impotence, considered alongside all that they pre-suppose
about the world, are seen as simply evil: Golgotha empty of redemptive
value: merely a statement of the unjustifiable terror of history, the
god-forsakenness of the world, and the power of the reign of death that
never should have been.
The closing chapters of The Crucified God earth some of what Moltmann has
been saying, in terms of the potential of liberational praxis. In "Ways
Towards the Psychological Liberation of Man" (CG p292-316), he looks to a
utilisation of psychological insights for giving added depth to
theological perspectives on human healing and liberation. In the end the
potential seems to add up to a tampering with the symptoms of life lived
in a rightly doomed creation. But at least, where the resurrection
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transforms vicious circles of the psyche and society, we are raised up to
life, rather than orientated upon death.
Thus the final brief chapter concentrates on how practical action can
channel and develop this faithfulness to hope, resurrection, earth and
cross. Political liberation is centred on an analysis of the five intei—
related vicious circles which can be seen at work in technological mass
society. 12 The prognosis is an unhappy one. These circles cover economic
and political poverty, racial/cultural alienation and industrial abuse of
nature. And not least the circle of senselessness and god-forsakenness
(CG p330-332). Liberating action has to cover all these areas
simultaneously because of the causal interaction between them. In the
economic sphere there needs to be social justice in the distribution and
control of resources (Socialism). Politically, alienation of the majority
from power over their lives is to be ended (Democracy). Racial and
cultural integration is not to mean mass uniformity but coming to one's
identity in recognition of others (Emancipation). Peace with nature is
essential, and thus the rejection of dominance over the earth. This in
turn has the consequence of the humanisation of humanity (Ecology).
However, in coming to the final circle of deprivation, that of
senselessness and god-forsakenness, Moltmann introduces a final element
of required fulfilment which takes one above previous concerns with
praxis. This is the paramount vicious circle that cannot be tackled
merely by succeeding in righting all the other dimensions of human
existence:
"In the background of personal and public awareness, perplexity,
resignation and depair are widespread. This inner poisoning of life
extends not only to poor societies, but to rich societies as well. It
cannot therefore be overcome simply by victory over economic need,
political oppression, cultural alienation and cultural crisis. Nor can
it be reduced to these realms and dimensions. The crisis of meaning
oppresses an unfulfilled life, and a life filled in in other ways,
albeit in different manners. This wound remains open even in the
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best of all conceivable societies. It can only be healed by the
presence of meaning in all events and relationships of life." (CG
p334-5: rny emphasis)
This is reminiscent of what was said in respect of Bloch's socialist
utopianism. The emphasis is on the complete and universal presence of God
in the new creation as the only terms on which all can have the meaning
it requires for consummation. In the meantime, encouragingly, : "Hell
does not lie before men. It has been conquered in the cross. Here life
and sacrifice for life against death gain their meaning amidst the
general senselessness. This 'courage to be' becomes a 'key for being'"
(ibid). Still this courage to be appears to derive its strength from the
fact that the new creation brings hope of something unobtainable in this
world.
Meanwhile, the question of "vicious circles" becomes more complex, and we
realise with ever greater clarity why courage to be draws its strength
from the future. Moltmann wishes to hold all five "vicious circles"
together. He argues that the first four cannot attain anything without
overcoming despair and meaninglessness. Conversely, it is held, meaning
and fulfilled life cannot exist without the overcoming of these four
preceding vicious circles. But is there a full reciprocity in these
conditions? Certainly Moltmann implies there is. They are related and
their solution is joint: "Therefore liberation must be sought in all
these five dimensions simultaneously in every specific direction. Anyone
who falls short here is courting death... It follows from this that in
any theology of 11berations the universal must be understood in the
particular and the eschatological in the historical" (CG p336). Yet
problematically though, there does not seem to be any necesary inter¬
connection between the latter fulfilment condition and the others. The
relationships have already been broken in the passage quoted. 'A'
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(establishment of political and cultural, ecological, and economic
harmony) can only really bring things into line with God's righteousnes
if life is given meaning by 'B' (meaningful existence). If by contrast,
there were a direct causal link in which the 'A', came about, and
resulted in meaningful existence * B" (or they grew simultaneously in
inter-dependence), then the liberation argument would have more
coherence i.e. as the initiative of a wholly good God. Whilst life with
'A' remains meaningless without 'B' (which it cannot bring about), and
'B' somehow still presupposes 'A', matters are clouded. Practical action
will surely always founder in nothingness. It amounts to a thankless task
for humanity, poisoned and bearing an open wound so long as it is
actually living in a world where even societal perfection cannot bring
real meaning. Perhaps the possibility of attaining meaning from within a
perfected social human world mediating God's love, would go some way to
encouraging and enabling people to create such a world, That this is not
possible without new creation only makes the poison of life in a world
without meaning more understandable. Is there a dialectic at work; or has
humanity, even the little burning children, earned its fate from the
unrighteousness of the species: mortality as the wages of sin: innocent
suffering as the price of authentic human freedom and responsibility? Yet
as Moltmann has said, such suffering is unjustifiable. So what case can
there be for not having created humanity from the first with the new
freedom which is to be enjoyed in the new creation? An extremely weak one
it appears. However, this is arguably deceptive. Since it could be held
that it is extremely difficult to see what we could make of the claim
that God is wholly good, we could already be dealing with a God of whom
it is best to say that he is probably quite good. With this weakening
in moral perfection, the difficulties in providing a case to explain why
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God might not have created us free from the beginning are not
insurmountable.
So, what are the consequences of the fact that brotherhood with Christ
has its power in the "sighing and liberating spirit of God" - "Its
consummation lies in the kingdom of the triune God which sets all things
free and fills them with meaning" (CG p338).
I believe that the critique I have attempted in this chapter needs little
in the way of summing up. The most important feature is the manner in
which Moltmann seems to truncate and distort the theodicy question, so
that what is at issue, and why, the possibility of the existence of a God
who is wholly good and perfectly just, seems dangerously obscured. And
darnagingly for Moltmann, his theology affirms that there has been
unjustifiable suffering. There looks as yet to be no reason why we should
believe that the difficult questions asked in the conventional debate are
of a kind we can lay aside.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
In the preface to The Trinity and The Kingdom of God, Moltmann distances
himself from attempts to write theological systems, since: "In principle
one has to be able to say everything, and not to leave any point
unconsidered. All the statements must fit in with one another without
contradiction". There are different issues to be dealt with here. First,
systems. A system can indeed be an attempt to encompass all. But if
Moltmann does not wish to attempt this, this does not mean that he need
not be systematic in the approach to an issue. That is, in being
systematic one tries to identify the relevant issues, and to move
intelligibly from one to the other. Whilst he may be justified in his
sceptical attitude to theological systems, Moltmann is arguably mistaken
if what one does say is held to be free from the condition that it does
not ultimately contradict itself. For even if one is modest enough not to
claim to have covered everything it is difficult to claim convincingly
special exemption from basic conditions of coherence. It may be that
certain parts of what one says are held to be superficially
contradictory, or go beyond what 'facts' would seem to allow. For
example, it may appear that a theodicist cannot discern a justificatory
pattern to suffering free from major criticism, and that much suffering
appears still frankly incompatible with the existence of a wholly good
God. However, theodicists will claim that although they cannot put
forward a totally foolproof theodicy, there is a justification, or at
least the possibility of one (whilst no final proof of impossibility is
obtained). The perceived incompatibility between what exists, and God's
existing is not real and final. In this sense, even if we do not claim
to have stated the whole, we are not committing ourselves to an
abandonment of the criterion of non self-contradiction. For whilst our
14-9
present thought points only in the direction of an answer, it does point
to the possibility of a certain kind of answer; that evil is justified.
Whilst it is only suggested in what Moltmann says that coherence is
optional, his statement should not be allowed to pass without this
distinction between the construction of universal interlocking systems
and more limited thinking being qualified by recognition of the condition
that both approaches be coherent; even if this means, in the case of
theodicy, attempting to defend eschatological verification (as with
Ahern).
Moltrnann goes on to argue that thinking in terms of theological systems
encourages uncritical acceptance and a lack of genuine discussion. His
own systematic contributions are to do no more than prepare the way for
a future theological debate which "will be broader and more intensive"
(TKG pXII). The kind of theology he is writing "has no longer to be"
Eurocentric, androcentric, and nor does it have to reflect a 'first
world' position. Thus: "We normally presuppose the absolute nature of our
standpoint in our own context. To abolish this tacit presupposition is
the intention behind the phrase 'contributions to theology". Moltmann
also emphasises the placing of theological discussion in an unfinished,
and "uncompletable" dialogue in history. Nevertheless each generation is
allowed to come to some sort of conclusion, in that "there are unsettled
theological problems for which every new generation has to find its own
solution if it is to be able to live with them at all" (TKG pXIII).
Indeed, he goes on to maintain that by "recognising limits we can step
beyond them"; theological testimonies can be viewed in their
particularity, or they "can also be investigated and interpreted in the
light of their universality" (TKG pXV).
250
Perhaps clarification on how far Moltmann really manages to escape the
traditional interest in being comprehensive and systematic (even if he
does not create a traditional system as such), comes in the preface to
Richard Bauckham*s study "Moltmann". There, Moltmann retrospectively
recognises a closer unity and organisation in his work in general, than
he may previously have allowed for:
'Bauckham... goes into the movement of the ideas and shows the
coherence of the arguments. In this way he brings to light the
concealed methods I have used. He demonstrates the
consistence and coherence of the thought even where I myself had the
feeling of being led by spontaneous inspiration or of only being
carried back and forth." (Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making
- R Bauckham. pVII)
In the following discussion of The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. I
shall attempt to present some of the main (perhaps also the concealed)
features of this important book as they relate to the question of
suffering. The approach is to offer a presentation successively dealing
with aspects of chapters one, and two, three, four, and six, with
critical discussion interspersed.1
The opening chapter, "Trinitarian Theology Today", takes a brief look at
the way contemporary trinitarian thinking is done, and introduces three
historic views on the nature of God. First though, Moltmann notes a
dearth of trinitarian thinking. So he will discuss some objections and
tacit reservations concerning this doctrine (TKG p2), beginning with a
criticism of the understanding of the God-human relationship c(.S seen
through the category of experience. Schleiermacher is the principal
object of interest here. Moltmann agrees with the at least apparent
logic of Schleiermacher's position. God statements not including
statements about the immediate self-consciousness are not direct
expressions of Christian self-conscience, but constructs (TKG p3).
However, he strongly criticises what he sees as the consequent tendency
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to abstract monotheism and the relegation of the trinity. What about the
other side of the relationship - "how does God experience me?" (ibid) It
is not of course a case of a relationship between equals, but it is one
of love and covenant. The person means something to God. Indeed "it is
only when the self is perceived in the experience which God has with
that self that an undistorted perception of that history of one's own
self with God and in God emerges" (TKG p4). The bible testifies to God's
history and experience with people. And crucially, experiencing in faith
how God has experienced us, and still does experience us, is to perceive
how the world's history is the 'history of God's suffering' (ibid):
"At the moments of God's profoundest revelation there is always
suffering: the cry of the captives in Egypt; Jesus' death cry on the
cross; the sighing of the whole enslaved creation for liberty... God
suffers with us - God suffers from us - God suffers for us." (ibid)
This can only be understood in trinitarian terms. Moltmann goes on to
state that the fundamental discussion of access to trinitarian doctrine
is carried on today in the question of God's capacity or incapacity for
suffering. This explains why chapter two, which I shall look at shortly,
explores the positive handling of the passion of God, and only then does
the discussion move to the "doctrine of the Trinity in the narrower
sense".
Moltmann's introductory discussion continues with a lengthy reflection on
the importance of suffering. Something which he seems to put forward as a
constant is the fact that experience includes both wonder and pain. Thus:
"In wonder the subject opens himself for a counterpart... In pain the
subject perceives the difference of the other, the contradiction in
conflict and the alteration of his own self" (TKG p5).
252
Moltmann talks of a new approach to thinking about God, avoiding the
out-dated cosmology of substance thinking, and the escapist tendencies
of pure subjectivity. It will concentrate instead on the history of Jesus
the Son before asking about the unity, and so will be a new "historical
doctrine of the Trinity" (TKG pl9). The unity will be looked at in terms
of the trinity of the persons; a social trinity. Trinitarian hermeneutics
will be applied to scripture, and thinking in terms of communities and
relationships along with panentheistic concepts will mark the effort to
"think ecologically about God, man and the world in their relationships
and their indwellings" (ibid).
Following the opening manifesto, comes the discussion of God's passion.
Theologies of absolute substance or subject dealt, it is held, with a God
incapable of suffering. However, Christ's passion is at the centre of
the Christian proclamation. God is involved, but how? Is God suffering?
(TKG p22) A treatment similar to that in The Crucified God. Greek
metaphysics with the apathetic axiom have rendered God silent and cold,
or resulted in complex efforts at mediating apathy and passion. Moltmann
thinks it better to start with God's passion as the axiom. Thus, in line
with what was previously said, it held that God can suffer from an
abundance of being rather than any implied deficiency (TKG p23). Amongst
patristic theologians Origen is singled out as the only one to recognise
that there could be this suffering from super-abundance of love. Further
when he talks of the divine suffering he does so in a Trinitarian
context, because as Moltmann believes, it alone can give a viable account
of God and suffering.
This second chapter of The Trinity and The Kingdom of God is dedicated to
developing a doctrine of theopathy, an understanding of the passionate
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God. In order to achieve this, Moltmann reviews Rabbinic, Kabbalistic,
Anglican, Spanish, and Russian-Orthodox thought.
In the discussion of Abraham Heschel (TKG p25ff), we have an expansion of
what Moltmann has said earlier on the same subject. God in his pathos
goes out into his chosen people, is affected by its experience, suffers
with and for it. A bi-polar theology is detected. God is free, yet
chooses to love his people. He reigns in heaven, simultaneously dwelling
with the humble. A second bi-polarity is also said to exist: "The
sympathy of man responds to the experience of the divine pathos. That too
is determined by God... The sympathy of the spirit which comes from God
responds to the pathos in which God goes out of himself". And: "... the
experience of the divine pathos inevitably leads to the perception of the
self-differentiation of the one God" (TKG p27).
Early rabbinic theology and the doctrine of the Shekinah are called on to
follow up these insights. God's pathos is known here as divine
humiliation:
'The history of the world develops out of a series of divine
humiliations and it is these that it represents: the creation, the
choosing of the patriarchs, the covenant with the people... are all
forms of this self- humiliation on God's part." (TKG p27)
Although it is held these humiliations are to be understood as
"accommodations" to our human weakness (ibid), the concluding remarks on
the Shekinah (TKG p30>, suggest that the human weakness may well stem
from the very nature of the divine creational humiliation. Shekinah is
understood as having three dimensions, indwelling, condescension, and
anticipation (TKG p28). The Shekinah came to be seen as not only a
characteristic of God, but as "God in person", (ibid) Moltmann cites
Gorshem Scholem to the effect that in God there exists a profound self-
differentiation which will not be overcome until the "original harmony"
is restored. Although he qualifies his look at this area of Jewish
thought by stating that it is only one amongst many in the deep Jewish
experience, Moltmann is convinced that the pathos of God means acceptance
of differentiation, or a "rift" in God. He sees "moving potentiality" in
the application of Shekinah thought to the suffering of the Jewish
people: "... it allows us to comprehend ... the story of its martyrs as
the history of the suffering of the tortured divine Shekinah... 'My head
is heavy, my arm is heavy' says a Mishnah, talking about the way God
suffers with the torments of the hanged" (TKG p30).
What of the origins of the Shekinah', the divorce, the rift in God? "The
answer can only really be: the dichotomy in God which is... based on the
pathos and the initial self-humiliation through which the Almighty goes
out of himself and becomes involved with the limited world and with the
freedom of his image in that world" (TKG p30). I shall discuss this
position later when looking at God in Creation.
Moltmann proceeds to a brief discussion of English thought (late 19th,
early 20th century) on divine suffering (TKG p30ff). He draws mainly on
three theologians (J K Mozley The Impassibility of God. J Hinton The
Mystery of Pain, and C E Rolt The World's Redemption), maintaining that
the hall-mark of Anglican theology of this period was the concern to take
the earthly cross seriously, perceiving in it the "primordial heavenly
image" (TKG p32). He takes up Mozley's reference to Bushnell's The
Vicarious Sacrifice (London 1866, p35). Bushnell wrote:
'It is as if there were a cross unseen, standing on its undiscovered
hill, far back in the ages, out of which were sounding always, just
the same deep voice of suffering love and patience that was heard
by mortal ears from the sacred hill of Calvary." (TKG p32)
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Curiously, where the Anglican contributors to the theology of suffering
are concerned, all seem to go against Moltmann's own anti-theodicy
position. Horace Bushnell's book integrates suffering into the divine
life, arguing that love is joy (indeed is love) precisely in so far as it
involves suffering: "We are never so happy, so essentially blessed, as
when we suffer well, wearing out our life in sympathies spent on the evil
and undeserving, burdened heavily in our prayers, struggling on through
secret Gethsemanes, and groaning before God, in groanings audible to God
alone... What man of the race ever finds that in such love as this he has
been made unhappy?" (The Vicarious Sacrifice p16—17: London 1866) The
idea that there is unjustifiable suffering is not pursued by Bushnell.2
Moltmann also cites James Hinton's The Mystery of Pain: "If God would
show us Himself, He must show us Himself as a sufferer, as taking what we
call pain and loss. These are his portion; from eternity He chose them.
The life Christ shows us is the eternal life" (TMP London, 1886 p40 -TKG
ibid). The theological problems inherent in a statement such as this,
with its notion of choosing from eternity and the question of divine
foreknowledge in creation, and how this is related to predictability,
divine freedom, and necessity, potentially of great importance to an
understanding of his own position, are not pursued by Moltmann. In
addition, Hinton's is a statement which must arguably cast doubt on the
ability of a theologian to claim that theodicy is impermissible, and that
unjustifiable suffering cannot be considered as part of the divine
responsibility. After all, God has chosen the path of suffering, and if
he will choose to suffer some of the evil that has come about, given the
way the world is, and he did this from eternity, then he cannot renounce
knowledge and responsibility for that evil which is 'unjustifiable', but
concomitant with the way the world goes.
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Hinton's attitude to pain can only be described as positive, even if
there is an appearance that pain might be truly evil. Overall, suffering
appears to have its justification. Of one important kind of suffering,
he states: . . there is one condition under which all know that pain is
not truly an evil, but a good. This is when pain is borne for another's
sake. Its entire character is altered then. It not only passes into the
category of good things, but it also emphatically becomes the good. . . All
kinds of pleasure fall infinitely below it... Conceive all martyrdoms
blotted out from the world's history; how blank and barren were the
page!" (TMP pi 1-12). In fact, Hinton's approach is to hold that all evil
is for the good, and on these grounds, justifiable: "It is in the
power... of the discovery of an unknown or unregarded fact to alter our
feelings - even to invert their natural character.." (TMP plO). And:
"The apparent good and evil of life constitute a case in which a truer
understanding might invert the natural impression" (TMP p11). It is held
that: "There are materials... within us for an entire inversion of our
attitude towards pain. The world in this respect, we might almost feel,
seems to tremble on the balance. A touch might transform it wholly. One
flash of light from the Unseen, one word spoken by God, might suffice to
make the dark places bright..." (TMP pl3).
Moltmann writes of how Rolt, in response to Darwinian challenges to the
idea of God's power, argued that the divine power was love, made perfect
through willing suffering as on the cross (TKG p31: TWR p30). Christ is
humble and weak, and therefore carrying this into the eternal being of
God, one is to say that God is weak, that the mystery of the cross is
eternally at the heart of God (ibid: TWR p27>. The essence of God as
self-love is self-sacrifice. Moltmann offers the following summary: ".. .
God's eternal bliss is not bliss based on the absence of suffering. On
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the contrary, it is bliss that becomes bliss through suffering's
acceptance and transformation. In the eternal joy of the Trinity, pain is
not avoided; it is accepted and transmuted into glory" (TKG p34).
Moltmann's summary again: "Through openness and capacity for suffering,
the divine love shows that it is life's pre-eminent organizing principle
in the deadly conflicts of blind natural forces" (TKG p33). How does
Moltmann handle the following texts? "'Brute force... comes from God and
He is responsible for it. Good and evil come from the same source and are
therefore precisely the same thing'" (ibid: TWR pl24). And: "'Evil exists
precisely because He commands it not to exist" (ibid: TWR pl26). Moltmann
writes:
"A statement like this only makes sense if 'non-existence' has the
power of nullity as whatever is shut out from God. But then the
statement makes very good sense indeed. Because God creates order
and excludes chaos, chaos (as what has been excluded by creation) is
an ever-present threat to that creation. If, now, God endures this
evil in suffering love, then he transforms its power into vital
energy." (TKG p34)
Rolt's The World's Redemption (p228), gives one an outline of the nature
of the divine love: "God is a Trinity because He is perfect love; and
therefore the Holy Trinity is one perfect and ineffable bliss. And that
bliss consists not so much in the absence of pain, but rather in the
victory over all its pangs. In the eternal joy of the Trinity all pain
is, not avoided, but overcome and transmuted into glory. . . But eternity
is not independent of time: it is time's crown and goal. God must,
therefore pass through time to attain to His own eternal being. And in
this passage he must experience the pain as untransmuted pain. Only thus
can He transmute it, and by it, attain to His own perfection" (TWR p247 -
my citation). Rolt's theology is evidently processual, and contains a
powerful justification for suffering. It is not compatible with
Moltmann's stance on evil and theodicy.
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Moltmann also considers that Studdert-Kennedy's The Hardest Part should
have received greater attention than Earth's almost contemporary Epistle
to the Romans - for, "the theology of the suffering God is more important
than the theology of the God who is Wholly Other" (TKG p35). He
highlights Studdert Kennedy's profound sense of the suffering of God, as
revealed in the cross. The following is quoted (along with two other
passages):
'1 want to win the world to the worship of the patient, suffering
Father God revealed in Jesus Christ... God, the Father God of Love, is
everywhere in history, but nowhere is He Almighty. Ever and always we
see Him suffering, striving, crucified, but conquering. God is Love."
(THP p42; TKG p35>
-kenned.^
Studdert * also wrote in The Hardest Part that God, in giving rise to
creation: "... was forced to limit Himself... He had to bind Himself with
chains and pierce Himself with nails, and take upon Himself the travail
pangs of creation. The universe was made as it is because it is the only
way it could be made, and this way lays upon God the burden of many
failures and of eternal strain" (THP p26). This shows a divine
comprehension and acceptance of evil. Arguably it also means that
-kevmcdw
StuddertA can't categorize evils as unjustifiable without making God
appear perverse. After all, a suffering world whose creation requires a
kind of agonized bondage, and which was consciously "made as it is",
cannot be incompatible with God's being wholly good. Where this fits in
with ray case on the theodicy problem, is that God's being wholly good
would strongly suggest that his permitting, giving rise to, irredeemable,
ultimately unjustifiable innocent suffering could not be contemplated,
as once innocent and unjustified suffering it remains forever innocent
and unjustified. To make a suffering world like this one, God may have to
work within a narrow range of specification, but there is no obligation
to create such a world if doing so will result in sickening and
e
irredeemable suffering (indeed, the point is, it is incoherent to suggest
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that a wholly good God could create such a world). Moving on from his
survey of English contributions to comprehending the passion of God,
Moltmann comes to Miguel de Unamuno.
The relatively lengthy treatment of "The Tragic Sense of Life" (TKG p36-
42), is well-disposed to Unamuno's case. Life is a tragedy, a struggle
without victory. It cannot be fulfilled, and that contradiction between
existence and death is to be affirmed. Life can do no other. Moltmann
writes of this: "He wants to affirm it in order to cling to the profound
experience of disagreement: it is man's sharpest pain to try very hard
and not achieve anything:" (TKG p37; c. f. , TTSL chapters 7 and 9).
Unamuno's ' congoja' , is the pain, sorrow, and anguish of this life. Such
an awareness, coupled with reflection on the cross and suffering of
Christ led him to break with the "God of the philosophers", and move to a
theology of God's infinite sorrow. Suffering is no mere emptiness.
Moltmann cites Unamuno's statement that:
"... the truth of the suffering God, which so appals the mind of man,
is the revelation emerging from the very matrix and mystery of the
universe. It was revealed to us when God sent his Son so that he
might redeem us by suffering and dying. It was the revelation of the
divine nature of suffering, since only that which suffers is divine..."
He notes that Unamuno makes a concession to tradition in recognising that
this may sound like blasphemy, and refers to the doctrine of matter which
partly explains why there is suffering (although not quite why God had to
realise a suffering creation). I quote the Crawford Flitch translation
(TTSL 1931 McMillan: p207), as the Trinity and the Kingdom of God version
is a re-translation of the German translation:
'It may perhaps appear blasphemous to say that God suffers, for
suffering implies limitation. Nevertheless, God, the Consciousness of
the Universe, is limited by the brute matter in which He lives, by the
unconscious, from which He seeks to liberate himself and to liberate
us. And we, in our turn must seek to liberate Him. God suffers in
each and all of us, in each and all of the consciousnesses imprisoned
in transitory matter, and we all suffer in him. Religious anguish is
but the divine suffering, the feeling that God suffers in me and that
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I suffer in Him. (op.cit.: TKG p39>
Moltmann notes too how Unamuno thought that suffering was essential to
life, as being a condition of consciousness (ibid), and goes on to quote
the statement in the discussion of Schopenhauer in chapter seven (where
Unamuno holds that the 'true property and most inward function of the
will is to suffer, will being a corollary of consciousness) that: "The
capacity for pleasure is impossible without the capacity for suffering,
and the faculty of pleasure is the same as the faculty of pain. He who
does not suffer does not enjoy, just as he who does not perceive cold
does not perceive heat either" (ET - pl62 of vol. 4 Selected Works: RKP
and PUP 1972 / pl47 of McMillan ed. 1931/ TKG p41). The first part of
this statement is questionable, as the potential to experience or
comprehend something does not mean that we need realise this potential to
an extreme. God can conceive of unjustifiable evil, but he does not need
to subject himself or others to it, or perpetrate it, in order to do so
(I am assuming of course that there could be such a thing as justifiable
evil, which must be the possibility behind theodicy). However, the second
part is more interesting. It is a debateable contention that for a wholly
good being, if they do not experience suffering, they cannot experience
joy. But if we look at the world, it is evident that if we cannot
experience pain or heat, we cannot experience joy or cold, and the world
in which the kinds of somatic beings we are, come to be, is a world in
which there is inevitably and necessarily human experience of pain as
well as an occasional sense of joy. We can say of our openness to such
experience - as human beings - that joy and suffering are symbiotic
binary opposites. These things are unavoidable if we live in this
world, and are not in some way damaged. Taken as the beings that we are,
in the world that there is (and ignoring arguments of the kind that all
possible beings must actually experience suffering if they are to
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experience joy), we recognise that what is perceived as good and
beautiful, as in the happy child, is one aspect of a natural spectrum
which also encompasses senile dementia and mortality. We cannot have the
Engadine without Lisbon. This is in effect what Unamuno says: in the
reality there is, the person who does not experience suffering does not
experience joy. That is, if you are alive in this world, you will
experience both. But what if we are alive and experience unjustifiable
suffering (let alone unjustifiable joy)? For Unamuno there appears no
really unjustifiable suffering, even if we give it this label, because
his God is the kind of God who will stop at nothing in order to give
reality to consciousness, suffering, hope: and if we are to call anything
worthwhile, we might as well start with the kind of world which we have,
which includes or even pre-supposes all kinds of the most degrading and
innocent suffering. What is the alternative?
Moltrnann sees the eschatological aspect to Unamuno's thought as the
dimension which prevents it from becoming almost masochistic, and writes:
"How could we participate in God's sorrow and feel compassion with God's
pain if this unquenchable hope for the reversal of all things and for the
divine redemption were not involved?" (TKG p42) As to the theodicy
question, he describes Unamuno's idea in the theology of divine sorrow as
a "simple one". "Either God lets people suffer, or he suffers himself...
The God who lets the innocent suffer is the accused in theodicy's court.
The God who suffers everything in everyone is his only possible defending
counsel" (TKG p40). I believe that Unamuno offers a theodicy of a
stronger kind in his understanding of consciousness; in fact suffering is
necessary if there is to be a world. I am not concerned with how Unamuno
himself develops this idea, although I think his is vulnerable for the
same reasons that Moltmann's accounts of it are: the theodicy argument
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answered here on the basis that God joins in; rather than looking at
divine responsibility and the implications of innocent suffering as
innocent for all time. More importantly, it is arguably secondary to an
understanding of suffering and its role completely incompatible with
Moltmann's: the difference between suffering as embraced, and as
something caught between a partial embrace and utter dismay.
Unamuno's thought, as I have suggested, has a much more robust attitude
to evil than does Moltrnann's. Consequently it has little to give in the
way of support. Take the following:
'Is not pain essential to life?
Men go on inventing theories to explain what they call the origin of
evil. And why not the origin of good? Why suppose that it is good
that is positive and original, and evil that is negative and
derivatory?... What does 'being good' mean? Good is good for
something, conducive to an end... our desire is to eternalize
ourselves, to persist, and we call good everything which conspires to
this end and bad everything which tends to lessen or destroy our
consciousness." (op.cit p247)
Then his attitude to war. Unamuno argues that the attentions of the
inquisitor are preferable to the merchant. The one views me as an end,
the other as a means to an end. The latter has a 'supreme indifference'
to my destiny:
'Similarly there is much more humanity in war than in peace. Non-
resistance to evil implies resistance to good... War is the school of
fraternity and the bond of love; it is war that has brought people
into touch with one another, by mutual aggression and collision, and
has been the cause of their knowing and loving one another... even
the purified hate that springs from war is fruitful. War is in its
strictest sense the sanctification of homicide... God revealed Himself
above all in war...; and one of the greatest services of the Cross is
that, in the form of the sword-hilt, it protects the hand that wields
the sword." (TTSL p280: McMillan 1931)
He and Moltmann would concur that death is a bad thing. But for the
inspired Unamuno, the death of the innocent does not appear to be so much
of a problem as it is for Moltmann.
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The treatment of Berdyaev (TKG p42-47: refs to The Meaning of History. ET
Scribner 1939, and Spirit and Reality. ET Scribner 1939 and 1946),
centres on interpretation of ideas on the suffering in God (the "tragedy
in God"). For Berdyaev, God suffers because humanity is free, a humanity
which exists because of a divine "'longing for the beloved, the one who
freely loves...'"; the Other (TGK p43: TMOH p57). Berdyaev's image of
the divine life as in a sense a deep historical drama is, as Moltmann
says, a challenge to monism (ibid). Monism excludes movement or
suffering love from God, and according to Berdyaev, two primary
criticisms can be made of it (TKGp44: TMOH p46-47). First, how can
monism conceive of God as the source of a diverse and 'non-identical'
world? Second, upholders of monism fall victim to dualism rather than
avoiding it, in that they set God in radical opposition to the world.
Berdyaev thinks in terms of a historical dialectic where no such
contradictions emerge. Thus God longs for the response of the free Other
(TKG p45: ref. to TMOH p48); God is involved in a history, and can move
and suffer.
It is important for Moltmann that Berdyaev "... finds the ground for the
creation of the world within the Trinity, not outside it" (TKG p46).
This earthly freedom is to be seen as having history as an element in the
heavenly history (noted TKG p47); the history of the divine love
suffering for the Other. Moltmann ends by quoting from Spirit and
Reality CTKG ref. to 1946 ed. pl06), where some light is thrown on the
origin of suffering, not that Berdyaev would want to explain how freedom
actually results in suffering:
'Evil and suffering exist because freedom exists; but freedom has no
origin; it is an ultimate frontier. But because freedom exists, God
Himself suffers and is crucified. The Divine love and sacrifice are
God's answer to the mystery of freedom wherein evil and suffering
have their origin. Divine love and sacrifice are likewise freedom."
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What then of the question of Berdyaev' s conception of the value of
freedom? This is of importance for theodicy. The last sentence of the
passage quoted above represents Berdyaev's commitment to the idea that
freedom and tragedy go together. The belief that this is something
positive and necessary is expressed in the following words of Berdyaev:
'Existence in the wicked world is a paradox for our spiritual life -
a paradox because good and evil are correlated. The struggle for good
supposes the resistance of evil, just as the struggle for freedom
supposes the resistance of violence and force. The experience of evil
enriches good, as a result of that creative effort and knowledge
which are called into being by contradiction and struggle, as a
result of that knowledge which is gained through division and
polarization, through submitting to trials." (Spirit and Reality p 123:
The Centenary Press 1939)
Berdyaev is critical of the rationalistic tradition which cannot accept
the reality of unjustified suffering as compatible with God's existence
(SR pl04, 1939 ed. ). It is hindered by a moralistic hankering that good
and evil be distributed upon individuals according to their worth. In
fact, the world is not open to a rationalistic theory of divine
providence (op. cit pl06). It has to be accepted as a world of unjust
suffering. To understand Berdyaev's viewpoint, one has to see that "Evil
may be a cause, but it has itself no cause. Freedom is a definite
mystery, an irrational element. It engenders evil as well as good without
any discrimination, content simply to engender" (op. ci.t pi 13).
Like Unamuno, Berdyaev has a 'robust' attitude to evil, one which
arguably goes beyond what Moltmann could countenance. As I have noted, he
disparages the 'bourgeois' notion that suffering should really be
proportionate to moral status. Whilst Berdyaev recognises that there is
unjustifiable suffering, he belives that:
'There is nothing spiritual or even human about a completely happy




'For the most part man is obliged to attribute his fortune or
misfortune to chance - to an irrational and inexplicable element
acting independently of all laws. A particular combination of
circumstances revealed in chance is not determined by any special
laws... It is a serious error to interpret chance as an expression of
a universal will directing life towards a uniform goal... The
significance of unfortunate accidents lies in the trial of our
spiritual strength, in the subjective rather than the objective
sphere. From the objective standpoint universal life has no purpose,
but the task of spirit is to infuse it with purpose." (SR pl03)
And of the unjust suffering of Jesus:
"... unjust suffering, that of a just man, was transformed into a
mystery - a mystery of salvation. Therein unjust suffering appeared
in another light... Unjust suffering was Divine suffering. And unjust
Divine suffering proved to be the expiation of all human suffering."
(SR pl06)
"It is a world in which prophets are stoned and unjust men, the
persecutors and crucifiers of the just, are triumphant. It is a world
in which innocent children and innocent animals have to suffer. It is
a world in which death and suffering reign supreme. Is Divine
Providence effective in this world? That is the question of reason -
meaningless when confronted with the mystery and secret of love...
Suffering is a mystery because it can also become expiation." (ibid)
Berdyaev, in the statement that suffering can also be expiation, seems
to offer the possibility of something in suffering itself which might be
its justification. If not, since God created a world which simply spawns
good and evil without reason, we would be justified in talking of God
repenting of his sins and his mistake in creating as he did. Such a God
could not be the wholly good God of Christian belief.
Berdyaev's idea of freedom is interesting. There seems no reason why
freedom should not continue to give rise to unjustifiable evils for ever;
and there seems no reason why divine suffering as expiation, without
suffering being its own justification, should lead us to conclude that it
would have been better to have refrained from creating; especially if we
wish to retain the notion that God is wholly good in the sense that he
wishes to preserve being and enrich it, without being compelled to
simultaneously permit its destruction by 'irrational' created forces.
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That is unless the existence of such forces contributes to a worthwhile
good in creation taken as an organic whole. If this latter idea is
considered repulsive, then it is arguable that the idea of a wholly good
God's creating the kind of world there is, is implausible.
Berdyaev thinks that rationalisation of evil leads to its denial (SR
pl06). Yet it is the 1 irrationality' of evil which is exactly the threat
to the belief that creation is the work and responsibility of the God who
is wholly good. A theodicist might wish to argue that even if people
rarely suffer in ways proportional to their moral failure (if we would
want them to), they may do so as a consequence of the world being the
kind of world where it is possible to make free decisions for good or
evil, and (as with Swinburne) it is right that our freedom have exercise
in situations of real responsibility. A very good person may suffer
because someone else chooses evil. But they could not have made the good
and meaningful free choices that they did if this kind of free wrong
decision were not possible. But Berdyaev doesn't think in these terms.
Freedom is a mystery, and it mysteriously engenders good and evil.
Moltmann thinks that if someone is truly free, then choosing the good is
a matter of course (TKG p214). There seems to be a fundamental
incompatibility between the two positions. Berdyaev has thrown away a
trust in providence which expects to see it prevent the suffering of
innocent children and animals. It clearly doesn't. One is left with the
impression that providence may work through injustice and cruelty, rather
than against them per se. With Moltmann, the hope for justice is never
far away, and the attack on theodicy which both repudiates it as an
enterprise because it can never justify the suffering that has occurred,
and claims that it can never be abandoned, represents a wholly different
perspective on things, and one that is perhaps more confusing.
Moltmann shows how far he is from Unamuno and Berdyaev with the second
paragraph of the section God and Suffering in chapter two (TKG p47ff). I
have discussed this material previously, so I will not do so again,
However, it is worth citing for a second time in order to gain a clear
sense of the contrast between Moltmann and the two previous figures. It
is stated:
"... incomprehensible suffering calls the God of men and women in
question. The suffering of a single innocent child is an irrefutable
rebuttal of the notion of the almighty and kindly God in heaven."
(TKG p47)
And:
'There is no explanation of suffering which is capable of
obliterating his pain, and no consolation of a higher wisdom which
could assuage it." (ibid)
He thinks the theodicy question cannot be answered with any new theory
about the existing world (TKG p49>. In saying this he is of course
excluding those theodicies which explain suffering in this world either
in terms of what goes on in this world, and the kinds of goods with which
it is causally connected, or by reference to this world and to a new
world to come. In other words, he is by-passing theodicy. And these
theodicies are (as every theodicy must be), very much theories or
accounts about the existing world and the creatures in it, and the kind
of God who made it.
Still, as so often, Moltmann appears to retain the theodicy question in
its traditional sense. Theodicy, as he has subsequently written in the
SCM Dictionary of Theology, is about justifying God. And it is, one
presumes, the gravity of this issue which makes: "The person who
believes... not rest content with any slickly explanatory answer to the
theodicy question. And he will also resist any attempts to soften the
question down" (ibid). 3 Again, the critical discussion in chapter three
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attempted to clarify the problems inherent in a position which amounts to
saying that the defendant cannot have ANY conceivable justification for
permitting what they did, but that at the same time, the search for one
must go on, with no lowering of the un-meetable standard to be met.
Chapter three of The Trinity and the Kingdom of God deals with the
history of the Son, revealer of the trinity <p65ff>. I want to look
first at section three, 'The Form of the Trinity' (TKG p74>. There is a
strong sense that God is only coming to be able to relate to those unlike
him (rather, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost), through the sending of the
Son. Thus:
'Through the sending, the fellowship of the Father and the Son
becomes so all-embracing that men and women are taken into it, so
that in that fellowship they may participate in Jesus's sonship and
call on the Father in the Spirit." (TKG p75)
And:
'tGod] In the sending of the Son, differentiates himself from himself
and yields himself up. The sending of the Son therefore finds its
foundation in a movement which takes place in the divine life itself:
it is not merely a movement outwards." (ibid)
Moltmann also states, that as Jesus reveals God as Father of the Son, he:
"... takes people - weary and heavy-laden men and women - into the
history between this Father and this Son. He reveals that history. The
secret of the kingdom which he brings to the poor is to be found in his
fellowship with the Father". If it is the case that God is only now
coming into relationship with his people, then this helps explain why the
forces of nothingness have been so succesful in bringing suffering to the
world, and why, as we shall see, there has been a lack of orientation
upon the realm of the Good.
He then discusses the passion of the Son (TKG p75ff). The outward side
of this suffering is his rejection by dominant groups, and his execution
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as criminal. There is too, an inward aspect; his god-forsakenness by the
Father. It is held:
'The pain which Jesus suffered from his God and Father is the special
thing about this passion on Golgotha compared with the history of
the suffering of so many innocent and righteous people." <(TKG p76)
However, it is also said:
'Of course there is also quite simply fear of the horribly slow death
ahead of Vvm... But it would be... foolish to see him as an especially
sensitive person who was overcome by self-pity at the prospects of
death awaiting him... The appaling silence of the Father in response
to the Son's prayer in Gethsemane is more than the silence of death.
/... he was not merely assailed by fear and suffering in his human
nature... He was assailed in his person, his very essence, in His
relationship to the Father..." (TKG p76-77)
So, the appalling slow death is seen as secondary to the silence of the
Father. Yet it seems to be that the silence of the Father implies god-
forsakenness, and this is also equated with the rule of nothingness and
death elsewhere. I believe that if God is the kind of God who permits
unjustifiable suffering in his creation, one which communicates the
fulness of his love, then in the final analysis, it is no worse to be the
Son, forsaken and made curse by this God (although very suprising if
total confidence is had), than it is to be any godforsaken human being in
a world for which there is no moral justification. That is, the creature
who is god-forsaken is no better or worse off than the Son who is
abandoned. As Mark Twain said, "No-one gets out alive". That the Son has
enjoyed a unique intimacy with the Father is paralleled by the fate of
the creation which has a unique dependency on its progenitor.'1 The son is
made curse, as, we might judge from Moltmann's characterisations of the
world, it itself has been made curse. From sin yes. But whence sin? From
the way the world was made, as I shall be discussing shortly.
Let us imagine a king and his son, and an anarchic and despairing
populace. The king has set up poltical structures which he knows will
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generate turmoil and unjustifiable suffering amongst his subjects.
Nevertheless, he feels that they communicate the best of his political
wisdom and his care. After many years, and great famines and oppressions,
the king takes pity on his people, and sends his son out amongst them. He
wants to express his love for his subjects by subjecting one of the royal
family to the kinds of humiliations that others are used to. The son, a
resolute and fair character, with a generosity, balance, and obedience
not to be found amongst the degraded and suspicious peasantry, or the
brutal over-lords, is put to death - like so many others destroyed by a
corrupt and brutalised society. Yet it is not the degradation of the
gallows which is the greatest cause of distress, but the thought of
separation from his father, the king, who has made all around possible,
and with whom the son has always enjoyed a much closer relationship than
any subject. Still, with the death of the son, the king, though grief-
stricken, is able to claim that he too, or the royal family, has suffered
all there is to suffer in a cruel and leaderless realm. The royal
experience is now that of every ordinary man and woman, and is thus much
fuller than before. From now on, there will be a new constitution, a Bill
of Rights, and a general happiness.
Clearly this is a caricature of an extreme sort, of what we might want to
say about a theology which blurs the meaning of love and justice, which
appears to suggest that love no longer means that those who are dependent
need be protected from unjustifiable suffering. Once this fundamental
condition is gone, and once we recognise the unjust suffering of innocent
dependent creature for what it is, then any suffering experienced by the
ultimately responsible party is not as shocking as it might otherwise
seem. And if being wholly good has no clear meaning, then (by most terms)
viciously paradoxical statements can be made. The following passage
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exemplifies the problems in identifying what Moltmann's stance on
unjustifiable evil really is. It all seems as if things are in process
towards God's becoming something more or richer than previously, and that
this is a good and worthwhile thing:
'What the love of God is - the love 'from which nothing can separate
us' (Rom 8.39) - becomes event on the cross and is experienced under
the cross. The Father who sends his Son through all the abysses and
hells of God-forsakenness, of the divine curse and final judgment is,
in his Son, everywhere with those who are his own; he has become
universally present. In giving up the Son he gives 'everything' and
'nothing' can separate us from him. This is the beginning of the
language of the kingdom of God, in which 'God will be all in all'.
Anyone who perceives God's presence and love in the God-
forsakenness of the crucified Son, sees God in all things, just as,
once having faced the experience of death, a person feels the living
character of everything in a hitherto un-dreamed of way." (TKG p820
In 'God and Freedom' (TKG p52ff), Moltmann makes an interesting case. He
is opposed to a nominalist conception of divine freedom, and is strongly
disposed to the view that although God freely determines to create,, this
is also an overflowing of the divine goodness: "His decision is a
disclosure of himself" (TKG p54>. That is, God does not have the choice
of mutually exclusive possibilities (ibid); between being love and not
love. In a ' Mackiean' statement, Moltmann tells us:
'If he is love, then in loving the world he is by no means 'his own
prisoner'; on the contrary, in loving the world he is entirely free
because he is entirely himself." (TKG p55)
He believes that: "The freedom of having to choose between good and evil
is less then the freedom of desiring the good and performing it" (TKG
p55). I think problems arise when the divine love becomes that of a
suffering God: suffering because he loves beings who are not free to be
themselves (are not themselves), and who find that as they are, they are
continually tormented by choice. Of course, it may be that people
choosing evil are expressing what they are: they have some corrupted
essence or rationality. What are the implications if they are not, and
act under duress, or with a compromised range of choice? And if they are
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acting as beings entirely themselves, what kinds of beings has God
created; if they are flawed, what kind of culpability can we put upon
them? Consider what Moltmann says next:
'Man does not already participate in God's eternal freedom in the
posse nan peccare of his primordial condition. He only partakes of it
in the non posse peccare of glory and grace. This is therefore
freedom for the good. The person who is truly free no longer has to
choose... the person who chooses has the torment of choice. Anyone
who has to choose is continually threatened by evil, by the enemy, by
injustice, because these things are always present as potentialities,
true freedom is not 'the torment of choice,' with its doubts and
threats; it is simple, undivided joy in the good." (ibid)
On the following page he writes:
'His [God's] freedom is his vulnerable love, his openness, the
encountering kindness through which he suffers with the human beings
he loves and becomes their advocate... Through his freedom he keeps
man, his image, and his world, creation, free - keeps them free and
pays the price of the their freedom. Through his freedom he waits for
man's love, for his compassion, for his own deliverance to his glory
through man." (TKG p56>
The question remains, what is it to say that humanity is the imago dei,
and that human beings are free? One understands that the freedom that we
have has a great price. And yet, surely the price God pays, and we pay,
is that of the fact that we are not truly free. We enjoy a 'primordial'
freedom 'continually threatened by injustice.'
Perhaps an understanding of the divine love will help clarify why we
enjoy this peculiar freedom, when there is, as Moltrnann himself agrees, a
higher and better freedom, one true image of freedom, as it were: God's
freedom. In the section 'God is Love' (TKG p57ff), Moltmann makes a
number of significant points. First, as I have also noted before "Love is
the self-communication of the good'. It is to be distinguished from
"destructive passions" (ibid). It wants to "give life" and live; it is
not about self-renunciation. It is the self-giving of the good "without
self-dissolution" (ibid). Significantly, "The loving person enters
entirely into the other whom he loves, but in that other he is entirely
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himself. The unselfishness of love lies in the loving person's
communication of himself, not in his self-destruction". When we view
this in the context of the Moltmannian concept of freedom, it seems that
a notion of destructive suffering is really alien to an understanding of
a free and loving relationship with the God who is good, and as existing
between the free created agents of such a God. However, in the following
paragraph one is informed that "Every self-communication pre-supposes the
capacity for self-differentiation" (ibid). Moreover: "When we say God is
love, then we mean that he is in eternity this process of self-
differentiation and self-identification; a process which contains the
whole pain of the negative in itself" (ibid). Why does it contain the
whole pain of the negative? Some light is shed when Moltmann cites I A
Dorner's words: "Love as the one that communicates does not yet find the
real place of its activity in God himself, but only where there is purely
free, primal giving, only where there is pure neediness in the receiver"
(TKG p58: Dorner - Die Unveranclerlichkeit Gottes, Leipzig 1883 p355).
So, does God need us to suffer? Moltmann quotes from another source in
order to back up his belief that for God creation means limitation, self-
hurniliation, and that "... creative love is always suffering love as
well" (TKG p59). For Troeltsch, the creation is:
"... at the same time the subjection of God to the sufferings that
follow from it... If God appoints all these sufferings, they are also
sufferings for God himself... we experience suffering differently if
it is not something fortuitous, but is part of the meaning of the
world." (citation shortened: E Troeltsch - Glaubenslehre. Nach den
Heidelberger Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1911 und 1912, Munich and
Leipzig 1925)
Here it seems we do need to suffer. And if God needs us to suffer in ways
which produce the kind of evils that Moltmann finds unjustifiable, they
can hardly be unjustifiable, for perhaps what God needs is always
justifiable. Yet is this not to lose sight of the fact that unless we are
prepared to revert to a terrifying arbitrariness, we are able to call
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on moral criteria for all actions; such that God is not able to permit
that which is unjustifiable, where what we declare as unjustifiable
implies that a wholly good God does not exist? Moltmann states: "Love is
a self-evident, unquestionable 'overflowing of goodness' which is
therefore never open to choice at any time. We have to understand true
freedom as communication of the good" (TKG p55).
The last two paragraphs of chapter two of The Trinity and the Kingdom of
God present a complex view of the relationship between freedom, love and
suffering. It is said that love which is creative is "ultimately
suffering love because it is only through suffering that it acts
creatively and redemptively for the freedom of the beloved. Freedom can
only be made possible by suffering love" (TKG p60). Again, this seems to
imply that love needs to see its object free, and will suffer to achieve
this, but that the object of love needs to be suffering in order for love
to be truly love. This appears so in the following: "The suffering of God
with the world, the suffering of God from the world, and the suffering of
God for the world are the highest forms of his creative love..." (ibid)
But then he continues the sentence: "... which desires free fellowship
with the world and free response in the world" (ibid). Is there a
contradiction between love which is self-communication of the good and is
entirely free, but which gives rise to unfreedom and the tyranny of the
negative; or is this dichotomy overcome in the realisation that true love
also expects and requires to suffer, indeed needs to suffer from others
who suffer and who desire to be free?
Moltmann holds that: "... the creation of the world and human beings for
freedom and fellowship is always bound up with the process of God's
deliverance from the sufferings of his love" (ibid). Yes, this will
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certainly be so if God can do no other than create through self-
limitation, self-humiliation, and a world pervaded by nothingness; and
also the case if this situation corresponds with God's need to love the
recipient who has a pure neediness and a desire to be truly free. Again
though, such a God is arguably perverse.
In looking at chapter four of the Trinity and the Kingdom of God, two
things stand out. Moltmann's understanding of what love means, and the
way in which the world suffers; either from its own freedom, or because
it is unfree. If Moltmann tells us that the creation is made unfree, and
suffers in order that God may love it and suffer, and free it, then
certain things follow. He cannot claim that suffering has no role to play
in the divine life and the plan of creation. If we accept that some of
the evil that has occurred is unjustifiable, then we will also know that
it has occured in a world where suffering was inevitable. In a world free
in some important sense, ultimately unjustifiable suffering as a realised
possibility has implications I have gone over before. What must the
consequences be for our idea of the wholly good God? If the suffering of
Jesus on the cross is unjustifiable, and has as its context a world
scarred by unjustifiable suffering, then it is arguable that God is
without wisdom. For it is one thing to say of an individual that their
suffering, at least in the context of their life here, is unjustifiable
(this is problem enough). It is another to say that in the over-all
picture, the destiny of creation as an organic whole, their suffering and
that of others is still unjustifiable, and always will be.
On page 106, Moltmann states that: "In both the Yahwist and the Priestly
Writings, 'creation in the beginning does not mean a primordial paradisal
state. It means the history that precedes salvation history."
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Furthermore, echoing a familiar theme, it is an open system and has to be
understood as a "... threatened world; it is surrounded by chaos. The
powers of corruption reach into the midst of it, in night and the sea"
(TKG plOl). There will be an exodus from the world of chaos, and God
will dwell in his new creation. Thus "'Behold I create new heavens and a
new earth; and the former things shall not be remembered or come into
mind. But be glad and rejoice for ever in that which I create'" (TKG
p 102: Isaiah 65: 17ff>.
How are we to think of the creative love of the trinity? Moltmann
perceives that the love within the trinity is love of like for like.
Still, in so being, it is not creative love. Creative love is love which
"... communicates itself by overcoming its opposite, which 'gives life to
the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist. ' (Rom
4. 17)" (TKG pl06).
One can see how creative love is presented with these opportunities in
Moltmann's first detailed discussion of creation "inwards" (TKG pl08).
Drawing on the thought of Isaac Luria and Gershom Scholem, he thinks that
creation involves creation of a "mystical space" within God. God is
omnipresent and of infinite extension, and if the world is to exist he
must withdraw his presence. Otherwise, we pre-suppose some kind of
eternally co-existent space outside of God. Thus: "... every act outwards
is preceded by an act inwards which makes the 'outwards possible... He
creates by withdrawing himself, and because he withdraws himself.
Creation in chaos and out of nothing, which is an act of power, is also a
self-humiliation on God's part, a lowering of himself into his own
impotence" (TKG pi 10). But despite the background of humiliation and of
lowering into impotence involved in its creation, Moltmann can affirm
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that the world is good, "just as God himself is goodness" (TKG pi 12).
So, the world is good, and ". . . that is why God has pleasure in it. That
is why he can expect his image, man, to respond to his creative love, so
that he may not only enjoy bliss with his Son, in eternity, but may also
find bliss in man, in time" (ibid).
Nevertheless, creation is. imperfect. This is evident in the handling of
the question of the necessity of the coming of the Son (TKG pll4ff).
Thus: "... the incarnation of the Son is the perfected self-communication
of the triune God to his world" (TKG pi 16). The suffering and death of
the Son is "... determined by sin and death, which pervert God's world
and enslave men and women" (ibid). Moltmann also states:... the Son of
God would have become man even if the human race had remained without
sin" (ibid). In what way would the Son have perfected the world if he so
came? There would be no sin, and without sin, according to Moltmann's
traditionalism, there would be no death, and I presume, no disease. What
perfecting could there be? A seal of approval perhaps. But then, would
there really have been no sin? After all, we were not created fully free:
this must be the area in which we are imperfect. To be free is to choose
the right as a matter of course, expressing correspondence between world,
God, and self. Where the realm of the Good is something with which we are
definitely not in correspondence, then I would argue that it is almost
inevitable that we sin, as we have in fact done. The 'torment of choice'
also reflects the immediate pressures and compulsions of the realm of
necessity, not only those internalised in evolution, but those
confronting the flawed individual thrown into a world pervaded by
nothingness: a torment persisting even when we are confronted with the
light from the realm of the Good. If it is in this way that we have
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sinned, and death is the wages of sin, then it should have been foreseen
prior to creation that Jesus would come to suffer, and to die.
The major question remains, why is there any unjustifiable suffering when
God is good, and when this goodness is relentlessly opposed to suffering
and transience, and wants all to be free? If God exists in a higher
realm of necessity, such as a happy and fulfilled being can only be a
free one, and freedom to be what one is makes choosing good a matter of
course, then it is hard to understand why he creates a realm of necessity
where there is only 'partial freedom' (a difficult concept), unless there
is some necessity and justification for doing so: such as those commonly
advanced in theodicy concerning growth of personality and education in
the exercise of free will; a justification more sustainable than the
belief that there was chaos mixed up in things, by necessity, but
eventually, after much unjustifiable suffering all will be liberated. If
I create a new species of microbe, and in order to do so, have to make
genetic changes which mean the product will, unkown to me, be unstable,
sometimes pestilential, such that it causes me to wish that I had never
made it, then as a human being, it is possible that I be excused if this
development was not reasonably foreseable. If God has to create by a
certain withdrawal, and this means that creation is permeated by
nothingness, and the consequences are such that God felt it would have
been better not to create, then he can't have created this: because God
knows how things go, and he will presumably only create where it is worth
creating; where a world truly expresses such goods as freedom and love
and joy (in other words, there are some worlds which because of their
suffering, it would be impossible for God to instantiate). If God
confronts unjustifiable evil, and still thinks that it was worth
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creating, then this surely cannot be unjustifiable evil. There must be an
ultimate justice in the way God acts to any being.
If in intention the incarnation precedes the creation of the world (TKG
pi 17), then God knows what a finite image yet perfect image of God is
like, and this makes one wonder why human beings have to suffer
unjustifiable evils prior to the instantiation of this image in the form
of the Son. For instance: "The Son is the image of God for which God
destines human beings... That is why the initial creation is open: it
waits for the appearance 'of man', of true man, the person corresponding
to God, God's image" (ibid). This raises the question, which I cannot
pursue here; if we are not human now, and only Christ is in this world,
but he is then transformed, are the incarnate Christ and the resurrected
Christ representative of two types of true humanity? Is the mortal
perfect Christ not inevitably destroyed by the imperfect mortals, for
whose condition God is however responsible? However, if Jesus was really
meant to be immortal, but since ' we' sinned, and the wages of sin is
death, he took on finite human form as mortal, then is it not the case
that he himself could have sinned if he had been in our place on earth?
What special advantage would he have: which would mean that we, as
deficient were not fully culpable, and hence not deserving of 'the wages
of sin'? To continue this to a reductio ad absurdum, if we had been meant
to be immortal, yet of this earth, were we to be celibate: for surely, as
immortal, we would be a species whose reproduction would inevitably
destroy the balance of nature? (or perhaps reproduction would occur at
rnulti-millenial intervals). If we were meant to be mortal, has God
changed his mind about the benefits? Also, if mortality is connected to
the possibility of unjustified evil (such as the death of the innocent
child), then it should never have been an ingredient of creation; one
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where imperfect agents could resolve to kill or love one another,
depending on situation, necessity, temperament, state of mental health,
and so on.
However, there are more immediate issues. Moltman states: "God becomes
the God who identifies himself with men and women to the point of death
and beyond" (TKG pi 18). Why? :
'In the incarnation of the Son the triune God enters into the limited
finite situation. Not only does he enter into this state of being
man; he accepts and adopts it himself, making it part of his own
eternal life. He becomes the human God... If this is the meaning...
then God's self-humiliation is completed and perfected in the passion
and death of Jesus the Son. Here too an indwelling significance is
perceptible: God does not merely enter into the finitude of men and
women; he enters into the situation of their sin and God-forsakenness
as well. He does not merely enter into this situation; he also accepts
and adopts it himself." (TKG pi 18-19)
Yet there must still be doubts as to why they die, and why they have been
so utterly god-forsaken. The Holy Spirit is well able to render things
intransient: "The eschatological work of the Holy Spirit is physical
resurrection, physical transfiguration, and transformation of the
physical form of existence" (TKG pl22). Still, it is from the
transfigured humanity of Christ that the Spirit procedes, and it is the
eschatological work of the Spirit. God appears to become the human God as
part of a drama for which he is reponsible as set designer, writer, and
chief protagonist. It is still hard to see how this can be the case
without full responsibility for permission of unjustifiable evil falling
on God, with the arguably inevitable consequences. The following passage
is an important statement which summarises Moltmann's trinitarian
thinking in its relationship to creation, in picture mode:
'If we want to describe in pictorial terms the two orders of the
Trinity which are to be found in the biblical testimony, we can say:
In the first order the divine Trinity throws itself open in the
sending of the Spirit. It is open for the world, open for time, open
for the renewal and unification of the whole creation. In the second
order the movement is reversed: in the transfiguration of the world
through the Spirit all men turn to God and, moved by the Spirit, come
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to the Father through Christ the Son. In the glorification of the
Spirit, world and times, people and things are gathered to the Father
in order to become his world." (TKG pl27)
We could perhaps, by way of a counter image, call this the ' boomerang
effect'. The original agent, flooded by lamplight, hurls the boomerang
into outer darkness; but it returns, for that is the way the boomerang is
constructed, things were meant to go, energies, dynamics, various
factors, dictating it. Except here, God somehow opens up this darkness
within himself, and the return of the boomerang is not a feat for
strangers, or for personal amusement, but the key to "the laughter of
the universe" (TKG pl28). The darkness too, through which creation
ploughs, has a profounder quality: the unjustifiable god-forsakenness of
the universe, and all that ensues.
For some, the problem will remain that Moltmann's picture is a
theological 'picture' or ' image' , and that attempts to cognize what it
presents run aground on a certain prima facie invulnerability to
critique. Since, evidently, God does want to relate to human beings, and
has put a lot of himself into creation, there are arguably though, limits
to how circumspect one can be, if one wants to make any meaningful images
at all. Perhaps God is beyond comprehension, or what he wants us to know
is so. But this latter supposition would be unsustainable. And a God who
didn't want us to glean anything about what he is about in the cosmos,
would be of no particular interest. Except, does he have something to
hide? Are there then, since we make rather a lot of them, right and wrong
images, and how do we discriminate, even tentatively? In particular there
is the issue of analysis of the kind frequently found in theodicy debate.
It may be illegitimate to take apart theological images and pictures in
this way. I will discuss this in chapter nine.
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I move now to look at Moltmann's thought on a trinitarian doctrine of
freedom (TKG p212). This is distinctly processual (and in this sense
somewhat resembles an Irenaean approach), despite what he says, and would
provide a sufficient explanation of why , on the way to the kingdom of
freedom, there is suffering (even if not how it is compatible with God's
being wholly good - given Moltmann's view that creation incurs
unjustifiable suffering). First, we see that God creates the world, and
that it suffers through self-destructiveness (TKG p212-13). But God is
patient, and: "This constitutes the freedom of created things and
preserves for them the necessary space in which to live" (ibid). Then
comes the Kingdom of the Son, which liberates people from self-
destructiveness, followed by the new creation which brings new powers and
energies. With these, "people become God's dwelling and his home" (TKG
p213). This new creation, crucially for this world, "... gives liberty
its bearings and fills it with infinite hope" (ibid).
Is it implied in this that we are presently unfree? It seems that we are
able to exercise free choice, that we await our free choice potential
being given direction (this raises issues such as; is free choice for
Moltmann an expression of what we are; if this is the case, why does it
require an external marker to give it direction? But Moltmann seems to
value the commitment implied in the "torment of choice", as if this
cancels the negatives of ontological deficiency and moral evil).
Moltmann gives us a three-stage history of freedom, which is not meant to
be taken as more than a description of "... stages and transitions which
are always present in the experience of freedom" (TKG p214). Firstly,
people exist in a realm of necessity, the world of nature. They attempt
to free themselves from necessity and to achieve power over nature.
However, "... the actual acquiring of power does not as yet determine
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whether it will be used for good or evil, constructively or
destructively" (ibid). Secondly, they exist in a world of choice.
Moltmann refers again to the proverb which goes "The person who chooses
has the torment of choice" (ibid). "To do what is good as a matter of
course is not yet a characteristic of the realm of freedom between the
liberation from necessity and the striving for the good. Consequently the
realm of freedom has to be interpreted as the history of freedom, the
struggle for freedom, the process of freedom" (TKG p214). People are
able to overcome this torment by reference to the "... realm of good,
beyond necessity and freedom" (ibid). The position (Kantian) is
summarised:
'The realm of the Good means the place from which moral purposes and
values shine into the realm of freedom, so that freedom may be used
properly - that is to say, for life's preservation and not for its
destruction. Freedom's goal cannot be the mere increase of freedom."
(TKG p213-14)
There are thus, initially, two sides to freedom: ": the liberation from
compulsion and necessity, and the striving for the realization of the
Good" (TKG p214). So what exactly is the realm of the Good? For Moltmann
it is "... freedom in its own moral world, the world that is in
correspondence with itself" (ibid). This then, it would appear, cannot
be a world of necessity such as renders food acquisition vital, and death
ultimately inescapable, with all the compulsions, absence of meaning, and
dread of nothingness which are concomitant. The realm of the Good, it is
said, is "... no longer... this ambiguous world in which freedom becomes
the torment of choice; it must be that unequivocal world in which freedom
consists of joy in the Good and in doing what is right simply as a matter
of course" (ibid).
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The argument becomes obscure. He says that we always live in transition
from necessity to freedom, and from freedom to "free practice of what is
good" (ibid). The main problem is embodied in the statement:
'The more power mankind acquires over nature, the more dangerous the
human history of freedom becomes, and the more urgent the
orientation towards the realm of the Good. Otherwise people could not
acquire power over the power they have, and could not make free ue
of their liberty." (ibid)
In looking at the account of the realms of necessity, freedom, and the
good, I wonder why we are not already orientated upon the Good, as
something whose choice is merely a "matter of course" - for the evil
stemming from the freedom of the "torment of choice", is frequently
unjustifiable. It seems that an ontological deficiency has played its
part, inextricable from the distortions introduced into human behaviour
by the realm of necessity, over which we, as threatened beings have
striven to exercise power. I think that a deeper analysis of our
ontology, and of what exactly the realm of necessity involves is
required, if we are as unsure and divided as is held to be the case.
Moltrnann goes on to present an analysis of freedom as having three
tendencies (TKG p214ff). That of feudal lordship; that of liberal
individualism; and that of community.
Freedom as lordship is dominating and subjugating of others. Bourgeois
individualism considers every person as merely a limitation upon my
freedom. The freedom of community is that where we become free when we
are open for others and vice versa. Now, although Moltmann is keen to
emphasise that these are ever-present strata of freedom, as with his
final model, servanthood, children, friend (TKG p221), they do of coure
reflect dominant realities for individuals or groups of individuals. Take
feudal society. It has its origins in a static agrarian system. Why are
people agriculturalists rather than nomadic pastoralists or hunters? It
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tends to allow settlement and stability, and perhaps primarily, to
provide a reliable if hard-gotten supply of food (also, an agrarian
society once entrenched is one where it is difficult to be a nomad;
aspect of the realm of necessity). The kind of issues confronted by such
a society are of the kind, 'will we get enough to eat this harvest; who
will protect us against the ruthless nomadic war-bands who are moving to
attack from across the Jordan - who fling children against the walls of
our captured towns?' There are thus, perhaps not suprisingly, stratified
and organized societies within which there are clear lines of obligation
and responsibility, higher and lesser status. If we follow Moltmann, we
can also say that the kind of society that is feudal is one manifesting
many aspects of the realm of necessity found in all ages; from fear of
slow or violent death, to the compulsions which he has spoken of as
coming from the 'death-urge'.
This situation has arisen in the realm of necessity. It would not do so
in the realm of the Good. Moltmann portrays the danger in our world as
being in our gaining power over creation, and being faced with choice
which we might misuse. Thus: "The more power mankind acquires over
nature, the more dangerous the history of human freedom becomes" (TKG
p214). Why might we misuse it? Arguably the real dangei—point lay in
God's creating a world of necessity, which was at the same time a world
of choice; which included such phenomena as disease; greater social
stratification the more complex and large the society; competitiveness;
mortality; appropriation of territory. Exercising power (individual
power, and the power of societies or states) in such a world is not a
neutral activity, but involves compromise, loss of individual control,
and dominance over human and non-human resources. The realm of necessity
and the campaign to survive within it as finite creatures, takes its
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toll. Moltmann holds that the realm of the Good projects its light into
the world, so that freedom of choice is exercised by beings able to
orientate themselves on the good. And yet, they do this in the context of
the realm of necessity, and as having evolved within it. They are its
children. Given they way he has characterised the creation, it is as if
the light shines into a darkened cave, beckoning a race of blinded
troglodytes.
Moltmann tries to overcome the inevitable impression of a history of
being in three major installments; from the instinctual, to the conscious
decision-making conditioned by the often dark forces of the realm of
necessity, to the movement towards the realm of the good - by focussing
on a single abstract model of human consciousness and experience. What
it represents is not only a possible model of consciousness, but an
actual history of unfreedom and unjustifiable suffering, and of the
veritable absence of God. It is stated in the concluding paragraph of The
Trinity and the Kingdom of God, that:
"... freedom means the unhindered participation in the eternal life of
the triune God... when we think of freedom we may surely say: 'Our
hearts are captive until they become free in the glory of the triune
God.*" (TKG p22)
It is also said:
'Freedom itself is indivisible and all-comprehensive. That is why
every partial freedom presses forwards to total freedom and to the
freedom of the whole creation." (ibid)
It is quite difficult to see what justification there can be for creating
an at best only partially free creation. For it is this creation which
has generated such horrors as Moltmann terms unjustifiable. Still, whilst
denying a processual dimension in the history of creation and suffering,
he is able to tolerate the fact that it is within God's power to create a
world which is free. Was it always so? Is this not only an
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eschatological possibility? We are back with the question of process. If
it was always possible to create finite beings who would rejoice in the
good and always choose the Good, without this being an imposition of
freedom, then the God who creates a partially free world leading to great
horrors, without their being justifiable, cannot be wholly good and
perfectly just. Even where we are opting for the processual
interpretation, it is evident that if the realm of the Good lies at
God's core, it is deeply problematic that the existence of this source of
ultimate values which shines into our imperfect hoping world is by
normal defintion incompatible with what is perceived by Moltrnann as the
occurrence (permittance) of (by any terms) unjustifiable outrages:
whether the great earthquake which annihilates multitudes of partial
images of God; or any one of numerous genocides, casual murders; or even
the death of a single innocent child.
I shall conclude discussion of Moltmann's key texts by looking at the
theology of creation contained in God in Creation.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
In God in Creation (1985), Moltmann reflects on a great range of issues,
from the idea of the Sabbath - the Feast of Creation, concepts of space
and infinity, and the question of Marxism and the degradation of nature,
to what would constitute a truly adequate definition of human health. In
this discussion, I shall focus on limited but crucial areas: those of
the origins and nature of suffering, and additionally, how Moltmann's
views on the problem of evil in this book compare with his earlier
statements, and what any differences might suggest.1
A theology which addresses, often with great insight and passion, issues
such as the ecological crisis, life in health and sickness, and which
embraces the evolutionary model of development is one which almost
inevitably has to face questions of innocent suffering, unfreedom, and
mortality. But when Moltmann says, '"All's well that end's well'" <GC
p28: GS p290: "Ende gut - alles gut"), then the theodicy issue seems to
be about to receive a suprisingly un-Moltmannian treatment. Indeed,
looking at God in Creation, it appears that Moltmann has opted for a
clearly processual model of the world (I mean one where reality grows
from one 'shape' into another in a necessary and constructive manner). He
writes:
'The famous image with which Hegel describes the nature of
philosophy can very well be applied to the Sabbath: 'As the thought
of the world, it does not appear until reality has completed its
formative process, and made itself ready... The owl of Minerva takes
its flight only when the shades of night are gathering." (GC p288:
Pref. to Philosophy of Right)
Without wanting to be repetitive, it can be argued that the idea of a
formative process would mean that if God is wholly good and acts freely
in full expression of the divine nature, then we should be able to take
any particular moment of the process, and see in this, related to the
overall picture, the manifestation of the divine intention of loving
creativity, and the divine repugnance at evil which cannot contribute
towards any worthwhile good. One would suppose that any given feature of
an unfolding and evolutionary movement such as Moltmann talks of,
reflects the creator's intention: there is no necessity to discern either
a specifically Hegelian logic of movement, nor to provide a detailed
account of causation behind any series of events and possibilities, going
back to the instant of creation.
In order to re-clarify the theodicy issues at stake in God in Creation. I
would like to take a second look at the idea that unjustifiable evil
might not be incompatible with the existence of a wholly good, just,
creator God, creating ex nihilo. What, it might be said, if he permits
all the evils that arises in the world, including those which are
unjustifiable, but not the evils that might arise in another world, which
he would consider to be worse in some decisive fashion? Why worse?
Arguably because they would outweigh any goods with which their
possibility may be connected. Or is it not just that they are
intrinsically more evil? Perhaps any talk of worse or less bad implies a
grading of suffering in terms of injustice, or in sheer pain and anguish.
Taking the first point. The more innocent the greater the injustice,
especially when the suffering is greater. If we abandon this model of
justice/injustice (where apparently justice is absence of suffering for
those who are good and who are loved by God), it is difficult to see what
else we have to go on in describing degrees of suffering apart from sheer
extremes of physical or psychological degradation. That of course, is
still a miserable though hardly satisfactory possibility. Perhaps that
was why in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, Moltmann said that there
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was no suffering which wasn't innocent suffering: even if, by
implication, there was no commitment to the notion of justifiable
suffering (what are the ultimate implications of this for responsibility
in an embodied world?), the actual experience of suffering by innocent
beings was not to be condoned. Why? It could be held that there are,
outright, certain things which no creature ought to experience. However,
this is extremely problematic. Quite obviously for instance, every
creature currently suffers death, which, if 'innocent suffering' is to
convey any sense, over and above statements of conjunction but not of
causal relationship, such as 'all creatures who suffer are fluffy', and
if Moltmann really sees mortality as bad, then that means that God is
perverse. Or is there some reason why all things die (or might die),
compatible with God's being wholly good? Even if we want to rid ourselves
of the concept of just and unjust suffering, the apparent fact that
animal and human suffering can be classed as great evil, is of a depth
impossible to find a sufficiently worthwhile purpose for, is upsetting.
Yet to say this is to come right back to the notion of balancing goods
and evils, and of rationalising evil. I think this may be a strong
tendency because although people may not be particularly interested in
elaborating ideas of just suffering/punishment, they are perhaps
interested in the idea that generally, evils are ultimately justifiable
in the constructive sense that their occurrence is not unrelated to
otherwise unobtainable and worthwhile goods (this means however that
whilst we recognise that people do not always get what they 'deserve' in
terms of reaping 'just deserts' in any very obvious way, this possibility
is balanced by the good of the possibility of realisation of ourselves
and of others in free decision and genuine responsibility). The
alternative, that they do not fit into any framework of
justifiability/unjustifiability is almost unbearable. Terrible things
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happen: but is this as injustice not an illusion? If we take great and
nauseating pain such as might be experienced in some terminal illness
(perhaps more frequently the case in the 'developing' world) out of the
framework which says life, despite all its problems is worthwhile, and
suffering, or its possibility, cannot be separated out from the
possibilities for good in existence, then we are left with the following
choices. The suffering in life is the cost that is paid, or an arbitrary
and senseless attrition. The first option is different from the idea of
justifiable suffering in the traditional understanding. Suffering is seen
as unrelated to benefits: the cost extracted from any individual is not
necessarily related to benefits in their own life, but to the species as
a whole. Suffering can then be seen as a charge exacted for a notional
gain to the individual - the individual as tied with the species. Here
we have the balancing notion again. But it is arguably better to keep the
idea of justification at a level which avoids individual versus species.
The goods which arise from the possibilities for evil and suffering are
worthwhile for all. I think that where we say that God is wholly good and
perfectly just, if we hold that one individuals suffering was not, or
will not be ultimately justified, then no number of connections to the
general possibilities for humanity will make it possible to avoid saying
that God would have been better to have refrained from creating anything.
My free choice yesterday has implications which I must accept today:
someone suffers as a consequence of my action. But if I believe in free
will as a great and worthwhile good allowing moral responsibility, that
suffering should not distress me as the exercise of free will, only as
the wrong exercise of free-will. Of course there are difficulties on the
topic of human ability to forecast consequences, and there are other
difficult problems, but here is not the place to discuss them. If we
decide that given the things that happen, free will is not worthwhile,
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that there are unjustifiable moral evils, then there are drastic
entailments. If Moltmann does talk of unjustifiable suffering, this,
again if it is to mean anything significant, must imply that there is
suffering which not only is not justifiable, but in so being, over and
above any kind of word-play, is a very bad thing: and it is especially
bad if all who suffer are innocent. Could there be justifiable suffering?
I would argue that if there could be no justifiable suffering, in the
sense of its being causally connected with conditions for the possibility
of obtaining otherwise unobtainable and worthwhile goods, there could be
little to say for the God who has created the world. Where an earthquake
kills 'innocent people' and causes 'unjustifiable suffering', we may
attempt to justify God the creator as permitting this kind of event by
reference to all the connected good things of the earth (together, even
if we feel that good predominates, they do not of course prove that
there is a moral agent at work in the world). But is human life, or the
experience within it, calculable in the way that we normally seem to
conceive possible for all other life? If we think not, then the creator
of such an environment cannot be the kind of God who is deeply perturbed
by innocent suffering which is incalculably unjustifiable. If he was
wholly good, he would not of course permit such innocent suffering. I
shall of course return to this topic.
I will start my discussion of God in Creation by looking at chapter four
(p72ff). I do so in order to see in what way Moltmann has developed his
thinking on divine freedom, purpose in creation, the nihil, and
humiliation. After this, there is an attempt to draw a picture of how
Moltmann views creation in its present inadequacy, and in its expression
of what is good. Meeting this second objective will require a culling of
material from a number of chapters.
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It is stated in the opening section of chapter four, that "... the divine
creativity has no conditions or premises. Creation is something
absolutely new" (GC p73). God did not create arbitrarily (GC p75), God
created out of his love (ibid), his decision being a disclosure of the
divine life (GC p85). Thus:
'In his love God can choose; but he chooses only that which
corresponds to his essential goodness, in order to communicate that
goodness as his creation and in his creation. God's almighty power is
demonstrated only inasmuch as all the operations of that power are
determined by his eternal nature itself. God therefore does what for
him is axiomatic - what is divine... This excludes all forms of
duresse." (GC p76)
Moltmann then puts emphasis on the idea of 'Nothingness'. God creates out
of nothing (as ex nihilo), but this nothing is not merely the absence of
something. It appears to be endowed with a destructive and de-stabilising
potential. This is the power of the nihil:
'God makes room for his creation by withdrawing his presence. What
comes into being is a nihil which does not contain the negation of
creaturely being (since creation is not yet existent), but which
represents the partial negation of the divine Being, inasmuch as God
is not yet Creator. The space which comes into being and is set free
by God's self-limitation is a literally God-forsaken space. The nihil
in which God creates his creation is God-forsakenness, hell, absolute
death, and it is against the threat of this that he maintains his
creation in life." (GCp87-88)
So, absence of God implies god-forsakenness. The nothingness which has to
be made before creation has a special cause. In "... a doctrine of
Nothingness a distinction has to be made between the non-being of a
creature, the non-being of creation, and the non-being of the Creator. It
is only in connection with the last that of these that we can talk about
Nothingness" (GC p88). Nothingness has its effect after we isolate
ourselves in sin. For then: "Creation is therefore threatened, not merely
by its own non-being, but also by the non-being of God its Creator - that
is to say, by Nothingness itself" (ibid). I do not see that how this
happens is ever specified. If for instance, mortality is to be described
as a consequence of human sin, but sin as letting in the external power
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of nothingness, then the introduction of fiendish negativity into the
world in this way is problematic: rather like a persorfs making a
moderately reprehensible mistake in behaviour in a foreign land, and
finding that they have unexpectedly precipitated a war. Who are they to
know that the country is simmering, that the calm is a fragile surface to
great destructive forces? Except, in this case, the land is their own
land, and self-isolation threatens an unsuspected vengeance across the
generations. Perhaps vengeance is too strong a word: it may be that God
would prefer that Nothingness as an alien power have no such massive
effect on his world. Was God forced to make the world the way it was?
Some of the criticisms which Hick made of Barth's ' das Nichtige' throw
light on problems of the Moltmannian doctrine of the nihila (See the
discussion in Evil and the God of Love pl43ff). Does this nihil, as
genuinely opposed to God, arise as something unavoidable, which God
doesn't want, but has to accept if he is to create? If this is so, then
Moltmann may be contradicting his position on God1 s power - where he has
stated for example, that: "God's almighty power is demonstrated only
inasmuch as all the operations of that power are determined by his
eternal nature itself" (GC p76>. This entails that what God does is
entirely compatible with his nature, as say, wholly good. Of course, that
doesn't mean that God can avoid everything he might want to avoid
(miscarriages, world-wars...), but it implies that where this question of
power arises, the resultant possibilities for evil need to be seen as
balanced, or more than balanced, by worthwhile good.
There is a further aspect. It is not clear that God does want to avoid
the possible involvement of the nihil (see also EGL pl45). The nihil is
embroiled in the way things go in such a manner that it is hard to be
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sure that if God could have created without this limitation, he would
have chosen to do so. For instance: "If life is lived in embodiment and
if it is committed in its earthly context, it becomes vulnerable and
mortal. But because it is spent, it brings fruit. The death which this
life experiences is a fruitful and therefore a meaningful death" (GC
p269). I feel that in the reference to the image of the owl of Minerva,
Moltmann indicates that such effect as 'Nothingness' has, is within the
parameters of the formative process of reality. But taken against the
general and problematic trend to dismiss theodicy, I do not think that
this kind of statement is sufficient to divert critical attention. It
also points to the danger of self-contradiction.
One line of enquiry when looking at Moltmann's doctrine of Nothingness,
is to ask to what extent he commits himself to a ' likely' account, or
actually feels he is making, to use Hick's words (on Barth's
'nothingness'), a contribution to 'the science of theology*. The latter
understanding seems in order, even if he begins the discussion in terms
of going more deeply into 'an idea'. It is shortly afterwards stated:
'Theologians have made [the]... distinction between God's 'inward' and
his 'outward' aspect so much a matter of course that no one has even
asked the critical question: can the omnipotent God have an 'outward'
aspect at all? If we assume an extra Deum, does this not set god a
limit? ... In order to create a world 'outside' himself, the infinite
God must have made room beforehand for a finitude in himself." (GC
p86)
Perhaps this is so, but Moltmann's deductions are of a kind open to
opposition as incoherent. He holds, as I previously noted, that God
withdraws and creates a "literally God-forsaken space" (GC p87). It is
stated:
'The character of the negative that threatens it [creation] goes
beyond creation itself. This is what constitutes its demonic power.
Nothingness contradicts, not merely creation, but God too..." (GC p88)
In order for this to be so, the space of creation has to be viewed in the
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way Moltmann proposes. It appears to be assumed that God has to evacuate
his presence, and that there is an unavoidable underlying
incompatibility or hostility between creation and its living-space (GC
p87-S8). If we accept that the death of a single innocent child is
unjustifiable, and we can argue strongly that the potentially deadly
antagonism between creation and the void has a major part to play, and is
probably the key factor in converting human isolation to death and
rneaninglessness (see below), then the line of responsibility goes back to
the God who creates, and the question of justification is less able to be
avoided than ever.
There are other perhaps less problematic models for creation. There is
arguably no reason to believe that God couldn't create space, and create
the universe, simultaneously. 3 Perhaps even this duality is misleading.
The universe is multi-dimensional. The instantaneous creation of the
infant universe (and simultaneously of its particular dimensions), and
i
opening up of God to receive it need not imply the creation of a void
into which the universe is inserted.
The way in which Moltmann suggests that acts of human sinfulness allow
Nothingness to surge up, seems to say that a negativity 1 pervades' the
interstices of reality itself, ready to destroy: "... by yielding up the
Son to death in God-forsakenness on the cross, and by surrendering him to
hell, the eternal God enters the Nothingness out of which he created the
world... He pervades the space of God-forsakenness with his presence" (GC
p91). And: "On the level of the life processes, perversions...
continually occur - perversions of constructive potentialities into
destructive ones... Because these are forces which do not belong to the
human sphere, but which yet have a destructive effect on that sphere, we
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talk about demonic forces... It is these dimensions, transcending human
beings and the earth, that are meant by the symbols of 'the fall of
angels' and 'the rule of Satan'" (GC pl69>, This presence of the alien
within creation, as if the latter were some permeable body in the void,
strengthens the impression that Nothingness is not only the space for
creation, but from the beginning qualifies the integrity of creation to
an unacceptable degree. We could alternatively speak of the universe as
growing within God as he makes space for it_: not within hell, or
absolute death (GC p91), but the space which is part of creation, and
which has its source in the love of God, in his grace. God then makes way
for this life-giving space, and not for anything else.
We could say that an infinite nihil within God threatens to eliminate
God. Further, if we think of a finite universe within either an infinite
or finite nihil, in the former instance, creation is surrounded by an
infinitely large hell, arguably superfluous (although God may have his
reasons, so long as this state of affairs does not give rise to
unjustifiable evils). In the latter instance, the nihil is negated by
creation if the two are co-terminous. Arguably, it is not really
plausible to assume that God makes the nihil too large through bad design
(hence perhaps causing unnecessary added suffering). Surely he only needs
to contract as much as needs be, in letting the divine energy and love
flow into an expanding life-giving space with its own integrity: there
being no need to open up an inter—mediate zone of absolute death. Of
course though, this an area of speculation, and God, as noted, may make
the nihil as large as he wishes, even if it does introduce the
possibility of a special suffering, but again, with the condition on
unjustifiable evil attached, and only with wholly good intention.
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I want to move now to look at the kinds of evil Moltmann finds in the
world, and how the nihil or other factors are involved. The following
references to evil in the world of God in Creation are taken from a
number of chapters.
Moltmann makes a number of important statements about evil and suffering.
Chapter two, dealing with the ecological crisis, gives a picture of
social dynamics which seems like a variation on J L Mackie's 'traps':
'The norms which regulate a society derive from its cultural
traditions... Over a long period of history, systems of value and
meaning have become very deeply rooted in the human subconscious.
Changing them is painful, and usually takes a very long time.
Societies which are unable fundamentally to alter their systems of
value and meaning, so as to adapt themselves to the new situation,
are unable to change as a whole. This means that they cannot end the
destruction they are causing. On the contrary, the destruction of the
natural environment which they have brought about has, in its turn, a
destructive retroactive effect on the societies themselves, evoking a
loss of values and crisis of meaning The defence measures that
are undertaken can even serve to spread and deepen the crisis. (GC
p24)
It is important that Moltmann is not committed to saying that we cannot
learn, although this is tied to the elements of a key theodicy argument:
"Only life systems that are capable of suffering are capable of
surviving, because they are the only ones that are prepared to learn, and
are open to change and renewal" (GC p24). Still, the problems that force
us to change through suffering arise from basic tendencies, perhaps
inherent in the world as it is: "In the struggle for existence L Kampf urns
Dasein], scientific and technical progress is not used merely for the
enhancement of living; it is also utilized by the political will to
achieve or secure power. In terms of social reality, there is no such
thing as 'value-free science'" (GC p25). Moltmann frequently refers to
Francis Bacon, and is especially critical of what he sees as the
exploitative theory of knowledge coming from that early modern period <GC
p27).
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Still, critically, whilst it is true that Europe and its civilisation
have developed in a way which has unleashed great forces through
technology, it is difficult to know how much is to be ascribed to the
flash of inspiration which might never have been, and how much to the
forces of evolving capital, means of production, consumption, demand for
raw materials, involving myriads of individuals and a whole culture. It
is hard to estimate to what extent the tendencies to destruction and loss
of control have to do with a particular ideology or with more universal
human limitations, as well as potentialities. Given that the modern world
was clearly possible, and that it expresses human potential and
limitation, as every other society does, the problems of our age are
perhaps not best wholly identified with its ideology. Arguably, all
societies express human limitations, whether in sanctioning slavery, or
exploiting natural resources as far as their technology allows and
compels. One of our basic problems is the limited nature of human
foresight and the tendency to dominate wherever this is possible: the
apparent inability of the mass society, or agglomeration of mass
societies to express decisively the individual's concerns at social and
environmental degradation could also be seen as an unfortunate aspect of
human finitude. Moltmann's interpretation of Genesis indicates that for a
long time humanity has failed to restrain forces of domination and
exploitation. Why might this be so? How, in Moltmann's account, does it
deviate from God's original vision?
Talking about Genesis 1:26, Moltmann views the words 'subdue the earth'
as an authoritative dietary commandment, not as anything that could "lay
the intellectual foundations for today's ecological crisis" (GC p29).
That is, "human beings and animals alike are to live from the fruits
which the earth brings forth in the forms of plants and trees. A seizure
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of power over nature is not intended" (ibid). There is no indication that
Moltmann does not think this command the actual ideal which God intended
to see realised on earth. In the light of this it is hard to know
what to make of the moral status of the carnivorous snail. I am not being
flippant, since I think it clear that Moltmann thinks meat eating was
unintended by God. Indeed, the disastrous way in which life has evolved
is made plain when it is held that truly: "... the rule of human beings
over the animals can only be a rule of peace, without any ' power over
life and death.' The role which human beings are meant to play is the
role of a 'justice of the peace [ Friedensrichtersl' " (p29-30). It is
puzzling though that in a world where every creature is presumably
naturally a vegetarian, that the peace needs to be kept. Perhaps there
will be stiff competition for resources, and who is to say that some
creatures will not develop a taste (as has obviously happened), for the
abundance of animal food moving around?
The mystification of mortality in the world is evident on page sixty
eight of God in Creation. Nature has "fallen victim" to transience and
death. This seems to speak of a carelessness in God's activity. I quote
the following passage in order to show the way in which Moltmann combines
incompatible elements:
'Because in human beings faith brings liberation from the closed-in
isolation which is sin, in nature too the isolation of the life
systems can be seen as their 'bondage' to transience, and 'openness'
is recognizably their living character. The human being who is closed
in upon himself finds his correspondence in the nature that is sealed
off and therefore dies. The person who has been opened up for a new
hope for life finds his correspondence in the nature which has been
thrown open for its own future. In human beings this new orientation
is to be apprehended in hope; in nature it can be identified as
unrest, as a drive and thrust towards higher complexity and a more
prodigal fulness of life." (GC p69)
Taking death as the paradigm for failure and meaninglessness, which
Moltmann generally seems to do, this great failure is nevertheless, as I
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shall argue shortly, an inescapable part of the cycles of nature. For
Moltrnann it appears that death is countered by the drive to higher
complexity, but perhaps most scientists would argue that it is the
'drive' to higher complexity which involves transience. Interestingly a
counter to the theory of evolution as driving upwards to some pre¬
ordained higher types, and to ever greater variety has come in the recent
book on the Burgess Shale, 'Wonderful Life', by Stephen Gould, Hutchinson
5
Radius, 1989. Who knows how many antecedents have been involved in the
'drive' towards Moltmann himself? Multitudes certainly. He kicks away the
ladder by which his possibility has been maintained, and without which,
for evolutionary reasons, it is otherwise impossible to conceive (except
perhaps that laws of heredity and chromosomal variance are illusions, and
that we could all be completely different - except God decides to match
us to our forbears, to give an appearance of heredity). Death is seen so
often as purely negative (e.g., "The unredeemed character of the body
which believers sense in themselves corresponds to the tragedy of the
non-human creation, which is subject to futility. Nature has fallen
victim to transience and death": GC p68>. If it is so viewed, then the
traditional idea that it is a consequence of sin, is attractive. For
otherwise, how does one reconcile the world as it is with the God who
creates? This would be an impossible position, for holding that death is
a key component in producing unjustifiable evils, and perhaps one itself,
is not a tenable option while we believe that God is wholly good. But
imagining too that we would exist without transience in nature is
incompatible with evolutionary research. Then there is the old problem
that however there comes to be unjustifiable evil, this cannot be
permitted to come to be by a wholly good God.
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I move now to a key passage (key, where responsibility for suffering in
Moltmann's theology is concerned), which introduces a number of arguable
confusions in this doctrine of creation. First, creation out of nothing
is described as without any prior conditions ("we can see initial
creation as the divine creation that is without any prior conditions:
creatio ex nihilo" GC p90>. Then we move to "creation in history", which
is ". . . the laborious creation of salvation out of the overcoming of
disaster" (ibid). Following this is the "eschatological creation", seen
as arising from the vanquishing of Nothingness: sin and death (ibid).
God overcomes the Nothingness "which lies heavy over sin and death"
(ibid). This raises the question is God really free from any
preconditions? If so, if he did not have to create a God-forsaken
primordial space, why did he do so. Consider the following statement from
God in Creation:
'If God creates his creation out of nothing, if he affirms it and is
faithful to it in spite of sin, and if he desires its salvation, then
in the sending and surrender of his own Son he exposes himself to
the annihilating Nothingness, so that he may overcome it in himself
and through himself, and in that way give his creation existence,
salvation and liberty.... by surrendering him to hell, the eternal God
enters the Nothingness out of which he created the world. God enters
that 'primordial space' which he himself conceded through his initial
self-limitation... By entering into the God-forsakenness of sin and
death (which is Nothingness), God overcomes it and makes it part of
his eternal life: 'If I make my bed in hell, thou art there' (ps.
139.8)." (GC p91)
Immediately following is a passage I cited in chapter three, where
Moltmann addresses the problem of Auschwitz and Hiroshima. If it is true
that there is a negative that cannot be turned to any good, then Moltmann
is back in the position that there is no justification for having created
a world where such negatives arise. But as I have argued, whether God was
truly free of all prior conditions or not, his being wholly good would
prevent him creating such a world. It can seem as if the commitment to
understanding goods and evils as somehow balanced so that the latter are
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justified by the worth of the former, is extremely callous. And in the
way Moltmann has spoken of all who suffer as being innocent, it appears
that he is one of those who is able to reject the idea of some suffering
as justified in the sense of 'just deserts', just as he is able to
dismiss any slick theodicy justification of the sufferings of the victims
of moral or natural evil; people or animals who have in no way 'deserved'
their experience. It seems as if Moltmann is dispensing altogether with
the idea that goods and evils can be balanced and productively inter¬
connected. But as previously suggested this threatens the view that the
world is a bizarre affair, where what goods are experienced are
completely isolated from the general conditions which are their pre¬
condition, and the pre-conditions of evil and suffering. One cannot live
as an evolved being, and not die.
There is no quiet village with its peaceful church, in the lee of a
mountain, which is not at the same time the consequence of processes of
climate and earth-forming, of evolution, which have killed multitudes,
extinguished species. If the evil is to be neatly driven into a corner,
and excoriated, then the talk that we should not ignore the goods with
which God has blessed this finite life, should be seen as dishonest. If
they are good, they are still inextricably connected with the bad. If
death and suffering is considered unjustifiable, then the good, the
obverse for which, indeed its sine qua non, is the possibility of
destruction, should be re-assesed. Calling it truly good would be like
relishing the tonic effect of the sun in the middle of drought and
famine. If there is no connection between possibilities for good and
freedom and the occurrence of natural and moral evil, then we have to ask
why God has made a world where there is such evil. The evil there is
cannot contribute anything, its existence is unrelated to the
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possibilities for good, and having free will: in other words, it is
meaningless suffering gratuitously inflicted by God, Where however, we
hold that people are free, and the world is such that great and unflawed
good will come from it, and that suffering or its possibility is not some
alien and unrelated aspect of life, then the creative activity of God
becomes more intelligible. Of course, some will argue that if God really
was wholly good, then he could have created beings who would have been
free and never chosen to do wrong. But where we maintain that people are
free in crucial respects, and that this evidently leads to acts of evil
which God must have seen the possibility of, given the evolutionary
environment, then to say that the death of a single innocent child shows
that the almighty kindly God does not exist, because it is a radically
unjustifiable thing which has happened, does no good to the Christian
case. What kind of God does exist? Perhaps one who is almighty and
amoral, or who is incompetent but kindly. Given that the death of this
child is intimately connected with the possibility for good or evil
action by human beings, their fate has to be seen as linked with
possibilities for good. For it not to wholly negate the good, as
superficial, and induce a state of mind which says enjoy all the things
you can, because you may die slowly you know not when; 'every dog has its
day'; or the poverty of so many and the wealth of the few is just the
luck of the draw, requires that the world be seen, in its good and bad
aspects as a field of moral endeavour, and one in which every life and
fate is tied to an understanding of this fact. Even if God weeps in agony
over the fate of one child, as he should, it cannot be the anguish of the
parent who says, 'why did I ever bring this child into the world with its
conflicts? Everything is pointless: I should have known what might
happen'.
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God has brought everybody into the world, with all its and their
possibilities for good and evil. Arguably the only option for the God who
is not to be seen as mistaken, but rather as wholly good and wise, is
that the connections serve some purpose such that ultimately, for each
and every individual, their life, freedom, finitude, and suffering
cannot be written off as a regrettable and tragic incident that had
better never been: the latter judgement being what I believe to be
involved in the idea that individuals in this world as an organic whole,
suffer unjustifiably. If they had truly better never been, in the freedom
and potentiality they experienced, then God is willing to create
individuals, peoples, and species even, whose existence in all its wealth
is not enough to counterbalance evils which are after all, derived from
the same ground of possibilities as gives freedom, life, sentience. To
say something is unjustified, is to make a judgement. It must be an
ultimately fatal judgement in a Christian theology. For suffering is not
merely questioned as justified or not in the sense of 'did I deserve
that?', but in the light of the ground of its possibility as also the
possibility for what are worthwhile goods, such as freedom, compassion,
perhaps even sacrifice. I arn not actually going to defend these latter
arguments, but I think they are the arguments which have to be pursued if
suffering is not to be seen as a purely gratuitous element of life in the
world of the God who is wholly good.
There is a related argument which says that it is best to leave evils
unexplained, and outwith the sphere of justificatory talk. For to explain
is to justify, to show interconnections and reasons why something should
be one way and not another. However, whilst no-one would pretend to
explain all the detailed inter—connections which make up even a short
span of existence, behaviour and experience, it is possible to argue that
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it is necessary that there be intei—connectedness between happenings in
ways such that what has happened, even if we cannot detail it, is
intelligible to God, For if God is unable to comprehend the working of
his creation, then he cannot claim to have created a world which in
fundamental ways expresses his love: he will have no knowledge that
indicates that the way the world will go is any different from the way a
world created by a cruel God might go. Considering that this God will be
wholly good, it would be difficult to accept that he might create a world
where individuals were destroyed, with lives which could not ever justify
their fates: I mean a kind of 'hard' justification, where the tragedy
stands, yet the life lived, the life potential, and the freedom of action
which is shared by victim and aggressor is somehow more than its equal.
If we grant that this is so, then our leaving evil and suffering
unexplained is not to say that it is ultimately inexplicable. A world
whose course is truly inexplicable in terms of the relation of the
experiences of its inhabitants to its creation by a wholly good God is a
world which gives no possible indication that it has been created by such
a God. As I have argued, it will be a sign that a wholly good God could
not have made it, if he creates as an expression of his goodness, and if
that term is intended to signify anything in particular.
Perhaps inexplicability of good and evil expresses the divine goodness
and wisdom. But if that is held so, no-one is entitled to say that an
evil is unjustifiable. How do they know? And if we take inexplicability
seriously, we could never know if any particular good was justified
either - in the sense that it is what we expect of God who is always
wholly good, and who graciously and constantly relates to his people. Why
something perceived as good is seen as of God, and not as the prelude to
some cruel (inexplicable) 'twist of fate', if this phrase is permissible,
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could not be made clear, since the common ground of possibilities for
good and evil is dissolved away in the attempt to forego any balancing
and inter-connectedness; such as might occur in the free will defence, or
visions of responsibility, compassion, and a sense of the sometimes
melancholy worth of radical finitude. In other words, a free decision to
love, or an active sympathy, precisely as free and not mechanical, seen
as good and related to the graciousness of God, loses its value if we
fail to recognise that an essential part of this value comes from its
status as free. If we understand that the flip side as it were, is the
possibility of evil, then it has to be recognised that the genuine good
requires this as possibility, and in the divine mind the relatedness is
comprehended. I do not think I have to provide a table of some kind to
show strongly that if some evils are seen as wholly unjustifiable in the
deepest sense, then God is 'free' with lives other than his own, and
either wicked or incompetent.
Moltmann enquires:
'Does the resurrection of the crucified Christ also bring the
Nothingness of world history into the light of the resurrection? Here
the experiences of Auschwitz and Hiroshima raise questions for which
no answers are endurable, because they are fundamentally protests."
(GC p91)
Protests against what? It seems as if Moltmann is protesting about the
bullets, gases, the technology and human implementation of destruction,
without viewing them in the context of a cruel world, one which he
himself sees as pervaded by Nothingness. Ultimate responsibility for such
a world lies with God. The discussion above, shows, I hope, how the idea
that God's creation is divinely intelligible will mean that we can trust
that the ground of possibilities which includes potential for good and
horrendous action is one which is divinely comprehended. Therefore,
there is some ultimate, if 'hard' justification for this ground; 'hard'
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since the ways things are undoubtedly results in much suffering which
cannot be tied to any abuse of responsibility on the part of the victims.
I take it that the questions raised by genocides, or even the fate of
individuals, are those covered in the theodicy debate. They take
particular forms, and if they are protests, they are protests against God
for particular reasons. They are not incoherent, unarticulated, and
undemanding, but rather, specific (certainly Moltmann acknowledges that
they are questions, not just exclamations).
I might expect no answer to my protest if reduced to shouting and crying
in rage, or mumbling grief-stricken at the fire-ringed cone of a volcano
that has just destroyed my village. If I ask some fundamental questions
of the God who is said to have created the world in which there are such
volcanoes, I would expect something more than a puff of smoke, a rumble,
and my personal knowledge that some day the village can be rebuilt (that
is, I would accept that there is some higher purpose; or attempt to
propitiate the cunning and blood-thirsty volcano; or accept that there is
no meaning, and that I was unlucky to live there). It is possible for
people to protest at a regime, and then realise that there is no need to
accept the state of affairs. One might protest in favour of a purer
dictatorship of the proletariat, only to discover that things can become
much clearer if one turns in an entirely different direction. This is an
old problem in Moltmann. If one can ask proper questions, and expect
answers, or feel that the answer should really be of a certain kind, then
the idea that there can be no answer is unsatisfactory. Moltmann says:
"Belief in the resurrection looks towards God at the very point where
humanly speaking there is nothing to hope for and nothing to be done" (GC
p92). But why is there this situation when God is wholly good, and
creates without pre-conditions? And why should one believe and trust in
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God when there is nothing to support the reasonableness of this move;
indeed a lot against it? Moltmann also writes: "How should the Creatoi—
out-of-nothing be diverted from his intention and his love through any
devastations I Vernichtungenl in what he has created?" (GC p93) God
evidently has a robust attitude to suffering. If it becomes clear that
the 'presence* of Nothingness has a major role to play in exacerbating
human isolation to the point of massive and unjustifiable annihilations,
then the issue of responsibility becomes more than generator of
transient protest, and one of the existence of the wholly good God. I
will now look at chapter seven, as it projects a certain ambivalence
towards transience and mortality. The chapter deals with the question
"Why is Creation a Dual World?" It is held that a world created by God
cannot be one which "... revolveEsl within itself, either in absolute or
in relative completeness and self-sufficiency" (GC pl63).
Earth has its foundations outside itself, in God. And "In this sense it
is an ' open system' . We call the determined side of this system 'earth' ,
the undetermined side 'heaven'" (GC pl63>. There is a strange dichotomy
evident here. Earth has its determined nature, and its longed for
openness lies outside itself. This strongly suggests that there has to be
some rationale behind this state of affairs, for arguably, the less
reason there is to think that earth might be its own justification, the
more justification this set-up requires, especially in the light of the
great suffering that occurs in this 'closed' world. Still, the
relationship is presented in positive terms: ". . . we can call heaven the
relative transcendence of earth, and earth the relative immanence of
heaven" (ibid). Further clarification of the distinctions comes with the
words: "If 'things visible' means the finite world, then 'things
invisible' means the relatively infinite world. Men and women are God's
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finite and mortal creatures. Angels are God's finite but immortal
creatures" (ibid). Apparently the eschatological determination of the
world towards openness means the attainment of this latter state,
although Moltmann does not commit himself to a specific description of
what this might be: "heaven means God's potentiality for the earth, which
is unknowable and indefinable but defining" (GC p!65). What would the
world be without this potentiality? "It would be a world which is not
open 'upwards', or open for God; it would be a world without this
qualitative transcendence. A world like this would be a closed system,
resting and revolving within itself" (GC pl63).
Of the world that exists, it is said in a morally negative sense (i.e. ,
not just because God is infinite), "God's potentialities are not
congruent with, or absorbed by, the realities and potentialities of the
earth" (GC pl65).^ With the earth affected by Nothingness it certainly
seems to require an up-grade in potentiality. And "... when 'heaven
opens', this means that God's energies and potentialities appear in the
visible world... What was impossible before will then become possible...
A future will be opened which was hitherto closed and inaccessible" (GC
pl72). Can this overall situation (where there is great suffering on
earth) be reconciled with what Moltmann has said shortly before:
'By determining that he will be the Creator of this world, God
decides out of the whole wealth of his potentialities in favour of
the potentialities which are creative, and against those that are
destructive... There is no 'dark side' to God - no side where he could
also be conceived of as the destroyer of his creation and of his own
being as creator." (GC pi68)
Problematically, it is stated in the paragraph following this that (some
of this I have already cited):
'Evil is the perversion of good, the annihilation of what exists, the
negation of the affirmation of life. On the level of the life
processes, perversions of this kind continually occur - perversions of
constructive potentialities into destructive ones. On the human level
they make themselves evident as processes of separation - sin; and
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isolation - death. There are apparently also perversions of the same
kind in the sphere of the potencies which are intended to make the
life process possible. These then hinder and destroy those life
processes. Because these are forces which do not belong to the human
sphere but which yet have a destructive effect on that sphere, we
talk about demonic or satanic forces.... It is these dimensions,
transcending human beings and the earth, that are meant by the
symbols of 'the fall of the angels' and 'the rule of Satan'." (GC pi69)
Are these satanic forces transcending the human sphere, sufficient to
unleash the forces of Nothingness? If they are, even indirectly, through
promoting the insecurity and isolation of human beings, then Moltmann is
arguably in some trouble. Creation would have potential for evil beyond
human control, the consequences of which in the human sphere are
unjustifiable. Is the God who permits such satanic forces to pervert the
fundamental processes of life, and intrude on the existence of finite
fragile beings, righteous? Arguably not. What is additionally confusing
is that Moltmann sees heaven as being transcended (GC pl83), adding to
the problems of the the dichotomy I referred to above. That is, firstly,
the kind of place the earth apparently really ought to be, is a realm of
being which is already open for God to create, and which he will have to
create anyway, since it is not in the potentiality of the earth as it was
created to evolve to such a condition. Now, heaven stands for earth's
eschatological possibilities (GC pl32). But heaven itself, if we are to
understand it realistically, is a place of sadness. It is said: ". . .
heaven itself weeps over an earth of blood and tears" (GC p!83). And:
"It is not only earth that requires a new creation, tormented as it is by
suffering and pain and crying and death. Heaven requires a new creation
too" (ibid). The amount of suffering and the need for radical change is
disquieting. Even that which represents earths eschatological
possibilities requires transformation. Earth is created without
destructive potentialities, but is racked by unjustifiable suffering
through the operation of satanic forces and intrusion of the power of
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Nothingness, the perversion of basic life processes, and human
isolation. To start with, heaven is earth transcended, as earth is heaven
immanent. Heaven suffers from earth's suffering. Finally, it seems that
heaven is transformed, for it is in fact a kind of intermediate staging
post for the souls of the dead, who are not redeemed until a new heaven
appears, an event which frees them from their suffering at the fate of
the earth (ibid).
We have an interesting duality. First the duality of heaven and earth as
they initially stand in immanent/transcendent relationship. It could be
argued that the heaven is already flawed if earth is its devastated
immanence. However that may be, it certainly becomes contaminated by the
suffering of its immanent realisation. There also seems to be this wider
duality. For the real heaven seems to be the one which is the first
heaven itself transcended.
Moltmann argues that heaven contains the Ideas which are instantiated in
the world, but that God loves this reality more than the archetypes (GC
pl67>. The crucial question is, what if the concrete realisations of
these divine ideas suffer extremely concretely, unjustifiably, and in a
world from the first characterised by a predisposition to engender such
suffering? If it were held that there was a justification for the evil
that occurs, then the notion that heaven provides an horizon towards
which creation moves, would be more plausible. But that there is no
justification, and that the horizon is darkened by the suffering of
earth, requiring a complete renewal of earth and horizon, is highly
problematic. First, because associate with the claim that there is
unjustifiable evil, arguably incompatible with the idea that God is in
fact wholly good and perfectly just. Second, because if earth is the
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immanence of heaven, then heaven must contain many dark and problematic
ideas. Blake put a variation of this issue:
Tyger Tyger, burning bright,
In the forests of the night;
What immortal hand or eye,
Could frame they fearful symmetry?
In what distant deeps or skies,
Burnt the fire of thine eyes?
On what wings dare he aspire?
What the hand, dare seize the fire?
And what shoulder, & what art,
Could twist the sinews of thy heart?
And when thy heart began to beat,
What dread hand? & what dread feet?
What the hammer? what the chain,
In what furnace was thy brain?
What the anvil? What dread grasp,
Dare its deadly terrors clasp?
When the stars threw down their spears
And water'd heaven with their tears:
Did he smile his work to see?
Did he who made the Lamb make thee?
Tyger Tyger burning bright,
In the forests of the night;
What immortal hand or eye,
Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?
(Willam Blake: Songs of Innocence and Experience
No.42 'The Tyger': OUP 1970)
I now move to our last discussion of material in God in Creation.
dealing as it does with evolution (chapter eight "The Evolution of
Creation"). I think I have shown the reasons why I think that Moltmann
cannot dismiss theodicy, describe many evils as unjustifiable. Can
Moltmann's theology stand as coherent when the justification of suffering
is denounced because it is so horrible as to be beyond rationalisation,
and also portrayed as practically inescapable for all creatures who exist
in the world God decided to make: where God is righteous in the sense
that reconciling suffering with his standards of justice and love is an
impossible task? I do not think so. Suprisingly though, In his attitudes
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to evolution, Moltmann now shows an ability to minimise the suffering
inherent in its nature. If evolution is an abundant process which
maintains life, and is only corrupted by satanic forces, Nothingness, and
human isolation, then perhaps the transience and suffering of life, so
reviled by Moltmann, will not be so much of a problem (though there is
always the fundamental issue of the implications for belief in a wholly
good God of saying that even the smallest amount of suffering is
ultimately unjustifiable). But if Moltmann shows an optimistic and even
naive view of the world and its fundamental processes, he is perhaps
obscuring the fact that the world God has made, and the way he has made
it, is quite capable of generating an amount of suffering which would,
without any human sinfulness staining an original purity, be more than
enough to satisfy his criteria of unjustifiable suffering.
In his account of creation it is noted how, "So that they may reproduce
themselves, human beings are given bi-sexuality and fertility. On this
the Creator confers his blessing: 'be fruitful and multiply' (Gen. 1.28)"
(GC pl88). Transience is however noted to be a "curse" (GC pl89). It
seems to many that transience is indeed the fate of any life form, but
always has been. It appears as a pre-condition of anything's having
developed to a level of complexity, and it would be difficult to imagine
a world where all animal, bird, fish, and insect ancestors are alive.
Immortality is not an intelligible, or workable 'strategy', for any
species in finite world. Clearly a limited life-span and the ability to
reproduce have been the key techniques for succesful organic existence
on this planet.
Moltmann sees that human beings wish to reproduce themselves, and that
God blesses this (see also GC p247). The following argument follows the
315
implications of Moltrnann's position closely. We must first accept that
however positive Moltmann sounds about evolution, he is strongly
committed to the belief that death is a phenomenon which stands in
contradiction to God's righteousness. Death was not something, we can
gather, which characterised the world of life from the beginning; it is a
consequence of sin. If this is to be at all a defensible position, we
must say that human beings were responsible beings when they sinned, and
thus took on the burden of death. To push death back into the mists of
pre-sentience, to some primitive transgression, only makes the idea of
universal mortality as the result of mis-behaviour more morally repulsive
than some would argue it already is. The other components of the case are
Moltmann's welcoming affirmation of the primordial divine wish that human
beings should multiply, and the apparent acceptance of evolutioniary time
scales and processes. One can now follow through with a necessary
reductio ad absurdum.
It takes only a simple calculation to show that starting with a balanced
population of 1000 immortal but fertile individuals in the stage before
full sentience and responsibility could be credited, granting the
generous concession that each couple has only two children every fifty
years, that in a mere 1750 years the population would have reached 8601
billion. This is excluding the problem of immortal mice, dogs, midges, or
trees. I think that Moltmann gives a wholly unacceptable account of one
of the key features of creation. His vision has several problems. If we
were intended to be immortal and fertile, then an incredible amount of
suffering would have occurred. It is hard to see how anything complex
could have evolved in the first place, as tendencies to natural selection
would be swamped. Over-population would stretch natural resources to
breaking point. In other words, these factors would make the evolved
existence of highly developed and at all culpable human beings
impossible.
We are forced to accept the fact that death is an unavoidable feature of
life on earth. It cannot be made our responsibility, Responsibility lies
with God. We cannot say that God abhors what he himself has directly
brought to be. But given his optimistic view of evolution as apparently
not requiring transience in the form of annihilation, Moltmann is able to
write:
"... we can make the generalization that the more a life system is
capable of bearing strain, the stronger and more capable of survival
it shows itself to be. It absorbs hostile impulses and assimilates
them productively, without destroying the enemy or itself. In so
doing, it itself becomes richer and more flexible. For the more an
open life system is able to suffer, the more it is able to learn."
(GC p210)
One could perhaps respond to this with the fate of the dinosaurs.5 The
unreality of this account of life is manifested in the attitude to food
consumption. Using the Genesis accounts, Moltmann, as I have already
noted, genuinely concludes that human diet is to be exclusively
vegetarian. And "The beasts are also to eat only vegetarian food" (GC
p224). Clearly a further catastrophe has happened in the course of
realising the intention in creating. The perverted development of the
world, including plants that eat flesh, and mass extinctions, speaks of
great negligence on the part of God. Animals are eaten by people. Animals
also eat each other. Dietary catastrophe. One might also ask on what
moral grounds it is forbidden to eat krill or worms, but acceptable for
animals to chew the bark off, and kill, an ancient and beautiful tree.
Moltmann's account of evolution, over and above the general problems
associated with holding that evil is unjustifiable, adds to his
difficulties. For I suppose it is possible that theodicists might agree
that there are some evils which could be ultimately unjustifiable. The
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only problem is, that if they are real possibilities in this world, God
may well be considered a careless and flawed God. Strangely, Moltmann
actually gives an account of how such unjustifiable suffering has to be
accepted as a divine responsibility. Perhaps such suffering, if it were
entirely mysterious, out of God's hands, would allow a genuine hope for
an eschatological homecoming as the guests of the God who is wholly good
(though such a God would not be that of Christian faith). I think that if
we follow Moltmann*s particular analysis, there is clear evidence that
God has to be the instigator and responsible agent behind much, and
indirectly, all, of the unjust suffering that is held to exist. In this
sense, answers to the theodicy protests are available, and in regard to
this theology at least, they are arguably fatal to the idea that God is
wholly good.
I want to end by looking very briefly at a statement in chapter three of
God in Creation. It goes to the heart of the evolutionary problem.
Moltmann first makes an assertion which must eventually call into
question his belief that our mortality is evil, a consequence of sin, and
a human responsibility: "In physical terms, believers are bound together
in a common destiny with the whole world and all earthly creatures. So
what they experience in their own body applies to all other created
things" (GC p68). Yet there is also a desire to isolate the cause of the
human condition: "Nature has fallen victim to transience and death. It
has not fallen through its own sin, like human beings... a sadness lies
over nature which is the expression of its tragic fate and its messianic
yearning. It is enslaved and wishes to be free..." (ibid). But it is
necessary to say that humanity exists because of transience, and not
despite it. If mortality has a moral origin, then the death of a single
innocent, conceived of as the now biologically determined fate of
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individuals who cannot be culpable for this fact, and as utterly
unjustifiable in Moltrnann's own thought, is arguably sufficient to
topple God. Further though, if the accidental or humanly pre-rneditated
death of an innocent is unjustifiable, so is the universal taking away of
life by the Creator - if Moltmann wishes to retain his valuation of the
moral enormity of death and dying, but opt for a more conventional notion
of evolution and mortality. The fact that it seems likely that God
intended that human beings should die, will of course mean that
justificatory arguments be taken seriously. There is nothing divinely
unintended in the congenital deformity or the defective blood cell: long
before human beings could be themselves culpable, the Creator was alone
responsible. In cases of human responsibility it is normal to offer
compensation (for that which cannot be compensated for). With God an
ultimate justification may arguably be expected, or understood to exist,
even if as yet not explicable.
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CHAPTER NINE
There are three areas which I wish to discuss in thus chapter. The first
is the openness of Moltraann's theology to critical analysis. There are, I
think, two aspects to this question. [ 1] The issue of the general
immunity of theological concepts to precise definition and rational
'coercion'. [21 The individual style of Moltmann's theologising; if
Moltmann is a theologian who creates pictures or images, rather than a
philosophical theologian, is he unfairly treated when subjected to
'rational critique' and notions of conceptual coherence? The second area
of discussion is the issue of right and wrong belief. Is it possible,
following D Z Phillips, that we can exempt a believer from critique which
sees certain things as impermissible and leading to irrational belief,
incoherent stances, to positions which must be 'corrected' if they are
not to be wrongly, mistakenly held? If this is so, then Moltmann is
neither 'right' nor 'wrong' in his approach to the phenomenon of evil. He
is simply entitled to his ' view of things' . This brings us to the third
area of concern. The so-called principle of contradiction is a vital
element in judgement and so critical evaluation. Is there though, a key
level of contradiction in Moltmann which is resolved by an underlying
Hegelian dialectic?
The way in which it can be argued that the language theologians use has
to be seen as referring to some definable values or characteristics of
human existence if it is to convey meaning, is a matter I have already
discussed at some length. An apophatic theology will arguably only allow
us to conclude that "God" is either fundamentally un-related to the world
and its possibilities, or that if he is related, it is in an entirely
incomprehensible fashion. There will of course be no way of deciding
between these two options. To be able to say nothing about "God" as love
or as just gives no indicator of what God is like. God may destroy one
universe as he creates another (although how we reach the stage of saying
he creates I am not sure). God could be evil. But is it possible to apply
such a concept to God, or negate this characterisation? It would be after
all impossible to say that God is love, or is wholly good. When we talk
about God in the Christian context, we do so with the belief that God is
love, that we can say crucial things about what this love is like.
Holding this does not permit us to say that being love is accidental to
God in the way that our uncle1 s boiling an egg once a week could be to
him. The entailments of the proposition God is love are not equivalent
to those of the statement that our uncle boils an egg once, or even twice
a week. It might be said in response that God is love, but is a 1 lot'
more besides, just as our uncle is hardly likely to be substantially
defined as an individual who boils an egg. Clearly nevertheless, boiling
an egg may or may not preclude a whole host of distinctive and defining
features about one's uncle. He could be an egg scientist, a rneat-eater or
a vegetarian; a mass-murderer, or a pacifist - but being wholly good and
perfectly loving, is incompatible with being wicked, irresponsible -
responsible for evils irreconcilable with perfect goodness. In the
theodicy debate, it is this issue which counts.
Are we going to allow that an expression such as 'God is love' is
grounded in the fact that love can be characterised as such and such? Are
we going to say that these expressions, defined and re-defined in the
light of scripture and experience, allow us to reach conclusions as to
roughly the kind of actions in which love is exemplified? If we say no,
we have no way of saying that any evil is incompatible with God's being
wholly loving and good, because we cannot say what God's being good
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means. Wanting to say moral things of God, understanding that God reveals
such things to us, requires a certain limiting of the use of a word. If
we can very roughly characterise this love, look at the life and death of
Jesus, we arguably cannot say that God's love is distinct (if not easy
or cheap), alive even in the most awful circumstances; that God is love -
but hold that this love rides on a ' dark side' . We either say God is
love, and is wholly good, or say nothing of divinity and goodness and
justice as understood in Christianity. God cannot be part love, wholly
good only in certain respects.
I have referred in passing to Richard Swinburne. I do not want to repeat
in detail the kinds of arguments looked at previously, and I think it
reasonable to accept that Christian belief involves propositions which
are required to be coherent: that is, that they are such that we could
suppose them to be true. This is not the same as holding that
Christianity consists of sets of propositions. Nevertheless propositions,
and our ability to make them about God and his relationship to his earth
are crucial. They are statements about the divine love; human love, human
failing; hope; suffering; the world and its future with God, and so on. I
would argue that there is no section of Moltmann's theology which does
not display and presuppose a number of beliefs about what God is like, or
not like, what God is going to do, has done, and so forth. Shortly I will
be looking at the possibility that Moltmann theologises in a special way
which puts him beyond assessment of the coherence of beliefs in his
theology - a position which I will disagree with. For the meanwhile, I
am assuming that at least some of his theology falls under the general
heading of theology which is propositional, and thus liable to assessment
on criteria of the kind Swinburne defends. I would hope that this
contention is supported by the survey of texts in earlier chapters, and
322
the following is a reminder of the kind of discussions that Moltmann
engages in. In God in Creation, he makes these statements:
if... we understand the universe itself as involved in an
irreversible history, and in the course of evolution, then we are
interpreting it as an open system. In this case an entropy may be
demonstrable in individual systems and processes, but it does not
apply to the whole. We must then, however, assume that the universe
itself has a transcendent encompassing milieu, with which it is in
communication, and a transcendent future into which it is evolving."
<GC p204)
He also writes:
"As a system aligned towards growing communication, we must also
view the world as an anticipatory system. As communication towards
every side grows, so too does the scope for anticipation in the
realms of possibility. The open system of the world is characterised
by self-transcendence, both in individual cases and as a whole. It
thrusts beyond itself because, by virtue of its imbalance, it cannot
apparently 'tarry' in any given condition, this permanent self-
transcendence points towards the forecourt of an inviting and guiding
transcendence, and it is only in this forecourt that the self-
transcendence is possible... In saying this we are interpreting the
universe as the self-transcending totality of a diversity of
communicating, individual open systems. All individual systems of
matter and life, and all their complexes of communication as a whole
exist into a transcendence and subsist out of that transcendence."
And:
"If we call this transcendence of the world 'God' we can then
tentatively say: The world in its different parts and as a whole is a
system open to God. God is its extra-worldly encompassing milieu,
from which, and in which, it lives. God is its extra-worldly forecourt,
into which it is evolving. God is the origin of the new possibilities
out of which its realities are won." (GC p206>
Moltmann adds at the foot of this section: "But of course any such
theological statements based on scientific hypothesis can only be working
sketches [ Entwurfel; they can never be dogmas" (ibid). However, whether
or not these kinds of statement can ever be dogmas, they are
propositional and they have entailments. The first passage can be viewed
as follows. The first proposition is that the universe can be seen as
having an irreversible history, as evolving. The second proposition is
that it is thus an open system. The third proposition (the world is not
as a whole subject to entropy) is I think closely related to the first
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two. If the world is complex, ultimately evolving into higher complexity
and self-transcendence, it cannot be degenerating into overall entropy,
as this implies increasing disorder. Of the first two propositions, as
Moltmann seems to understand them, you could not affirm the one and deny
the other. That is, the one entails the other, which is more than simply
to say that they are compatible. An open system, for Moltmann, is one
open to God, to self-transcendence into the guiding transcendence of God.
An evolving universe, as opposed to one with a reversible history and a
degenerative dynamic, or a static reality, is one which accords with
this belief, in fact presupposes it.
Most importantly, I think that Moltmann is operating with concepts that
at the level of dogma or core belief cannot be substantially changed
without renouncing Christianity. Whether or not we are ever driven to
drop these beliefs because they are flatly incompatible with what science
tells us, or they preside more or less intact over ever changing
scientific world views, and are not to be thought of as open to change
themselves, they have entailments and conditions of coherence. This is
the crucial point. I will discuss this issue further in the following
section, where it is naturally a key factor in assessing the
possibilities for a privileged kind of talk in Moltmann's theology which
would have an effect on our view of his handling of the problem of evil.
The second issue in the question of the openness of Moltmann1 s theology
to critical analysis involves the problem of whether or not he is
constructing special theological pictures or images, which would mark his
out from other more conventional reflections on the problem of evil - and
the extent to which, if he were, this would invalidate discussion of the
kind characteristic of the theodicy debate. W T Mitchell's outline of a
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GRAPHIC OPTICAL PERCEPTUAL MENTAL VERBAL
pictures mirrors sense data dreams metaphors
statues projections "species" memories descriptions
designs appearances ideas
fantasmata
It is evident that if we accept that Mitchell gives a more or less
comprehensive outline of the major references of the term image, any
single definition of image is going to be difficult unless we then
proceed to make some fairly elaborate differentiations. Mitchell (whose
book is an exploration of 'iconophobia' and 'iconophilia' ), writes: "We
speak of pictures, statues, poetical illusions, maps, diagrams, dreams,
hallucinations, spectacles, projections, poems, patterns, memories, and
even ideas as images, and the sheer diversity of the list would seem to
make any systematic, unified understanding impossible" (op. cit. p9). I
believe that the issue of image or picture as it relates to Moltmann does
not require an investigation which would be of quite such breadth.
Pictures (graphic), statues, constructions, or designs, do not appear (as
reproductions) in his theology. Neither does he present his theology by
means of extensive verbal reference to the representations and
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expressions of art; there is a only brief reference to the Isenheim
crucifixion. It might be said that if ideas are in some way images, then
his theology is constituted by a kind of imagery, however far from being
a work of graphic art, or reliant on detailed description or grounded on
metaphor. Still, I do not think that we need to pursue this line far. It
can be seen that however we come to have our concepts of goodness,
justice, evil, the actual explication and inter-relation of these
concepts has to recognise certain principles or universal practices: it
needs to maintain coherence. Propositions have entailments, and if we
wish to be generally intelligible, this cannot be ignored. Moltmann
sketches with reference to certain theological 'truths' as absolutely
indispensable, inescapable rules of theological perspective, such as God
is love, wholly good, and so on. The possibilities of his opening up a
dimension of image or picture which contradicts what is communicated in
'propositional' theology, or enlarges the theological horizon to the
extent that what is propositionaly encompassed becomes relativised, non-
axiomatic for Christian belief, are therefore limited.
In exploring what might constitute a privileged verbal image, we can ask
the following question. If one makes out a theology which has beliefs at
its heart which as beliefs can be rendered propositionally (there is no
demotion of non-verbal communication and practice intended here), a
theology which is accessible and not evidently incoherent, can I claim
that in a privileged area I may contradict or marginalise what is made
clear or central in a "rationally accessible" area? Presumably what makes
the privileged verbal image or theological 'picture' exempt from critical
analysis of the kind found in theodicy discussion is that it does not
operate in the same way as propositional theology. It can neither be held
to affirm, complement, or deny the non-privileged text in the usual ways.
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This raises a problem. If we cannot legitimately infer that the
privileged image either affirms, complements, or denies the propositional
theology which surrounds it, what is the cognitive or emotional content
or potential of this verbal 'picture'? Surely there must be some? If it
somehow tells us something very significant about God, the kind of thing
which would affect our view of the theodicy question, there must be some
way to demarcate this approximately, or come to some kind of public
understanding.
If we say that the 'image' conveys something about God's love, or the
nature of suffering (which it must do if it is to relate to the Christian
theodicy debate), then we are setting it firmly in a public theological
world, even if we are trying to add something new. Admittedly this begs
the question of what does the image 'image forth' in its own right that
is Christian? However, I do not know what this could be if it could not
be rendered propositionally in some way and thus open to criticism and
comparison. A privileged dimension of verbal theological picture
making, however exactly we are to conceive of this (and I cannot find
anything in Moltmann's work which would suggest what it might be), is a
human creation, although it will of course be 'saying' something about a
non-human agent. But unless it is conveying nothing to us about God,
except that nothing can be said excepting this condition that nothing can
be said, it will be saying something about the God who in Christian
belief, and apparently to Moltmann, is love, who is just, who creates
and forgives out of boundless grace, or referring to such a God. It has
to be enquired if the fact that it what it conveys cannot be rendered
into some propositional forms such as 'God is love', or 'God is not
evil', or as someone suggested "God is like a Kangaroo", is a handicap or
not to its telling us anything about the God who is love, and whether or
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not it can possibly be seen to relate constructively to what we pray,
hope, trust in as Christians?
A dimension of theological picture making faces the following problem.
Does it refer to God? Does it refer to any divine attributes? Perhaps by
metaphor or description, or allusion to works of art in the Christian
tradition? Does it allow us to affirm core theological thinking and
Christian belief, with its notions of the necessity of saying God is
love, good, just? If the answers to the questions are negative, then I
can see little chance of going forward with the notion of theological
'picture' making. If the answer to even one is positive, then I think
that there must by implication be a positive answer to them all.
Again, for any area of picture making or theological 'images' to gain
exemption from normal critical analysis, it must neither be seen to
affirm, complement, or involve denial of the surrounding (non-privileged)
propositions. For if it did any of these things, we would be entitled to
ask 'how?' (If it doesn't do any of these things, we can ask what its
significance is). If a privileged Moltmannian verbal 'image' or
theological 'picture' 'affirms' that God is wholly good and perfectly
loving, how would this be? The 'picture' must be wholly other than
propositional, or dependent on a propositional/ confessional framework if
it is to qualify for exemption, and yet convey important truths about God
and his relationship to the world. I have argued that there are major
problems facing Moltmann's analysis of the theodicy question and what is
involved in an adequate response to it. A proponent of priviliged
theological picture making, if he is to show that such an evaluation is
fundamentally misguided, needs to demonstrate not merely that there are
mysterious non-conceptual images or tableaux in Moltmann's theology, but
that they have a real bearing on the way one goes about assessing his
treatment of theodicy.
There are several ways this might be so. The non-conceptual images may
reveal, as I have suggested, that God is in some crucial way beyond any
human definitions about what he is about, and that this evacuates talk
that God is love, wholly good, of any real significance. However, this
would disastrously undermine the whole theological enterprise. It must
imply not only that we do not know whether God is wholly good, but that
he is not wholly good. For if we can never apply such terms to God in a
significant way, then God is not described or characterised in such
terms. We may hope he is something vaguely akin to what we mean in such
language; but how can this be? It might be felt that if God is not ever
evil, he might be wholly good. However, the impossibility of such talk
being meaningfully applied, forbids such moves, and points to the
absolute negation of all that could be meaningful to us, that is
involved in a thorough-going negative theology.
Perhaps the privileged theological pictures may be understood through
references to their contribution in non-privileged text. But this is
pointless. Why speculate about what such 'image' theology would be like
in its implicatiuons for theodicy, when what it would essentially convey
is already to hand in the propsitional or critically accessible text?
Whilst still unsure of what such an image might be, let us look at a
further possibility. It is an image which without being legitimately
rendered in prepositional form is nevertheless 'imaging' forth certain
things with a clarity and depth of meaning which it possesses out of its
unique nature. Without dependence on conventional theological talk, it is
its own criterion of what it signifies. In a sense graphic art
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establishes its own conventions and criteria by the very nature of the
media. There is little point in asking if Rembrandt wrote grammatically
if we are concentrating on a painting. In art, it is though legitimate to
ask what relationship the image has to our everyday perceptions. The
difference is what makes the painting an artistic representation or
expression. So in theology, we arguably need to ask how a non-
propositional theological 'picture' stands in relation to the 'truths' of
a creed. Without some kind of conceptual meshing, in a realm of words
(which one must suppose does not work with metaphor, description of
places, people, ideas, colours, attitudes, or reference to art), how are
we to characterise our 'picture'?
Where we are claiming to give positive content to the God idea of a kind
which would have a bearing on the theodicy question, we are, I would
argue, bound to provide something which can be rendered propositionally,
which would lead us to qualify our understanding of beliefs such that God
is love, in some important way. When Moltmann uses words such as love,
death, future, suffering, justice, joy, nature, he is doing so with a
propositional framework. In any particular section of his work he
asserts or accepts things about God and the world which are subject to
public conditions of meaning, And indeed the passages below are evidence
that no special privileges relating to an area of theological 'pictures'
can be, or are claimed by Moltmann. He writes in The Crucified God, that:
'The understanding of the death of Jesus in the context of his life
must be theological, and must take into account the God for whom he
lived and spoke." (CG pi48)
Although:
'By the standards of the cry of the dying Jesus for God, theological
systems collapse at once in their inadequacy." (CG p53)
And yet:
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"When the crucified Jesus is called the 'image of the invisible God',
the meaning is that this is God, and God is like this. God is not
greater than he is in this humiliation. God is not more glorious than
he is in this self-surrender. God is not more powerful than he is in
this helplesness. God is not more divine than he is in this humanity.
The nucleus of everything that Christian theology says about God is
to be found in this Christ event... Here God has not just acted
externally, in his unattainable glory and eternity. Here he has acted
in himself and has gone on to suffer in himself. Here he himself is
love with all his being." (CG p205)
What is important here, is that although Moltmann shows how the events of
Easter can cast theological systems and 'gods' into disarray, Easter is
not itself beyond a crucial level of description and understanding.
Indeed, it this theological understanding which allows one to say that
theological systems are perennially shaken by the event of the cross.
It is interesting to look at his view of symbols in God in Creation:
"... essentially speaking, the whole of life is tacitly present in
every individual experience of life, and the world itself is latent in
every experienced impression of a particular object. Consequently our
attempt to use symbols as a way of finding our bearings in the all-
embracing whole is not really a transference at all... Every
experience that happens to us brings with it a context of meaning
without which we cannot take in the experience at all. This wider
horizon literally 'dis-closes' itself, in its first, daybreak colours,
in the individual experience. But it is not wholly absorbed by that
experience. It is the transcending element in the individual
experience. Symbols represent this inherent tension, present in every
experience, between the determined and the undetermined - the tension
between particularity and totality, it is this tension that is the
ground of the symbol's surplus of meaning. Through the movement of
their 'meaning more', symbols do not establish facts; they release
experiences. Symbols do not define, they 'give us something to think
about', and invite us to new discoveries. Symbols should be
understood as the initiatives for processes of perception and
interpretation..." (GC p297)
Moltmann is speaking about special kinds of image. He does not attempt to
explore every kind of experience as symbol with a surplus of meaning,
although perhaps every experience could ultimately be invested with wide
significance. It is arguably true that "every experience that happens to
us brings with it a context of meaning without which we cannot take in
the experience at all" (ibid). Perhaps this is a way of saying that
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people see their experiences as reflecting complex and ever-changing sets
of circumstances around them, with which they inter-act; or see that
they interpret or 'experience' them as experiences of this or that sort
in the context of a value system continually re-shaped by, and shaping,
experience. And perhaps an horizon of this sort is the "transcending
element in the individual experience" (ibid). However, in his talk of
symbols Moltmann is concentrating on certain pictures, parables and
metaphors which relate to our experiences in a special way:
"There are fundamental patterns which lend bearings to human life,
and to which language reverts to again and again, because they
provide an order for the unconscious. We call images which put a
fundamental impress on the soul or psyche, 'archetypes'. Every
archetype has its own world of symbols and its own wealth of images
and its own possible methods of transferred speech. An archetype is a
predisposition of the soul which produces and orders concepts,
absorbs experiences and gives them expression." (GC p298)
He goes on to say that:
"We shall be comparing the symbols in the light of the messianic
veiwpoint, not purely in the context of religious history. My
intention is to indicate the points at which the Christian world of
symbols has absorbed these other symbols of the world, and to show
they have been transformed in the process." (ibid)
This is interesting because there is perhaps a suggestion that the
Christian symbols are symbols in a range ("My purpose is... to compare
the biblical symbol of the world as God's creation with other symbols of
the world, and to relate them critically to one another. " ibid), which
could lead us to explore the contacts, if any, between Moltmann's kind of
theology, and say, that of John Hick's God Has Many Names. Ultimately, I
think that Moltmann's theology is really not amenable to such a
treatment. Whilst he is thinking in a 'universe encompassing' Christian
tradition, symbols are thought of primarily for what they have to offer
Christianity, in what they say about humanity and about the world in this
context. The following is important for our understanding of the
possibility of locating a non-conceptual theology in Moltmann:
"In comparing the symbols of the world which I have described, our
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aim will be to move from images and the visions of the imagination
to concepts. Our purpose is to arrive at a mutual complementation of
the ideas inherent in the different symbols of the world, so that we
can evolve an understanding of the human being in his world which is
richer than any single world symbol is capable of achieving. Finally -
as I have already indicated through my account of the different
symbols - we shall ask what form a Christian integration of these
symbols of the world could take. Here Christian integration does not
mean an appropriation by the church. It means the interpretation of
religious history in the messianic light. This interpretation also
suggests the possibility that the creation traditions of the Old
Testament might also be relativized and integrated into a new total
picture. Christian belief in creation is messianic belief in creation.
Messianic belief in creation as a perception of the world and human
beings in the messianic light of their redeeming future." (GC p316-7)
So it appears that a realm of privileged theological picture making is
one that would have its locus somewhere between the images and visons of
the imagination, with their inherent conceptual content, or conceptual
ordering facility, and the kind of propositional theology which says God
is love, and attempts to communicate something more or less definite
about what this means, making inferences, and referring to symbols. I am
still not sure what this privileged way of doing theology might be, and
can think of no examples in Moltmann.
Perhaps this idea of theological picture making has distracted from the
possibility that Moltmann*s theology is from start to finish, or in very
crucial places, poetic and dramatic and in this way not open to a simple
critique based on concerns with coherence. Again though, I am prepared
to argue that Moltmann does not theologise in a way which puts him
beyond the bounds of propositional analysis, and certainly this is true
of his handling of the problem of evil. There may be many ways of
speaking about God, or ways of miming, music-making, designing, and
crucially, daily living, which reflect something of what God is about,
and how people can respond to the feelings and understanding that God
cares for the world, for society, and for individuals. Here the sense is
not to be found outside the action in some dry verbal summary, but in the
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energy and grace, movement, love and care, which is what it is, in
practice. However, Moltmann's theology is conceptually based. All I can
do is to continue to draw attention to what Moltmann has said, the way he
says it. I can, as I have noted, find no substantial evidence that wou Id
support this kind of claim that Moltmann is 'poetic* in a way which means
that statements that God is love, and that the suffering of one innocent
child is enough to condemn the kindly God of theism, are no longer
problematic for his theology. I believe it would be demeaning to Moltmann
if we held that he never really means what he appears to say at crucial
moments; when, for instance, he says that the kindly God can no longer
exist if such and such is the case (where one set of beliefs about a god
is invalidated, given their entailments, by events which are incompatible
with its being true that such a god exists). He may make judgements which
we believe to be mistaken, or make real theological advances, but he is
not theologising above and beyond the concepts which are the very crux
of the theodicy debate. If Moltmann is deliberately creating a theology
which incorporates these concepts, indeed depends upon them, and yet
escapes the problems attached, he will have made the theodicy debate
happily irrelevant. Overall, this does not seem to be the case.
I turn now to the thinking of D Z Phillips. I think a discussion of his
views will add support to the claim that it is legitimate to ask certain
kinds of question about what people say about God. Moltmann does not
discuss the question whether or not belief in general is specially
privileged. Claiming such a privilege is certainly one response that
could be made to criticism of his theology, especially if it is thought
that it has a special indefinable quality which carries it away from the
field of critical evaluation. I have not been able to characterise this
quality, but it may be that D Z Phillips provides the strongest answer as
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to what this might be in his ideas on mistakenness (where it would become
a general feature in life). He also gives what he would consider a
Christian response to the facts of evil and suffering, without resorting
to conventional notions of justifiablity. This is an interesting
position, as it shows the kind of thinking which may be involved when we
say God is perfectly good and just, but that the evil that is permitted
does not have to be reconcilable with the requirements of the good which
we feel the universe to be somehow centred on.
Phillips is well known for his criticism of the moral insensitivity and
human unacceptability of theodicists arguments. In particular, those of R
Swinburne have been subject to strong attack. That the failure of
Swinburne's enterprise can be greeted with equanimity, even assurance,
stems, one supposes, from Phillips paradoxical sounding rejection of the
idea of mistaken belief, and his arguments for the place of mystery in
religion. I cannot see otherwise how his alternative to Swinburne's
approach, recognition of the radical pointlessness of our experience of
evil and suffering (which I think incompatible with Christian belief), is
tenable. But more on this shortly. He writes: "Kierkegaard once depicted
a source of confusion in philosophy as thoroughly investigating details
of a road one should not have turned into in the first place" (RR pl03-
4). For Phillips, Swinburne is well down such a road in developing his
theodicy. He is moreover later termed in Belief. Change and Forms of
Life, an 'externalist' (ibid p80). That is, one who has wrongly given in
to the call that Christian belief be accepted on the condition of its
successfully meeting the criteria of an autonomous rationality (BCFL
p82). Swinburne would describe his activities somewhat differently, as
those of one who is interested in assessing "what claim a man who asserts
that there is a God is making and whether it is a claim which is
coherent, a claim which makes sense to suppose could be true" (CT pi).
As an 'externalist* though, he is held to submit Christian belief to what
Phillips holds are alien criteria.
To Phillips the anti-theodicist, Swinburne's world is repugnant when what
appears evil is in fact directed towards the general good. In this world
"a little evil does no one any harm, and even the greatest evil on closer
examination, turns out to be worth the price" (RR pl03-4). Finding
Swinburne's thinking immoral and grossly insensitive to the realities of
suffering, Phillips opts, as I have noted, for an understanding of the
'pointlessness' of evil:
"L have... suggested in discussing what might be meant by someone who
said the outcome was in the hands of God, that the force of the
belief depends on the absence of the kind of higher level planning so
essential to Swinburne's theodicy. The same is true of talk of God's
grace in the face of life's evils. In order even to reach the
threshold of understanding what might be meant here, the sheer
pointlessness of these evils has to be admitted. One has to see, for
example, that there is no reason why these natural disasters should
not come our way. One has to answer in face of one's cry, 'Why is
this happening to me?', 'Why shouldn't it?' This recognition of the
pointlessness of suffering can lead in various directions. It has led
some to speak of the absurd, but it has led others to speak of all
things as being God's gifts, and of things not being one's own by
right or reason, but by the grace of God. It is not my purpose to
advocate these uses of language, but simply to note their existence."
(RR pl20-l>
The difficulty with this 'noting' of the existence of such uses of
language is that it seems to tolerate an absurdist position, but not the
Swinburnian road. Yet if a philosophy of the absurd is unchallengeable,
why not Swinburnianism also? In regard to Phillips' treatment of the
latter, is it not also true that there are arguments against our
accepting that experience of suffering reflects absence of a higher order
in reality, and pointlesness, and for the incompatibility of this
position with belief in a wholly good, perfectly loving creator? And
after all, it must be on an understanding of moral entailments that
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Phillips rejects Swinburne. It appears we might be able to show that an
absurdist view of life experience is not compatible with a Christian one.
If we could show that Phillips's own position involves contradictions,
what then?
For instance, someone like Swinburne would perhaps say that our existence
as fleshly creatures, and our eventual physical failure, our 'being-
towards-death', is something which can be seen as tied up with a complex
inter-relationship of possibilities for evils and goods in our life in
this world, and that this range of possible experience is justifiable.
Now if Phillips is to stick to his understanding of the pointlessness of
suffering, and be consistent in his rejection of theodicy like
Swinburne's, he must deny this. However he holds that recognition of
pointlessness, as he has described it can "lead us to speak of all things
as being God's gifts". Surely this is self-contradictory if we understand
gift in a positive sense. It is not a understanding compatible with his
doctrine of pointlessness, if we are to take this doctrine seriously.
Phillips rejects Swinburne's thinking because he finds it immoral. He
clearly thinks it incoherent to hold that a loving God could work in
these ways. He is using a critical technique which involves uncovering
inconsistencies and incompatibilities. Now if it is applied to
Swinburne, there seems no reason why we should draw back from applying it
to Phillips. I for example, do not accept that if Swinburne is wrong, we
can then successfully move to a Christian recognition of the
pointlessness of suffering. Unlike Phillips I think that Christian belief
might well be untenable and incoherent if Swinburne's kind of thinking is
immoral - for the reason that belief in a God who is wholly good and
perfectly loving entails that suffering be ultimately justifiable.
Phillips seemingly does not agree, yet if both his own position is
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arguably quite incoherent, and we were to agree that Swinburne's is
wholly mistaken, then we should recognise the atheist as offering a
stance which is at least coherent. However, this understanding of the
moves possible in this situation would though be anathema to Phillipfe.
This reflects an important area of Phillips thought. If we reject the
notion of there being mistaken beliefs, because it is our religious life
and commitment which counts, and not its accessibility to some bogus
autonomous rationality, then attempts to point out contradictions in
Phillips thought are misguided. But before looking at what Phillips says
on mistaken belief in Faith After Foundationalism. I will look briefly at
his position on criticism and religion in Belief. Change, and Forms of
Life. There it is seemingly possible to make important judgements about
what people commit themselves to, and I think for good reason.
In the essay 'The challenge of what we know: the problem of evil' (BCFL
p52ff), Phillips refers to two charges commonly brought against
philosophers of religion who are seen as reflecting Wittgensteinian
tendencies. These are, that it is what is seen as religious which
circumscribes what is or is not meaningful in religion, and that religion
is beyond criticism. In the chapter 'Wittgenstein and Religion:
Fashionable Criticisms' (ibid plff), he details his claim that these are
both theses he has argued against. Thus in Faith and Philosophical
Enquiry (p72) he was prepared to accept that believers can make mistakes:
". .. What they say if it comes under the appropriate criteria of
rneaningfulness, must answer to these criteria". Some ideas of God are
clearly confused, as when Gagarin said that he had not seen God in space.
Gagarin's thinking is mistaken, since it conflicts with what might be
reasonably expected to be seen in space, and that reality which might be
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ascribed to God. Phillips tells one that God's name cannot be associated
with nonsense (op.cit. pl3). For: "Nonsense remains nonsense even if we
associate God's name with it". There are limits to what can be said of
God if it is not to decline into some sort of "transcendental
metaphysics", or nonsensical superstition. The world must be taken
seriously too. He states: "I have argued that religious reactions to
various situations cannot be assessed according to some external criteria
of adequacy". This is followed by the words: "On the other hand, the
connections between religious beliefs and such situations must not be
fantastic". What is or is not 'fantastic' is decided by "criteria which
are not in dispute" (ibid - not detailed however). Phillips interprets
this move in an interesting way. Religious believers who try to explain
'away' the harsh facts of suffering are seen as vulnerable to these
criteria, i.e., they are not taking suffering seriously. Similarly, those
who describe death as an extended sleep are to be accused of not taking
it in its full seriousness. Phillips refers to his arguments in Death and
Immortality (p52ff>, where he in fact concludes that talk of life after
death is mistaken; that the believers eternal life after death is
participation in the reality of God; that seeing that nothing is ours by
right, dying to self-centredness (and to notions of personal survival),
is to die to death, and in this way to have overcome it. It is arguable
that this involves an excessive degree of stipulation in regard to what
constitutes a correct religious confession, incompatible with the intent
to 'note' uses of language. However, it does show clear recognition of
the fact that there are entailments involved in beliefs and statements
about the way things are.
Phillips stance on mistaken belief is developed in his critique of the
' foundationalist' position in epistemology. 1
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"Foundationalisrn is the view that belief is a rational belief only if
it is related, in appropriate ways, to a set of propositions which
constitute the foundations of what we believe. It assumes, from the
outset, that belief in God is not among these foundational
propositions. Belief in the existence of God, it is said, stands in
need of justifications, grounds, reasons, foundations... We are
acquainted with countless cases where it is appropriate to be asked
why we believe what we say we believe, and it is simply assumed that
belief in God is another belief of this kind. Once this assimilation
of belief in God to other kinds of belief takes place, asking whether
belief in God is rational quickly becomes a matter of seeking
evidence for the existence of God." (FAF p3)
This has introduced what Phillips terms 'evidentialism' into the
philosophy of religion: Swinburne as the modern Cleanthes, and J L Mackie
the Cleanthes of unbelievers (cf. Humes's Dialogues on Natural Religion).
But the God of philosophical theism, as the subject of such argument and
counter-argument is not, Phillips believes, the God of the Christian, of
the bible. To believe in God is not to entertain a hypothesis, nor, in a
remark directed at Swinburne, "to embrace the best available explanation
given the evidence at hand" (FAF p8). God is the measure of all things
for the believer. It is simply not possible for the believer that he
[God] does not exist: Camus said that to judge God is to kill him in
one's heart. Thus for the believer, God judges man, and not vice versa,
Phillips discusses Alvin Plantinga's efforts to show that
foundationalists have no real criteria for deciding what constitutes such
a proposition (Plantinga in Reason and Belief in God). Take for instance,
self-evidence. Plantinga argues that a properly basic proposition would
be one which stands by itself.2
Here the theist is able to argue that foundationalists themselves lack
any reason for maintaining the beliefs basic to their noetic structure;
that the foundationalist relies on self-evidentiality for his/her
propositions, but if asked to provide a criterion for this, will, in the
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attempt have to call on other supporting 'self-evident' propositions,
themselves in need of backing, and so on in infinite regress. The
foundationalist's commitment to the self-evidentiality of certain
propositions, such as that they are basic for all further reasoning, is
ultimately an affair of trust. They trust their episternic practice,
something Phillips thinks crucial.
Phillips' interest in Plantinga's moves against foundationalism, is not,
he says, to deny that foundationalists give an unsatisfactory grounding
for their selection of basic propositions to the exclusion of others.
Nevertheless, he wishes to examine 'difficulties' on the route which
leads to this conclusion (FAF p24). Plantinga has argued that there is no
non-regressive criterion which foundationalists can provide to justify
their only apparently basic propositions. Yet it is not that anything
whatsoever can be allowed to constitute the foundations of one's noetic
structure; there are experiences which allow some beliefs to be
considered properly basic, and others not. One's practice is the
criterion of what is basic. Phillips' criticism hinges on Plantinga's
further belief that one or other of the positions on God's basicality in
the noetic structure is still mistaken: indeed, that all our epistemic
practices may be misleading, wrong.
Phillips argues: "If showing that the practices are correct is confused,
so is showing that they are incorrect" (FAF p25). According to Phillips,
Plantinga's move to defend the notion that all one's practices may be
wrong re-introduces the idea of external criteria for the practice in
which all parties were argued to put their trust: this naturally
undermines the notion of trust in practice. For instance, Plantinga
considers that an arithmetical proposition of the type 2+1=3 may be
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self-evident to some, but not necessarily to all:
"Understanding a self-evident proposition is sufficient for
apprehending its truth. Of course this notion must be relativized to
persons', what is self-evident to you might not be to me. Very simple
arithmetical truths will be self-evident to nearly all of us; but a
truth like 17 + 18 - 35 may be self-evident only to some. And of
course a proposition is self-evident to a person only if he does in
fact grasp it; so a proposition will not be self-evident to those who
do not apprehend the concepts involved in the proposition." (FAF p26
- Plantinga op.cit. pl7)
What is it that those who do not grasp this self-evidentiality may be
lacking? Phillips asks if it is some intuition or psychological
experience? His thinks that it is not that some experience or special
intuition is pivotal when a child gives a correct, or an incorrect
answer, but that the answer has been calculated according to the normal
practices:
"The self-evidence of the arithmetical proposition is made a function
of an individual's reaction... But if self-evidence is a function of an
individual's grasp, what is it that the minority can be said to fail
to grasp?"
For: " What is at stake is not the absence of self-evidence,
understood as a function of a reaction lacking in a child, but a
child's lack of ability to engage in a certain practice... The question
of whether something appears to be self-evident to a person is
different from the question of whether a person can see what is
self-evident..."
Crucially: " The self-evidence of 2 + 1 = 3 does not emanate from
the epistemic and phenomenological properties of the proposition
considered in relation to the reactions of an isolated individual. The
proposition enjoys its self-evident status in arithmetic." (FAF p27-
28)
So, Plantinga's argument that it is practice ie. certain conditions and
circumstances, which provide the ground for holding some things being
necessarily basic propositions, and not merely anything being so (such as
belief in 'the Great Pumpkin'), is undermined by his case for what
Phillips sees as a kind of back-door foundationalism. Phillips believes
that no metaphysical proofs can be provided to show the absolute
necessity of our doing mathematics the way we do: other procedures can
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indeed be postulated. However: . . the philosophical point of
postulating such alternatives is to rid us of the conviction that there
roust be some queer kind of necessity underpinning our procedures... the
philosophical postulation of other possibilities is not meant to cast
doubt on our own procedures" (FAF p31>. To think that such postulations
are real alternatives, in the sense that they are 'right' as opposed to
our 'wrong', is to pre-suppose some external criterion that gives a
'vantage' point for choice: "Plantinga is one with the foundationalists
in thinking that our practices need such a justification. Since the
criterion has not been arrived at yet, our practices can be deemed
innocent until proved guilty. . . what we have seen is that the
intelligibility of our practices await no such verdict, neither do they
need it. They are simply there as part of our lives?' (FAF p33>.
Expressing the debt that much thinking on the nature of belief owes to
Wittgenstein, 3 particularly his own, Phillips points to a feature of
thinking in terms of the nature of one's 'world picture,' (rather than of
competing right or wrong 'world pictures') which is important when
preceding to determine the strengths or weaknesses of his attitude to
evil:
"The difficulty Wittgenstein's work presents is that it stands outside
the apologetic context. It is difficult to appreciate this if
philosophy is itself to be conceived to be a way of assessing
religious belief pro and contra. The sense in which conceptual
analysis goes beyond Plantinga's negative apologetics is not that it
provides a positive apologetics, but that it endeavours to elucidate
the kind of beliefs religious beliefs are... Here is a conception of
philosophy and epistemology which is neither for nor against
religion." (FAF pi 13)
Still, we may have a philosophical approach which in itself is
(arguably) neither for nor against religious beliefs, in that it is only
concerned with whether or not they are coherent. We may for example
question if the idea of an infinitely extended disembodied person is a
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coherent one, one we could suppose to be true, and this could be seen as
a hostile question, following from an inherently biased rationalist
perspective. But people are free to attempt to show that it is not an
incoherent proposition <as Swinburne does), or that it is not involved
in their belief. However, I am more nterested in the particular debate
surrounding the problem of evil. The affirmations that God is love,
creator and sustainer of the universe, the challenges presented by evil
and suffering, and hope for redemption are central to Christian faith.
To see if they present a coherent range of beliefs, or even if we can ask
this question is not an unimportant or outrageous intention. However,
Phillips shows that he does not (uniformly at least) share this view that
coherence is of critical importance in looking at belief.
He refers to the position that it is in "the context of ritual and
worship in which the possibility of religious experience has its sense".
He notes how this approach has raised questions of priority, there being
other competing theories "which explain ritual as emanating from
experience" (FAF p207). He holds that both perspectives will prove
confusing insofar as they emphasise a temporal sequence. For instance,
in the former option the development of ritual practices is utterly
mysterious. It is argued: "Practices divorced from religious experience
are just as unintelligible as religious experiences divorced from
religious practices". And: "We need to get away from... [a] 'chicken-or-
the-egg' way of thinking... as Lindbeck says 'The primary knowledge is
not about the religion, nor that the religion teaches such and such, but
rather how to be religious in such and such ways'". What may be disputed
is Phillips' contention that whilst the issue of the temporal priority of
practice, belief, or experience is one which can obscure their inter—
dependence, the core knowledge in religion is always simply to do with
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how to be religious in "such and such ways", where this might imply a
secondary status for the role of the coherence of belief in determining
how a practice is justified. Where scripture describes religiously
significant actions, and events, these are held to determine how and
why one is to act. There is, I would argue, a conceptual content in being
religious in that one may suppose that being religious in "such and such
ways" involves acceptance or espousal 'of the fact* that certain things
are true about how the world has gone, goes, should go, and will go:
about the creator who brought it into being, of what nature, and with
what intention; and about good, evil, and redemption.
The chapter 'Episternological Mysteries' <FAF p255ff> is prefaced with a
reference to some words of Wittgenstein: "Christianity is not a doctrine,
not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will happen to the
human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in
human life. For 'consciousness of sin' is a real event and so Cis]
despair. . . Those who speak of such things. . . are simply describing what
has happened to thern, whatever gloss anyone may want to put on it"
(Culture and Value). It is arguable nevertheless that the Christian
confession is one which may be vulnerable on grounds of coherence. This
seems like a grave misunderstanding of the point Phillips presumably
intends to be conveyed in this quotation, that the person experiencing a
sense of 'sin', is in fact being religious in 'such and such a way'
rather than ever thinking of theories, and attempting to apply them to
existence, or feeling the way they do because they adhere to beliefs
which they could exchange for others, and not feel the way they do (or
they might in fact feel much the same, but for different reasons). What
I am saying is that insofar as say, sin and despair, death and illness
are human experiences, and they are understood to occur in a world
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created by a God who is love and who is wholly good, there is a place for
recognition of problems about God and evil. A weeping slave may tell us
of his or her despair at the consequences of disobeying the master, and
it would be true to say that they are probably describing how they feel.
If they live in a state with doctrines of universal freedom and equality
we may go to ask if this kind of despair is compatible with holding that
it is true that equality and freedom is a reality for all. A mass killer
may have a sense of sin after having killed his innocent victims, and
experience conversion. That does not prevent us asking if this kind of
killing is compatible with the world's being created by a God who is
wholly good. It is not enough to say that asking this question is a real
event for the asker. It needs to be recognised why this is a question,
and not just an expression of perplexity.
I have spent some time looking at Phillips because he shows the kind of
things which happen when we set out to abandon what are arguably core
aspects of Christianity concerning coherency and the problem of evil.
Most importantly, he does so on the basis of arguments which would appear
to be the kind we would generally need to forward to justify or explain
our moving away from conventional kinds of theodicy discussion. Moltmann
makes moves which if they are to be exempted from normal criteria would
appear to need such support; but he does not provide arguments and
justifications, and this is the primary reason behind turning to
Phillips. Phillips deplores attempts to justify the suffering that
occurs. He thinks they are immoral. He thinks they involve submitting
Christian belief to alien criteria. But it seems that his attempt to show
that thinking our belief might in any way be mistaken is contradicted by
his own stipulations on what is sense and nonsense, and undermined by the
fact that Christian belief is about certain things; his own version with
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its absence of moral content and dependence on 'primitive' sensations of
awe and wonder is arguably incompatible with the kinds of belief that
most Christians have about God's love for the world. Ultimately, although
we may think Swinburne's arguments are bad arguments, it is not right to
say that seeking to see what people believe (given that they believe some
things and not others), and if it is coherent, something we could think
of as being true, is in itself a wrong practice. Overall, I believe
Phillips positions on what is involved in belief are untenable, that the
arguments he makes in their favour are flawed. As a consequence, our
imaginary proponent of the idea that Moltmann be exempted from critical
discussion of the kind I have undertaken is arguably unable to show that
the thought of thinker like Phillips can lend support.
We now turn to the third issue to be discussed in this chapter, that of
contradiction. I believe that Moltmann adopts a position on theodicy
which implies a view of insoluble contradiction. That is, certain
features of this world are ultimately irreconcilable with the principles
of justice and goodness. If we are to consider the world as somewhere
which in an ultimate way reflects the supreme wisdom of a wholly good and
just God, who is its creator, then these features are not intelligible as
aspects of such a world. This second statement is not of course one that
Moltmann makes in quite this way, nevertheless it is a conclusion that
arguably stems from the first, that much evil is plainly unjustifiable.
Moltmann has said there can be no answer to our theodicy question. The
full implication of this second statement is that the world is not the
creation of a wholly just and good God, given the consideration we could
expect such a God to give to the fate of every uniquely valuable
individual who would exist if he were to create a world. Still, it may be
that Moltmann can be seen as holding a Hegelian view of evil, one where
the kind of contradiction we have just discussed is not present - and
where present contradictions could be transecended in a final synthesis.
Can we see a Hegelian dialectic in Moltmann's work? I have noted the
occasions when it seems as if this is the case. Yet Moltmann rejects
this idea of Hegelian style dialectic.A But we do not need to enter into
this question of how many times Moltmann makes Hegelian sounding
statements about Easter for instance, and then says he is frankly
opposed to any idea of the unfolding of what is logically intrinsic to
the life of Spirit, to see whether or not a Hegelian model of
contradiction is at the heart of his understanding of theodicy. It is
not, and for good reason. It is not possible to say that the God who
creates a world, whether this presents us with the dialectical life of
Spirit in the full (here I mean Hegel's dialectic), or is unable to show
such a developmental logic in its development, is wholly good, if much
that occurs in such a world is morally unjustifiable. We can remind
ourselves again of the significance of saying that suffering is
unjustifiable. Suffering, if it is ultimately unjustifiable, falls
outside of any inter-relationships which would allow us to say that it
is a possibility necessary for the existence of freedom and the
possibility of other worthwhile goods freely chosen, and that the
suffering that occurs or can occur is .more than balanced by the overall
good of valuable action, thought, and the freedom of the human spirit.
The connection I make between the possibility of suffering and freedom,
is that freedom allows us (where we always could have chosen other than
we did) to act in ways which are morally wrong, and which may result in
the suffering of others and ourselves. The problem of natural evil and
animal suffering is also a great one. If we are to state it as a problem
on the ground that natural evil is often unjustifiable (e.g., earthquake,
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disease and so on), then we are also looking for some kind of
relationality in the way the world goes, which would permit an 'organic'
view of things, and enable us to conclude that what is involved
contributes to a worthwhile world.
It may be that looking at suffering in such a way that it is Christianly
perceived as unjustifiable, is in Hegel's terms, symptomatic of
analytical rather than speculative thinking. But if Moltmann thinks much
suffering is unjustifiable then he is right not to to deny this -
although admittedly there seems to be a de facto denial of the
consequences in the ability to continuing theologising all the same. I do
not agree we can assume that the so-called analytical judgement is
really an unwarranted breaking-of'f of some events from others, a kind of
theological, philosophical, existential myopia. It is precisely because
relational thought fails to show that suffering can be justified by its
necessary causal connection with 'worthwhile' goods, that one is led to
think of unjustifiable evils. We may be thinking of the moves of
Swinburne, or the speculative philosophy of Hegel, but the judgement is
essentially the same. Unjustifiability denies, I think, that evil and
suffering are intelligible as phenomena within a quality of existence we
judge ultimately worthwhile, and with which the possibility of suffering
is necessarily inter-twined (which the Christian Hegelian would want to
say). Perfect goodness would appear to exclude there being unnecessary
and unjustifiable possibilities for evil and suffering. So suffering and
evil, if it is unjustifiable, is incompatible with what we could expect
of a wholly good and just God. Such unjustifiable evils would not, I
think, fit into Hegel's conception of reality, just as Mackie and
Swinburne would think it incoherent to claim that a wholly good and
loving God exists if one believed that evil and suffering were radically
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unintelligible, unjustifiable. The unjustifiable, if it is a final
judgement, cannot be intelligible in the world of the wholly good God.
If it is intelligible, it is so only in the world of an immoral or amoral
God. How do we reconcile Moltmann's position on the death of an innocent
child with the following words of Hegel in The Phenomenology of Spirit:
[7753 ":... it is the existent Spirit, which is the individual Self
which has consciousness and distinguishes itself as 'other', or as
world, from itself. This individual Self as at first thus immediately
posited, is not yet Spirit for itself it does not exist as Spirit; it
can be called innocent but hardly good. Before it can in fact be Self
and Spirit it must first become an 'other' to its own self... Since
this Spirit is determined as at first an immediate existence, or as
dispersed into the multifariousness of its consciousness, its othering
of itself is the withdrawal into itself, or self-centredness, of
knowing as such. Immediate existence suddenly turns into thought, or
mere sense-consciousness into consciousness of thought; and moreover,
because the thought stems from immediacy or is conditioned thought,
it is not pure knowledge, but thought that is charged with otherness
and is, therefore, the self-opposed thought of Good and Evil."
And:
[777] "... Good and Evil were the specific differences yielded by the
thought of Spirit as immediately existent. Since their anti-thesis has
not yet been resolved and they are conceived of as the essence of
thought, each of them having an independent existence of its own, man
is a self lacking in any essential being and is the synthetic ground
of their existence and their conflict."
Also:
[780] "... If Evil is the same as Goodness, then evil is just not Evil,
nor Goodness Good: on the contrary, both are suspended moments -
Evil in general is self-centred being-foi—self, and Goodness is what
is simple and without a self. When thus expressed in terms of their
Notion, their unity is at once evident... The whole is only complete
when the two propositions are made together, and when the first is
asserted and maintained, it must be countered by clinging to the
other with invincible stubborness. Since both are equally right, they
are both equally wrong, and the mistake consists in taking such
abstract forms as 'the same' and 'not the same', 'identity' and 'non-
identity', to be something true, fixed, and actual, and resting on
them. Neither the one nor the other has truth; the truth is just
their movement..." (Hegel: Phenomenology of Spirit. p467,469,472. A V
Miller trans. OUP 1977)
Hegel also gave a characterisation of religion which shows in a less
complex, indeed rather pictorial way, how his thought on the issue of
contradiction differs from Moltmann's. In Moltmann it is apparent that if
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something is unjust, such as the death of the innocent child, it cannot
be made over into something just, by discerning an ultimate worthwhile
process in which the possibility of such suffering is an integral part.
By contrast, Hegel wrote of religion, that it:
"... is the realm where all the enigmas of the world are solved, where
all the contradictions of deeper-reaching thought have their meaning
unveiled, and here the voice of the hearts pain is silenced... In this
realm of the spirit flow the streams of forgetfulness, where from
Psyche drinks and wherein she drowns all sorrow, whilst the dark
things of life are softened away into a dream-like vision, becoming
gradually transfigured until no more than a framework for the
brightness of the eternal." (Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion, i, plff. Speirs and Sanderson trans. 1896; Kegan Paul 1966)
Theodicy-wise, the important part is the first sentence. I now quote
again Moltmann's statement:
"Does the resurrection of the crucified Christ also bring the
Nothingness of world history into the light of the resurrection? Here
the experiences of Auschwitz and Hiroshima raise questions for which
no answers are endurable, because the questions are fundamentally
protests. Even Hegel found that there was a negative which could not
'be turned to good' in any dialectic. He therefore left the unresolved
contradiction - the Peloponnesian and the Thirty Years War, and
other mass annihilations - out of his dialectic altogether. Ernst
Bloch was able to see nothing in the incinerators of Maidanek except
the hard meaningless, annihilation, Nothingness: 'There is undoubtedly
a grain of wheat that dies without bringing any fruit, without there
being truly - let alone necessarily - any positive negation of this
negation afterwards." Only the militant hope that is associated with
objectively real possibilities, he believes, can keep at bay the fields
of annihilating Nothingness; but even the passion for life cannot
completely do away with the life that is utterly meaningless." (God
in Creation p91-2)
But this was the point where Moltmann went on to say: "This idea of the
negative is really Manichean. it can do no more than 'keep Nothingness at
bay'. It cannot abolish or overcome it" (ibid). And this is where he
said: "Is Christian faith in the resurrection in a position to go any
further than this? ... Where it can go further is in its hope in the God
who raises the dead. Belief in the resurrection looks towards God where
humanly speaking there is nothing to hope for and nothing to be done...
The hope of resurrection... brings even the Nothingness of world history
into the light of the new creation" (ibid). This points to several
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things. Moltmann wishes to identify with the reactions of those who can
see only negativity in the gas chambers and death pits. He for one is
certainly not going to be talking of suffering of this kind that is in
any way ultimately justifiable, intelligible in the world of the God who
is wholly good, perfectly loving, wise, and free. In the face of the
great Lisbon quake, he is willing to proclaim that 'all theodicy turns to
lies'. His position is frankly incompatible with Hegel's. Nevertheless,
his stance has resemblances to the latter part of Hegel's
characterisation of the realm of religion, quoted above. But Hegel is
working on the basis of speculative thought which overcomes
contradictions, whereas Moltmann opts for a problematic 'clean-break' in
getting over the problems of suffering, by refusing to integrate the
suffering of the world with the movement of Spirit. I said getting over
the problems, because in the last analysis, the problem of evil fades
away: "Even 'the end of the world' can set no limits to the God who
created the world out of nothing, the God who in his Son exposed his own
self to annihilating Nothingness on the cross, in order to gather that
Nothingness into his eternal being. And this is true whether the end of
the world is brought about by natural catastrophe or human crime". For:
"How should the Creator-out-of nothing be diverted from his intention and
his love through any devastations in what he has created?" (GC p93) This
seems to disregard the the problems of innocent suffering. It also
appears that there may be a dialectical movement after all. But I think
that it may be safer to say that Moltmann perceives the Nothingness, and
that God has to face and vanquish it. To go any further would imply that
Moltmann does not recognise contradictory statements on following pages.
We find the following statement on page ninety-two (previously cited):
". . . the protest against senseless murder, with which no one can come to
terms, can only retain its staying power if it is borne up by a hope for
the victims of that senseless murder, The protest against the
annihilating Nothingness must not lead to the suppression and
forgetfulness of the annihilated; and equally, hope for the annihilated
must not permit us to come to terms with their annihilation. The first is
obviously the danger for revolutionaries; the second is the danger of the
religious" <GC p92-3). Despite this, where we look for the implications
of what it means that we never come to terms with the fate of the
annihilated, it does seem that there are none. The new creation will
come, all will be well. Indeed, to cite Moltmann's own words from the
same book, "All's well that ends well". Yet I think it important that
talk of senseless murder occurs with reference to the annihilating
Nothingness. For this Nothingness is a feature conditioning the world's
history; in Moltmann's theology it can be tied to such things as
mortality, and sin. The question we must ask is: ' can we come to terms
with this Nothingness?' If it is so strongly causally connected with the
suffering there is, and God is wise, wholly good, perfectly loving and so
on, is it possible to say why we must never come to terms with death and
annihilation, but at the same time not look quest ioningly in God's
direct ion?
Let us say that Himmler, although he gave Jewish children sweets, was
behaved wickedly. He organised great suffering. Let us also say that
those who suffered did so uncomprehendingly. That is, they could see no
justification for their suffering. They were suffering in a world where
almost anything that could degrade human beings did take place, and where
any explanations, such as that in God's world it is divinely permitted
that people get mentally disturbed, God must have allowed for this -
Himmler is mentally disturbed; in God's world it is permitted that there
are evil people - Himmler is one such; human freedom has its acceptable
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cost; suffering will bring out what is humanly best in us; the good
things in our life are inextricably linked to the kind of reality in
which great evil is also necessarily possible, and so on, were shown to
be platitudes which could never make what was happening intelligible as
the fate of millions of God's creatures, each one of infinite worth;
intelligible in the creation of the God who is wholly good and perfectly
loving. If this was the case, then why did God create the kind of world
there is? Is God callous? Again, is God cruel? If we are not to come to
terms with the annihilation of the innocent, how does God? If I say I
can never come to terms with the suffering, brutality, and exploitation
involved in slaughtering cattle, such that I could never do it myself or
witness it, but am content to eat steak, then it is evident that I have
somehow come to terms with this suffering despite my scruples. If God
could not come to terms with the inevitable decay and death of all his
creatures, with sometimes appalling suffering, what does it tell us about
him that he permits it? God is in the unique position of not having to
instantiate this world. Surely he only creates the kind of world he
wishes to create. Since he has created the kind of world he has, and we
must, I think, if we are to follow Moltmann, say that he cannot come to
terms with the suffering that is possible in this world, then we still
have to conclude that in practical terms, whatever the moral qualms, he
was certainly not going to avoid creating this world. This implies that
there must be a reason, a justification for this being so (otherwise it
appears God does not know what he is doing). In fact, we can arguably
conclude that God would never hold back from creating a world such as
this, however many millions might die horribly in that world. For if God
could create a world which expressed his love fully, and this was a world
in which there was no unjustifiable suffering, then he would have created
this world, rather than the one we occupy, with its unjustifiable
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suffering. We corne to a problem. If this is so, then God chose to create
this world because the unjustifiable suffering was a necessary
possibility in a world if this world was to fully express the divine
love; or this was the only world he could possibly make, and he judged it
better to make a world with unjustifiable suffering - suffering with
whose injustice he could never come to terms, than not to make a world.
Yet this really means that God must have come to terms with injustice.
Looking closely at this situation, our ideas of what it means for God to
be wholly good, start to fall apart. He would rather have a world, even
if it was one pervaded by Nothingness and ultimate injustices, than none.
Either way the creation has to be such that it is worth the cost
(although what is worthwhile to a god who is not perfectly just and
wholly good?). I believe that these are the unfortunate consequences (for
Moltmann) of wanting to say that God created the world and is wholly good
and just, and that there are unjustifiable evils.
To return to Moltmann and Hegel. It would be possible, as I have noted,
to draw together various Hegel inspired statements from Moltmann's
theology. However, I think there are difficulties with making anything of
this approach. We could undertake it in order to show that whatever he
says about theodicy, he is in fact committed to an incompatible
dialectical view of things. Indeed, if we push a consistent Hegelian
interpretation of Moltmann we must be prepared to recognise that his
theology will disintegrate in the process. This may sound over-stated,
but the problem of evil is not something incidental to this theology. I
have looked at what is distinctive about Moltmann1s treatment of the
issues, and on this count, found that it is unsatisfactory. It may be
that picking over the Hegelian utterances will allow one to conclude that
Moltmann successfully integrates evil and suffering into the theological
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'big picture'. This will be at the cost of ignoring his deeply held
belief that given the world there is, 'all theodicy turns to lies'. So I
think we can either ignore what he says on theodicy in favour of a
Hegelian (and justificatory) re-working of his theology, or accept that
as a whole, the theology is punctuated by allusions to Hegel, whilst the
fundamentals are incompatible with a fully Hegelian interpretation. Yet
there is a dialectic of a kind. The world is evolving towards a glorious
future, and doing so in a series of movements and counter-movements.
Still, by fundamentals I mean: a] Moltmann, even when we reject the
theodicy stance, does not describe a dialectic which has the ability to
escape the criticism that it involves injustice. b] And of course, it
is fundamental that Moltmann in fact goes on to say that theodicy is not
possible, that much suffering is unjustifiable; if we tie this to the
evidence that the dialectic or history of creation is indeed one marked
by a concept of ultimately insoluble injustice, we see that what
dialectic there is really is a specially Moltmannian one. c] He denies a
Hegelian approach, and in God in Creation for instance, or at least,it is
clear how the drama is one of God's wrestling with Nothingness and its
unjustifiable consequences, rather than as characterised below:
"Philosophy... has to do, not not with unessential determinations, but
with a determination insofar as it is essential; its element and
content is not the abstract or non-actual, but the actual, that which
posits itself and is alive within itself - existence within its own
Notion. It is the process which begets and traverses its own moments,
and this whole movement constitutes what is positive [in it] and its
truth. This truth therefore includes the negative also, what would be
called the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one




I began this thesis by attempting to set out why there was a problem of
evil, and what the conventional conditions for its resolution were. I
suggested that Jiirgen Moltmann's thinking stood out from positions
normally taken. In chapter one we saw how Richard Swinburne, an eminent
theodicist and defender of theism put forward an understanding of the use
of words which, I held, was of a kind foundational for the view that
divine attributes must mean some things and not others. The way in which
J L Mackie viewed theological and philosophical concepts in his critique
of theodicy defences, clearly rested on this idea that we cannot dilute
the meaning (and thus loosen the entailments), of our words beyond
certain limits. I took his arguments to represent the kind of critical
case being made on fairly widespread readings of what is involved in
Christian belief. His arguments were forceful, and of a clarity to make
one think carefully about the implications of abandoning theodicy, and
accepting that there is evil not proportionate to the good. In other
words, that there are insoluble and permanent injustices in a world
which we want to say is God's.
We next came to M B Ahern. Like Mackie's, his position was based on the
view that evil requires some ultimate justification. However, I disagreed
with his argument that we could never actually know whether or not the
evil that there is is justifiable, but that we would nevertheless be able
to welcome a God who was revealed eschatologically, as a wholly good God,
This was important for discussion of Moltrnann's position (even if Ahern
would think Moltmann clearly wrong to say that some evils are
unjustifiable, there is more). For if we can show that Ahern is wrong, as
a defender of the wholly good God, to say that we can never know whether
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evils are unjustifiable or not, but that he, along with others will be
able to say that if [a] god exists, evil will be justified, then any
theology which is anti-theodicy will find itself in a difficult position.
Of course, if we show the legitimacy of theodicy in principle, this will
already be the case. But if we are inevitably made to confront the
intellectual need for, and the possibility of positive theodicy
arguments, given that it is not possible to wait for a future time when
in some way, impossible for us to actually comprehend, things will be
shown to have been alright, then there is a real need to find some way of
rationally affirming the world as worthwhile here and now on human terms.
One cannot be simply neutral on the topic of whether or not this world is
ultimately justifiable and human existence worthwhile. So Moltmann may
not only fail to escape here on his anti-theodicy stance, but a blanket
epoche on theodicy in this world will not be a sustainable position. He
will have to acknowledge the possibility of rational theodicy, and the
requirement to think hard about what kinds of things proportionate,
worthwhile goods are; what the entailments are for our view of the world,
when we hold that God is wholly good and perfectly just.
In chapter two I started by looking at some traditional theistic
attributes, the divine qualities or characteristics which generate the
problem of evil, and the theodicy enterprise. I concluded that perfect
goodness, and omnipotence constrained by logical possibilities; or taken
with the power to do less than all that it is logically possible to do -
even taken with omniscience; or a state where God knows less than all
that it is logically possible to know - still compels us to undertake
theodicy, hold that evil is justified if God, wholly good, exists.
Following this I looked at a number of actual theodicies. J L Mackie had
been an example of the kinds of powerful argument which seem to throw
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continued belief in the wholly good God into question. It was time to
look at what kinds of things theodicists said. Were they for example
committed to making blatantly morally unacceptable points, advancing
unintelligible, unwarranted arguments, clearly incompatible with
Christian belief? Looking at a range of theodicy options, and making some
critical comments in passing, it was evident that there was little to
suggest that what was being said was prima facie incompatible with
Christian belief. Indeed, these seemed the kinds of argument most likely
to offer a resolution to the problem of evil.
At this point I opened discussion of Moltmann's texts with an
introductory survey of his thinking as it most concisely expressed his
understanding of the problems of evil, and of theodicy. I concluded that
there were arguable inadequacies in his approach. These centred on the
paradoxical formulation of a major problem to which a resolution was
denied. God was just, and the injustice and unintelligibility of so much
suffering was the basis of a yearning for justice - and of a question
'Why?' But to this question there could be no answer. Chapters four,
five, six, seven, and eight, looked in detail at the key texts in the
Moltmann corpus. If Moltmann was unconventional in his most specific and
detailed references to the problem, did his theologising show that
overall, a new and coherent response was being evolved?
This is not the place to recount at length the many difficulties, as well
as points of interest, which presented themselves in this review of his
handling of the issues. On Theology of Hope. I attempted to give an
outline of the main development, and then focussed on specific issues. It
was apparent that Moltmann rejected Hegel's philosophy of religion, and
did not want to be seen as dealing in divine patterns of life. Dialectic,
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of a kind where some 'rational' shape or dynamic could be given to the
movement of creation, suffering, and redemption, was rejected:- "the
glory and misery of past ages do not require the justification of God or
reason" (T/H p291). Instead, the corrupted and suffering creation awaited
its new possbilities. Religion. Revolution and the Future, and Hope and
Planning, .were also problematic. They shared a message of divine
contradiction of present reality:- "God and reality are analogies which
do not yet exist" (H/P pl6). Death is inhuman. Human efforts at
liberation run into the "sands of nothingness". Indeed, the central
alienations in human existence were beyond humanistic visions of
reconciliation and renewal. Ultimately it seemed they were God's
responsibilities, and in a situation where theodicy was reviled, and much
suffering seen as unjustifiable, we were left to wonder if God was truly
j ust.
On The Crucified God. I again attempted to show the overall development,
looking closely at the handling of evil and suffering, and to offer a
critique, focussing on these aspects. Difficulties arose when our world
was found a "night of false life", and death in contradiction to God's
righteousness. Taken with the thinking behind the stance on conventional
theodicy, the unjustifiable suffering of people, the death of innocents,
Moltrnann's reformulation of the theodicy question as the "phenomenon of
the delay of the parousia" (CG pl84), was hard to accept. His view of the
suffering of God was moving, but. from the point of view of an
understanding of the theodicy problem, it was difficult to integrate into
a coherent understanding of suffering as permitted by the wholly good
God. Suffering and humiliation appeared as things central to the being of
God, whilst their being possible in the way they were, presupposed that
360
there could be a divinely permitted or wrought world of unjust suffering:
unjust on Moltrnann's own criteria.
In The Trinity and the Kingdom of God we saw how Moltmann's varied
exploration of thought on the topic of divine suffering did not, after
all, add to the strength of his own position. Excepting the Jewish
element, which I looked at at greater length in the section on God in
Creation. Moltmann's examples were instrumentalist thinkers. Problems
also arose in regard to Moltmann's doctrine of freedom. It was made clear
that there was a higher and better freedom than the one we possess, with
our history of existence in a world of sometimes cruel necessity, and of
forces more powerful than individuals, and beyond the power of socities
to control. Some of the key material from The Trinity and the Kingdom of
God was dealt with earlier in chapter three. When we combine the thought
om unjustified suffering which I cited there, with the doctrine of
imperfect freedom, it was again evident that the abandonment of basic
theodicy principles had had its price: incoherence. That is, this kind of
theologising was not compatible with the entailments stemming from our
beliefs about God's being wholly good and perfectly wise.
We then moved to God in Creation. There God was seen to create entirely
freely, without duress, out of his absolute goodness. Nevertheless, the
actual means by which God was portrayed as creating, involved introducing
a devastating nothingness. The nothingness permeated life systems, and
appeared to be a sufficient explanation of human sinfulness, and if we
follow Moltmann's traditionalist view, death. In chapter nine, I looked
at attempts to give Moltmann a privileged position, above or beyond
conventional theodicy debate, and made several objections.
361
From this, what do I conclude? My thesis has been grounded on the
following beliefs. Throughout his theology we find Moltmann operating
with, or against the background of, a very unusual position on the
theodicy question. What he has said about God as love; on the origins of
suffering; the kind of suffering in the world; how this relates to God's
being with the world; to the divine openness to suffering; human freedom,
and our ability to lead a fruitful and meaningful life in the world as it
was created, made open to nothingness - amounts to extensive and
important theologising done on a revised basis for handling the problem
of evil.
So far from Moltman's position being simply unusual, it signalled a
revolutionary stance for a major theologian. One which as I earlier
noted, if tenable, would make arguments such as those advanced by figures
like R Swinburne and J L Mackie, irrelevant. What if he were seen to have
succeded?
Say that a questioner surveys the horizon, in search of possible
solutions, new ways of looking at things, Moltmann should figure large on
this horizon. What is especially fascinating is that he is able to say
that there are unjustifiable evils; evils with which we can never come to
terms. Yet he is also able to say that, even if theodicy is impossible
and immoral, we can say God is just. This would be an extremely
important theological move. Here we have perhaps the first major
theologian to throw conventional theodicy overboard, as it were. This is
what makes Moltmann a theologian of particular interest to me, and what
should also make his talk on suffering of concern to all those interested
in the problem of evil.
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In the event, I think it has been shown that Moltmann does have an
unusual and strongly held view of theodicy, and that his theology on
suffering and evil is also distinctive. But in fact, both are highly
problematic, and in the final analysis, in its position on suffering and
justice, Vtis theology is incoherent. Swinburne, Hick, and Mackie, are not
misguided. Justification of evil is a central condition of coherent
Christian belief.
I believe that this conclusion is a positive one. The thesis has been
that Moltmann offers a very different approach to a great problem - but
in the end he fails to show how traditional difficulties are avoided. I
believe it is not at all negative to set out to explore what is involved
here, and to have reached this particular conclusion. We might say 'this
is an interesting area - if Moltmann is right, his position is
sustainable, then the theodicy scene has been transformed as never
before. However, if we find against him, that would be a negative, and
this would be an intolerably non-constructive position to end up in.
Therefore it is best not to attempt this kind of exploration'. I do not
think that this stance is a defensible one.
The further question of the possibility of the theodicy problem being
resolved in the future through some new approach is of course of very
real importance. It is a possibility which cannot be ruled out if we are
to continue to believe - but I very much doubt that in looking at
Moltmann and the issues he raises, we are under an obligation to provide
the answer as to what this resolution might be.
I believe that in the thesis I have described arguments from various
quarters which represent much of the current debate. It is clear that
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Moltrnann is a major figure who appears to have broken new ground in a
subject which is characterised by well marked positions. As to producing
an answer to the theodicy question, I have not come across someone else,
who, to my mind, successfuly meets the problem of evil, or who suggests
a radically new direction which really does point to an impending
definitive resolution. I partly sympathise with Moltmann's position on
suffering in his not offering easy solutions. But I have noted my own
belief that any justification is going to have to be realistic, will be a
'hard' one if it is to be fully inclusive of world experience, i.e.,
unpalatable for those who think that the world has to be seen to be
ordered in some way where everyone clearly gets their 'just deserts', if
it is to be God's world (I think this approach has to be adopted whether
one believes in post-mortem existence or not), Theodicists like Hick and
Swinburne are right to argue for proportionate justificatory goods, and
in doing so their position on God and evil is coherent where Moltmann's
is not. However, this thesis is not the place for following up the
various complex arguments made in such theodicies, and their counter¬
arguments. If they were generally acknowledged as indisputable as answers
to the problem of evil, there would have been arguably little point in
investigating a starkly unconventional ' alternative'. We would not know
that God exists, but we would know that a clear answer to criticism on
the issue of compatibility with evil was available. In fact, Moltmann
might well not have felt able or rather, compelled, to take the position
he did. That he did choose a different course out of compassion for the
suffering, the innocent, the annihilated, points to the inevitable
difficulties of trying to reconcile genocide, or even the most individual
and isolated of suffering with belief in a wholly good God. How exactly
this might be finally accomplished in theodicy, is a topic too extensive
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to discuss here, and whilst obviously related to the issues I have been




1. J L Mackie's treatment of the problem of evil simply notes this
distinction as 'customary', and works with it. See The Miracle of Theism.
pl62ff. H J McCloskey has a detailed discussion of varieties of evil,
using a number of categories, such as 'Disease', 'natural phenomena which
bring pain and suffering to men and animals', 'the suffering caused by
man to man and to animals', and 'moral evil' (God and Evil). However,
there seems no reason to question that these categories could be reduced
to the two, physical (or natural), and moral evil, without thereby
limiting the scope for close analysis of the particular sub-divisions,
such as that between diseases and earthquakes. John Hick gives the
standard moral/natural evil distinction (whilst noting some imprecision
in theodicy terminology: see also G Wallace's article ' The Problems of
Moral and Physical Evil', in Phi losophv. 46, 1971, pp349-51). He also
refers to 'metaphysical evil', saying: "This phrase refers to the basic
fact of finitude and limitation within the created universe. The
Augustinian tradition of theodicy, on its more philosophical side, traces
all other evils, moral and natural, back to this as their ultimate cause,
or at least (in the case of sin) as their ultimate occasion" (Evil and
the God of Love pl8). We could though consider this as a natural evil,
although since the universe is the consequence of a divine act, it may
also be argued to be a moral act, which if we would think it ultimately
immoral (in relation to a wholly good God) because of its consequences,
could not be compatible with the existence of the Christian God.
Rolf Gruner is highly critical of theodicy debate because amongst other
things, he considers it to have very limited categories of evil in the
natural and moral evil distinction (Gruner: 'The Elimination of the
Argument from Evil', Theology. 83, 1980, p418ff). However, I do not think
he takes fully into account the complexity of discussions such as can be
found in the work of McCloskey and others.
2. Ahern: The Problem of Evil. p33ff. McCloskey: God and Evil. p5ff.
Plantinga: God and Other Minds. pl!6ff.
3. Plantinga notes this in God and Other Minds. pll6ff.
CHAPTER ONE:
1. There is though the position that whilst we may say such things as
'God is wholly good, and is love', and think we are saying something with
important meaning, we are not to pursue what is (or is not) implicit in
this meaning. John Hick discusses a problem related to this attitude: "We
are told, for example, that the very notion of a theodicy is impious. It
is said to represent a foolish pretension of the human creature, under
the illusion that he can judge God's acts by human standards... Now
certainly the problem of evil (like any other religious question) can be
approached in an impious spirit... However, the subject does not demand
an impious attitude in the thinker who investigates it... suppose we
use... the more neutral term 'understand' [more neutral than to 'justify'
God's ways]. Is it impious to try to understand God's dealings with
mankind? Surely if theology is permissible at all, it would be arbitrary
to disallow discussion of the topics that come under the rubric of
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theodicy: creation, the relation of human suffering to the will of God,
sin and the fall of man, redemption, heaven and hell" (Evil and the God
of Love p6-7). Of course, we can only discuss these topics if we feel
that they are subjects for intelligible discourse, that the words and
concepts used have meaning. If they did not, there could not be such
subjects. That theodicy is so closely tied in with what we do understand
as fundamental about God, means we can hardly deny its possibility, its
grounds, without repudiating all talk of the God who is love, where that
claim is held to be a meaningful one.
Another approach which would question Swinburne's view of credal
statements is that of D Z Philips. Phillips writes for instance: "One
should 'die to the understanding' and give the appropriate response to
the contingencies which are experienced in life, as did Job: 'The Lord
gave, the Lord hath taken away, blessed be the name of the Lord'" (Faith
After Foundationalism. p283). And: "Theodicies distort this mode of
religious acceptance. They want to make God's ways our ways, and our
thoughts his thoughts [Phillips seems to be allow room here for the view
that 'ordinary' statements are perhaps propositional in the way that
Swinburne understands. But what then is involved in credal statements?].
They do not recognise that what needs to come in at the right point... is
awe, wonder, and mystery" (ibid: see chapter nine of this study).
2. See The Coherence of Theism p272ff, and p278.
3. See The Coherence of Theism p99ff, and p273ff.
4. See Hick, Evil and the God of Love. p65ff, and p301. Hick thinks
Mackie's compatibilist position coherent, though he denies its
applicability to the Christian view of things: "Is it logically possible
for God so to make men that they will freely respond to Himself in love
and trust and faith? I believe that the answer is no" (op. cit. , p308).
But he rejects the traditional free will defence (see chapter two of this
study); McCloskey, God and Evil. pll5ff; A Plantinga, God and Other
Minds, pl31ff, and God, Freedom and Evil. p29ff; Hugo Meynell has an
interesting discussion of theism and freedom in God and the World. p46ff.
5. The reference to Demea's words, "The world is but a point in
comparison to eternity..." can be found on pl99 of the Bobbs-Merril
edition, Indianopolis, 1980. Philo concludes Part X with the words:
"...there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from
which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes,
or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and
infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone"
(op.cit. , p202).
6. Mackie's most influential account is in his 'Evil and Omnipotence',
Mind. 64, 1955, p210. This account is discussed by Plantinga in God and
Other Minds. pl68. For Aquinas's account of what is not feasible for an
omnipotent God see ST, la. 25. 3.
7. For a concise discussion of the issues surrounding compatibilism, see
D J O'Connor's Free Will. MacMillan, London 1979. See also A Flew's
'Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom', in New Essays in Philosophical
Theology. SMC, London, 1955, for a case which like Mackie's, asks why God
did not create beings such that they would freely always choose the good,
given that he could.
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8. The discussion of Kant is fairly complex, and not one we need to
investigate here. Mackie is referring to the third section of Kant's
Groundwork of the Metaphvsic of Morals (Kant's Theory of Ethics, trans.
Abbot: Longman's, London, 1927), when he argues: "Kant thinks that a will
is subject to alien causes if and only if it chooses or it acts as it
does because of inducements of some kind - desired ends, temptations,
threats, rewards, and so on - whereas it is not subject to alien causes
if it chooses simply in accordance with its own rational ideal of the
universal law or of humanity (or rational nature generally), as an end in
itself. But though Kant himself thought he was asserting the contra-
causal freedom of some human actions, what he says fails to give any
substance to this view. The real distinction he draws is between alien
causes and the autonomous operation of the rational will. But this is
entirely compatible with the two suppositions, that there are antecedent
sufficient causes of a certain agent's having a rational will with a
certain strength, and that what such a rational will does on any
occasion, how it responds to its circumstances and struggles against
contrary inclinations, depends causally on its character and its
strength. Autonomy as contrasted with heteronomy is completely distinct
from contra causal freedom as contrasted with having had a causal
history. Though Kant meant to assert both, he succeeded in describing
only the former. . . In a later work, the Metaphvsic of Morals. he
recognized this distinction. Here he contrasted Wille, the good,
autonomous, will, with Willkur, the will in the ordinary sense, the
faculty of making choices, some right, some wrong, and ascribed contra-
causal freedom only to the latter. But this emphasizes rather than
resolves our present difficulty. The value of freedom has been located in
the autonomy, the self-legislative character, of the Wille. . . " (The
Miracle of Theism pl70-171).
9. Ahern concludes his argument here as follows: "If God exists, there
exists an omniscient being who knows everything that it is logically
possible for unlimited power to achieve and how to achieve it; an
omnipotent being exists which has unlimited power; a wholly good being
exists which will bring about whatever omnipotence can bring about to
justify evil. A theist may rightly point out the consistency of this
position. It suggests, however, a new reason why it may not be possible
to go far in solving the concrete problems [that is, the problem of the
evil that actually occurs]. We have very imperfect knowledge of the
logically impossible. Consequently, what God, if he exists, is able and
intends to achieve through the world and its evil may not be apparent to
us in most cases of evil,/ Accordingly, the only positive answer that can
now be given to the concrete problems is an indirect one, i.e. the answer
that all actual evil is justified if God exists" (Problem of Evil. p74-
5).
CHAPTER TWO:
1. H J McCloskey makes a good case against the metaphorical
understanding of such terms: "... it is difficult to see how assertions
about God's power and knowledge could be construed as being simply
metaphorical and not as literal statements. Indeed, it it difficult to
see what sort of metaphorical utterance would be possible here, and how
it could be cashed in literal language. It necessarily would have to be
cashed in terms of God not being literally all-powerful and all-knowing.
Yet if that is so, those who hold this view of God would have no reason
for concern about the traditional problem of evil for they would have as
their God a finite being, since the only alternative to a being that is
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literally omnipotent is one who is limited in power... If God is good qua
moral, rational being, he cannot be called good simply metaphorically. . .
In brief, the attempt to explain assertions about God in respect of his
power, knowledge, and goodness as metaphors and not as literal truths,
cannot succeed, but the attempts to explain such assertions in this way
indicates that theists who hold this view are committed to a view of God
as a being finite and limited" (God and Evil p54).
On analogy, Swinburne has argued convincingly that the more we resort to
reductions in semantic rules for particular words, the more difficult it
becomes to apply criteria of coherence or incoherence to statements in
which they appear. So: "In giving words analogical meanings. . . although I
have loosened up the meanings of those words, I have not emptied them of
meaning. There are still statable and precise rules for their use. For
that reason information is still conveyed by the use of the words
although not as much as would have been conveyed if the words had been
used in the normal senses. Many words which the theist uses, he may
claim, are used in perfectly ordinary senses - all conjunctions such as
'if' and 'then', and topic-neutral words such as 'necessarily' amd 'state
of affairs', and also 'good'. For the application of these words there
are the same syntactic rules and the same standard examples, the other-
words I have been discussing have had their meaning loosened, but the
loosening-up is not too great, since most of the syntactic rules remain"
(The Coherence of Theism. p278),
The kind of word theists use analogically when talking of God, is
'person'. Swinburne argues for instance, that: "...in claiming that God
is necessarily the kind of person which he is, the theist claims that God
is a necessarily eternal being. Being what he is, he cannot cease to be.
Clearly, only with a stretched sense of 'person' can the theist
coherently make that claim. But to make this claim is also to make a kind
of claim which is not altogether remote from mundane thinking" op.cit.,
p276).
2. On the paradox of the stone see the following work, which has set the
framework for much of the discussion by writers such as Swinburne and
Mackie: J L Mackie, 'Evil and Omnipotence', Mind. 1955, p209-212;
G Keene's 'A Simpler Solution to the Paradox of Omnipotence', Mind. 1960,
69, p74ff; B Mayo, 'Mr Keene on Omnipotence', Mind. 1961, 70, p249ff;
G Mavrodes, ' Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence, Philosophical Review.
1963, 72, p221-3; A Plantinga, ' Verificationism and Other Atheologica',
God and Other Minds. pl68-173; J Cowan, 'The Paradox of Omnipotence',
Analysis. 1965, 25, pl02~8; C Savage, 'The Paradox of the Stone',
Philosophical Review. 1967, 76, p74-9; in less detail, M Ahern, ' Terms' ,
The Problem of Evil, pi4-15.
In Swinburne's discussion, he notes two positions preliminary to
developing his own. Mayo, Mavrodes, and Plantinga represent the first
(see references above): "Let us take Mavrodes. He argues that God is
omnipotent, presumably by definition. But 'on the assumption that God is
omnipotent, the phrase "a stone is too heavy for God to lift" becomes
self-contradictory' [Mavrodes p222]. Since it is no objection to the
omnipotence of a being that he cannot do self-contradictory things, it is
no objection to his omnipotence that he cannot do this self-contradictory
thing" (CT pl53).
Swinburne follows Savage in arguing: "... the point of the paradox is to
show that the concept of omnipotence is incoherent. It is therefore
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begging the question to assume that a certain person, if he exists, has
that property, whether by definition or not" <CT pl54). Of Savage's
solution: "Wade Savage claims that 'P cannot create a stone which P
cannot lift' does not entail that 'there is at least one task which P
cannot perform'. It might seem that it does. But, it is claimed, this
illusion vanishes on analysis. ' P cannot create stone which P cannot
lift' can only mean 'If P can create a stone, P can lift it'. It is
obvious that the latter statement does not entail that P is limited in
power' (CT ibid - Savage, p77). Swinburne then rejects it CI omit the
details of the argument]. For if we say that if P can create a stone,
then P can subsequently lift it, then this ultimately means that "P
cannot give to any stone which he creates the power to resist subsequent
lifting by P: indeed, that if P does create a stone, he cannot then or
thereafter limit his stone-lifiting powers so as not to be able to lift
that stone, and. . . he cannot commit suicide. So there is a task which P
cannot perform - to make a stone to which he gives the power to resist
subsequent lifiting by himself. That is clearly a task which many
ordinary beings can perform" (CT pl55).
Swinburne follows with a detailed discussion, the kind of thing with
which, arguably, Moltmann will need to become familiar if his
descriptions of theism and its options are not to be unbalanced. The
following is important: "We suppose that P is able to bring about the
existence of a stone endowed with such properties that he cannot
subsequently cause it to rise. What then is the state of affairs which P
is unable to bring about? The rising of the stone 'in question' . But this
needs filling out - the stone needs to be described more fully. Of which
stone is P unable to bring about the rising? 'A stone too heavy for P to
bring about its rising'? But the rising of that stone is a state of
affairs of which the description entails that P did not bring it about
after t. 'The next stone created by P'? There is no reason to suppose
that P will create any more stones, but if he does, there is no reason to
suppose that P will be unable to make them rise. 'The stone created by P
which is too heavy for P to bring about its rising'? There is no reason
to suppose that P will bring about the existence of such a stone; that he
can does not entail that he will. . . Any attempt to describe the state of
affairs which P is allegedly unable to bring about will either lead to
the description of a state which there is no reason to suppose P unable
to bring about, or to a description of a state which entails that he did
not bring it about" (CT pl57).
3. For a reconciliation of an orthodox theists view of God with
Moltmann's theology of the crucified God, see D G Attfield's, 'Can God be
Crucified', SJT. 30, p47-57.
4. See The Coherence of Theism. pl62ff.
5. See M Ahern, The Problem of Evil, p16—18; H J McCloskey, God and Evil.
p46-47; J Hick, Evil and the God of Love. pl2-18 - gives the following
definition which could be argued to be rather open-ended - what if a
particular world was created by satanic forces? Thus: "We have seen that
from our human point of view, unaided by religious faith, the good is
that which we welcome, and the bad that which we would shun. The
analogous theological definition will be in terms of the divine purpose
for the created world. Whatever tends to promote the attainment of that
purpose will be good and whatever tends to thwart it will be bad"
(op.cit., pl5). As I am suggesting that Christian belief involves ideas
such that God is perfectly just, wholly good, and so on, and that this
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means there cannot be divine permittance of ultimate injustices, I would
agree with Hick insofar that anything that actually results in such
injustice is certainly bad. By this stage, one would reasonably doubt
that the world had been created by a perfectly just and wholly good God
(I would agree that there could also be acts and events which would not
amount to ultimate injustices, but which would go against what God
desires most for the world). See also Plantinga's 'The Problem of Evil',
God and Other Minds. pll5ff.
6. It is interesting that Hick and Ahem are of course in agreement here,
but that after offering a summary of Hick's position, Ahern's position,
described earlier, leads him to argue as follows: "This theory shares
with every theory which attempts to justify all evil, the disadvantage
that there is no way of knowing whether it is true. Even when Christian
belief is taken into account, it cannot be shown with certainty what
God's exact plan for the whole world may be. Accordingly, Hick cannot
show that he has correctly outlined it. It is, of course, impossible to
verify the success of any suggested plan" (Ahern, PE, p64). Again, this
suggests difficulty for Christians who want to make the world intellgible
as the world of a wholly good God - a world where many suffer terribly,
and understandably seek intelligibility (of a kind which would convert
their suffering from brute experience with no apparent possible
justification, to a component of a worthwhile world and existence). And
how can we ever know whether we meet a cunnning god, or God, at the
eschaton?
CHAPTER THREE:
1. See R Swinburne's The Coherence of Theism for a major philsophical
discussion of what is involved in the traditional attributes.
H J McCloskey also looks in great detail at theist attributes, and the
consequences of compromise, in chapters four and five of his God and
Evil.
2. Richard Bauckham discusses Dostoyevsky's thinking in his article on
Moltmann and theodicy in Modern Theology. 'Theodicy from Ivan Karamazov
to Moltmann', 4:1, 1987. I believe that his conclusions on both Ivan and
Moltmann can be challenged. He starts by stating that "Moltmann's
response (not solution) to the problem of suffering has two considerable
merits, which are not both to be found in many other recent treatments of
theodicy. In the first place, he responds to the problem of suffering in
the particular shape which it has assumed in the modern period, and
secondly, he responds to it from the resources offered by the
christological centre of historic Christian faith, i.e., from an
incarnational understanding of the cross and resurrection of Jesus
Christ". One thing that should be noted here, is that a response to what
is described as a "characterstically modern perception of the world", is
one which should be judged on whether its arguments are good arguments
vis a vis the problem of evil, rather than contemporary ones.
I shall not reiterate the progress of The Brothers Karamazov. Book Five,
chapters three to five in detail. Ivan rejects classical theodicy with
its aim of justifying evil: "Surely the reason for my suffering was not
that I as well as my evil deeds and sufferings may serve as manure for
some future harmony for someone else. I want to see with my own eyes the
lion lie down with the lion and the murdered man rise up and embrace his
murderer. I want to be there when everyone suddenly finds out what it has
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all been for. All religions on earth are based on this desire, and I am a
believer" (BK, Penguin, 1982, p285-6).
Ivan continues: "But then there are the children, and what am I to do
with them? That is the qustion I cannot answer. . . Listen: if all have to
suffer so as to buy eternal harmony by their suffering, what have the
children to do with it - tell me please? It is entirely incomprehensible
why they, too, should have to suffer and why they should have to buy
harmony by their sufferings. Why should they, too, be used as dung for
someone's future harmony? ... I understand, of course, what a cataclysm
of the universe it will be when everything in heaven and on earth blends
in one hymn of praise. . . Then, indeed, the mother will embrace the
torturer who had her child torn to pieces by his dogs, and all three will
cry aloud: 'Thou art just, 0 Lord!', and everything will be explained.
But there's the rub: for it is that I cannot accept" (ibid).
Bauckham discusses Dostoyevsky's position, and concludes: "Though Ivan,
ironically, for the sake of argument, accepts the existence of the God of
classical theodicy, he finds this God's world morally unacceptable...
therefore he rebels... In the name of justice, he rebels against the God
who can only be justified by calling injustice just" (op. cit p85>. This
is a position Bauckham himself seems to accept. Moving to a discussion of
Camus, Bauckham's main point is to highlight that although Ivan rebels
for the positive reason of humanity and justice, the sentiment that if
God and immortality are no longer believed in, then ' everything would be
permitted' (BK p77), signals the growth of nihilism, and the age of
justification of suffering for human ends. Bauckham argues: "What is
needed is a a basis for Ivan's protest against innocent and senseless
suffering, a basis for rejecting any justification of such suffering,
whether as theodicy or as anthropodicy. How can Ivan's protest be
maintained and not lapse into the cynical terror of the Grand
Inquisitor?" (ibid).
What he does not seem to realise is that such a prominent contributor to
the theodicy debate as J L Mackie has argued that we can make our own
humanist ethics, and that it is possible to do so without lapsing into
"cynical terror". Mackie wrote of H KUng's ethical argument in Does God
Exist: "He concedes... that 'There is in fact what Nietzsche called a
'genealogy of morals''" - that is, that concrete ethical systems have
been developed by a socio-historical process - and that today we have to
'work out "on earth" discriminating solutions for all the difficult
problems. We are responsible for our morality'" (MT, p246, citing KUng,
p469). Mackie continues: "All this is strikingly similar to the main
theme of my Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong [CH.i ] - and, what is more
important, it is in itself an adequate reply to nihilism about value"
(MT, p246). Then: "With comic condescension, Kung allows that 'On the
basis of fundamental trust, even an atheist can lead a genuinely human,
that is, humane, and in this sense moral, life', and that 'Even atheists
and agnostics are not necessarily nihilists, but can be humanists and
moralists'" (MT, p247, KUng, p476). Mackie then criticises KUngs "crucial
step in the direction of theism". In a move which would seem to match
Bauckham's thinking, KUng wrote: "It must now be obvious that the
fundamental trust in the identity, meaningfulness and value of reality,
which is the presupposition of human science and autonomous ethics, is
justified in the last resort only if reality itself - of which man is
also a part - is not groundless, unsupported and aimless" (Kung, p476).
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Bauckham next looks at E Wiesel's loss of faith (op.cit, , p86ff: ref. to
Wiesel's Night. New York, 1960). The key point is, nevertheless, that:
"Wiesel recognizes... that God stands in a dialectical relationship to
the problem of suffering. God is not only the authority over history to
whom the rebel directs his accusation; he also represents and so sustains
the human values which alone keep human beings human in the face of
unacceptable suffering" (op. cit. , p86). Here Bauckham seems to be moving
towards the position of Rolf Gruner in his article "The Elimination of
the Argument from Evil" Theology. 83, 1980, p418ff), where it is seen as
somehow paradoxical that religion relies on that which has been argued to
be incompatible with its being true. As Mackie points out, the paradox
lies "squarely within theism" (Miracle of Theism, p157), and if Bauckham
does accept that no theodicy is possible, then I would argue that this
kind of Christian position is incoherent.
Before looking at Moltmann himself, Bauckham cites Mark 15:34, 37. He
asks what can the significance of this be for our thinking on the deaths
of innocent sufferers? Referring to Camus in Man in Revolt (see his
references), Bauckham points to the problem of accepting Jesus as either
human victim, or divine sanctification of suffering. For "If the cross is
divested of deity, Jesus is just one more victim, protesting his
innocence against divine injustice. If the cross is invested with deity,
it becomes the most effective, but also the most objectionable theodicy,
justifiying suffering and silencing protest" (op.cit. , p89). All in all,
Bauckham succeeds in raising major problems for the Christian who wants
to make sense of what it means to say that God is wholly good and
perfectly just, given the world there is. How does he see Moltmann
overcoming an apparently unsustainable situation?
Bauckham first identifies two requirements which a contemporary response
to the problem of evil must meet. It must not justify innocent and
involuntary suffering. And: "If it is not to justify suffering, it must,
on the contrary, help to maintain the protest against suffering, and
convert it into an initiative for overcoming suffering" (op.cit., p89).
In Moltmann's theology, Bauckham finds these requirements met, not, I
would argue, that this satisfactorily responds to the core issues of the
problem of evil: "the dialectic of cross and resurrection creates a
dialectical concept of divine promise. The God of promise redeems the
world by contradicting it and transcending the contradiction, i.e. he
confronts the world in its godlessness and godforsakenness with the
promise of righteousness and divine presence, and he transcends the
contradiction by recreating the world to accord with the promise. . . The
promise sets believers in contradiction to the state of the world in
which they live. By promising a quite different reality it gives them a
critical distance from reality as it is, and they begin to suffer the
contradiction between the two, as the promise exposes the lack of
righteousness and freedom in the world around them (TH pi 18-19, 222)"
(op.cit. , p90-91).
Bauckham continues: "As a response to the problem of suffering,
therefore, Moltmann is proposing an eschatological theodicy, not in the
sense that suffering will prove justified... but in the sense that God
will finally overcome all suffering... The divine promise gives no
explanation of suffering, but hope for liberation from suffering... By
identifying the divine purpose not with what reality is but with what it
will be - and under the impact of the promise, can to some extent begin
to be - Moltmann in effect aligns the divine purpose with Ivan's protest
against the unacceptable face of present reality" (ibid).
373
The case proceeds with Bauckham emphasising that the special contribution
of The Crucified God is to show how God voluntarily suffers with us.
Thus: "The cross and resurrection represent the opposition between a
reality which does not correspond to God, the world subject to sin,
suffering and death, and a reality which does correspond to God, a new
creation indwelt by God's presence and reflecting his glory...
incarnational Christology means that this dialectic is internal to God's
own experience. . . He is present in his own contradiction - the
godlessness an<j godforsakenness of the cross - because in his love he
embraces the reality which does not correspond to him" (op. cit., p92).
Thus: "A most important point in this argument for our purpose is that on
identifying with the godforsaken the crucified God does not sanction
their suffering as part of his purpose... God's purpose is liberation
from suffering, promised in the resurrection, where God is present in
reality corresponding to him. On the cross he embraces the godforsaken
reality which precisely does not correspond to him" (ibid). Bauckham
concludes his presentation by referring back to his three texts, He feels
Moltmann's position answers the needs they make clear. In relation to the
alternatives of the innocent victim or the sanctifying divine sufferer,
Bauckham sees that Moltmann presents us with an incarnate God who
protests on behalf of innocent sufferers. On Wiesel's experience of the
boy on the gallows, Moltmann can see God there too: "Hence, in Auschwitz
as on the cross, God is present in his own contradiction" (op.cit., p95).
Of Ivan's protest, there is a lengthier discussion.
First, "God is no longer just the heavenly authority whom he accuses, but
also the one who shares his suffering in love and protests with him
against his suffering in love" (ibid). Second, "the crucified God stands
in a dialectical relation to the problem of suffering. He is not only in
some sense responsible for the world which arouses our moral outrage...
he also endorses that protest against himself. This dialectic of divine
responsibility and protest must remain an open dialectic to be resolved
only at the eschaton when suffering is overcome... Meantime, God's
solidarity with the suffering provides a ground for that longing for
divine righteousness from which the protest arises, keeps it from lapsing
into nihilism" (ibid).
In Bauckham's analysis, I think we find the problem clearly set out,
rather than any evidence of its being overcome. Bauckham does not explore
just exactly what is involved in the traditional problem, though he
emphasises the divine responsibility and love which has meant that the
extreme contradiction between the world which exists, and that which will
exist, between reality and God's nature, has been seen as generating a
problem of radical incompatibility. To say that a person responsible for
setting up conditions and possibilities for great and unjustifiable
suffering, can be affirmed as unquestionably loving and just, when they
immolate themselves and rally us to condemn and revile the situation
which they set up, is not a move which resolves any of the traditional
problems. As to the argument on nihilism, it is interesting that some of
the most careful critique of theodicy moves and of Christian theism,
comes from a well known atheist moralist. J L Mackie, among others, did
not need to affirm God, in order to see that there were major moral
issues at the core of the theodicy question: issues which cannot be by¬
passed in the way Bauckham seems to suggest, and which I believe will
lead one to see that saying there is suffering which is ultimately
unjustifiable, is not a move that a person can make, if they wish to say
that the creator of the world is wholly good and perfectly just.
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3. Again, see Attwood: 'Can God be Crucified', SJT. 30, p47-57
4. Grace Jantzen makes a number of interesting observations on Moltmann
and the problem of evil (Kings Theological Review, 5, 1982, pl-7). The
first half of the article deals with Camus on suffering and atheism.
Jantzen states: "The most impressive feature of Moltmann's thought, in my
view, is his refusal to shirk the horrendous facts of human suffering...
and his effort not to pander cheap hope as an antidote to it. Instead, he
meets the protest atheists more than half way, accepting the legitimacy
of their cry for authenticity and their struggle against suffering, and
offering them the despair of Jesus as the grounds for a costly hope..."
(op.cit., p4).
However, Jantzen, rightly in my view, is troubled by the fact that God
has permitted so much suffering in the first instance: "A God who permits
moral enormities is a God who, even if he exists, makes the only possible
response that of Ivan Karamazov - wanting to 'hand back his ticket.' Now
if Moltmann is right, then what he has shown is that God does not sit in
aloof silence from the suffering of this world. God himself becomes
incarnate and suffers with us. Jesus suffers death, despair, and god-
forsakenness on the cross, and the Father takes the suffering into
himself in his grief and anguish at the anguish of the Son. . . This in
itself [would be a great deal!... Yet in the end it leaves us with the
main problem still unanswered: why does God permit the suffering in the
first place? If he is struggling with us in it, then he is not the
monstrous deity which we would have to renounce in the name of decency;
but this is so only if he is doing all he can against evil. Yet evil
continues. Does this mean that God himself is powerless to stop it? If
so, that requires a revision of the concept of God of a magnitude which
Moltmannn has not anticipated, and which undermines the possibility of
hope. If not, if God could prevent evil but does not do so, then are we
not back with the protest atheists? 'The only excuse' for that sort of
half-heartedly struggling God would be 'that he does not exist'"
(op. cit. , p5).
Jantzen re-states the problem: ". . . if God really is doing all he can,
and he is omnipotent, then why does evil remain? The fundamental problem
for a protest atheist is how an omnipotent God who allows such a world
can be believed in; and unless Moltmann is willing to sacrifice the
doctrine of omnipotence, he has not provided an answer to this problem"
(ibid). However, I do not agree that the problem is alive only if we
retain the doctrine of omnipotence. It might be that there is a wholly
good and just God with less than the power to do all that it is logically
possible to do: this God would not be wholly good if a world was created
without pre-conditions, which was a world of unjust suffering arguably
incompatible with what we would expect of a God who is actually wholly
good. Whilst the traditional problem rests on a theism which has God
being wholly good and omnipotent, we can take Moltmann's attack on
omnipotence into account, and still see that the fundamental belief in
God's moral perfection precludes accepting that there can be
compatibility between an ultimately unjustifiable world, and the wholly
good God of Christian belief.
5. At this point we can look at another figure who has taken up what
amounts to this view of the theodicy question. Kenneth Surin holds that
Auschwitz, and many other evils cannot be justified, fitted into any
theodicy; that to do so would be to ignore the "ethical irrationality" of
the world which "subverts all comprehensive schemes that purport to
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explain occurrences of evil in terms of what God is said to 'permit'"
(Surin, Theology and the Problem of Evil, p67). Further, post-Leibnizian
theodicy is heavily criticised for being an "essentially rational or
theoretical enterprise" (op.cit. , pl3). One problem here, is that if
Surin condemns efforts to detect what amounts to moral intelligibility in
the world, any concept of what it would mean to say that this a good and
worthwhile world would also have to be abandoned. Paradoxically, Surin
argues that this "worldly discipline [theodicy], which finds its
authoritative manifestation in common-sense rationalism and empiricism,
would cease to be what it essentially is if it were required to posit a
subject whose self-definition required her to live and think as a servant
of God" (ibid). One concludes then that the theodicist is not thinking as
a servant of God. Hick has made the following observation, one that I
have previously noted, but which has some bearing on this situation.
"Surely if theology is permissible at all, it would be arbitrary to
disallow discussion of the topics that come under the rubric of theodicy:
creation, the relation of human suffering to the will of God, sin and the
fall of man, redemption, heaven and hell. Indeed the objectors are
usually theologians who deal inter alia with these very topics" (EGL p9>.
Thus: "Their objection, then is not to the consideration of these themes
as such, but, presumably, to a consideration of them that results in
theodicy. That is to say, they object to the existence of sin and
suffering being thought about in a way that fails to conflict with belief
in the divine goodness and power" (ibid).
What Surin at one point thinks about the nature of Christian servant-hood
seems to run counter to the implications of references to Spinoza, Hums,
and Kant, who are seen as making it "less easy" for theologians to
explain evil "in terms of a divinely ordained creative process inherent
in nature" (op.cit., p44). Surin argues that theodicy was thus denied a
crucial element of its horizon (a contention which is part of his claim
that theodicy should realise the extent of its historicality and virtual
obscelescence, post-Enlighteninent; its reliance upon a transitory
epistemological framework). Nevertheless, Surin also appears to support
the idea that would seem self-evident to those involved in theodicy, that
God does have a recognisable purpose in history. He denies neither that
the causal agent in creation was God who is wholly good and perfectly
just, and that the total world environment, including human-kind, has its
ultimate basis in this free creative act. Given that this is the basis of
the problem of evil, it is curious that it is written of theodicy, that
it does not: "approach the problem of evil in a way that demands that
this... be seen as a constituent of an all-encompassing theological...
reading of history, [the theodicist]... views history (in its ideal form)
very much as an ahistorical and individualistic quest for logically
stable notions. . . Unlike Augustine, the post-Liebnizian theodicist does
not feel constrained to understand history as anything possessing an
intrinsic thematic importance, let alone as a history which is the work
of the very God who reveals himself in Jesus Christ, and which is a
determining element in the subjects self-definition" (op.cit., pl3).
6. See R Bauckham's Moltmann, Messianic Theology in the Making. p76-84.
7. Bauckham deals once more with the problem of suffering on p84ff of
his Moltmann. The words of Moltmann I have cited, occur in a passage
discussed here by Bauckham. He writes: "... God himself was hanging there
on the gallows. This is true in 'a real, transferred sense' (CG 278)
because of God's act of identification with all abandonment when he hung
on the cross of Christ. 'Even Auschwitz is taken up into the grief of the
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Father, the surrender of the Son and the power of the Spirit* (CG p278).
It would be a mistake to take Moltrnann to mean that the formula 'God in
Auschwitz and Auschwitz in God' is a solution to the 'problem' of
Auschwitz. It is rather like saying that God accepts the problem as his
own, suffers its pain, and thereby sustains hope for the overcoming of
Auschwitz in 'the resurrection of the dead, the murdered and the gassed'
(CG p278>" (Moltrnann. p86). Again, I think this misses the core of the
question of evil.
Bauckham argues: "He [God] does not, like the god of theism, justify
suffering, but he does bear a responsibility for it. There is therefore
some real point in the 'metaphysical rebellion' against God which the
dying Jesus takes up. The cross does not absolve God of responsibility
for suffering. Rather it shows that the one who bears overall
responsibility for this suffering world is on the side those who suffer
to the extent of sharing their pain and adopting their cause" (Moltmann.
p87). In response to Grace Jantzen's questions, of which perhaps the key
one is why does God permit suffering if he can prevent it, it is held:
"It seems to me that Moltmann thinks we really are and must be left with
a residuum of the protest atheist's case... But we need to take account
also of what Moltmann says about the power of God's suffering... The
cross means that instead of overcoming evil by suppressing evildoers, God
overcomes evil by embracing evildoers in his love and bearing the pain"
(Moltmann. p88). So far as I can see, this brings us no nearer an answer
as to why we should believe a world full of injustice the free creation
of a God who is perfectly just and wholly good.
An interesting series of remarks on Moltmann's conception of love appears
to offer a hint of justification for the way the world is, but since
there is evil which can never be justified, this cannot really answer the
vital questions: "In the situation of the crucified God are found the
conditions for a life of unconditional love which is vulnerable and open
to the other. . . In the end The Crucified God is about love: the love
which empties itself in solidarity with others and identifies with what
is alien, which embraces the negative and bears the pain of the negative
and overcomes it... The cross is the event of his suffering love by which
it embraces the world, so that human life can be truly lived in love and
suffering and the struggle against suffering. It does not solve the
problem of suffering, but it meets it with the suffering of love"
(Moltmann p89-90). However, unless there is clarification as to why it is
wrong to ask why is there evil if God permits what he can prevent, and if
it is not incoherent to suggest that he permits that which is
incompatible with perfect justice and goodness (mass ultimately
unjustifiable suffering), this will not do. For it seems that this God
who meets the suffering world of ulimate injustices with suffering love
may be a deeply flawed and limited being.
8. See J O'Donnel, 'The Doctrine of the Trinity in Recent German
Theology, Heythrop Journal. 1982, 23, p16 4: he discusses briefly the
Hegelian implications of the idea that the history of the world can be
identified with the history of God.
9. On the use the of Isaac Lauria's doctrine of zimzum, see Walsh,
op. cit., p72, where it is questioned if this theory is logically
necessary given the structure of reality; also if there is any good
biblical or theological basis.
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10. Brian Walsh has a penetrating discussion of various problems in
Moltrnann's theology of creation: "Theology of Hope and the Doctrine of
Creation: and Appraisal of Jurgen Moltmann", The Evangelical Quaterlv.
59, 1987, p53-76. A particularly interesting point is the following: "It
is significant that Moltmann often refers to Romans 8: 19ff. The creature
groans in earnest expectation.../ It is therefore most revealing that one
finds few references to creation praising God, its Creator in Moltmann's
writings. Could it be that Moltinann's doctrine of creation does not
emphasize the element of creational praise and thanksgiving because he
has ontologically structuralized the directional question of sin, and has
thereby fused creation into the fall?" (op.cit., p65).
CHAPTER FOUR:
1. For an account of Bloch's influence see Bauckham's Moltmann. p7ff.
Bauckham also has an extensive bibliography on the subject. Christopher
Morse also looks at aspects of Bloch's influence: The Logic of Promise in
Moltmann's Theology, p12 — 15, p57-59.
2. Brian Walsh, op.cit., notes this major element of contradiction
between righteousness and reality critically: "Undoubtedly, the weight of
Moltmann's theology falls on the side of the novum, the power of the
future and adventus. Indeed, in Theology of Hope the primary relation
between the future and the present is one of contradiction. Hope reveals
present experience as a 'God-forsaken, transient reality that is to be
left behind'..../ If contradiction is the primary relation of such a
theology to the present, can it ever affirm the present? Moltmann
realizes the problem and attempts to address it as early as the
Introduction to Theology of Hope. But even here we have an affirmation of
the present because the future brings 'to light how open all things are
to the possibilities in which they can and shall live,' coupled with a
warning that 'an acceptance of the present which cannot and will not see
the dying of the present is an illusion and a frivolity...' An
affirmation perhaps, but certainly a guarded one" (Walsh, op. cit., p58:
citing Theology of Hope. p32, his italics)..
3. See C Morse, op. cit. , pl27.
4. Morse, op.cit., pl09ff, has a discussion of the implications for
thought about God of eschatological ontology.
5. C Morse examines the concept of promise in great detail. Page 27ff of
his work noted above, looks at the nature of the divine promise of
righteousness. However, the connection with the problem of evil is not
made.
6. Walsh makes the following reference to L Gilkey's Reaping the
Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation of History. New York, 1979, p235:
"Gilkey argues... that Moltmann's radical view of the novum does not even
serve his own revolutionary political interests because in any effective
revolutionary understanding of history 'the relevant ideal for the future
cannot be understood as utterly new, as a creatio ex nihilo out of the
future, as totally unrelated to the the latent forces or conditions of
past and present.' [Walsh continues himself]... And why should the 'new'
creation be a new thing out of nothing, even for Moltmann. The only
answer we can arrive at is that Moltmann's theology is a form of Spirit
idealism that cannot ultimately affirm creation, regardless of how it may
try" (op.cit. , p59).
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7. Morse discusses this with reference to Georg Picht, whose thought
influenced Moltrnann. Morse holds: "Rather than tailoring the conception
of revelation to fit [the Kantian understanding of experience]...
Moltmann argues that it is the conception of experience instead which is
in need of a theological reformulation.../ the thesis is not that a
dynamic or dialectical ontology is to be preferred over a static or a
transcendental one (though it may well be), but that revelation must
itself be allowed to define the boundaries of experience" (op.cit.,
p88>.
8. B Walsh criticises Moltmann*s ambiguity on the subject of the
openness and closedness of the world: op.cit., p56-57.
CHAPTER FIVE:
1. For a survey of Moltmann's thinking on theology of hope and political
theology, referring in part to Theology of Hope. and Religion.
Revolution, and the Future, though not covering the problem of evil in
that particular discussion, see R Bauckham's Moltmann: Messianic Theology
on the Making. pp22-49.
2. See again B Walsh on the problem of what Moltmann means by openness
(with reference to Moltmann's The Experiment Hope. trans. Meeks,
Philadelphia, 1975). "Moltmann's position is... ambiguous when he
says... that the power of the future 'is not identical with the power of
present reality or of the future's open possibility.' This seems to be in
direct contradiction with his 'ontology of possibility' discussed a mere
ten pages earlier, where he explicitly understands reality in terms of
the 'realization of possibility' and calls for 'an ontology of that which
is not yet but is possible or stands in possibility'" (op. cit. , p57).
3. In the survey article ' Revolution as an Issue in Theology: Jtirgen
Moltmann' , Restoration Quarterly. 1983, 26, pl05-120, Ben Wiebe
principally discusses Moltmann's attitudes to just war, and violent and
non-violent action in revolution. The article does not deal with the
ever-present question of evil; how the way Moltmann portrays a radically
deficient world ultimately in need of replacement rather than revolution
might well exacerbate problems over the compatibility of God and the
world.
4. On the image of guilt hurling humanity into transience, and its
vagueness, in a brief review article for RS, dealing in part with Hope
and Planning. A D Galloway compared Moltmann unfavourably with Pannenberg
in one respect: "Pannenberg is more sober and, when he is driven to the
use of metaphor, is inclined to take cognisance of the fact and to ask
questions about the logical status of what he is saying". More
encouragingly, Pannenberg and Moltmann together are considered as setting
out "a programme rich with promising suggestions. . " RS, 8, pp368-9.
CHAPTER SIX:
1. Bauckham offers an analysis of The Crucified God in chapter three of
his Moltmann. However, I disagree with his approach to Moltmann's
handling of theodicy.
2. Adorno, Negative Dlalektik, 1966. ET, Negative Dialectics. trans.
E B Ashton.
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3. References to M Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie I, and II, 1968.
Bauckham briefly discusses the Horkheimer contribution in Moltmann.
p81f f.
4. See Religion. Revolution, and the Future. pl59ff.
5. On this particular statement of dialectical principles see also R
Bauckham's critical discussion in "Moltmann1 s Eschatology of the Cross",
SJT. 30, p304ff. Bauckham takes the issue up again in his Moltmann. p68-
72. He explains the passage in a manner where it is hard to distinguish
it from the basis for a theodicy of sorts (it certainly puts
responsibility of some kind onto God, and invites a critical analysis of
what love which propagates injustices to survive might be); "God is
revealed in his opposite because he is love which identifies with what is
alien to him and finds his identity in self-emptying solidarity with
others... The love of God is most powerful in the helplesness of the
cross; the righteousness of God is the righteousness of his unconditional
love in justifying those whom the law condemns" (Moltmann. p69-70)
6. For an enthusiastic discussion of Moltmann's theology of
contradiction, not however dealing with the implications for the theodicy
problem, see J Irish's article ' Moltmann's Theology of Contradiction',
Theology Today. 32, p21ff. Irish emphasises God's contradiction of death
and misery in a manner which arguably begs the question of why they were
permitted a presence in his world; "Moltmann's understanding of the
resurrection never operates as a denial or an evasion of death. In his
interpretation of the passion narratives, death is seen as irrevocable
ending and loss" (op.cit. , p24).
7. Moltmann cites the following passage from Beyond Good and Evil. Ill,
46; "Modern men, with their obtuseness as regards all Christian
nomenclature, no longer have the sense for the terribly superlative
conception which was implied to an antique taste by the paradox of the
formula, 'God on the cross'. Hitherto there had never and nowhere been
such boldness in inversion, nor anything at once so dreadful, questioning
and questionable as this formula: it promised a transformation of all
ancient values" (Hollingdale translation modified - Penguin).
8. J 0'Donnel touches on the question of Hegelianisrn in Moltmann's
theology in his article "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Recent German
Theology", Hevthrop Journal. 1982, 23, pl64. He is satisfied with
Moltmann's distancing, and doctrine of divine freedom. On the question of
divine freedom though, B Walsh is less happy (in his discussion of God's
freedom in creation); "Moltmann may be proposing a dialectical
understanding of freedom and necessity but the weight of the argument
falls heavily on the necessity side of the dialectic" (op. cit., p71 -
Walsh is referring to passages in God in Creation tin the section "God's
Determination of Himself to be Creator", p82, p851 and The Trinity and
the Kingdom of God tin the section "God is Love", p58~91 -).
9. On the question of absence of relationship see George Hunsingers
suggestion that: "In this act what occurs is the absolute separation of
being. The separation of being is overcome through the life-giving act of
the Spirit. But in this conceptuality (especially in view of Moltmann's
polemic against monotheism), the result seems to be three Gods, separate
in being, yet united in intention. The unity of the Trinity seems to be
volitional, but not ontological" (Hunsinger: "The Crucified God and the
Political Theology of Violence, Hevthrop Journal. 1973, 14, p278).
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10. Abraham Heschel (1907 Reference is made to Heschel's, The
Prophets. New York, 1962. Bauckharn refers to Moltrnann's use of Heschel's
concept of divine pathos in Moltmann, p!04ff.
11. Wiesel continues with the words: "That night the soup tasted of
corpses": Night. New York, Avon Books, 1969, p76. R McAfee Brown explores
Wiesel's testimony and loss of faith in his book Elie Wiesel: Messenger
to All Humanity (Notre Dame, 1983).
On the passage cited by Moltmann A R Eckardt writes: "Part of the famous
episode from Night is reproduced... a voice whispers that God is
hanging on the gallows. Moltmann offers the response, 'Any other answer
would be blasphemy. There cannot be any other Christian answer to the
question of this torment' [ Eckardt's emphasis]. But why has the word
'Christian' been inserted here? The sufferer was a Jew. Further, the
voice giving the answer is that of a Jew. However, a much more shattering
consideration is involved: It may be asked why the section, 'The fullness
of life in the trinitarian history of God,' is given a location
immediately after the story from Night...? An element of 'blasphemy'
appears, however unintended this may be" (A R Eckardt, "Jurgen Moltmann,
the Jewish People, and the Holocaust", Journal of the American Academy of
Religion. 1976, 44, p683).
12. J Miguez Bonino makes a number of remarks on these vicious circles:
Revolutionary Theology Comes of Age, London, SPCK, 1975. Although not
concerned with Moltmann's pessimistic view of liberation possibilities
this side of the new creation, or with the question of evil, the
criticism is directed at the generally rather vague way in which human
existence and suffering is analysed and described in Moltmann's theology,
a feature which causes problems for detailed discussion of the theodicy
problem. Bonino refers to Moltmann's understanding that:
"we will find God's action in the concrete and the historical. But, if
this is so, should we also not recognize that it is impossible to reflect
on a political theology of the cross without resorting to a historical
and concrete way of understanding that 'sacrament' [history]? Can we
remain satisfied with a general description of 'demonic circles of
death,' without trying to understand them in their unity, their roots,
their dynamics, i.e. , without giving a coherent socio-analytical account
of this manifold oppression? Are we not taking lightly the stark
historical reality of the cross when we satisfy ourselves with an
impressionistic description of man's alienation and misery? In other
words, it seems that, if theology means to take history seriously, it
must incorporate - with all necessary caveats - a coherent and all-
embracing method of sociopolitical analysis. Moltmann does not seem to be
conscious of this need" (op.cit., pl47).
CHAPTER SEVEN:
1. Bauckham offers a critical survey of Moltmann's Trinitarian thinking
up to and including The Church in the Power of the Spirit, in his book
Moltmann. chapter four.
2. For instance, Bushnell (1802-76: an American and Congregationalist)
writes: "In what is called His vicarious sacrifice, Christ, as we have
seen, simply fulfills what belongs universally to love... Vicarious
sacrifice then will not be a point where He is distinguished from his
followers, but the very life to which he restores them, in restoring them
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to God" (op. cit. , p66). And: "What is the sacrifice that must not be
vicarious sacrifice, but a virtue that has even lost connection with
Christian ideas? It is mere self-abnegation, a loss made for the simple
sake of losing, and no such practical loss as love encounters, in gaining
or serving an enemy... Sacrifice out of love, or because a full heart
naturally and freely takes on itself the burdens and woes of others, has
a positive character, and is itself the most intensely positive exercise
that can be conceived" (op. cit. , p70).
3. But what question precisely is this? Not, I think, that which is
debated 'conventionally'. If it were, the simple promise that things will
be compatible or expressive of God's perfect righteousness in the future,
would not suffice as a response.
4. Bauckham writes on D Sdlle's idea (Suffering., London, 1975), that
Moltmann's Father is the God of theism: "'the ruling, omnipotent Father'
[Suf fering p26-71 who deliberately causes the suffering and death of
Christ. He is therefore identified, not with the victims, but with their
executioners . In reply it must be said that this is plainly not
Moltmann's intention. The Father's surrender of the Son to death is an
act of suffering love for the world... The cross is not just the Son's
but God's act of loving solidarity with the godless and the godforsaken,
in which the Son suffers the pain of identification with the godforsaken
and the Father suffers his Son's identification with their fate. The
cross shows not just the crucified Son, but the trinitarian God not to be
the god of theism who presides invulnerably over a suffering world"
(Bauckham, Moltmann. p86-7). However, by shifting attention from the
Father and the Son as individuals as it were, to the trinitarian God,
this only emphasises difficulties in understanding the nature of God's
love and justice. Do we wish to share in the reality of this arguably
bizarre family concept of love?
CHAPTER EIGHT:
1. For a critique of Moltmann's theology of creation see Walsh, op. cit,
2. Barth's position seems to me to be an attempt to place fundamental
evil outside of God's intent (CD, III/3, p304: "Here we can see what
nothingness is. . . Here we can see that it is an antithesis not only to
God's whole creation but to the Creator Himself. What challenged Him and
provoked His wrath, what made Him come forth as the Judge, and what made
Him yield to nothingness in order to overcome it, was obviously nothing
that He Himself had chosen, willed or done"), failing though to answer
the question of responsibility (op. cit., p302: "... it is in opposition
primarily and supremely to God Himself, and therefore necessarily and
irrevocably to all His works and creation. Yet God Himself comprehends,
envisages and controls it"). However, whilst some of the questions we may
want to ask of Barth are similar to those we need to ask of Moltmann,
there is a great difference in their positions.
Barth affirms that the shadow-side is good: "It is true that in
creaturely existence, and especially in the existence of man, there are
hours, days and years both bright and dark, success and failure, laughter
and tears, youth and age, gain and loss, birth and sooner or later its
inevitable corollary, death. It is true that individual creatures and men
experience these things in most unequal measure, their lots being
assigned by a justice which is curious or very much concealed. Yet it is
irrefutable that creation and creature are good" (op.cit. , p297: by
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itself this can be seen as a fairly comprehensive acceptance of all kinds
of human suffering and misfortune. Barth does not make clear what can be
attributed specifically to the shadow-side, or to the effect of das
Nichtige). He also proclaims that: "As God is Lord on the left hand as
well, He is the basis and Lord of nothingness too C das Nichtige being
referred to here]. Consequently it is not adventitious. It is not a
second God, nor self-created, it has no power save that which is allowed
by God. . . Even on His left hand the activity of God is not in vain. He
does not act for nothing. His rejection, opposition, negation and
dismissal are powerful and effective like all His works because they,
too, are grounded in Himself, in the freedom and wisdom of his election"
(op.cit. , p351-2). I do not find any evidence that Barth thinks that even
with the chaos contributed by das Nicht ige, creation is a realm of
ultimate, irresolvable injustice in the sense that Moltmann is willing
to accept. Therefore, whilst questions of divine responsibility and power
are raised, Barth avoids the problem of claiming that the consequences of
God's action on the left hand run to such things as permanent injustices
on a massive scale.
3. As I have noted, Walsh calls into question the need for this model of
creation, op.cit.
4. A startling contrast with Moltmann's theology of the deficiency of
world reality comes in Gerard Manley Hopkins well known poem "God's
Grandeur" (The New Oxford Book of English Verse. London, 1975):
THE world is charged with the grandeur of God.
It will flame out, like shining from shook foil;
It gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil
Crushed. Why do men then now not reck his rod?
Generations have trod, have trod, have trod;
And all is seared with trade; bleared, smeared with toil;
And wears man's smudge and shares man's smell: the soil
Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod.
And for all this, nature is never spent;
There lives the dearest freshness deep down things;
And though the last lights off the black West went
Oh morning, at the brown brink eastward springs -
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.
5. The following extracts from S J Gould's Wonderful Life: The Burgess
Shale and the Nature of History, represent a challenging view of our
status in the universe. Moltmann is not alone in taking an optimistic
view of evolution as encouraging ever greater possibilities for diversity
and expressing a divine purposiveness in what comes to be. By contrast,
Gould's appraisal is based on a new emphasis on contingency. The Burgess
Shale has provided glimpses of complex creatures of the Cambrian life-
explosion, most of which represent 'rational* designs no longer with us
even in variagated forms. This is argued to be the consequence of events
such as sudden environmental change - rather than of inevitable
displacement by 'higher' types. :
"In its conventional intepretation, the cone of diversity propagates an
interesting conflation of meanings. The horizontal dimension shows
diversity - fishes plus insects plus snails plus starfishes at the top
take up much more lateral room than just flatworms at the bottom, But
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what does the vertical dimension represent? In a literal reading, up and
down should record only younger and older in geological time: organisms
at the neck of the funnel are ancient; those at the lip recent. But we
also read upward movement as simple to complex, or primitive to advanced.
Placement in time is conflated with judgement of worth" (op.cit., p39).
According to Gould, the reality is that: "Life is a copiously branching
bush, continually pruned by the grim reaper of extinction, not a ladder
of predictable progress..." (p35). And: "If mammals had arisen late and
helped to drive dinosaurs to their doom, then we could legitimately
propose a scenario of expected progress. But dinosaurs remained dominant
and probably became extinct only as a quirky result of the most
unpredictable of all events - a mass dying triggered by extra-terrestrial
impact. If dinosaurs had not died in this event, they would probably
still dominate the domain of large-bodied vertebrates... and mammals
would still be small creatures in the interstices of their world" (p318).
Thus: "we are an improbable and fragile entity, fortunately succesful
after precarious beginnings as a small population in Africa, not the
predictable result of a global tendency. We are a thing, an item of
history, not an embodiernent of general principles. . . Run the tape again,
and let the tiny twig of Homo sapiens expire in Africa. Other hominids
may have stood on the threshold of what we know as human possibilities,
but many sensible scenarios would never generate our level of mentality.
Run the tape again, and this time Neanderthal perishes in Europe and Homo
erectus in Asia (as they did in our world). The sole surviving human
stock, Homo erectus in Africa, stumbles along for a while, even prospers,
but does not speciate, and therefore remains stable. A mutated virus then
wipes Homo erectus out, or a change in climate reconverts Africa into
inhospitable forest. One little twig on the mammalian branch, a lineage
with interesting possibilities that were never realized, joins the vast
majority of species in extinction" (p319).
CHAPTER NINE:
1. 'Foundationalism'. For an account of what is involved in the
'foundationalist' position see the critique by Alvin Plantinga, "Is
Belief in God Rational": C F Belaney Ed., Rationality and Religious
Belief. Notre Dame, 1979, p7ff.
2. Reference to Plantinga's discussion of proper basicality in "Reason
and Belief in God": A Plantinga and N Wolterstorff Ed., Faith and
Rationality. Notre Dame, 1983, see p76. The critique of proper basicality
begins on p55.
3. On the subject of theology as world picture and language-game, and
Phillip's debt to Wittgenstein see for instance chapter five of Phillip's
Faith After Foundationalism. p54ff.
4. Bauckharn accepts that Moltmann is "indebted" to Hegel. In his
Moltmann. pl06-110, he writes: "His trinitarian dialectic is certainly
Hegelian in structure.... but not necessarily therefore entirely Hegelian
in content... The charge which Moltmann is most anxious to deflect is
that of making evil necessary for the sake of good..., since it is
essential to his approach to theodicy that evil must not be explained and
thereby justified. But Moltmann's most extreme statements about the
meaning of the cross - as the self-constitution of the Trinity. . . make
this difficult, whether these statements are understood, in the most
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Hegelian and perhaps the most obvious reading of The Crucified God, as
meaning that in the event the cross God becomes Trinity, or in a less
intelligible way as suggesting that the temporal event of the cross
constitutes God's trinitarian being from eternity. In either case,
godlesness, godforsakenness and death are necessary to the dialectic
which constitutes God's trinitarian being, so that either evil is
necessary or God's trinitarian being is contingent on unnecessary evil"
(Moltmann. pl07-8).
I do not think that Bauckham is entirely convinced by his own
explanation of how this is not really true of Moltmann's theology. He
continues: "Moltmann avoids this dilemma only by retreating from the
position, if he really ever intended it, that God is Trinity only through
the cross. Instead, he gives the cross a central but not uniquely
determinative place in God's trinitarian history. Already in 1973, he
raises the possibility that. ' the eternal generatlo filii' could be the
prior condition in God for the derelictio lesu on the cross, so that
God's history has a trinitarian origin before the cross, just as it has a
trinitarian goal at the eschaton (The Future of Creation. London, SCM,
1979, p74-5>.
But the problem returns through the back door: "Pursuing this thought
enables Moltmann still to maintain a sense in which the cross is
constitutive for the trinitarian relationships even, so to speak,
retroactively in God's eternity (cf. TKG 161). If God as he has always
been in eternity corresponds to God as he is in the event of the cross,
then suffering love must characterise the eternal trinitarian
relationships in the sense that 'God's essence is from eternity a love
which is capable of suffering, ready to sacrifice and to give itself up'
[reference to Jewish Monotheism and Christian Trinitarian Doctrine.
Philadelphia, 1981, p54, and Biskussion uber Jiirgen Moltmanns Buch 'Per
gekreuzigte Gott' . Munich, 1979, pl79-803. In this sense, the Lamb was
slain from the foundation of the world... So far, if Moltmann means that
God is such that, if and when his love is contradicted, he will suffer,
the contingency of evil is preserved. But when he later puts it more
strongly - that 'the Son's acrifice of boundless love on Golgotha is from
eternity already included in the exchange of the essential, the
consubstantial love which constitutes the divine life of the Trinity'
(TKG 168), so that 'the pain of the cross determines the inner life of
the triune God from eternity to eternity' (TKG 161) - we seem to be back
with the original problem. If this does not make evil necessary, the
contingent evil not only affects God in the course of his trinitarian
history (cf. Future of Creation 77), but essentially determines his inner
life from eternity. This conclusion results from the temptation, which
Moltmann from the Crucified God onwards seems unable to resist, to see
the cross as the key to the doctrine of God, not only in the sense that
it reveals God as the kind of love which is willing to suffer, but in the
sense that the actual sufferings of the cross are essential to who God
is. This attempt to take God's temporal experience as seriously as
possible oddly ends by eternalising it" (Moltmann. pl08-9).
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